By Daniel Clark, 21st December 2025
I recently observed a case in the Court of Protection which (as many such cases do) raises significant issues of legitimate public interest.
- Challenges with residence and care for a disabled person: The protected party, P, is living in what was intended as his “forever home”, but the public body who commissions his care now say he must move. The property may be unsafe, and the relationship between landlord and freeholder is said to have irretrievably broken down. It’s a sadly familiar story that speaks to the unstable and fragile position that people who receive care are in. Family members disagree with each other about whether or not that move is in P’s best interests. The hunt for a new property will likely not be easy – only 22% of houses built since 2022 meet government-defined guidelines of properties that are accessible or adaptable[1].
- Court-ordered restrictions on contact between family members and penal notices: There are contact restrictions between P and one of his relatives (I’ll refer to that relative as “Relative A”.) These restrictions were, and I think still are, endorsed by a penal notice, meaning that breaching them could result in an application to commit Relative A to prison. Some Court of Protection lawyers report that contact restrictions and committal proceedings against family members are rare – but we see them very regularly, and one solicitor tells us that contact disputes arise in around 30-40% of her cases. Contact restriction engage Article 8 (right to family life) issues and are clearly of legitimate public interest.
I’d like to say more about both these matters and how they’ve arisen and developed in this particular case. especially the contact restrictions which have a long history already in the public domain – both in a blog post published by the Open Justice Court of Protection Project, and in a published judgment by a (different judge) in the Court of Protection.
But I can’t full publish a fuller account of the issues in this case because the Transparency Order prevents me from publishing anything “that identifies or is likely to identify … that any person is a member of the family of the subject of these proceedings….” (§6(i)(b)). That covers Relative A – and, in the specific circumstances of this case, anything that connects my report of these proceedings to the previous blog post or (especially) to the previously published judgment, would be very “likely” to identify Relative A. In fact, the published judgment names Relative A.
Any of the following would enable a sufficiently interested person to locate the judgment naming Relative A.
- The case number. A simple search for the case number in either the National Archives, BAILII, or our blog index reveals the judgment naming Relative A.
- The public body involved in the case – for the same reasons as above.
- The judge’s name. A search of this judge’s name will make it highly like that you could identify the previous judgment.
- The date of the hearing that this blog is about. With this knowledge, it would be fairly easy to look back through court listings and find the case, including its case number and the name of the judge.
- The particular court in which this case was heard: Again, this is distinctive enough that the path to discovering the information I cannot disclose would be a fairly short one for anyone determined to uncover it.
- Certain facts about the history of this case. A reasonably well-informed person would recognise those facts, and make the connection with information that is already lawfully in the public domain, enabling them to locate the published judgment naming Relative A.
Some people may think I’m being overly cautious. Indeed, the judge hearing this case thinks that I could report the case number without breaching the Transparency Order, and told me as much. But as I’ve said above, the case number provides a really easy and straightforward way to locate the published judgment that uses Relative A’s name.
A Transparency Order is endorsed by a penal notice. If I publish any information that “identifies, or is likely to identify” the information I cannot share, then I could be found to be in contempt of court. I could be fined, have my assets seized, or even be sent to prison for up to two years. It’s a scary and unsettling prospect.
So, I might be being over-cautious. But knowing that I could have been over-cautious, and chose not to be – on the word of a judge who might not have fully understood the implications – will be small comfort if I were subsequently found to be in contempt of court, and sent to prison.
This blog is in three parts. First, I’ll give a history of this case. Second, I’ll explain the court’s consideration of P’s residence (his is the only section of the blog where redactions are minimal). Finally, I’ll explain the submissions about contact restrictions so far as I can.
The history of this case
This case (COP [case number redacted]) has been heard by the judge I can’t name, sitting at the hearing centre I can’t name, for a number of years that I can’t specify. There is a previously published judgment that I can’t refer you to.
In a year I can’t tell you, P moved to his current residence (Residence A). For all intents and purposes, it was intended to be his forever home.
This year, the public body re-issued proceedings. They now apply for an order that authorises P’s move from Residence A to a new residence. I call it Residence B but the new residence hasn’t actually been identified yet. This is on the grounds that the property is unsafe, and the relationship with the landlord and leaseholder has irretrievably broken down.
Residence
At the hearing on the day I can’t report, the judge whose name I can’t report first had to consider residence arrangements.
The public body told the court that it appears that notice is going to be given for P to vacate the property. The public body seeks declarations that is in P’s best interests for a property search to begin. While they are keen to ensure some continuity in the care provider, counsel told the court: “[the public body] is trying to approach this very realistically, and is conscious there is a limit of properties, inquiries are ongoing with a great deal of determination and focus. But being aware as to the general lack of properties, specifically properties to meet [P’s] needs, in a desirable location which will assist the family to visit – the [public body] does consider those investigations need to be begin now, and as soon as an alternative is found a transition needs to start”.
The judge was evidently not happy about this: “At the first hearing once the proceedings were reinstated, I made very clear my grave concerns that P is [the sound wasn’t very good here so I’m not sure what the judge said]. It took an awful long time to find [Residence A] and that was going to be his permanent home. I again want to express my grave disappointment that [P] is going to have to move again”.
The difficulties with finding an appropriate new house for P to live in should not be under-stated. As referenced in the introduction to this blog, there is a significant lack of accessible or adaptable properties. Successive governments have known about the issue, and successive governments have “dropped the ball”.
Relative A, a litigant-in-person, was also not happy about this turn of events, and made it very clear. Relative A’s position is that there is no rush for P to move, and they described the public body’s approach: “They kept assuring not only me but everybody that this is the best option for him…it’s his best interests. It seems the definition of best interests for [P] is what suits [the public body] rather than him – because he was never taken into account”.
At this point, Relative A raised an issue that I can’t tell you about because of the Transparency Order.
Relative A also disputed that the relationship between the landlord and freeholder has broken down, submitting that there is no evidence of this, and describing some of the emails (I’m not sure between whom) as “mumbo jumbo”.
In brief, Relative A disputed the validity of the claims that P had to move, and wants P to stay where he is. However, counsel for the public body identified something of a tension in Relative A’s position: “Although [Relative A] has made it clear to us that [they] would wish [P] to stay in the current placement as long as possible, [they] consider there should not be a rush [to move him out], which is a slightly contradictory position. The [public body] is desperate not to find itself in a crisis situation”.
I don’t think this is a contradictory position. In fact, Relative A was fairly clear that their position was that P ought not to move, that there was no need for P to move, and that the application to move him was being rushed.
Another family member in court (Relative B) also didn’t want P to move “because no change is good for him” but conceded that P may have to move – so long as the new residence was in travelling distance, and the current care provider stayed the same. That being said, Relative B also wanted evidence “that it is not safe for [P] to stay any longer”.
Counsel for the Official Solicitor submitted that the court should make declarations that Residence A is no longer viable, that in principle it is in P’s best interests to move, and the property search should commence.
In an ex-tempore judgment, the judge again repeated that “when [P] moved to [Residence A] all parties were of the view that [Residence A] was going to be his permanent home.”
The judge nevertheless found that it is in P’s best interests to move. Given the scope of the court’s jurisdiction, it is difficult to see how a different decision could have been reached. At the same time, it is difficult (in fact, nigh on impossible) to reconcile this as being in P’s best interests.
The judge also declined to restrict the search such that only properties where the same care provider could be retained should be chosen. However, if two properties were found, and the care provider could only continue to work at one of them, “it will be difficult to persuade me that the better option is the one where they can’t”.
Contact restrictions
Relative A is the subject of contact restrictions with P and had made a written application for daily video contact with P – indicating,verbally in court, a further request that “I would like to ask you to restore it to the way it was”.
The judge was not willing to entertain this application for reasons that I cannot tell you because to do so would be “likely to identify” the information, lawfully in the public domain, that I can’t report. The Transparency Order severely limits what I can report of the exchange between Relative A and the judge.
Here’s what I can report. The references to misleading the court relate to a submission at an earlier hearing that daily video contact was already taking place. This is untrue, and counsel for the public body had apologised.
Relative A: That’s another example of misleading the court….the fact they always say, whatever [care provider] tell them, and present it without checking it first, and they present it in a statement to the court – it’s not professional, it’s ridiculous to be honest. They put me in a position in front of you as if I am lying. They apologise to the court but didn’t apologise to me….It seems it is simple for them to do whatever they want…It doesn’t work like this. These are professional people who should act professionally. Then we hear false claims, similar to [Relative B] who says the video calls are disturbing…I’m the one who has the evidence. He’s very happy with it. Where are they getting this information? How dare they lie to the court in front of the judge, none of them are true. They put me in a position to defend myself, to divert the court’s attention from other issues…They need to provide evidence I’ve been giving emails daily to ICB. And evidence from [Relative B] how does [Relative B] know the video calls are disturbing him? Let [Relative B] provide some evidence of that. [Relative B] has never seen a video call. It’s getting really annoying. [further explanation REDACTED].
Judge: Do you want to tell me why it’s in his best interests to have daily video calls?
Relative A: He calms down straight away, when I ask him to go to sleep, he goes to sleep [further response REDACTED].
Judge: [Question REDACTED].
Relative A: [Reply REDACTED].
Judge: [REDACTED].
Relative B opposed Relative A’s application. Relative B did think the daily video calls would be distressing. There is another reason why the judge and Relative B take this position but I can’t tell you what it is.
The position of both the Official Solicitor and the public body was that the application should be dismissed – but the Official Solicitor would endorse a review of the contact restrictions following the move to Residence B.
Ultimately the judge dismissed the application on two grounds. One was that the contact between various members of P’s family is “balanced”, and any change to the current arrangements could be disruptive to that. As to the other reason, I can’t tell you because of the prohibitive Transparency Order that, either by accident or design, means I cannot report information that is lawfully in the public domain.
This case will return to court on a day I can’t tell you before a judge I can’t name. To find the case, you’ll need to look at the listings for a hearing centre I can’t tell you, and ask to observe the case by reference to case number that I can’t give you.
Unless, of course, the judge grants my application for the Transparency Order to be varied.
Daniel Clark is a member of the core team of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project. He is a PhD student in the Department of Politics & International Relations at the University of Sheffield. His research considers Iris Marion Young’s claim that older people are an oppressed social group. It is funded by WRoCAH. He is on LinkedIn, X @DanielClark132 and Bluesky @clarkdaniel.bsky.social.
[1] With thanks to Gill Loomes-Quinn for pointing me in the direction of research about access to accessible and adaptable properties. For the avoidance of doubt, I did not breach the Transparency Order in asking for Gill’s help. She knows nothing about this case beyond what is in this blog.
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