“Paid to be family”: Do Shared Lives schemes engage Article 8 rights?

By Celia Kitzinger, 15th November 2026

The protected party at the centre of this case (COP 20017600 before Mr Justice Poole sitting remotely in the Royal Courts of Justice on 14th October 2026) is a young man in his twenties whose diagnoses include severe learning disability, autism, global developmental delay, microcephaly, spinal stenosis and epilepsy. He requires 24/7 care and support.

But something has gone badly wrong. In May 2025, he was removed from their care and placed with different Shared Lives carers. Mr and Mrs B have not seen him since. They don’t know where he is now living.  They received a letter from the Shared Lives agency saying they have no right to contact P and should not do so. Earlier in the proceedings, a different judge made a ‘no contact’ order.  There are safeguarding enquiries underway, and a police investigation. Mrs B has been suspended as a Shared Lives carer and recently had her registration removed.

Mrs B has applied to the court for:

(1) P’s return to live at home with her and her husband

(2) contact between P and herself (and her husband I think) until he does return home

and

(3) appointment as his Welfare Deputy.

Prior to this hearing, there had been a closed hearing on application from the local authority, heard by Mr Justice Poole on 6th August 2026, at which a temporary closed material order was made (i.e., information before all the other parties is not to be disclosed to Mrs B).[1] I haven’t observed any of these earlier hearings.

There are many complex issues in this case I’m struggling to understand – partly  because of the closed hearing(s) and closed materials, but also because the parties failed to submit the case summary, chronology and list of issues before the court (the so-called “Gardner” documents) mandated at Practice Direction 4B para.4.2(a)-(c) COPR 2017. They also refused to disclose their position statements. See my “Postscript” about the transparency failure this represents. The absence of any documentation[2] means that access to the hearing achieved transparency more in form than in substance, and this is obviously reflected in my reporting of it.

In this blog post, I’ll first describe as accurately as I can what happened during the hearing,[3] and then reflect on an issue that may or may not turn out to be something the judge needs to decide, but which attracted my attention as an apparently contested matter in this case: whether the Article 8 right to respect for private and family life applies to people who are effectively “paid to be family” (as counsel for the local authority described Shared Lives carers).

1. Hearing of 14th October 2026

According to her counsel (Brett Davies of Spire Barristers), Mrs B’s principal concern is to get P home. It became apparent that the judge wouldn’t be in a position to make a decision about that until the safeguarding investigations are complete. 

In this hearing, the judge made directions about the evidence he needed to make residence decisions in the long-term, and then focussed on the issue of interim contact, i.e. whether, and how, Mr and Mrs B could see P over the course of the next six months or so while the safeguarding investigation is ongoing. The judge also made a declaration that P was not deprived of his liberty in his current Shared Lives placement.

Mrs B’s application to become P’s Welfare Deputy was deferred because (said the judge) there was no immediate need for a Deputyship while P’s welfare is before the court.  Her counsel said that the Deputyship application was in any case  “not high on Mrs B’s list” and came about because (when unrepresented) “… she didn’t know what to do to and made that application to get the matter before the court”.  Her priority was, and remains, getting P back home.

I will cover first directions about residence and contact, and then the DOLS.

Directions on residence and contact

The question of long-term residence and contact would have to wait until the outcome of the safeguarding investigation, projected to be six months hence. 

In response to the judge’s question of whether P’s return home is being pursued (given that it may no longer be lawful to place him with Mrs B, given that she’s been deregistered as a Shared Lives carer), Brett Davies said unhesitatingly that indeed it was:  “Yes, it’s being pursued. As set out in my Position Statement, my client sees P as part of the family, as he has been for almost 17 years. He has established relationships with [name] and other family members, family in inverted commas, who reside in that household. The Official Solicitor’s Position Statement was only circulated at 9.30 this morning but calls for a detailed response.” 

I do not have the Position Statement to which Brett Davies referred, so I do not know the details of the argument on which the Official Solicitor relies, but I got some sense of what it must be that the Official Solicitor is arguing from what Brett Davies said next:

“In the time available to me, I have discovered that the Health and Social Care Act 2026[4] says at paragraph 58 that “a family relationship includes a relationship between 2 persons who (a) live in the same household and (b) treat each other as though they were family members of the same family’.  In my submission, that definition is enough to defeat the argument of the Official Solicitor.  P would, if placed back, fall within that definition of a family relationship, living in the same household and treating each other as family. Mr and Mrs B have Article 8 rights. […] The obvious inference is that it is NOT unlawful for P to be placed in the care of Mr and Mrs B.”

Considering the issue of interim contact, the judge asked counsel for the local authority, Shadia Doerfel, for their position about various options. Could remote contact be considered if it were possible that P might be able to benefit from that? Could face-to-face contact be supported in a public space, such as a park? He asked her to consider this “against the background that he’s lived with this family for many years”. 

“They were paid to be his family”, said Shadia Doerfel.

“That is, if I may say so, a slightly insensitive remark”, replied the judge.

Sadia Doerfel did not engage with the judge’s assessment of her remark and merely reiterated that the local authority does not consider returning P to live with Mr and Mrs B to be an option at all.

Counsel for the Official Solicitor, Oliver Lewis of Doughty Street, suggested that the court might adjourn for six months pending the outcome of the safeguarding investigation and then “issue an order though a parallel closed material process”.  His view was that “the concerns of the closed materials go to the heart of contact and residence, so it would be difficult to assist the court on this in the interim”.

“But the court has the closed material and can take it into account,” said the judge. “Obviously if I adjourn for 6 months, that excludes any possibility of interim contact, so I think I am indicating I wish to address the matter of interim contact  I would also like legal argument on the residence issue. I think it’s unlikely I’d make an interim order on change of residence. But interim contact is a different matter.”

Alluding to the closed materials, counsel for Mr and Mrs B pointed out that “the local authority knows more than we do, so in their evidence on contact, can they properly address how risk can be managed by support”.

The judge said that’s what he had in mind and that the evidence in front of him “doesn’t seem to me to exclude the possibility” (I think he meant the possibility of managing risk via supervised contact).

The next hearing will be listed, for two hours, in  “four to six weeks from now” – so sometime between 11th and 25th November 2026, if everything goes according to plan.

Decision on deprivation of liberty

A community DOLS was currently in place to cover P’s residence and care at the Shared Lives home to which he’s been moved. The question of whether or not these arrangements constitute a deprivation of his liberty under Article 8 following AGNI was raised towards the end of the hearing.

Neither the local authority nor the Official Solicitor considers that P is currently deprived of his liberty under the new multi-factorial test.  Mrs B, who does not know where he’s living or anything about his current care, “does not take a view” (counsel said). 

The Official Solicitor asked whether “the court is minded to let the DOLS fall away”.

Judge: Remind me what the care arrangements are. He’s living in a family home –  (wryly) though it might be said they are paid to care for him. Does it involve locked doors?

Official Solicitor: It does – but that’s a mere indication. There are lots of people post-AGNI who are actually deprived of their liberty physically but not deemed deprived of liberty in relation to  Article 5. He’s happy. The local authority has set out reasons why this does not meet the multi-factorial test [NB I assume counsel means that these reasons are set out in the position statement that the Official Solicitor has refused to disclose but relies on here in oral argument.]  This is very far from the paradigm of the prison cell. He’s accompanied whenever he goes out, but that for his benefit.

Judge: Was he under a community DOLS when he lived with Mr and Mrs B?

[The answer to that question was not forthcoming.]

Judge: It seems to me he clearly isn’t deprived of his liberty, applying the more holistic approach of AGNI.

It’s absolutely normal to see this type of fairly cursory judicial decision-making about deprivation of liberty when there is no disagreement between the parties.[5]

2. Shared Lives: “Paid to be family”

Shared Lives is a regulated adult social care and support model, often compared to adult fostering, delivered mostly through local council adult social care services, NHS budgets, or commissioned providers. Their purpose is to provide care for adults in the homes of people  who are not their relatives. The NHS UK website about Shared Lives schemes says that they are “an alternative to traditional kinds of care, such as care homes”: adults with care needs are matched with an approved carer who “shares their family and community life”.  The schemes are regulated in England by the Health and Social Care Act 2008.[6] The first Shared Lives scheme in the UK was launched in the mid-1970s under the name “Adult Placement” and changed to “Shared Lives” in 2008.[7]

Shared Lives schemes generally offer three different types of care: live-in (60%), short breaks e.g. for respite 31%, and day support (17%) [8].

The largest demographic group supported by Shared Lives is adults with learning disabilities, but schemes can include people with a diverse set of needs including autism, mental health issues,  dementia, and care leavers needing to learn independent living skills. 

Long-term live-in care, sometimes following on from foster-care arrangements once the child becomes an adult, is common[9], and cared-for adults sometimes live in the family home for years or even decades.

Today most local authorities in England operate or commission a Shared Lives scheme and they’ve been assessed as providing excellent quality care service (97% are rated as ‘Good’ or ‘Outstanding’ by the Care Quality Commission[10]) while also being cost-effective[11].

People who sign up for the Shared Lives schemes as providers or as recipients of care are actively encouraged to see it as becoming part of a family. Recruitment materials for local schemes repeatedly reiterate that ‘the person would become part of the carer’s extended family’(Tower Hamlets)[12], “a valued part of your family unit” (East Riding[13]), “part of the family” (Cumberland Council[14]).  Shared Lives Plus, the national organisation promoting the scheme, uses the strapline on one of its videos  “Start your shared life today and become part of a family again“[15].It reports that 97% of the people in Shared Lives felt they were part of the family most or all of the time.[16]

A video on the NHS ‘Shared Lives’ website features Dave and Pauline describing their experience as carers for two adults (71-year-old Alma and 57-year-old Keith – both with mental health issues and learning disabilities) who have lived with them for 19 and 13 years respectively. The video shows carers and care-recipients looking at family photographs together, watching television, and sharing a birthday celebration with grandchildren. They go on holiday together, and to events like weddings and christenings: Dave says, “they’re part of the family and all the things that go on in families from day-to-day”.

Familial and kinship terms are absolutely standard across Shared Lives schemes.  “We’re his family”, says Debbie, a carer in Doncaster, who features, along with cared-for adult James, in one of a series of videos showcasing South Yorkshire Shared Lives schemes: “Not just the immediate family, but extended family members as well” (she adds). James agrees: “It’s nice to know that I’ve got all these people that care about me and love me and see me as family”.  In the Sheffield video, Donna says something very similar: “They’re part of a family rather than a care system”, and Kayleigh, the cared-for adult who lives with Donna, agrees: “this is my home now, and the people who live here, they are my family”[17].  

But it’s not just “family”: it’s also paid work.

“Your new career starts here” announces a red tab on the front page of Shared Lives Plus. Click on the tab and you are promised “a steady income” with “generous tax breaks”. In “The Financial Bit”, it’s explained that carers are self-employed and paid a weekly fee of between £350 and £650 per person, depending on the local authority and the person’s assessed care needs. This payment is subject to a favourable tax arrangement (“Qualifying Care Relief”), which can often mean no tax is paid. Carers also receive rent (on average £120 a week) and a housekeeping contribution of £60 to cover food, hot water and heating. Clothing, toiletries subscriptions and the like are paid from the person’s own money.[18] Nonetheless, the NHS does acknowledge that “Carers, as well as their families and friends, contribute a lot that is unpaid”.

Shared Lives carers in court (and Article 8)

People meeting the current definition of “Shared Lives carers) – i.e. people paid by the state to provide care and residence in their own homes for (unrelated) vulnerable adults – appear quite frequently in legal cases concerning disabled people, including in some of the landmark cases.  The Bournewood Case (HL v United Kingdom) was initiated by Graham and Wendy Enderby who had been caring for HL under an “adult fostering scheme” in their own home for more than three years[19].  And in Cheshire West, “MIG” lived in an adult placement, and “was devoted to her foster mother (whom she regarded as her ‘mummy’))”.

I did a quick search and found that Shared Lives arrangements have cropped up quite frequently in the Court of Protection over the last few years, both in published judgments and in “unreported”[20] cases.  Examples include: court oversight as former foster parents register to become Shared Lives carers (KL (A Minor: deprivation of liberty) [2022] EWCOP 24), a young person choosing (capacitously) to move from the family home to a Shared Lives placement (Re AG [2024] EWCOP 18); court consideration for a Shared Lives placement for a man in his 70s with alcohol related dementia[21] and a Shared Lives carer acting as P’s litigation friend in court.[22]

I’m surprised by the argument I understood the Official Solicitor (and local authority) to be making that, due to the financial arrangements underpinning Shared Lives carer, they cannot engage Article 8 rights to respect for private and family life.

On my reading of the case law, it appears that the courts have taken the position that Article 8 rights are not automatic in fostering arrangements (either for adults or for children) but can arise as a consequence of the nature, duration and strength of the relationships formed as a result of them (see Moretti and Benedetti v. Italy, 2010, § 48; Kopf and Liberda v. Austria, 2012, § 37)[23].

Baker J says” “There was, in my judgment, a deplorable failure to take into account the close relationship between E and F, the need to sustain that relationship, and a consequent failure to arrange any contact for several months between this vulnerable young man and the person who had been his carer – his mother-figure – for most of his life.” (§85).

Two general points made in the judgment:

The question of whether adult fostering arrangements can constitute ‘family’ life has also arisen in domestic law in the Court of Appeal in the very different context of immigration.  (Uddin v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 338).   A young Bangladeshi adult, who had lived with his foster family for twelve years and had been denied leave to stay in the UK by the lower court because the “commercial arrangement” for the “mechanics of care” constituted by fostering was said not to engage Article 8. The Senior President disagreed:

In sum, both European and domestic case law seem (on my non-lawyer’s reading) to support the position that de facto “family” relationships can develop in the context of paid adult placement arrangements, and that these engage Article 8 protections.

I will be interested to hear (and I hope to read) the arguments relating to this at the next hearing.

Celia Kitzinger is co-director of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project and an Honorary Professor in the School of Law and Politics at Cardiff University. She is on LinkedIn (here), and also on X (@KitzingerCelia) and Bluesky (@kitzingercelia.bsky.social)

Postscript: Transparency fails (again)

As is the case in well over 50% of the hearings I’ve observed in the last few months, there were no Gardner documents before the court (i.e no case summary, no chronology and no list of issues the judge was being asked to consider). I am grateful to the judge for providing an introductory summary which helped to fill that lacuna.

In the absence of Gardner documents, I requested Position Statements on the grounds that, without documentation, I would be unable to properly follow the hearing or to understand the basis on which the judge would make his decisions – in which case my access to the hearing itself would be transparency only in form and not in substance (as Nicklin J, Chair of the Ministry of Justice Transparency and Open Justice Board has put it). The parties unanimously declined to disclose their Position Statements to me despite the judge giving permission for them so to do.

It subsequently became clear in the course of the hearing that there was an “Addendum Position Statement” for P which I understood to present a legal argument against considering Shared Lives carers and the adults they care for (either in general, or this adult P in particular, I’m not sure which) to be “family”, in the sense of engaging Article 8 rights to protection of their private and family life. I asked (orally during the course of the hearing) whether this Addendum Position Statement could be disclosed to me, redacted to remove any personal material if necessary. The judge assured me that there was no personal material to redact – it merely sets out what the Official Solicitor considers to be the correct legal position. 

This matter is likely to be addressed at the next hearing by which time counsel for the former foster/Shared Lives carers will have had time to consider and respond to the OS position. So, I followed up on my oral request with an emailed request to Oliver Lewis (copied to the other parties) on 14th October 2026 pointing out that I hoped to attend the next hearing in this case and would also be requesting the response from the other parties specifically in relation to the Article 8 point.  I have had no reply. I am about to submit a COP 9 application for disclosure.

Endnotes


[1] For information about closed hearings and closed material hearings see the Vice President’s Guidance. I did not observe the closed hearing in this case, but another public observer did, and is prohibited by the Transparency Order from relaying to me “any information relating to the closed material application by the local authority and the closed material hearing on 6th August 2026 other than (a) that the local authority made an application for closed material (b) which was heard by Mr Justice Poole on 06 August 2026, and (c) a temporary closed material order was made” (§6(iii)).  I have also been served with the same Transparency Order. This means that I cannot report what was said and done by the judge in relation to that closed material application at this hearing on 14th October 2026.  I cannot see any reason for prohibiting me from reporting this information, and in fact I’m not sure that it was the intention of the applicant in drafting, or the judge in signing, the Transparency Order, to forbid me from doing so.  Since I’ve not received any response to my email seeking clarification on this, I will make a COP 9 application to vary the TO to permit me to report on this.  My understanding is that this clause in the TO was inserted as a reporting restriction against a different public observer who did observe the closed hearing of 6th August 2026 and that there was no intention to prevent me from reporting developments in relation to the closed material as relayed in public court on 14th October 2026.  I am however cautious about determining the “intention” of the court in the light of what appears to me to be wording that clearly bans reporting.  It may be that the TO would better reflect the intention of the court if it were reworded as follows: “..any information about the closed material hearing on 6th August 2026, which dealt with the closed material application by the local authority, other than…” and that is the variation I have requested. In the meantime, I have not disclosed “any information relating to the closed material application by the local authority” other than that expressly permitted by the Transparency Order.

[2] I have requested the approved order from the hearing as per COP Rules 2017, 5.9.—(1) Subject to rules 5.12 and 4.3(2), a person who is not a party to proceedings may inspect or obtain from the court records a copy of any judgment or order given or made in public. I’ve been told this is not yet available. I am hoping that it will shed light on some features of the case that are currently opaque to me. If it does, I’ll update this blog post to reflect that.

[3] All quotations that purport to be reports of what was said in the course of the hearing are based on my touch-typed contemporaneous notes and they’re as accurate as I could make them but unlikely to be verbatim.

[4] I’m almost certain that this is the statute referred to by counsel, but when I looked it up after the hearing, I couldn’t find any such definition there.  I eventually located something that sounds like the same definition of “family relationship” in a different statute: the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, (Section 58(3) “A family relationship includes a relationship between two persons who live in the same household and treat each other as though they were members of the same family)”. It would have been useful had the party been willing to disclose their Position Statement as that would have enabled me to check this.

[5] Without position statements I am merely speculating, and these matters may have been addressed therein – but I do wonder whether P might be ‘objecting’ in so far as he is able to, about having been removed from his family home of nearly 17 years, and may also be ‘objecting’ to contact restrictions preventing him from seeing familiar people he’d become accustomed to and might relate to as ‘family’. In the case of G v E [2010] EWHC 621 (Fam)), it was reported that the protected party was missing his “mummy” (the adult placement carer) and also her son, with whom he’d grown up (§33). Both removal from the family home and contact restrictions are features of a vulnerable person’s residence and care arrangements that the courts have taken seriously in determining deprivation of liberty. It’s depressing to see how swiftly the “safeguards” put in place for vulnerable people are being dismantled as a result of the AGNI judgment – even though, in my own family experience, it was clear that they were often ineffective (Polly and AGNI: A family reflection on deprivation of liberty). 

[6] In Wales, the relevant statutes are the Adult Placement Scheme (Wales) Regulations 2004 Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014 and the regulator is Care Inspectorate Wales (CIW).

[7] Scotland and Northern Ireland also have “Shared Lives” schemes. Similar models outside the UK are generally known as ‘adult foster care’. In the USA: “AllThrive365” https://allthrive365.org/resources/adult-foster-care-what-is-it-and-how-can-you-get-involved/ and “CareForth” https://careforth.com/blog/what-is-adult-foster-care/.  In Finland: Leinonen E. Caring in space: the boundaries between public and private spaces in Finnish adult foster care homes. Ageing and Society. 2021;41(5):1184-120. In France:  Chammem R, Domi S and Schott AM (2021) Perceptions and Experiences of Older Persons in Two Types of Institution in France: Foster Care Family Institution and Medico-Social One. Front. Public Health 9:684776. doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2021.684776. In Guadaloupe and Martinique: Boucaud-Maitre, D. et al. 2024, Comparison of quality of older life of older adults living in foster families versus nursing homes, Journal of Nutrition, Health and Ageing 28(10)

[8] https://www.local.gov.uk/publications/developing-shared-lives-people-learning-disability

[9] Worcestershire County Council has a useful explanation of how this works in practice, and some guidance about the legal differences between foster care and shared lives care https://www.worcestershire.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2025-04/Transitioning%20from%20Foster%20Care%20to%20Shared%20Lives%20v1.5%20%282%29.pdf

[10] https://sharedlivesplus.org.uk/our-work/research-and-reports/shared-lives-outcomes-and-quality/ and https://www.local.gov.uk/publications/developing-shared-lives-people-learning-disability

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/bld.12556 Todd Williams 2013 Investing in Shared Lives

[11] A 2023 survey by ADASS found that 87 per cent of Directors of Adult Social Care “are of the opinion that greater availability of Shared Lives would reduce or significantly reduce adult social care expenditure”.  Research conducted by Shared Lives Plus in 2024 shows that Shared Lives can save £12,000 to £26,000 per person, per year for people with a learning disability, compared to supported living or residential care.

[12] Tower Hamlets Shared Lives scheme https://www.towerhamletsconnect.org/information-and-advice/caring-for-someone/shared-lives/what-is-shared-lives/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[13] East Riding Shared Lives Scheme https://www.eastriding.gov.uk/adult-social-care/caring-for-someone/shared-lives-carers/about-the-shared-lives-carer-role/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[14] Cumberland Council shared lives scheme https://www.cumberland.gov.uk/health-and-social-care/care-services/shared-lives/how-get-support-through-shared-lives

[15] (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zx02T23F8II&t=77s)

[16] https://sharedlivesplus.org.uk/our-work/research-and-reports/shared-lives-outcomes-and-quality/

[17] Film called  “Family, Belonging and Shared Lives”.

[18] (https://heyzine.com/flip-book/3089f4b7bd.html#page/14; see also https://heyzine.com/flip-book/3089f4b7bd.html#page/14)

[19] Before moving to live with the Enderbys, HL had spent over 30 years in Bournewood Hospital. He was returned there after an incident at his day care centre, and the Enderbys were forbidden to visit him. The domestic judicial review proceedings challenged his admission and continued detention as unlawful. Further domestic proceedings in the Court of Appeal and House of Lords led eventually to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) whose judgment exposed the lack of adequate legal safeguards for people who lack the capacity to consent to their admission to hospital but do not actively resist it – a gap in legal protection that became known as the ‘Bournewood Gap’ and prompted the introduction of the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS), inserted into Schedule A1 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. For more information about the case and the Enderbys’ role in it, see the BBC podcast on “The Legacy of Bournewood”; the article “Making sense of Bournewood” by Robert Robinson (Graham Enderby’s solicitor) and Lucy Scott-Moncrieff, Journal of Mental Health Law, May 2005; and obituaries of Graham Enderby (e.g. https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/mar/11/graham-enderby-obituary; https://www.peteredwardslaw.com/latest/an-appreciation-of-the-life-of-graham-enderby/)

[20] In legal terminology, an “unreported” case is one where there’s no official published judgment – even though there may be a transcript of the proceedings, and even though they have may been reported by lawyers and court reporters. The vast majority of law cases are “unreported”.

[21] Improving P’s quality of life pending a s.21A change in residence

[22] Surgery for scoliosis when P indicates he doesn’t want it

[23]  The Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights also states: “Where either family life is not found or no breach is found regarding the right to respect for family life, Article 8 may still be applicable under its private life head (Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 165; Lazoriva v. Ukraine, 2018, §§ 61 and 66 concerning the applicant’s nephew; Azerkane v. the Netherlands, 2020, § 65; C.E. and Others v. France, 2022, § 99). The applicants’ “private and family life” can also been affected along with the right to respect for home (see, for example, Paketova and Others v. Bulgaria, 2022, § 153).” §349

[24] By the time of the judgment, the safeguarding investigation had been completed with an “inconclusive” outcome and the police had said they were taking no further action. The local authority had also raised  concerns about F’s management of E’s finances. The judge doesn’t address this in detail but says, “I found nothing in it to suggest that there was any reason to question F’s honesty. No doubt she has found some of the rules and procedures obscure and difficult to understand”(§49).  Her convictions for shoplifting were also raised – including the fact that she had dishonestly stated to the court she had only one conviction when in fact she had four.

[25] The judgment quotes from a letter sent by the local authority to F’s solicitors which echoes the oral arguments I heard in the case before Poole J: “whilst we appreciate that your client may have developed a positive and strong relationship with E over the past ten years, she is not a family member and she was financially remunerated for the services she provided to E” (§84).

An “Avoiding Restraint” Plan for a 17-year-old facing caesarean section

By Celia Kitzinger, 11th November 2026

A young woman (“AB”), diagnosed with autism and “learning difficulties”,[1] is 35 weeks pregnant.

It is “beyond doubt” (the judge’s words) that she lacks capacity to make her own decisions about the delivery of her baby. The judge made the formal s.15 declarations to that effect.

Doctors say that it’s in her best interests to have a caesarean section under general anaesthetic.  Nobody disagrees. And, as the judge observed, “to the extent she’s able to express any opinion, that appears to be what she has a preference for herself”.

So, the court in this case did not have to deal with any dispute about either capacity or best interests. 

Instead, the judge looked more broadly at AB’s pregnancy and birth plan, making suggestions and giving directions designed to improve AB’s experience of the birth and her quality of life.

I am sometimes critical of the Court of Protection and the harm it can cause to people caught up in it.  But in this case, I am certain that the court has helped the young woman at the centre of the proceedings – most especially by redirecting attention from the mechanics of restraint to the practical steps that might make restraint unnecessary.

This is the Court of Protection at its best.

The hearing

The Open Justice Court of Protection Project has covered many cases concerning caesarean sections.  This case stands out for having been brought before the court relatively early, at 35 weeks of pregnancy[2].

The difference of just a week or two (compared with the urgent hearings in some other cases, involving women much closer to their due dates) seemed significant. I could see how that additional time opened up opportunities for more consultation about best interests and, importantly, more planning ahead.

The judge, Ms Victoria Butler-Cole KC, sitting (remotely) in the Royal Courts of Justice on 10th November 2026 (COP 20042357) raised three key issues during the one-hour directions hearing:

1. How the need for physical restraint of AB can be avoided or minimised

2. Safeguarding arrangements for AB, who is pregnant but has no capacity to consent to engage in sexual relations

3. Whether AB may be deprived of her liberty in hospital and entitled to protections under Article 5.

The applicant, Sheffield Teaching Hospital NHS Foundation Trust, was represented by Sophie Hurst of Kings Chambers, instructed by Hill Dickinson.

The protected party (and first respondent), AB, was represented by  David Lawson of Serjeants’ Inn, instructed by her litigation friend the Official Solicitor

The second respondent, Sheffield City Council, was represented by Andrew Lord of St John’s Buildings.

There had apparently been a dispute between the two public bodies – the NHS Trust and the local authority – about who was responsible for AB’s pre- and post-operative care. The Official Solicitor reported that the Trust now accepted responsibility. The local authority was seeking to be discharged as a party. The judge, however, said: “for now, keep things as they are, please”, while acknowledging that the local authority might not need to attend the final hearing.

1. From a “Restraint Plan” to an “Avoiding Restraint Plan”

The proposed birth plan before the court needed “further work”, said counsel for the applicant Trust, “to include a specific restraint plan” (her emphasis). I don’t know what kind of restraint was under contemplation.

At what counsel described as “productive pre-hearing discussions”, the parties had considered “how that information [about the restraint that might be required and how it would be delivered] can be obtained and presented to the court”[3].

The local authority would “file statements and exhibits concerning the nature, type and duration of any restraint to be used in hospital, and how, and in what circumstances, it’s delivered in the community.” Counsel explained there was no domiciliary care provider who could assist with restraint in a hospital setting and that enquiries were being made about a third-party agency. Nobody considered it appropriate for hospital security staff to deliver restraint, but they were the only people in the hospital with the appropriate training.

The draft order proposed that a finalised Birth Plan and Restraint Plan should be filed with the court by 16th November. 

“Let me pause you there”, said the judge. “I have a number of questions”.

The judge shifted the focus from the mechanics of restraining AB to the much more fundamental question of how to organise her care and environment so that restraint is less likely to be needed at all.

“There is a lot of focus on the restraint plan,” the judge continued.  “It would be more helpful to think here about how restraint could be avoided.  The bulk of the plan should be about avoiding ever getting into that situation.”

The judge pointed out that AB is not someone who is regularly subjected to restraint (the last time was five months ago):  “A lot of what might be called her ‘challenging behaviour’ can be dealt with without restraint. For example, she is someone who finds transitions difficult. She puts herself on the floor. But that doesn’t require restraint. It requires giving her some space and supporting her to get ready for another activity“.

Input from people who know AB well (her parents and staff at her school) would be crucial in understanding how to move forward with surgery (and with pre- and post-operative care) in a way that causes least distress to AB.

Involving AB’s parents

I got the impression (it was never explicitly stated) that AB lives at home with her mother, and that her father lives elsewhere, but also has regular contact with her.  Neither parent was in court.

The judge had asked about their absence right at the beginning of the hearing and was told that AB’s mother had been notified (I think the father had not), and that the mother does want to be involved in the court proceedings, but was unable to participate in today’s hearing due to “child care arrangements” and because she has noisy building work going on in her home at the moment.  The judge asked for both parents to be properly informed about how they could become parties – and since neither currently has legal representation and like most family members will probably be involved either as interested persons or, if they become parties, as litigants in person, she specifically asked counsel for the local authority to “put in a link to the COP 5 form, so [the father] knows what form it is he needs to fill in, and send the email address he has to send it to, because he won’t know what filing it means”.

Making the hospital experience as positive as possible

The judge pointed out the possibility that AB might go into labour before the next hearing, listed for 10 days time. Rather than requiring written statements about how AB could be restrained, she suggested that the best way forward might be a meeting involving family members, school staff, and professionals.

The purpose of the meeting, she explained, would be to work out “not just what form of physical restraint might be used, but how are you going to make the period of time that she’s going to be in hospital as unlikely as possible to cause her distress.  It may not be possible to avoid restraint altogether – if she’s pulling out stitches for example – but instead of focussing on who is going to restrain her if that’s needed, can you think about making it an experience that’s as pleasant as possible for her.“

She suggested several practical possibilities:

“Are there members of staff at the school who might be able to visit her in hospital so she’s able to spend time with people she already knows rather than strangers? What information is going to be given to her in advance of the date of the surgery – would social stories be useful? Or Easy Read? Would a picture of the place she’ll be in the hospital benefit her or not?“

She wanted everyone involved to meet “in the same room – or virtual room” to address these questions. And she was clear that practical obstacles to AB’s mother’s participation should be overcome: “If someone from the local authority needs to provide childcare for other children, or a carer for AB, so that her mother can participate in the meeting, then that needs to happen. As soon as possible“.

It turned out that a ‘professionals meeting’ had already  been planned for Friday, involving the school, the hospital and the local authority. Counsel for the local authority said that AB’s mother “is capable of being invited to that, and we hear your point with respect to childcare etcetera”.

The judge immediately suggested “re-purposing” the meeting, to include the family and the Official Solicitor. She asked for this to be recorded in a recital at the beginning of her order.

“The mother, and perhaps the father too, should be invited to the meeting on Friday. The local authority has agreed to look into whatever is needed to enable the mother to attend it. The meeting will explore what I’m going to call the “Avoiding Restraint Plan”.

The plan would need to consider the circumstances in which restraint might be necessary – for example, where something AB was doing put her physical health at risk. But the judge wanted the meeting to focus much more broadly on how to avoid distress and reduce the likelihood of restraint being needed: “If she’s in hospital a few days later and wants to go outside, I would hope someone would be able to assist her. One of the main triggers for ‘challenging behaviour’ is being told she can’t do the thing she wants to do immediately. So that needs to be looked at – how to make the hospital environment as tolerable as possible. If she’s going to be stuck here for a number of days with nothing to do, that will cause problems for her“.

She also wanted the meeting to draw on the mother’s knowledge of AB’s communication: “Ask her mother how AB communicates pain, and how people should be responding to that. It would be helpful to have something from her mother about understanding whether there are non-verbal signs, rather than leaving that to hospital staff to figure out at the time”.

Other questions included what AB would be told about the surgery in advance, who would communicate that information to her, and how it would be presented.

And the planning needed to extend beyond the hospital stay: “Find out whether, when she returns home, her mother might need help in the home. The advice following that sort of surgery is to sit around and do not very much, and AB may not want to do that.  So, the meeting is to do all of that.”

2. Safeguarding

The judge turned to the safeguarding implications of AB’s pregnancy.

It was “highly likely”,  she said, “that AB doesn’t have capacity to give consent to sexual relations, so the act that caused her to become pregnant was a criminal offence.”[4]

She asked the local authority: “Has there been any change to her care arrangements, or are things just carrying on as they were?”

Counsel for the local authority said they had “not implemented anything different, and we don’t understand there’s anything different that mother has implemented”.

The judge found this “slightly surprising, given that we have no idea of the circumstances under which she became pregnant”.

Counsel responded “we don’t have locus in the family home”, by which I understood him to mean that the local authority does not consider itself to have the legal authority to intervene in the arrangements within AB’s family home.

The judge challenged this: “if AB lacks capacity to make decisions about contact, care arrangements and sex, the local authority does have the power to decide to place someone with her all the time to make sure she’s not sexually assaulted”.

“I understand that power”, counsel replied: “I simply say that my understanding is that that power has not been exercised. I can take instructions, but that’s my understanding”.

The exchange left an important question unanswered: what safeguarding arrangements were actually in place to protect AB from sexual abuse?

The judge also raised the question of contraception with the Trust. The Trust’s position was that “AB shouldn’t require contraception because she lacks capacity to engage in sexual relations”. It indicated that care planning in relation to contraception would be informed by “the outcome of police investigation and the local authority’s own safeguarding investigation”.

3. Deprivation of liberty

The Supreme Court decision in AGNI[5] has fundamentally changed the way ‘deprivation of liberty’ is understood in the Court of Protection. The parties had not yet addressed how the decision applies to AB’s circumstances, but proposed to do so at the final hearing. This will presumably include consideration of the fact that she’s only 17 (so the ordinary DOLS authorisation process doesn’t apply to her anyway).

Counsel for the Official Solicitor referred to R (Ferreira) v HM Senior Coroner for Inner South London [2017] EWCA Civ 31 – a case described in AGNI as one that avoids or narrows the effect of the ‘acid test’ (§114, AGNI). It concerned a woman who died in intensive care following life-saving medical treatment. The Court of Appeal held that the restrictions on her liberty arising from her medical condition and the treatment she received did not, in those circumstances, amount to a deprivation of liberty under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

Counsel suggested that whether court authorisation of a deprivation of liberty would be required in AB’s case would depend on the extent of the arrangements and restrictions put in place. He said it would be “proper” for any such application to come before the court.

Reflections

It’s a distressing case, and I appreciate the determined and practical approach of Ms Butler-Cole KC in trying to ensure that this young woman’s best interests are properly addressed.  One might wish, of course, that this were possible without court involvement. 

I was also alert to the fact that judicial suggestions and encouragement do not amount to directions or orders, and that there’s a limit to what a judge can order public bodies to do. (I noted that much of what the judge said was recorded in a recital and not in the order itself.)

The judge’s approach to restraint is particularly welcome. Rather than starting with the question of how AB might be restrained, she insisted that thought be given first to how to avoid putting AB in situations where restraint might become necessary.

This is consistent with established good practice.

The Restraint Reduction Network, a key charity working in this area puts it clearly: “In order for any action to be considered proportionate and least restrictive, all realistic, preventative options must first be exhausted”. 

The Care Quality Commission (CQC) has also recognised that restrictive practices can be a consequence of failures in person-centred care planning, and that the right person-centred care can renders them unnecessary.[6]

The Challenging Behaviour Foundation gives examples of concrete strategies that can be adopted to avoid or reduce the need for restraint.

What particularly struck me about this hearing was the judge’s insistence that the planning should begin with AB as an individual: her preferences, her communication, the things that cause her distress, the people she knows and trusts, and what might make an unfamiliar hospital environment more tolerable for her. That is what best interests consideration in general, and an an “Avoiding Restraint” Plan in particular, should look like.

The final hearing is listed for 10.30am on 20th November 2026, in advance of an anticipated caesarean section on 24th November 2026. I hope that the work initiated at this hearing will lay the groundwork for making a real difference to AB’s experience going forward.

Celia Kitzinger is co-director of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project and an Honorary Professor in the School of Law and Politics at Cardiff University. She is on LinkedIn (here), and also on X (@KitzingerCelia) and Bluesky (@kitzingercelia.bsky.social)

End notes


[1] These two diagnoses were provided in the Case Summary for observers, prepared by Ms Hurst, counsel of the applicant Trust. The Case Summary consists of just four sentences. It refers to AB as a “girl” who “lacks capacity to make decisions about the delivery of her baby” and says that the Court “is being asked to list a hearing for the Court to consider a care plan for the delivery”. I don’t know whether the diagnoses have been accurately reported in the Case Summary (no diagnoses were mentioned in the course of the hearing). I am, in particular,  not wholly confident that “learning difficulties” is the correct terminology  (see Mencap’s explanation of the difference between learning disability and learning difficulties: https://www.mencap.org.uk/easyread/what-difference-between-learning-disability-and-learning-difficulty). There is also an apparent discrepancy concerning capacity. The Case Summary states that AB “lacks capacity”, but the Transparency Order made by Theis J the previous day (9th November 2026) explicitly states that “the issues in this case relate to whether AB lacks capacity to make decisions about her obstetric care and treatment” [my emphasis]. In other words, the issue of AB’s capacity had not yet been determined, and was for the judge to decide at the hearing (as she did).  There is a further discrepancy about the scope of the proceedings. The Case Summary refers only to “a care plan for the delivery”, whereas Theis J specifically identifies “postnatal care” as one of the issues before the court. Where the Case Summary for observers (which I understand was prepared rather hurriedly) differs from the information in the Transparency Order or from what I heard in court, I have preferred the latter two sources, and that is reflected in this blog post. Neither of the other two documents listed at Practice Direction 4B para.4.2(a)-(c) COPR 2017 which “must” (it says) be provided to the court (and which the Court of Appeal suggests (in Re Gardner (Deceased) [2026] EWCA Civ 640) can be disclosed to observers, had been prepared – for which the applicant Trust apologised. Only one Position Statement (the Official Solicitor’s) had been submitted to the court: as is customary, counsel for the Official Solicitor declined to disclose it and suggested that “the paragraph that Ms Hurst refers to is probably a sufficient account of the proceedings”. (Clearly, it wasn’t!)  I am grateful to the judge for requesting an oral case summary at the start of the hearing, and for offering observers (at the end of the hearing) the opportunity to raise any problems of understanding: since I had not yet received the Case Summary (it was sent to me at 11.31 after the hearing had concluded), I was not at that point in a position to clarify either the diagnosis or the apparent discrepancies concerning the issues before the court. I have requested the approved Order as provided for by COP Rule 5.9 and will correct any obvious errors in this blog post on receipt of it.

[2] See, for example: “An urgent caesarean application in a disturbing case” (also decided by Ms Butler-Cole KC) concerning a woman with catatonic schizophrenia who was discovered to be pregnant after she returned from a visit to Somalia with her grandmother, also raising safeguarding concerns. This case was heard six days before her expected due date. In another case, too, heard by Moor J, the hearing was less than a week before the woman’s due date: “’The baby has to come out’: Court-authorised caesarean when subject-matter and litigation capacity are disputed”). Other cases include one for which Ms Butler-Cole KC made directions and Cusworth J made the final orders, concerning a 37- week pregnant woman detained under the Mental Health Act (“Caesarean: A directions hearing” and  “Court-authorised caesarean with chemical and physical restraint if required: A 14-minute final hearing”) a 37-weeks pregnant case before Moor J (“Elective caesarean in her best interests”), and three 36-weeks pregnant cases – before Morgan J (“Court authorised caesarean section for a mother with sickle cell disease who her baby to ‘see her face first’”),  Cohen J (“Capacity and elective caesarean”) and Hayden J (“C-section and general anaesthesia against her wishes”).

[3] All quotations purporting to represent what was said at the hearing are based on my contemporaneous touch-typed notes and are as accurate as I can make them, but unlikely to be verbatim.

[4] My own understanding of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 is that lack of capacity to engage in sexual relations does not, by itself, establish that a criminal offence was committed – but perhaps the judge is sure from her much more extensive knowledge of this case that it must have been under the particular circumstances.

[5] A Reference by the Attorney General for Northern Ireland of a devolution issue under paragraph 34 of Schedule 10 to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 [2026] UKSC 16

[6] “Restrictive practice – a failure of person-centred care planning”

Final hearing in the ‘vile judgment’ case: Coming full circle

By Daniel Clark, Amanda Hill and Celia Kitzinger, 8th November 2026

The final hearing in this long-running case lasted 16 minutes.

The case began with an application from Norfolk County Council on 18th December 2023 and came to an end nearly three years later, after 10 hearings [Note: Caroline corrects us and say it was 13 hearings – see her “Reply” to this blog post, below] and three published judgments[1], on 8th October 2026.

The case concerned safeguarding an elderly woman (“CA”) against what the local authority alleged was coercive control and assault from her daughter, who also holds Lasting Power of Attorney (LPA).  At a fact-finding hearing back in October 2024, the judge declared Caroline Grady had undue influence over her mother, and invoked the inherent jurisdiction to limit Caroline and her mother (CA) to supervised contact only, and also made court orders to restrain Caroline’s use of the LPA.

Now the case has ended with all contact restrictions between mother and daughter removed and with the daughter’s Power of Attorney in place and unrestrained by court orders. From the family point of view, the situation is returned – as much as is now possible – to how it was before the proceedings began.

Several of us involved in the Open Justice Court of Protection Project have observed this case across the years and this is the seventh blog post[2]. Celia has previously published an interview with the daughter (see “Safeguarding Mum”);  Amanda (who has watched most of the hearings) has also interviewed and corresponded with both the daughter and her McKenzie friend as part of her PhD research and draws on that information in this blog post.

In this post, we:

(1) outline the background to the case (Daniel Clark)

(2) report on the final hearing of 8th October 2026 (Daniel Clark)

(3) reflect on the difference of perspective between the court, with regard to “protecting” a vulnerable person, and the family view of “totalitarian state” intervention (Amanda Hill)

(4) consider this case in relation to the theoretical framework of juridogenic harm (Celia Kitzinger)

1. Background – by Daniel Clark

There has been substantial continuity of bar and bench throughout the nearly three years of these proceedings. All the most recent (High Court) hearings have been before Mrs Justice Arbuthnot. 

  • The protected party (referred to as “CA” in recent judgments, and in this blog post) has been represented throughout (with the exception of the committal hearing) by Malcolm Chisholm of ICG, instructed by her litigation friend the Official Solicitor.
  • The daughter of the protected party has (again with the exception of the committal hearing) represented herself as a litigant in person (usually with the help of her McKenzie Friend). Following the committal hearing and a subsequent application for transparency, the daughter can be named as Caroline Grady, and her McKenzie Friend as Arthur Stokes.

Since this case has a very long history which is covered in detail in an earlier blog post, what follows is a brief summary[3]:

In early 2023, Caroline Grady’s mother (CA) was admitted to hospital with a chest infection. While there, hospital staff became concerned about their relationship, and made a safeguarding referral to Norfolk County Council. Following an alleged lasagne-throwing incident after CA returned home, 24-hour care was put in place (from October 2023). Caroline was arrested on suspicion of causing actual bodily harm and banned from seeing her mother for 3 months. She has consistently denied throwing lasagne at her mother. She was never charged, and the police prohibition on contact had lapsed by the time the case was first heard.

At a directions hearing, on 17th January 2024, HHJ Beckley declared there was reason to believe that Caroline Grady’s mother lacked capacity to conduct proceedings, invited Caroline to make a series of undertakings that placed limits on her contact and communication with her mother (which she did), and attached restrictions to the LPA for Health and Welfare that Caroline holds for her mother. This was in advance of a projected fact-finding hearing. HHJ Beckley then remitted the case for hearing before a more senior judge, Mrs Justice Arbuthnot, as the local authority considered it might seek to invoke the inherent jurisdiction (which would require a Tier 3 judge).

In preparation for the the fact-finding hearing in October 2024, , Norfolk County Council submitted a lengthy schedule of allegations against Caroline Grady. They considered her mother to be a vulnerable adult and argued that Caroline has coercively controlled aspects of her mother’s life and assaulted her.  At that hearing, Mrs Justice Arbuthnot declared that Caroline’s mother (who has a dementia diagnosis, though that may not be correct) lacks capacity to conduct proceedings, to make decisions about her care, and to manage her property and affairs. But she does have capacity to decide about contact. Arbuthnot J also found, on the balance of probabilities, that all the allegations against Caroline[4] were “proved” or “found” – including the lasagne incident. She declared Caroline had undue influence over her mother, and invoked the inherent jurisdiction to maintain supervised contact only (by court order rather than undertaking).

Both in court, and in a subsequent interview with Celia Kitzinger (see section 5 of “Safeguarding Mum” blog), Caroline Grady rejected the judge’s characterisation of her relationship with her mother reiterating  that the lasagne incident never happened: ‘I feel like an innocent man hanged. I’ll go to my grave knowing that I never poured lasagne over my mother. But I’ve been caught on the “balance of probabilities”.’

In December 2024, the family applied for twelve hours of unsupervised contact on Christmas Day. Arbuthnot J granted six hours of unsupervised contact, on condition  that Caroline Grady’s partner was present at all times.

In January 2025, Arbuthnot J found Caroline Grady to be in contempt of court for a breach of the undertakings given to the court in January 2024. She was fined £500, having admitted four breaches but having denied a fifth that the judge nevertheless concluded did happen. 

In February 2025, Arbuthnot J heard (and approved) an application by Celia Kitzinger to vary the Transparency Order so that Caroline Grady (who opposed the application) could be identified by name in connection with both the committal and welfare proceedings.

By October 2025, the local authority concluded that 24-hour live in care was no longer required. Contact restrictions were lifted.

On 23rd March 2026 the court was asked whether the injunctions attached to the LPA for Health and Welfare could be lifted. The judge declined to do so, and listed a final hearing for October 2026.

2. Final hearing of 8th October 2026 – by Daniel Clark

Prior to the hearing, a series of agreements had been reached by the parties and were reflected in the agreed draft order before the court.

  1. All injunctive orders, including the restrictions on the LPA, could now be lifted.
  2. CCTV with audio enabled could be installed in CA’s house. The local authority was content to accept Caroline Grady’s promise to the social worker that the audio would only be used in emergencies.
  3. The Transparency Order should be amended so as to be discharged upon the death of CA, removing the need for Caroline Grady (or indeed anybody else) to apply to the court after CA had died if they want to publish or communicate the names of people (other than Caroline) involved in this case.

All that remained was for Mrs Justice Arbuthnot to approve the order, which is exactly what she did in the 16-minute hearing.

This was quite a development from the fact-finding judgment (and indeed contempt application) just two years before – a fact that did not go unacknowledged. With more than a hint of understatement, Counsel for the local authority told the court that ‘despite that long and difficult road, the parties are in a good position and have a good working relationship…we hope that will continue’. The judge was keen to concur: ‘I’ve read the statements and it’s a very positive picture…[with regards to] the audio part of the machinery, I’m perfectly happy to accept Ms Grady’s personal promise to the social worker. And when there are emergencies such as a fall or something, Caroline can step in via the equipment. We’re in a much better position than we were’.

There were only two issues discussed at any length during the hearing. The first was in relation to observer access to position statements (no so-called ‘Gardner documents’ had been prepared). There was some concern on behalf of the local authority and the protected party that these contained sensitive personal information, quoted directly from source evidence, and were not wholly anonymised.

Having clarified who I was, and why I might want access to position statements, the judge concluded that all four observers could receive the position statements. She directed that the statements should be anonymised, and that source evidence should be removed and replaced with a “gist” so that we (i.e. the observers) had a general idea of the evidence relied on. 

The second issue was amending the duration of the Transparency Order – as Caroline Grady had asked the court to do – changing it from “until further order of the court” to “until the death of CA”.  There was some sensitivity about discussing this issue in court because, as with other hearings, CA was in court on the video link, sitting just behind Caroline.  All of us who observed had nothing but praise for the careful way in which this was handled. CA’s representative, Malcolm Chisolm, explained the position of the Official Solicitor as being that “A time will come when different considerations apply  – I don’t want to put it in any more detail than that”.

Having checked that this is what Caroline Grady wanted (“you’re content with that, are you?”) the judge approved the variation. None of the observers has been sent the revised Order so I can’t report on the exact phrasing.

With these remaining issues resolved, the judge wrapped up the proceedings by characterising the current situation as “a very positive picture”.  It was agreed that it was “great news to be concluding this case on agreement” and the Official Solicitor wanted to “wish the family all the best”, saying it had been “a pleasure to represent [CA]”. 

The judge acknowledged that, going forward, Caroline did have some concerns about her mother’s current care arrangements (for example, “someone came in for 8 minutes and not the full hour”). Caroline commented that the previous care company (which provided daily visits after 24-hour care stopped, but which withdrew when they closed their local branch) was “amazing” and that the new one “hasn’t worked out”, adding that the local authority recognises the problems and “we’re all working together in mum’s best interests to try to get this working a bit more efficiently”.

3. Reflections on ‘protection’ and a “totalitarian state’ – by Amanda Hill

This hearing ended with the judge and counsel reflecting positively on the outcome – as though they considered the last 34 months to have concluded as a job well done. There was no suggestion that the case had been anything other than a necessary, proportionate and helpful intervention into this family’s life. 

But my own perspective is more in line with that of another observer who’s being following this case: she characterised the outcome as being effectively “as you were” – a phrase that perfectly captures the futility, exhaustion, and frustration of the situation. After almost three years of court proceedings, massive financial cost, and emotional pain, contact restrictions are over, and Caroline returns to her previous role as her mum’s primary (unpaid) carer as if the last three years never happened. “It’s quite extraordinary” she told me “how everything has come full circle”.

The tone of this short hearing was very different to others I’ve observed, particularly the previous one on 23rd March 2026, the subject of the most recent previous blog post.  At that hearing, Caroline’s father made a strong claim: that the court was acting like a “totalitarian state”. Following this, the judge declined to remove the injunction terms attached to the Lasting Power of Attorney, saying that she remained concerned about the risk of Caroline reverting to “previous behaviour”.

But now, after just 16 minutes, it’s all over.  The injunctions have gone and court involvement has ceased. Nobody seems worried about Caroline “reverting to previous behaviour”.  It’s almost as though somebody somewhere has said “Enough. These proceedings have got to stop”.

And stop they have. But at what cost – financial and human?

As part of my PhD research, I submitted Freedom of Information requests to many public bodies, including this local authority, Norfolk County Council (NCC), to discover what external legal fees are spent on Court of Protection cases. This is the reply from NCC:

These costs are at the upper end of the range of replies I’ve received from public bodies across the board. I can’t get information for specific cases, but I do wonder how much of NCC’s costs in 2024 and 2025 relate to this case (and legal fees for hearings in 2026 have not been included). This case must have cost the taxpayer a lot of money.

Of course, it’s not all about the money. What about the human cost? Caroline’s mother had 24-hour care in her own home for two years, apparently (according to the Council) to protect her from her daughter. Every one of their interactions was supervised. In 2024, Caroline had to beg the court to spend a few hours together, unsupervised, on Christmas Day. For my PhD research, I asked Caroline what she thought about the protection given to her mother by the court. She told me: “For me, one of the strongest points is that something described as “protection” can actually feel like punishment to the person living through it. It is also important that harm done to a close family member can become harm to P, because that family member may be one of the most important sources of love, security and support in their life.”

Part of the gulf between the family and the court is reflected in the way that particular words have been differentially used and understood by various parties.

“Guilty”: Caroline said in the March 2026 hearing that she “wasn’t guilty”. ‘Guilty’ is not a word used in the Court of Protection. Facts are found. But Caroline feels as though she’s been found guilty: she told me that she felt treated as guilty from the outset, and treated like a criminal. It’s now engraved forever on public record that Caroline coercively controlled and abused her mother. Not only Caroline, but her mother too (the protected party) has described herself as feeling “guilty”, as reported in the Official Solicitor’s position statement for the hearing in October 2025, when she was asked about the 24-hour care she was receiving: “I just don’t feel as though I have got a life anymore at the moment. I feel like I am the guilty one, like I am being punished. At my age, I don’t think it is right”.

“Enmeshed”: In the March 2026 hearing, Counsel for Norfolk County Council referred to the language Caroline herself had used in her oral statement to the court, which included use of the word “enmeshed” to describe her relationship with her mother, indicating that she accepted this description. I asked Caroline about this: “In answer to your question about the word “enmeshed”, it was not originally my word. I had heard the judge use it to describe Mum and me, and I repeated it in my statement. It was also written into the fact-finding judgement after the October 2024 hearing.  I am not a psychologist, and I did not understand it as a clinical or negative term.  I actually thought it might be positive but just looking it up, apparently not so! To me, it meant that Mum and I were exceptionally close and strongly bonded, probably more so than the average mother and daughter.” It seems as though Caroline thought “enmeshed” meant the same as “close knit”. It is, however, a term used in Court of Protection hearings to indicate a very unhealthy relationship (see “Tangled webs, ‘enmeshment’, and breakdown of trust”.)

“Undertaking”: In the March 2026 court hearing, after Caroline said that she found undertakings “scary”, Arbuthnot J described them as “just promises to the court”. Caroline had been found in contempt of court for breaching undertakings in January 2025. Undertakings have a penal notice attached. When I interviewed Caroline in November 2025, she described the effect of the undertakings on her family life: “….it ends up then we [Caroline and her father] can’t even just talk to mum about what’s supposedly going on, because remember that we had to sign these undertakings. I mean, we don’t know what an undertaking is. And to this day, we still really don’t. But we sign these undertakings, that we couldn’t use certain words; we were being controlled. They were so dictatorial to us, we couldn’t even talk naturally as a family”. The “certain words” that Caroline could not “mention” to her mother, because of the injunction, included the words “care home”. This led to Caroline’s parents adopting the code words “Big House”, as they talked to each other about neighbours and relatives who were moving into care.[5] Caroline told me she experienced the court as effectively telling her: “if you use that word Big House again, we’re going to have you!”. She continued “How dare they control what we say? I think that’s awful, isn’t it? Especially old people, they talk about death and care homes”.

“Totalitarian state”, “code words”, “dictatorial”, “control”. Some people might be surprised to hear citizens of part of the United Kingdom using vocabulary like this to describe a state institution in the 21st Century. But even a retired Court of Protection judge, Anselm Eldergill, associates elements of the Court of Protection with a totalitarian regime. He posted a slideshow on Linkedin[6] in June 2026, entitled “Reforming the Court of Protection & Mental Capacity Act”. Here’s one of his slides:

When I saw it, I thought of Caroline’s dad’s use of the words “totalitarian state” and I contacted Anselm Eldergill. I told him I was curious about the quote on his slide and the choice of images. He told me that it is a quote from Lord Chief Justice Lane and that “his point, of course, was that small encroachments on liberty added together eventually erode liberty. That is what we need to be vigilant about, and is likely how we will lose our liberty rather than by one dictator with a toothbrush moustache taking it in one go” (I have Eldergill’s permission to quote this.)

At the end of these proceedings, Caroline’s mum is in the position of a lot of people needing care – living at home with carers going in a number of times a day. And, as for many people in her situation, it seems that sourcing carers that fit in with her needs is a problem. Caroline as primary unpaid carer will no doubt be involved in trying to ensure her mother gets the care she needs.

Three years and 10 hearings later, Caroline Grady and her family no longer have the Court of Protection overseeing their lives. But the impact of these proceedings will last for the rest of their lives.

4. Juridogenic harms – by Celia Kitzinger

It is obvious to most family members and lay observers – and I think to many lawyers and judges too  – that the legal processes of the Court of Protection, however well-intentioned and however positive their eventual outcome, can and do cause harm, both to the vulnerable person at the centre of the case and to their families.

The term “juridogenic harm” parallels “iatrogenic harm” in medicine. It denotes “the harm that law generates as a consequence of its operations.”[7] It describes “the intrinsic and often inescapable harms caused by the litigation process itself, even when the process is working exactly as it should”[8]

Some of these harms are familiar from litigation generally: the stress of legal proceedings, the demands of navigating a court governed by technical language and unfamiliar conventions, and the financial costs. The research literature[9] identifies patterns of emotional and psychological harms – trauma, stress, stigmatisation, and feelings of being  “humiliated”, “bullied”, “afraid” and “overwhelmed” in court proceedings. In the Family Court, people often describe feeling feel blamed and pathologized[10]. In the Open Justice Court of Protection Project, we hear about the same sort of harms from family members involved in the Court of Protection: it’s “nerve-wracking’, “overwhelming” and “lonely” – leaving them feeling “helpless” and as if they are “foreign bodies in the hearing”.[11]

The same, unsurprisingly, is true for Caroline Grady and her family. She tells me she feels that her life was “taken over” by the Court, and that it’s been “the most exhausting and distressing chapter of our lives”.  She’s left feeling “devastated” and “exhausted” by what she’s been put through.  Harm caused to family members also harms the protected party, because it damages P’s familiar scaffolding and support network.[12]

It’s not just Caroline – we’ve also heard of her mother’s distress about the proceedings. In one hearing she expressed her sense of indignity at being found to lack capacity in certain areas of her life: “I do have capacity to make up my own mind. That makes me so angry, because I do have capacity. What I listen to, I take in. And I can respond coherently to other people”. In another, she  expressed her dismay about the court requirement that she be constantly supervised by paid carers (to protect her from her daughter): “I want a proper and normal life. I do not want to be somebody who is monitored and watched all the time. It is hurtful and I am not happy with that, who would be? It is not like they are a relative. They are always there and it is horrible”.

This case inevitably raises some difficult questions.  What was the psychological and emotional cost for the vulnerable elderly woman at the centre of this case of more than two years spent under constant supervision and prevented from unsupervised contact with the daughter she has a very close relationship with?  What was the cost for this family as a whole? 

Juridogenic harms need always to be weighed against the benefits of court intervention.  In this case, as in some others[13] I’ve witnessed, I’m not at all convinced that on balance the proceedings have contributed a net improvement in the lives of the protected party or her family

Daniel Clark is a Research Fellow in Open Justice at the University of Sussex. His research concerns public access to, and understanding of, courts and tribunals in England and Wales. He has a specific focus on applications relating to contempt of court, and in particular those that arise in the Court of Protection. Daniel is also a core team member of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project. He can be contacted on LinkedIn.

Amanda Hill is a PhD student at the School of Journalism, Media and Culture at Cardiff University. Her research focuses on the Court of Protection, exploring family experiences, media representations and social media activism. She is a core team member of OJCOP. She is also a daughter of a P in a Court of Protection case and has been a Litigant in Person. She can be contacted on LinkedIn (here).

Celia Kitzinger is co-director of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project and an Honorary Professor in the School of Law and Politics at Cardiff University. She is on LinkedIn (here), and also on X (@KitzingerCelia) and Bluesky (@kitzingercelia.bsky.social)

End notes


[1] The three published judgments are: Norfolk County Council v CA & Ors [2024] EWCOP 64 (T3); Norfolk County Council v Caroline Grady [2025] EWCOP 15 (T3); Norfolk County Council v CA & Ors [2025] EWCOP 16 (T3)

[2] The blog posts (in reverse date order):

[3] See “A remarkable turnaround: Updating the ‘vile judgment’ case”

[4] There were originally 36 allegations, but these were reduced by order of the judge to a list of 11 consolidated allegations.

[5] The injunction to the LPA only applied to Caroline and not her father, a fact that Counsel for the applicant brought up in the March 2026 hearing. This again illustrates how hard it is for lay people to fully understand court proceedings. It’s possible that this misunderstanding arose because of §140 of the “vile judgment” [2024] EWCOP 64 (T3) which states: “The risks of future harm to CA remain at present. CA needs to be protected from the harm particularly from DA [the cypher used for Caroline Grady in this judgment] but also from EA, CA’s ex-husband.” EA is Caroline’s father.

[6] https://www.linkedin.com/posts/anselm-eldergill-53146142_reform-eldergill-ugcPost-7471217629257646081–hwI/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop&rcm=ACoAADuX1HQB0Q_m3mh7jvi_Q2gP0df5aT6lmoY

[7] Carol Smart, 1989 Feminism and the Power of Law, Routledge

[8] The quotation is from Thomas G Gutheil, Harold J Bursztajn, Archie Brodsky and Larry H Strasburger, ‘Preventing “Critogenic” Harms: Minimizing Emotional Injury from Civil Litigation’ (2000) 28(1) Journal of Psychiatry & Law 5, 6.. They capture the same concept in the term “critogenic harm” (derived from crites, Greek for “judge”)

[9] For example: Michaela Keet, Heather Heavin and Shawna Sparrow, ‘Anticipating and Managing the Psychological Cost of Civil Litigation’ (2017) 34(2) Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 83; Feikoab Parimah and others, ‘A Snapshot of Emotional Harms Caused by the Litigation Process – Qualitative Data from Ghana’ (2021) 2 Forensic Science International: Mind and Law 100050; Thomas G Gutheil, Harold J Bursztajn, Archie Brodsky and Larry H Strasburger, ‘Preventing “Critogenic” Harms: Minimizing Emotional Injury from Civil Litigation’ (2000) 28(1) Journal of Psychiatry & Law 5, 6 < https://www.forensic-psych.com/articles/artPreventingCritogenicHarms.php; Sheelagh McGuinness, ‘The Harms of Criminal and Coronial Investigation in the Context of Reproductive Loss’ [2025] Criminal Law Review 5; Noel Semple, ‘The Cost of Seeking Civil Justice in Canada’ (2016) 93(3) Canadian Bar Review 639, 666

[10] Luke Clements and Ana Laura Aiello, Understanding Parent Blame (Bristol University Press 2025); Michael Layton, ‘Iatrogenic Harm and the Court of Protection'<https://openjusticecourtofprotection.org/2026/06/12/iatrogenic-harm-and-the-court-of-protection/ >

[11] For example, the blog post by ‘Hope’, ‘Counselling and Support Needed for Family Members in the Court of Protection’ https://openjusticecourtofprotection.org/2023/12/13/counselling-and-support-needed-for-family-members-in-the-court-of-protection/

[12] Iatrogenic harm and the Court of Protection https://openjusticecourtofprotection.org/2026/06/12/iatrogenic-harm-and-the-court-of-protection/

[13] Two other cases are described in the forthcoming chapter (co-authored with Amanda Hill) that I’ve drawn on in writing these reflections: Kitzinger C and Hill A 2027 “Juridogenic harm in the Court of Protection”, in Hidden Law Making in the Court of Protection (Edited by Judy Laing and Sheelagh McGuinness, Bristol University Press). These same two cases are also covered in the following blog posts: Celia Kitzinger, ‘Systems-Generated Trauma and Closed Proceedings: Hywel Dda University Health Board v P & Anor[2024] EWCOP 70 (T3)’ (Open Justice Court of Protection Project, 14 December 2025) < https://openjusticecourtofprotection.org/2025/12/14/systems-generated-trauma-and-closed-proceedings-hywel-dda-university-health-board-v-p-anor-2024-ewcop-70-t3/ and Sandra Preston and Joe Preston, ‘A Court Hearing and 23 Visits from 16 Officials: Family Doubt that “Deprivation of Liberty” Is Working in the Public Interest’ (Open Justice Court of Protection Project < https://openjusticecourtofprotection.org/2025/08/07/a-court-hearing-and-23-visits-from-16-officials-is-deprivation-of-liberty-working-in-the-public-interest/

Two siblings face imminent eviction due to care home closure: A race against time and a local authority lacking urgency

By Amanda Hill, 3rd November 2026

There’s a shocking new development in this case.

Two siblings, AA and BB, have lived together almost all their lives and now reside in the same care home. At a hearing on 11th September 2026 (blogged here) all parties agreed that it was in the best interests of the two siblings to live together. One had been facing eviction.

But now in a completely unexpected development announced on 15th September 2026, just four days after that hearing, it turns out that both siblings will be evicted. The new owners of the small care home the siblings live in have announced that they will be closing the care home in a few short weeks. A new home has to be found for the siblings, urgently.

This new development was reported at the latest hearing in these joined cases (COP 20005457 and COP 20031247) before DJ Clarke at First Avenue House, which I observed in person on Friday 30th October 2026.

One would think that in this situation, the local authority, the London Borough of Haringey, would pull out all the stops to find somewhere new for the siblings to live. The process is not easy. Not only are there two vulnerable people involved, each with their own care needs, but there are geographical constraints. A family member of the siblings, who has Lasting Power of Attorney for both Health and Welfare and Property and Affairs, is heavily involved in supporting them. Indeed, the judge said at the hearing that the local authority actually relies on the support of the family member, including taking one of the siblings to medical appointments. The new home has to be near the family member for that to continue. The Local Authority has cost constraints. Another constraint is that the new home must have a CQC registration or rating.

Once a potential placement has been identified, assessments need to be done to ensure that the placement can meet the needs of the siblings. And once they have been offered a place, the Local Authority has to approve the new placement.

And yet here we are at the beginning of November, with little time remaining before the home closes, and nothing has been arranged. As the judge said to the local authority during this hearing, the siblings “deserve to have a proper transition, which leaves you less time”.

The “Gardner documents” [1] I received shortly before the start of the hearing shed some light on what has happened since the closure of the current home was announced.

The family member has been frantically searching for a new provider herself and identified some possibilities. But she clearly felt she wasn’t getting a quick enough response from the LA. On 5th October 2026, the family member (a Litigant in Person) filed an urgent COP9 application “raising serious concerns about the LA’s conduct of the placement search and its alleged failure to follow-up on the six potential placements she had identified and brought to its attention, thereby losing valuable time in securing a viable options for the two [siblings].[2]

At a Round Table Meeting on 27th October, the LA explained that the “search remains constrained” by issues of cost, geographical proximity to the family member, CQC registration and the availability of suitable accommodation,  and they were considering looking further afield.

Each sibling is represented by their own litigation friend via the Official Solicitor. Each raised concerns about progress at the Round Table Meeting, including “delays in progressing assessments, the exclusion of placements above the local authority’s financial benchmark and the absence of a clear timetable for decision-making and transition”.

Although a number of issues were identified for the hearing, there was really only one issue addressed:  the need to progress the search for a new placement with the utmost urgency.

In the remainder of this blog, I will focus on the role of each participant in the search process before making final reflections.

The role of the family member in the search

Since the announcement that the care home was closing, the family member has clearly been making strenuous efforts to find a new placement for the siblings. But, as the judge stated during the hearing, the siblings are not self-funding their care and so the choice is not theirs, nor is it the choice of the LPA acting on their behalves. The local authority makes the decision and commissions the care. Having identified possible providers, the family member has to wait for the local authority to act. It seems as though rather than facilitating the search, there have been barriers to progress because of the LA. One placement had been lost due to a lack of action by the local authority. Another had been lost as the provider seemingly did not want to work with the London Borough of Haringey: this led the judge to remark that was a “damning view of Haringey”.

Another barrier to progress has been a lack of a clear communication route for the family member with the local authority. A key social worker involved in the process had been absent on leave due to a bereavement, which the judge said they couldn’t be criticised for. But the family member was not given another point of contact in their absence and is still struggling with communication with the LA.  The Litigation Friend for BB[3] stated that the family member should have a named person, but not the social worker; somebody who could respond quickly. He made the novel suggestion during the hearing of setting up a WhatsApp group including the family member, to facilitate communication.

The family member has also been proactive in applying to the court, and providing evidence of how the search has been progressing. This proved key in this hearing. For example, there was a discrepancy between the social worker’s statement about a potential provider and the family member’s. The social worker’s account stated that there were no places at a particular provider identified by the family member. However, the judge pointed out to Counsel for the LA, Rebecca Davies, that the family member’s evidence included recent emails from the potential provider that they have already done assessments on the siblings and were asking for more information which had not been responded to, indicating they did have places for the siblings.

The contrasting efforts made by the family member and the local authority reminded me of a comment Mrs Justice Lieven made about a family member in a different hearing I observed recently: “it’s their real life, it’s just our job”[4]. Professionals involved in cases like this do not have to live with the long term consequences of decisions made, unlike the family members. This is a possible explanation for the different degrees of urgency.

Counsel for the LA acknowledged the distress for the family member and said she was grateful that they were involved as “we don’t often have family members to speak for their family” and she acknowledged the value in that.[5]

The role of the London Borough of Haringey

Despite the efforts of the family member, it is the London Borough of Haringey that commissions and pays for the siblings’ care. And their priorities are different. One reason why placements proposed by the family member were not being considered was cost. The placement which was the subject of the “discrepancy” between accounts was, according to Counsel for the LA “more expensive than usual and funding is an issue to compare to other places”. The judges’ reply was that she hoped suitability was an issue too.

The placement which was the subject of the discrepancy was not CQC registered, to which somebody commented “it is”, and then the LA Counsel corrected herself to say that the LA has a policy not to place people in homes that do not have a CQC “rating” (due to not having been inspected). Another possible placement was also “not CQC registered” to which the judge replied that that was because they hadn’t opened yet.

The case summary referred to the local authority reviewing concerns about delays with “Brokerage”. I hadn’t heard of this before but a search online revealed that, for Residential and Nursing care placements in the London Borough of Haringey:“Residential and nursing care placements are commissioned on a spot contract basis via Adam’s Dynamic Purchasing System [DPS]. If a framework provider is unable to deliver a service, Brokerage can identify a provider outside of the Framework and commission a spot contract.”[6]

This internal process does not seem to be adapted to an urgent search for vulnerable people with very specific requirements.

All in all, the LA has not acted with sufficient urgency, for a variety of reasons.

The role of the Litigation Friends

Only one of the three legal representatives was the same as in the previous hearing I’d observed, and that was Tutku Bektas who represented AA by her litigation friend, the Official Solicitor. This continuity proved important. She told the court that she was the only Counsel who had been at the Round Table Meeting and recounted how when Brokerage were mentioned, that had “got a laugh” from the LA. Counsel for AA appeared shocked by this and she informed them that she wanted a focus on “collaboration” and that although some of the places being proposed “might be more expensive” there should be compromise about funding and the CQC. She wanted a clear explanation for why two of the providers were not being considered. She acknowledged that the court could not direct the London Borough of Haringey to commission a particular provider but she said the court could be “robust”.

This exchanged confirmed to me that the LA seemed to be mainly focussed on cost above other considerations.

Counsel for BB expressed grave concerns about the risks to the siblings of a placement not being found. Options were “falling away” and he was blunt in his assessment of the situation: “if ever there was a priority, this is one …the siblings could be placed in hospital and the impact would be devastating for them”.

He also outlined the role of the litigation friend in helping the family member. He told the court that they had helped her draw together her material, and could act as a “conduit” due to the “overwhelming” information. I also noticed that Counsel for AA was sitting right next to the family member, which is unusual. The family member cut less of a lone figure in this hearing compared to the previous one I’d observed.

The role of the court

The family member had applied to the court to get things moving. But the court has limited powers – it cannot order the LA to commission a provider. I did see the judge being robust, though. She had read all the papers and focussed on moving things forward. She stated, “I can direct them to provide information about how they have taken their decisions ….even if I can’t direct what they commission”.

She also said that she was considering listing future hearings for the 4th and 11th of November so that the court could keep what needs to be done “under consideration”. She remarked on the fact that the family member was not given a person to be in contact with when the Social Worker was absent. There was a failure to respond to the family member’s inability to contact appropriate people, and “her concerns were not being dealt with”. The judge said that she was considering “whether somebody more senior who can make decisions…from Brokerage or the Head of Social Services should attend the hearing”.

She stated she was “exceedingly concerned about this case” because “there is an incredibly strong bond between these individuals that has to be preserved whatever happens and there is nothing in the [LA] documents about how contact will be preserved.”

The family member voiced her concern that there were no sanctions for the LA and that “mistakes keep happening”.

The judge replied: “Let me be clear. There may be no sanctions…but the concerns you have raised lead me to consider more senior people attending court, people who make decisions. Haringey may not like that, but I will only have them here to make progress. I understand your increasing frustrations [about the placement that was lost]……. we have to focus on moving forward”.

The judge asked Counsel for the LA to seek instructions about two of the placements, whether or not they can be commissioned and what the LA contingency plan is if there are no placements arranged when the care home closes. The hearing was adjourned for 15 minutes.  Unfortunately, I had to leave the hearing at this point, so I don’t know what the final outcomes were. 

Final reflections

This case displays the limits of the Court of Protection, the immense pressure on social services, and the harm being caused to vulnerable people. And although the LA seems to be focussed on the financial cost of future care for the siblings, there are emotional and psychological costs too – for the siblings having to move, as well as for the family member trying to sort things out. The judge acknowledged how “stressful it must be for her”. And of course there is a substantial financial cost to the taxpayer of all the potential hearings resulting from the LA dragging its heels.

I hope that a suitable new home for these siblings is identified in time to allow an orderly transition, as I can only imagine how distressing this move will be for them. And I sincerely hope that they don’t end up in hospital as a backstop contingency.

Amanda Hill is a PhD student at the School of Journalism, Media and Culture at Cardiff University. Her research focuses on the Court of Protection, exploring family experiences, media representations and social media activism. She is a core team member of OJCOP. She is also a daughter of a P in a Court of Protection case and has been a Litigant in Person. She can be contacted on LinkedIn (here).

Endnotes


[1] Following the Court of Appeal’s decision in Re Gardner (Deceased) [2026] EWCA Civ 640, observers can request three documents (listed at PD4B para.4.2(a)-(c) COPR 2017), which are now commonly referred to as the “Gardner Documents”. These are the case summary, a chronology of relevant events, and the issues for determination at the hearing. I asked for these at the reception desk of First Avenue House, and the judge agreed I could have them, as she did at the last hearing. I am grateful to the LA legal team for providing these to me so I could read them before the hearing.

[2] In the blogs about this case, we have disguised certain details to limit the risk of jigsaw identification of the protected parties

[3] A Mr Slater, but I didn’t catch his first name

[4] COP 13630253  before Lieven RCJ  Tuesday 15th September 2026

[5] I was surprised by this comment, as I observe a lot of hearings where a family member is there to speak for their family, but it’s rarer that their value is acknowledged.

[6] Source: https://haringeyadults.trixonline.co.uk/chapter/commissioning-and-brokerage-procedures#residential-and-nursing-care-placements

Covert recording and contact restrictions

By Amanda Hill, 1st November 2026

The main issue for this hearing was prohibiting covert recording and re-establishing contact between a mother and her son.

Gravely concerned about her son’s care, the mother had resorted to covert recording by giving her son a teddy bear with a hidden device inside. After listening to the recordings, she went to the police, assuming – on the basis of what she’d recorded – that her son would be moved from where he was living.

But when the covert recording was revealed, the Health Board stopped contact between mother and son, and made an application to the court (on 21st August 2026) for an interim injunction to prohibit her from recording in future and to re-establish a (restricted) contact regime.

The main issues for determination at this hearing (COP 13290314, before HHJ Porter-Bryant, sitting at Cardiff Civil and Family Justice Centre on 5th October 2026) were the injunction against the mother (“CL”) and best interests for her son (the protected party, “LL”) concerning the covert recording and the contact schedule.

The litigation friend for LL (not the Official Solicitor in this case) agreed that an injunction concerning contact was necessary to “preserve the current placement” and to protect LL’s privacy, as well as the privacy of others (staff members) who were also recorded. The litigation friend also agreed with the contact restrictions proposed by the Health Board.

The police took no further action and LL stayed where he lives.

But the mother is now not the only party to be concerned by the recordings. The position statement for LL records that, having listened to the covert recordings at a strategy meeting three days before this latest hearing, the litigation friend “has grave concerns as to the contents of these recordings and wishes to address these concerns in evidence”.

This hearing focussed on the injunction against CL and re-establishing contact between CL and LL, but also considered the concerns raised by the recordings and recent changes of care staff.

In this blog I will set out the background to the case before focussing on key decisions and issues arising in the hearing.

Background

This hearing is part of a long-running case (more than 5 years now) described by the judge as “protracted”, “costly” and “underscored by significant disputes between the parties, principally the Health Board and CL” (§4, Swansea Bay University Health Board v P and Ors [2023] EWCOP 67).

I have observed seven hearings since April 2024, and the Open Justice Court of Protection Project has published three blogs about the case (listed at the end of this post).

There are also two published judgments: Swansea Bay University Health Board v P and Ors [2023] EWCOP 67 (concerning a hearing which we blogged about) and an (unsuccessful) appeal before a Tier 3 judge (CL v Swansea Bay University Health Board & Ors [2024] EWCOP 22). HHJ Porter-Bryant has been the presiding judge in this case since the Health Board first applied to the Court of Protection in July 2021. The court over time has been asked to make decisions regarding LL’s residence, care and contact with others.

The protected party in this case has a number of diagnoses including significant learning disability, atypical autism, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, hypermobility, low muscle tone, bowel problems, neuralgia and hydrocephalus. Until July 2021, he lived at home with his mum, CL, supported by carers and funded by a CHC package. The case was originally brought before the Court of Protection at that time because, according to the Health Board, the care package had broken down due to disagreements between mum and the care provider. The 2023 judgment states that “The Health Board has consistently struggled to find providers willing and able to provide a package of care to [LL]. In part, this has been due to the size of the package and lack of staffing resources generally in the area, but also due to the disagreement set out above” (§6). LL was moved to a new placement a significant distance from his home town, despite at a hearing on April 19th 2024, the judge saying “Community is of magnetic importance to LL, he is a (home town) boy”. That move was intended to be temporary. It broke down in May 2024 and LL moved to a new placement, still far away from his home town, one and a half hour’s drive away. That is where he lives today.

Contact restrictions imposed on LL’s mum are a recurring feature of this case. The 2023 judgment describes the detailed protocols providing for contact between them. The Health Board has argued that contact restrictions are needed to protect the placement, and the court has continued to authorise them. Mum has always been represented as a threat to the stability of care for her son. In the hearings I have observed, she has often been concerned about the care her son is receiving and asked the Health Board to consider different options, particularly those closer to his home town. She has contacted potential care providers herself. To date, the Health Board have not commissioned other options. The Health Board position statement for this hearing set out the current situation: “At the present time there are no viable alternative placements for LL and therefore no live dispute to resolve”.

Decisions at this hearing (5th October 2026)

Injunction

This latest hearing primarily considered whether the interim injunction against mum should be maintained. The judge authorised the continued injunction against mum video-recording and audio-recording her son. He did make the point that the injunction should be worded so that it does not prevent mum making ordinary family videos of her son, such as on his birthday. The judge also authorised the interim changes to contact arrangements between mum and her son. At present mum has no face to face contact at all with her son and efforts are to be made for supervised contact to resume.

Deprivation of liberty

A decision about LL’s deprivation of liberty was deferred until the next hearing, but Counsel for the Health Board, Rhys Hadden, reported the (shared) view of the Health Board and LL’s Litigation Friend, that following the Supreme Court AGNI decision, LL was unlikely to be deprived of his liberty. However, the judge would maybe need a whole day to consider that at the next hearing, to be listed for 11th December 2026. It will be interesting to see how much weight is given to contact restrictions as a factor in the multi-factorial decision. §2.5 of the DoLS Code gives two examples of contact restriction factors that may indicate a Deprivation of Liberty: (a) Staff exercise control over assessments, treatment, contacts and residence (b) The person is unable to maintain social contacts because of restrictions placed on their access to other people.

CL attendance at LL’s medical appointments

CL was requesting permission to attend medical appointments with her son. He is currently taken to them by care staff. Her counsel submitted that there is a high turnover of staff and that new staff don’t always understand previous medical issues. But Counsel for the Health Board submitted that the care provider would not allow CL to attend medical appointments as she would overwhelm care staff if she was in the same room as them. LL’s father, the 3rd respondent in this case, stated that CL knows LL better than anyone, and it was concerning that staff turnover means staff don’t have the medical knowledge about LL. The judge decided not to allow CL to attend medical appointments: he was not prepared to make an exception to the contact schedule. He would order that medical information should be shared with CL but (he said) he was not going to get into an argument about the appropriate channel for that.

Carers: Suspensions and professional boundaries

Counsel for the Health Board revealed at the start of the hearing that the care provider is conducting an internal investigation and three of LL’s carers have now been temporarily suspended, as a result of what had been revealed by the covert recording, but that no inference should be drawn from this and it was standard practice. He also stated that two other care staff had stepped down or been moved on, and so the care providers were trying to recruit new staff. This impacted mum having people to supervise contact. Later in the hearing, Counsel for the Health Board clarified that the care provider had asked the two carers to step down as they were concerned about professional boundaries being crossed. The judge asked what that meant, but there didn’t seem to be anything more concrete. He asked the Litigation Friend if they would be concerned about that: were those boundaries being too close to, or too distant from, LL or CL, and wouldn’t they want to find out more? The Litigation Friend replied that the Health Board didn’t have any more information.

CL’s representative shed a little more light. She told the court that CL had said the two carers were asked to relay information that was not true to CL, and that when they had refused to do that, they were ‘let go’. CL asked whether those carers could still facilitate supervised contact using direct payments. The judge replied that he didn’t have the power to authorise that, but the Health Board were in the courtroom and would hear the request. There seemed to be an implication that the carers had been ‘let go’ because they were too close to CL and would not lie on behalf of the care providers. LL’s dad said that the two carers had a “great relationship” with LL. LL’s parents wanted them involved in their son’s care, or to facilitate contact. The Health Board agreed to add a recital to the order about the two previous carers. The judge reiterated that there was a limit to what he could do, and he could not order the care agency to reinstate or rota staff.

Complaints and the impact of the Transparency Order

The position statement for the Health Board refers to CL making numerous complaints to regulatory bodies and states that transparent and swift responses to those complaints are “hampered by the Transparency Order and the inability to share important information from proceedings”. The Health Board was seeking the court to order the disclosure of court judgments and orders with “regulatory and inspectorate bodies investigating public bodies, care agencies or professionals involved in LL’s care”. LL’s Litigation Friend was content for the Health Board to share court judgments and sealed orders with the regulatory and inspectorate bodies investigating public bodies, but wanted more “limited wording” for care agencies or professionals involved in LL’s care, to preserve LL’s privacy.

My notes don’t refer to this issue in the hearing, so I’m not sure whether it came up or I missed it. I haven’t yet had sight of the approved order, which I have asked for but not yet received. I find the request from the Health Board puzzling though. The Transparency Order has a standard paragraph at 9(ii) confirming the applicability of paragraphs 33-37 of Part 3 of PD4A, which reads (in part):

Court etiquette

Both of LL’s parents were in court – but the judge addressed them differently. HHJ Porter-Bryant referred to CL as “Ms (Surname)”. But he addressed LL’s dad by his first name. This is consistent with the other hearings I’ve observed in this case where both parents have been present. I don’t recall this happening in any other case. Either all family members are addressed by their first names with their consent or they are all addressed with titles and surnames. Maybe at the very beginning of this case the judge asked how each parent would like to be addressed – I don’t know – but for an observer, the impression this conveys is that the judge has a better relationship with LL’s dad than with his mum, and that his evidence counts for more.

Following up on concerns

Newport City Council, not a party to these proceedings, is conducting a safeguarding enquiry. The Litigation Friend stated towards the end of the hearing that the police were possibly going to look again at the concerns. LL’s Litigation Friend sought a third party order against Newport City Council, to obtain their safeguarding records, and information from the police. The Litigation Friend wants to look further into the recordings, but accept that there must be an element of proportionality, as there were 21 days of recordings. He also requested the transcripts and the judge agreed.

I have requested a copy of the approved order to confirm these details but to date I haven’t had a reply.

I plan to observe the next hearing on 11th December 2026, to see what has happened following the concerns raised, and also to see what the determination about LL’s deprivation of liberty is. I hope CL can start seeing her son in person too.

Amanda Hill is a PhD student at the School of Journalism, Media and Culture at Cardiff University. Her research focuses on the Court of Protection, exploring family experiences, media representations and social media activism. She is a core team member of OJCOP. She is also a daughter of a protected party in a Court of Protection case and has been a Litigant in Person. She is on LinkedIn (here).

Previous blog posts about this case

Can a judge discharge a Deputy without determination of wrong-doing? Statutory determination in action

Crisis point: Is hospital a viable alternative for P

Unsuccessful application for permission to appeal

Photo by Sandy Millar on Unsplash

Everyone agrees it’s in the best interests of two siblings to live together – but is that possible?

By Daniel Clark and Amanda Hill, 29th October 2026

Two siblings, AA and BB, have lived together almost all their lives and now reside in the same care home. However, one has been served with an eviction notice and there is therefore a risk that they’ll be separated. It now falls to the Court of Protection to consider where it is in the best interests of these two siblings to live and receive care.

It’s not often there is a court hearing with two protected parties.  As we were both in London on the morning of Friday 11th September 2026, we decided to go along to this unusual in-person hearing before DJ Clarke at First Avenue House, concerning AA (COP 20005457) and BB (COP 20031247).

It proved to be an interesting hearing. AA’s case has been before the court for quite a while, but BB has more recently become a protected party and, as the cases are interlinked, the two cases are now being dealt with together. A family member (CC), with Lasting Power of Attorney for both siblings, was a Litigant in Person at this hearing.

The two siblings at the centre of this case have been very close all their lives, and were living together until Spring 2023, when AA had a number of falls and, after a long period in hospital, moved to a care home in Spring 2025. BB remained living at the flat, cared for by CC. But BB herself was admitted to hospital in Summer 2025 and was shortly after admitted to the same home as AA. Both have dementia and reduced mobility, and a number of other (different) health conditions. Therefore, their care needs are different.

In Winter 2025 the care home served an eviction notice on BB, on the basis that they are unable to meet her needs (it seems as a result of so-called challenging behaviour which, we heard during the hearing, has now since abated). This risks the siblings being permanently separated for the first time in a very long time.

The proceedings in respect of AA were pretty much concluded prior to the proceedings in respect of BB commencing. As the court and the parties have recognised that it is important to maintain the relationship between the two siblings – in whatever ways this might be possible – the proceedings in respect of AA were stayed rather than concluded. The Official Solicitor acts as their litigation friend but, as the best interests of each sibling may diverge at some stage, each is represented by a different legal team.

Another important issue that had been occupying time for two of the parties was the issue of funding for BB. The ICB (NHS West and North London ICB) had concluded that BB was ineligible for CHC funding and the local authority, London Borough of Haringey, had disputed this. But very shortly before the hearing the LA accepted funding responsibility for BB, and so would be funding both AA and BB. This was a key issue to resolve because the siblings are not living in a nursing home and if the ICB had funded BB, that would only have been if she was in a nursing home.

The court was now being asked to make directions about steps to be taken to enable decisions about residence and care. Due to the specific nature of the protected parties, we have disguised some details to prevent jigsaw identification, and have not reported other details. In this short blog,  we would like to draw out some key points.

Gardner documents and open justice

Following the Court of Appeal’s decision in Re Gardner (Deceased) [2026] EWCA Civ 640, observers can request three documents (listed at PD4B para.4.2(a)-(c) COPR 2017), which are now commonly referred to as the “Gardner Documents”. These are the case summary, a chronology of relevant events, and the issues for determination at the hearing.  Before the hearing, when we were at the reception desk of First Avenue House, we asked for a message to be passed to the judge asking that we be provided with the Gardner documents. We request these a lot of the time, but rarely receive them – in fact, Daniel had never received them.

The issue was raised by the judge at the start of the hearing, largely for the benefit of the LIP. The judge explained that Court of Protection hearings are private hearings, but they can be in public (subject to a Transparency Order). She continued that there is recent case law to “promote open justice and transparency” and that certain documents are usually provided to observers. The judge stated that the professional parties do not object to us receiving them but, saying, addressing CC,  that she understands that each of them, AA, BB, and CC  “jealously guard your privacy in relation to your personal matters. And I don’t mean that in a negative way”.

After a query from CC as to what the judge meant by observers, the judge went on to say that, “I don’t usually inquire why observers are here and they are usually entitled to be. The two observers are both members of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project which seeks to promote open justice within the Court of Protection. And they do blog but they do so responsibly. So, they report on certain cases but they do so in terms of the Transparency Order … and are no more identifiable than in the court list. My understanding from seeing their blog posts is that their reporting is responsible and has been recognised as such”.

Having heard this, CC had no objection to us receiving the documents, provided that her relatives were only referred to by their initials during the hearing. The judge said they would try to keep to this, but assured CC again that we were covered by the Transparency Orders.

We were pleasantly surprised when the judge then asked her clerk to hand us hard copies of the three documents, which had obviously been printed in advance of the hearing. Unlike position statements, these three documents can (at least in this case) be read at a glance as well as in depth. This meant, complemented with a brief case summary from the judge, we could follow the hearing well. For example when, during the course of submissions, an event in July 2025 was referenced, we could cast our eye over the chronology to see an outline of what happened.

Our understanding of this hearing was greatly enhanced by receiving the ‘Gardner documents’ at the start of the hearing. It meant that we understood quite a lot of the background of the case, and also meant that time didn’t need to be taken up by the judge giving a lengthy opening summary. In other words, the Gardner documents were good for observers and good for court time.

One downside of not having position statements is that we can’t be confident of the names of the barristers who acted in this case (position statements contain the barrister’s name at the bottom of the final page). Furthermore, as there was a lot of discussion before the hearing and the adjournment, we didn’t have an opportunity to ask.

Parties

The London Borough of Haringey is the applicant in respect of AA, and the first respondent in respect of BB. They were represented at this hearing by a legal team we weren’t able to identify.

AA is the respondent in CoP 20005457, and was represented by another legal team we were unable to identify.

BB is the applicant in CoP 20031247, and was represented by a Mr O’Brien.

CC is a respondent in both sets of proceedings, and represents herself.

The NHS West and North London ICB was a respondent in BB’s case, though we think they have now been discharged as a party. The ICB was represented by someone whose name sounded like Ms Stanley, though we may have misheard this.

The importance of love and the risks of being separated

All the parties in the courtroom and the Judge agreed that the siblings should stay living in the same place if at all possible. BB’s legal representative submitted that as the issue of who paid for BB’s care had been resolved, it was in the best interest of both protected parties to stay together. He stated that the impact for BB of being separated from their sibling was likely to be so emotionally detrimental that it would outweigh any clinical benefit achieved by moving her to a nursing home if that move entailed being separated from the other sibling. Towards the end of the hearing, the judge ordered various risk assessments to be carried out, one of which was the risks to the siblings of being separated. We haven’t seen this before.

A family member as Litigant in Person

The Litigant in Person (LIP) cut a lone figure at the end of the front row dominated by legal professionals. There was a lawyer for the Local Authority, the London Borough of Haringey, another one for NHS West and North London ICB, and each protected party had their own barrister. As is usual, there were solicitors sitting behind them, as well as a social worker for one of the siblings (the social worker for the other sibling did not attend for – wholly understandable – personal reasons).

CC told the judge at the start that she felt disadvantaged in light of all the legal professionals involved: “I have to struggle with this by myself…I’m having no help”.

The judge commented on that towards the end of the hearing, after CC had left as she wasn’t feeling well. She acknowledged that CC was struggling with the volume of people in the courtroom and she was thankful for the efforts of the legal professionals to help mitigate that, and their efforts “behind the scenes” too.

Potential harm to protected parties because of the court process

It transpired that what was going on behind the scenes was an important issue. As both the protected parties are in the same care home, and of course have their own legal representatives, the care home is receiving a lot of paperwork about the Court of Protection cases. And visits from different people.

CC argued that this could cause harm, as the care home is not very big and one person is having to deal with all the paperwork. She worried that this would be an additional factor that the home would take account of in deciding whether to enforce the eviction notice.  This raises the possibility of the Court of Protection process itself harming a protected party, if it resulted in a person being separated from their sibling.

The judge summarised her concerns as such: “if one of the issues is that the care home is unwilling to revoke the notice because they are being bombarded with correspondence, this is something the parties need to address”. During an adjournment so she could read some documentation, she directed the parties to discuss what could be done about this. 

Dispute between two public bodies about funding for BB.

If the ICB had accepted responsibility for funding BB’s care, the siblings would have to be separated as funding for BB would only have been in a nursing home. The ICB’s representative confirmed that was the decision of the assistant director of the ICB. It is outside the scope of this blog to go further into the issue of public bodies arguing about who pays for a person’s residence and care, save to point out that the funding is all being paid for by the public purse, otherwise known as the taxpayer. This sort of dispute illustrates the blurred distinction between the NHS (Health) and Adult Social Care. As a result of the local authority becoming responsible for BB’s funding, it was agreed by all parties that the ICB could be discharged as a party to BB’s case.

Final reflections

This hearing was ultimately about the court trying its best to find a way of two siblings being able to stay together. But ultimately the decision is one for the care home’s new owners, who have served the eviction notice on BB. Let’s hope that a way can be found for them not to be separated after many years of being with each other. And that the very proceedings which are working to keep them together are not a factor in the eviction notice being enforced.

Daniel Clark is a Research Fellow in Open Justice at the University of Sussex. His research concerns public access to, and understanding of, courts and tribunals in England and Wales. He has a specific focus on applications relating to contempt of court, and in particular those that arise in the Court of Protection. Daniel is also a core team member of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project. He can be contacted on LinkedIn.

Amanda Hill is a PhD student at the School of Journalism, Media and Culture at Cardiff University. Her research focuses on the Court of Protection, exploring family experiences, media representations and social media activism. She is a core team member of OJCOP. She is also a daughter of a P in a Court of Protection case and has been a Litigant in Person. She can be contacted on LinkedIn (here).


Contesting deprivation of liberty post-AGNI: Not a marginal case but “the very exemplar of why the state is under an obligation to provide safeguards”, says HHJ Hilder

By Celia Kitzinger, 28th October 2026

The main issue before the court at this hearing (COP 20013994 on 27th October 2026) was a dispute as to whether or not the residence and care arrangements, agreed to be in the best interests of the young woman at the centre of this case (“BW”), amount to a deprivation of liberty under Article 5 ECHR.

According to the local authority, BW is not deprived of her liberty following AGNI[1], meaning that the current DOL authorisation due to expire at 11.59pm on the day of this hearing did not need to be renewed.

The Official Solicitor and another respondent (whose identity and relationship – if any – to BW is protected by the Transparency Order both disagree: both consider that BW is deprived of her liberty, and that the DOL safeguards need to remain in place.

It’s been a long-running case, active since December 2022, first before DJ Mullins and then,  since October 2024, before HHJ Hilder[2].  It’s raised complex  issues and has involved, as HHJ Hilder pointed out, “a considerable expense of public funds”.  This was not a final hearing: it will be back in court for a review hearing in April 2027.

Capacity has already been determined across a wide range of decisions. BW has autism, “low adaptive functioning”, situational mutism (she communicates fluently and copiously in writing but not orally), and a history of significant trauma and attachment difficulties. The court has determined that she lacks capacity to conduct proceedings, and to make decisions about her care and support, where she resides, her social media and internet usage, contact with others, her property and affairs, and her care plan. (BW disputes these determinations and says she has “capacity in everything”.)

Best interests has also been agreed. It’s common ground between the parties that BW’s current arrangements for residence and care are in her best interests. She lives in a self-contained flat as a tenant in a supported living service, with care commissioned by the applicant local authority as s.117 aftercare provision.  There’s also a TZ-style care plan in place: family members can come and go without limitation, but potential sexual partners are subject to “Clare’s Law checks” (the Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme) and so far two persons have not satisfied these checks so BW has not been permitted to meet with them. 

At this hearing before HHJ Hilder, in person at First Avenue House, observers were able to access a remote link: the judge and legal representatives were in the physical courtroom. The local authority was represented by Jonathan Auburn KC of 11 KBW. BW was represented by Victoria Butler-Cole KC of 39 Essex Chambers through her litigation friend, the Official Solicitor, who instructed Leigh Day. The other respondent acted as a litigant in person.

The hearing was initially listed for half a day in the morning of 27th October 2026 (a time when I was not available to observe it) – but I learnt from other observers in the lunch break that an oral judgment would be delivered at 3pm in the afternoon and that’s what I report on here, with thanks to the judge and staff for facilitating late provision of the link.

Local Authority’s position

HHJ Hilder summarised the Local Authority’s reasoning as to why BW’s residence and care arrangements do not amount to a ‘deprivation of liberty’,  and are a long way from the paradigm case of the prison cell. 

BW lives in her own flat as a tenant. She has exclusive possession, and she holds the key.  She can and does exclude staff from entering, and although staff do have a key, it’s for emergency use only.  BW can leave the building whenever she wishes, so long as she is accompanied by staff, and can also leave on her own in accordance with the “Going Out on My Own Agreement” (part of a “Support Reduction Plan”) which specifies where she can go, arrangements for keeping in touch with staff, and requires her to wear a tracking device and return by a curfew. In point of fact, she does not comply with this plan and leaves the building without staff. She doesn’t have a key for the main entrance but exits by setting off the fire alarm. She has travelled as far afield as Scotland and Wales – returning, with police escort, willingly and without restraint.  That, say the local authority, is not objective confinement. 

Since BW is not objectively confined, there’s no need to establish whether there’s valid consent.  It’s true that she objects – but her objections are to Article 8 restrictions, and not to objective deprivation of liberty. She likes her flat. This is not like a prison and it’s not punitive. She can access the community every day: the restriction is only on how she does that.

Official Solicitor’s (and other respondent’s) position

The Official Solicitor (with whom the other respondent agrees) takes a very different position.

They say that tracking devices and curfews are NOT hallmarks of normality – they are material indicators that BW is not at liberty. When she has strayed outside her permitted area, she’s dumped the tracker in a dustbin.

She is not free to leave the building when she wishes to because she doesn’t have fob or key access to the community door.  When BW does not comply with the terms of the agreement, further restrictions are imposed. When she tried to leave by setting off the fire alarm, the staff obstructed the door.

The other respondent disputes the local authority’s claim that the key held by staff is used only in emergency and says staff do access P’s flat, using that key, for non-emergency reasons. She also notes that CCTV (which the local authority say is only in communal areas for collective security) is used to monitor BWs’ movements to prevent independent access to the rear garden and to the upper staircase (where some else lives).

Critically, BW objects to her living and care arrangements. The judge mentioned a long list of specified objections at §2(i) of the Official Solicitor’s position statement – which I don’t have access to and she decided not to read out.[3] I gathered, however, that BW describes the staff as her “jailors”, and her flat as a “prison” or “secure unit”: BW has spent time in a psychiatric hospital “and she says it’s not that much different”.  The Official Solicitor had also drawn attention to the language in one of the protocol documents which refers to “absconding” – “an unusual term to apply to a living arrangement that does not include deprivation of liberty”.

Insofar as BW appreciates some aspects of her flat, the Official Solicitor (and the other respondent) say this does not detract from the fact she does not want to live there and consistently says she wants to live somewhere else. She doesn’t want staff supervision and support – believing that she can live independently and she would prefer to do so. She would not want to live in her current accommodation if she had a choice. She does not want staff to vet her prospective sexual partners.  She tells her her legal representatives and the court that she wants “the DOL” removed.

According to the Official Solicitor, this is a deprivation of liberty post-AGNI, but it would have been a deprivation of liberty even before Cheshire West: it would always have been a deprivation of liberty.  It is, says the Official Solicitor, an “obvious” deprivation of liberty.

Why does it matter whether or not this is an Article 5 deprivation of liberty?

Before determining the issue, HHJ Hilder considered it constructive “to take a sideways step into considering what the point of this argument is”.  The parties agree that care and residence arrangements are in BW’s best interests. They agree that the court should retain oversight, and that the matter should be listed for review hearing in 6 months time. 

“What then is the significance of labelling it as a ‘deprivation of liberty’ or not?”, asked the judge.

The local authority had (said the judge) accepted that it made no difference to court oversight whether the court were to decide that there was ‘only’ an Article 8 restriction or whether BW was also deprived of her liberty.   Preparation for the review hearing in six months time would be same either way, and the range of possible outcomes at that hearing would be the same.  The judge concluded: “On that basis, in my view there is no substantive difference for BW today in terms of court oversight whether or not the arrangements are labelled ‘deprivation of liberty’. I leave to others any comment on the implications of that.”

The Official Solicitor and the other respondent had been offered the opportunity to explore with the judge what difference there might be in terms of BW’s perception and the impact on her of the ‘deprivation of liberty’ determination.  The judge had (she said):

“… canvassed the possibility that without the label there would be no deprivation of liberty, which would match her wishes. They were both very clear that absence of the label would not improve BW’s perception of things. When she says she wants “NO DOL”, she means none of these care arrangements. She could not understand the same care arrangements remaining without the deprivation of liberty label.  This would only create more conflict and friction with staff.”

HHJ Hilder’s determination: Is this a deprivation of liberty post-AGNI?

I have tried to capture as accurately as possible what the judge said in arriving at her decision.  She did make the point at the beginning of the afternoon that “oral judgments are necessarily less carefully crafted and less detailed” but said she was unable to provide a written judgment since Friday is her last sitting day.[4]

The judge started by citing a series of passages from the  AGNI judgment.

  • “The starting point in assessing whether someone has been deprived of liberty within the meaning of article 5 is the specific situation of the individual concerned, and the assessment is multifactorial, with account taken of a whole range of factors including the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question” (§53(i) AGNI)
  • There is an overlap between the objective and subjective element so “the assessment of the objective element can take account of the specific context and circumstances of restrictive measures that are different from the paradigm of confinement in a cell” ((§53(iii) AGNI).
  • The effect of restrictions on the individual is relevant to objective element. Both “relative normality of the placement” and “the purpose for which a measure has been taken” are factors to be considered (§53(iv) AGNI).
  • The court’s approach “should be practical and realistic” (§ 53(5) AGNI).
  • “The difference between deprivation and restriction of liberty is one of degree or intensity, and not one of nature or substance”.   “Where there are a number of restrictions involved in the treatment of an individual, it is necessary to consider them cumulatively and in combination to assess their overall effect on the individual” (§119 AGNI).
  • “The degree of understanding an individual in fact has regarding their circumstances, even though they lack legal capacity, is an important part of their concrete situation” (§123 AGNI)
  • “If a restrictive measure is imposed with the aim of punishment or coercion against someone’s will, it will more closely approximate to the paradigm of imprisonment in a prison cell” (§ 130 AGNI –  and §146 AGNI).
  • The Supreme Court specifically recognised that deprivation of liberty could apply to someone living in their own home. “However, if an individual is living in their own home, in accordance with their wishes and feelings, it makes it less likely that the individual is being subject to a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of article 5” (§193 AGNI).

HHJ Hilder had considered the other published judgments post-AGNI, which the parties had put before her, and concluded they were “of very limited assistance. They are illustrative of how judges have seen other cases. They are not binding on me – and anyway two, I’m told,  are subject to appeal”[5]   She continued:

“So, I focus on the concrete situation for BW. I am absolutely certain that BW has a clear understanding of what her circumstances are. She has other experiences to compare it to. She can and does articulate something different. She understands the care package to be aimed at securing restrictions on her that she does not want. She may regard her flat as home in the absence of any other, but she’s not living there “in accordance with her wishes and feelings”. She’s adamant that she does not want to be ‘on a DOL’ – I accept submissions from the Official Solicitor and [the other respondent] that what she means is that she does not want to be in these care arrangements.

So, I’m in no doubt at all that there is an element of coercion in these care arrangements. Without them, it’s inevitable that she’d remove herself and put herself at risk of serious harm. In fact, it’s been demonstrated that she will remove herself even with these restrictions. She removes the tracking devices and comes back only under escort from the police. I am mindful of the overlap between objective and subjective elements. BW’s living arrangements do amount to confinement to a restricted space. She’s not at liberty to be able to leave when she can do so only with two carers in attendance, or only on 2 days a week, to limited destinations, with a tracking device and a curfew. 

I am equally satisfied that BW is not giving valid consent. BW is objecting as loudly and frequently as her condition enables her to do. I agree with Ms Butler-Cole that this is not  a marginal situation.  This is the  very exemplar of why the state is under an obligation to provide safeguards.

So, applying the AGNI multi-factorial test, in my judgment BW’s living arrangements do amount to a deprivation of liberty.

And in accordance with agreement between parties – and acceptance by this court –  that those living arrangements are in her best interests,  I will authorise that deprivation of liberty until the date of the next hearing.

That is the end of my judgment.

Celia Kitzinger is co-director of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project. She is on LinkedIn (here), and also on X (@KitzingerCelia) and Bluesky (@kitzingercelia.bsky.social)

Endnotes


[1] A Reference by the Attorney General for Northern Ireland [2026] UKSC 16

[2] I’ve watched four hearings (all since December 2024): many other hearings have been covered by other observers.

[3] I am grateful to have received a useful Case Summary and a Chronology (two of the so-called ‘Gardner documents’) but – as ever – these documents are not a substitute for understanding the substance of the legal arguments advanced by the parties (albeit that they were summarised in this case by the judge).

[4] I understand that the judge had offered the parties the opportunity to have the case deferred and heard by a Tier 3 judge who might provide a published judgment, but none of the parties pushed for this.

[5] These are:  Re AR (Whether restrictions amount to a deprivation of liberty) [2026] EWCOP 45 (T2) and Derby City Council v SM [2026] EWCOP 46 (T2)

Photo by 🇻🇪 Jose G. Ortega Castro 🇲🇽 on Unsplash

Two non-compliance hearings concerning Finance Deputyship applications: Finding pragmatic ways forward

By Celia Kitzinger, 23rd October 2026

There were five hearings concerning ‘non-compliance with court orders’ listed, for 15 minutes each, before DJ Ellington sitting remotely at First Avenue House on Monday 19th October 2026.  I watched two of them, at 11am and 12.30pm.[1]

­­­­Both hearings concerned family members who’d made applications to become Deputies for Property and Financial Affairs[2] for their relative with dementia.  Progress on both applications had stalled due to the applicants’ adverse financial histories.

These two cases involving family members were very different from “non-compliance” hearings we’ve blogged about before where it was public bodies who had failed to obey court orders (see: “This cannot be allowed to carry on”: A non-compliance hearing with NHS Humber and North Yorkshire ICB” and “Non-compliance:  What happens when public bodies don’t obey court orders?”).  In both of these earlier non-compliance hearings, there was some “stern talking” from the judge. to the lawyers representing the public bodies.

In these two cases, by contrast, it was immediately apparent that the judge’s aim was not to rebuke the applicants, but to discover what had gone wrong – with a clear awareness that this may have been something completely outside the control of the family members – and then find the best way forward. In both cases, this turned out to be appointing the applicants as Deputies.

My main take-away from watching these two hearings was an understanding about why there are such long delays in dealing with some applications for Finance Deputyships and how this judge tried to put right the court delays and inefficiencies that had beset these two applications.

1. Application stalled by non-compliance with an order made in error

The first of the two hearings I watched lasted a little over 10 minutes.

The judge, reading from the court papers, said that her understanding was that there was a problem with the application for Deputyship from P’s daughter (D) and granddaughter (G), because  there were “issues relating to historical insolvency”. Another judge had apparently ordered them both to submit evidence about this. The court had received this evidence from D, but not from G. 

G said immediately that she’d “never been bankrupt or anything like that”.  Her mother added: “G was 6 years old when we went bankrupt”. 

“So, you think it’s an error in the order,” said the judge, looking through the files.  “Okay, sometimes there is some misunderstanding”. 

After a short pause while the judge looked through the documentation, she said, “Oh yes, they’ve put applicants in the plural,  and that’s how it’s gone down this route”.

It seems that the delay in processing this application  – I think a delay of about 18 months – was occasioned by a mistaken plural reference form in an order.  It meant that the court was waiting for evidence about insolvency from G, who has never been insolvent and on whom such an order should never have served.

The judge then checked the rest of the application. She verified that P had been notified of the application: the correct form (an application notification and acknowledgement form (COP14PADep) had been completed by a social worker on 30th March 2025. She also checked that other relatives had been notified of the application.

She then checked the details of P’s estate – at which point it became apparent that she had no income apart from state benefits, and that D and G had not applied to become DWP appointees (see: https://www.gov.uk/become-appointee-for-someone-claiming-benefits) This was a concern.

Judge: Part of the Mental Capacity Act is we have to make the least restrictive decision. The general view is appointeeship through DWP is a less restrictive system than deputyship. Also, if you obtain deputyship, you have additional duties. You have to obtain a security bond which will cost money and you have to do an annual report to the OPG. And they prefer it online so you have to be tech-savvy too.  Why have you applied for Deputyship rather than appointeeship?

Granddaughter: We were advised by the Social Worker to get Deputyship.  Also not having Deputyship is something I know is causing problems for other people I know who can’t access the bank with only an appointeeship.

Judge: That’s a problem with the bank, not the legal system. But this has been waiting long enough.

Granddaughter: Yes!

Daughter: We agree!

Judge: So, I will give you deputyship – but you may wish to apply for discharge after that.  I need you to be aware of the added burdens this is going to give you above appointeeship.  But you won’t have difficulty opening a bank account.  Because there’s not much money, I’m going to put the bond at £10,000. That means you need to buy insurance cover and take the cost of that from her estate. The court will help you with that. I will  make the order today and the court will write to you.

Daughter/Granddaughter:  Thank you! Thank you for your help.

2. Application stalled for lack of alternative family member willing to act as Deputy

The second hearing lasted around 25 minutes. 

In this case, an applicant for Deputyship for Property and Finance, P’s niece (I think), had previously suffered some “financial difficulties” of her own that had resulted in court involvement.  When this had come to light, “the court had some concerns and asked if there was anyone else who would be suitable” and (according to the files the judge was looking at) someone else’s name had been “put forward”. But the court had never received a “Deputyship declaration” from that person, so there was still no Deputy in place for P.[3]

The applicant confirmed that this is what had happened and said that the person whose name had been mentioned was her father, and “he doesn’t feel comfortable about doing it – he’s 77 and lives in [another country]”. She added, “We did speak to P’s Social Worker and tell her”.  But clearly the message had not got back to the court.

“Is there anyone else?” asked the judge. After a discussion of the different family members, it appeared not.

A discussion of the applicant’s past financial difficulties ensued, and it became clear that – although she’s still paying off the debts in accordance with court orders – the context in which the debts were incurred are historical, relating to events from around a decade ago, in association with someone who is now deceased. She is in stable employment and has been for a long time. She is now in the difficult position of using her own savings to subsidise P and the family member he lives with (I think it was two brothers, her uncles) in their own home and she’s is moving money around between that other family member’s account (for which she has third-party authorisation)[4] in complicated transactions to cover the bills. The  sum of £6,000 to cover roof repairs was mentioned, plus a recent unspecified amount for carpet cleaning.  Although the applicant said that her savings could bear this, the judge saw it as a problem: “this is not money you should be spending  […] Obviously we can’t have the current situation carry on – it’s not fair on you”.

The judge then considered the possibility of appointing a panel deputy. The disadvantage of this is that since P part-owns his own home, the charges would be “set at solicitor’s normal costs, so quite a drain on his estate”.

Judge: There is a difficulty with your history, but […] what I’m going to do I think is uhm give you the chance to put in a Witness Statement saying why things are different now from 2006/2007 because I don’t think the previous judge went through that.

Applicant: They did ask me to come back and say where the statements originated from and what payments I was making on them

Judge: In August last year?

Applicant: I don’t know – it’s been going on for such a long time.

Judge: I know it must be very frustrating.

[…] (Judge locates witness statement in bundle)

Judge: You say in your Witness Statement you ran in to problems following a redundancy.  You did not go into insolvency, did you?

Applicant: No.

Judge: What I’m going to do is not give you the ability to sell the house ((“that doesn’t matter,  they’re living in it”), but I will appoint you as a deputy.

Applicant: Oh! Thank you very much!

Judge: This is a best interests decision under s.4 of the Act that it’s in P’s best interests to have you as Deputy and that, in the circumstances, you are an appropriate person in this situation.

The judge then went on to “just check everything else”. 

The assessment of capacity (completed by a social worker) was “in order”. 

The notification to P of the application for Deputyship (“the one I had to sign and P had to sign as well to tell him I was making the application?”) was out of time: the judge said: “it’s supposed to have been within 3 months of when the application was made. That’s not fatal. […]  It has the date of 5th June 2025  – though not in the right box – and is signed by you as a statement of truth. That’s enough for me”.

But there were missing declarations about P’s investments: “it says ‘details not known’” – and details of P’s occupational pension had not been completed. “I need  you to fully complete this form”, said the judge. 

The applicant said she would visit P and see if she could locate what was needed – the problem being that P tends to “throw his paperwork away”.  She undertook to complete the form within the next four weeks, and then to file it and “obtain an insurance product to cover the estate in case you are unable to account for any of it”, and to mark her application as for the attention of DJ Ellington. 

The hearing ended on a positive note:

Judge: The court, on the information supplied, is willing to appoint you as Deputy – with no power of sale – subject to the form being filled in appropriately.

Applicant: Brilliant thank you.  Thank you very much for your time.

Reflections

It was useful to see the judicial approach to these ‘non-compliance’ hearings. It was entirely helpful to the applicants.  So these ‘non-compliance’ hearings are clearly not just about penalising non-compliance and adverse costs orders against the non-complying party. Court of Protection judges seem to have quite wide discretion as to how they manage cases like these, which I think derive from their general case management powers under Part 3 of the Court of Protection Rules 2017. This permits a judge to “take any step or give any direction for the purpose of managing the case and furthering the overriding objective”.

Finally, I don’t know if Financial Deputyship applications are particularly likely to cause problems (or whether it’s just that there are so many of them that they are common but proportionately represented among ‘stalled’ cases in the COP) but the only previous case we’ve reported on concerning a ‘non-compliance’ hearing for a family member of P also concerned a Deputyship application – and in that case the application had, it seems, simply been ”lost” in the court process after a judge “went off sick” (see “A deputyship application  gone astray”).

Celia Kitzinger is co-director of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project.. She is on LinkedIn (here), and also on X (@KitzingerCelia) and Bluesky (@kitzingercelia.bsky.social)

Endnotes


[1] I’d asked to observe all five – because non-compliance with court orders is a serious matter.  Not only is it disrespectful to the court and tends to undermine the rule of law, it causes delay in judicial decision-making, extends proceedings, and has a cost to the public purse.  It’s important for the public to know how judges deal with it. As it turned out, the court did not respond to my request for the links (sent at 8pm the evening before and again on the morning of the hearing) until after the first of the five had started, so I missed that one. I watched the second hearing. The third was vacated. No parties turned up for the fourth. I observed the fifth and final hearing.  As usual, material quoted from the oral hearing is based on my contemporaneous touch-typed notes and is as accurate as I can make it, but is unlikely to be verbatim.

[2] For what these applications involve see: https://www.gov.uk/become-deputy/apply-property-financial-affairs-deputy

[3] The quote marks are phrases used by the judge. I’m not sure exactly what had preceded this hearing that qualified as P’s brother having been “put forward” as a deputy, but I think whatever it was (maybe no more than a suggestion from the niece that if she couldn’t be deputy, then he might be a suitable alternative), it led to an expectation on the part of the court that a “Deputy’s declaration” would be submitted by P’s brother – and I take it that this means the COP4 form which is headed “Deputy’s declaration” and is a formal application to be appointed as deputy. So, in effect, the niece’s application having failed, her father would have been making a new application to become P’s deputy in his own right.

[4] Applicant: “I’ve got 3rd party authorisation from [the relative P lives with] but P uhm-ed and ah-ed about it and then his dementia got so bad he couldn’t do it.”

“Pleading for information about mum’s care”: Court makes pragmatic appointment of interim welfare deputy

By Jenny Kitzinger, 20th October 2026

I was appointed as Welfare Deputy for my sister in 2009, very soon after the Mental Capacity Act 2005 came into force (in 2007). I’m intrigued to observe how applications for Welfare Deputyships are treated in the court today, especially as I know that there’ have been significant developments in case law relating to welfare deputyships over the last few years.

So I asked to observe a hearing listed on 2nd October 2026 about the “appointment of a personal welfare deputy” (COP 20022119) before Tribunal Judge Holmes, sitting remotely at First Avenue House.

The case was listed as a directions hearing.  However, in this brief 30-minute hearing, the judge decided to make an order immediately appointing the daughter as an ‘interim deputy’ with authority to receive relevant health and social care information about her mother (but not to make decisions). He also granted P’s daughter permission to apply to the court to become what the judge called, a ‘full deputy’ with some decision-making authority; another hearing will be held in about six weeks’ time for the court to decide on this.

In this blog I summarise what happened at the hearing and draw on my own experience of being a Welfare Deputy to consider what this interim appointment might achieve.

The hearing

The only people at the hearing were Tribunal Judge Holmes, P’s daughter, the judge’s clerk and me.

The judge started by explaining to the daughter (D) why I was present as a public observer. Then he provided a brief summary of the application for my benefit.

D had already been appointed as her mother’s Finance Deputy but she’d also applied to be a Welfare Deputy. The judge said he understood that she was motivated in this application by difficulties she was having “trying to get hold of information and be a voice for your mother”.

D had submitted a great deal of evidence along with her application and had provided additional evidence that morning in the form of a safeguarding review and complaint investigation report. She talked the judge through the ongoing problems she was facing and why she was seeking to become her mother’s Welfare Deputy.

There was a sad background to this situation which may be familiar to other people with aging parents.

D lives a long way away from her mother and stepfather, both of whom are now in poor health. Her mother, who has dementia, was previously supported with a care package at home but, after a hospital admission, she was discharged to a care home. Her stepfather, who continues to live at home, has post-stroke cognitive decline and needs four home care visits a day.

D experiences a huge difference in her ability to be involved in supporting her mother compared with her ability to support her stepfather: “I have full oversight of his [stepfather’s] care package”, she said, “but when it comes to my mum, I’ve no idea of what is going on”.

Daughter: I want to know where my mum is going to be happy and safe – should she stay in [the existing care home], go to another one, go back home? I don’t know because the people who’ve obstructed my oversight and have not provided her with any advocacy during major life-changing decisions are not giving me information.

Judge: Are they not inviting you to best interests meetings?

Daughter: […] I wasn’t aware even of the best interests decision to discharge her from hospital to the care home as a permanent resident.[1]

She said she’d requested evidence of DoLS and “that’s not been forthcoming” and also that “there was no investigation of what went wrong with her home care package”.

Since her mother has been in the care home, D has been concerned about support for her mother’s eating and drinking. There was an incident in 2025 when her mother had become dangerously dehydrated, leading to hospital admission and “a section 42 safeguarding concern was raised by the paramedics attending”:

“I could not understand why she was dehydrated because I was giving her food and fluid in the hospital and she was finishing her meals. I was pleading with them to understand how she became so dehydrated. Pleading for it to be sorted before she was returned to the care home.” (Daughter)

She requested an assessment from a Speech and Language Therapist – who confirmed that her mother was fine to drink fluids from an open cup. D believed that one possible source of the problem was that: “the care home had only been giving fluid in spouted beakers. She couldn’t cope with them”. Commenting on this, D said this was a “basic care” issue: “I’ve got a disabled son. I’m a nurse. And I’ve worked with a lot of families with disabled children”.

Her mother had also been subject to a “highly intimate” examination in August 2026 which her daughter knew would be very upsetting for her: “she finds these sort of examinations very distressing, and always has done”.  But “they subjected her to this procedure without even asking me”. This examination had not, she added, led to any medication or care plan. When D tried to explore options (e.g. she suggested a local application of an oestrogen cream), this was misunderstood: “they saw this as me asking for HRT to help with her dementia – which I did not ask for”. There had also been problems, according to D, in ensuring the right information was put into care and funding assessments (“I requested a CHC checklist, which was done but because nobody divulged that my mother had behavioural issues, that wasn’t on the form”).

According to D she’s been “completely overwhelmed about everything I’ve discovered since I’ve begun practically supporting my mum”. She’s been left “pleading for information about how she is being cared for”. Without being provided with key facts, consulted, or listened to effectively, she feels hamstrung in trying to advocate for her mother.

The judge sought to clarify what decisions D thinks need to be re-visited.

Judge: Are you raising issues with her current placement?

Daughter: Yes, because they are not sharing things with me.

Judge: Would you be saying “move to a different placement”?

Daughter: I’m not sure – because I don’t know what would happen in a different care home […] Even though the social worker who did the first review concluded there was no reason to obstruct me from information, I’ve had no reason to see that that obstruction has been lifted. […] Continually, as I’ve been asking for information and trying to protect my mum, I’ve been told [I can’t have it] because I don’t have LPA  [Lasting Power of Attorney] or deputyship.

The judge asked her what decision-making authority she might ultimately be seeking and he explored the possibility of making a personal welfare application to the court rather than, or alongside, a Welfare Deputyship application. But D explained she did not know enough yet to work out what the best course of action might be.

“I don’t feel I can make a fully informed decision … I’ve got so much to consider. What I’d respectfully ask the court to do is to give me the authority to access information about my mum from adult social care, safeguarding, the GP practice, the hospital, the care home and the home care agents prior to her admission [to hospital]. […] If I can get that information, I can make a decision.”

The judge stated that “You’ve notified [the relevant bodies about your application for deputyship] – and no one has responded” and that “there are no safeguarding concerns about you getting the information”. So, given the evidence he’d seen so far, he decided to make her an interim deputy with immediate effect, with the authority to “request such social and medical records as your mother would be able to request and receive such documents on her behalf”.[2]

Another hearing will be listed for the next available date six weeks hence.

Reflections

I’m glad the judge gave P’s daugher the interim deputyship – she looked relieved, and the judge’s decision seemed like a pragmatic step to try to ensure that the relevant information is available for the next hearing.

It should not, of course, require a court order or a deputyship for appropriate information-sharing to take place. However, judges have recognised “public bodies and others responsible for the care of an adult without capacity” can be “anxious” about “the propriety of sharing information” with that person’s relatives, given that the person cannot give or withhold their consent for sharing information about them (Poole J, Parr v Cheshire East Council & Anor [2026] EWCOP 1 (T3)).  In trenchant commentary on that judgment, legal commentator Alex Ruck Keene KC (Hon) recognises that concerns about consent in the context of a person lacking capacity to give it remains “prevalent” but is clear that in his opinion this anxiety is “a very problematic basis upon which to justify appointment of a health and welfare deputy”. This is because “[w]hat Poole J could perhaps usefully have made clear is that they are simply wrong to have this anxiety. Within limits […] the MCA provides the workaround for a person’s inability to consent to relevant actions in the health and social care context in the form of s.5” (i.e. information can be shared if sharing that information is determined to be in a person’s best interests).[3] In principle, Alex Ruck Keene is, of course, correct.

In a judgment in the Court of Appeal concerning appointment of a Welfare Deputy, the President of the Family Court and the Court of Protection explicitly cautioned himself “against treating deputyship as a mechanism to overcome professional hesitation or institutional risk-aversion” (Sir Stephen Cobb at §61, Re HB [2026] EWCA Civ 960). Nonetheless, that seems to be what the judge in this case has done, with the intention of ensuring that everything will be in place for the next hearing.

The Mental Capacity Act 2005 states that those making best interests decisions must “take into account, if it is practicable and appropriate to consult them, the views of […] anyone engaged in caring for the person or interested in his welfare”. In order to consult those persons effectively, there is clearly a need to provide information relevant to the decisions that need to be made. The MCA Code of Practice spells this out:

“The Act’s requirement to consult relevant people when working out the best interests of a person who lacks capacity will encourage people to share the information that makes a consultation meaningful.” [S16.20, Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice]

At the same time, the Code of Practice underlines the need to take into account data protection law and gives detailed guidance about the limits on what can be provided – including to a person who holds Lasting Power of Attorney or Deputyship (see Chapter 16 – “What rules govern access to information about a person who lacks capacity?”, MCA Code of Practice).

Health and social care providers have to be careful how they interpret their obligations. They need to ensure that the information shared is relevant to the decision to be made and balance the value of sharing information with the principles of safeguarding patient privacy.

In my experience, interpretation of such guidance (and other professional and legal guidelines) can vary by institution. In some cases, there is a tendency to err ‘on the side of caution’ (in terms of data protection) in ways that can undermine best interests processes for the person concerned. I suspect organisations may feel this is the ‘safer’ option because they are less likely to be held to account for erring in that direction. I also suspect some families/friends who clearly care for the person and are interested in their welfare are denied information because in fact no best interests process is followed at all or because clinical teams do not understand, or do not wish to comply with, the process.

On the basis of D’s account, it seems there have been some failures in communication and best interests decision-making consultation. The situation she described in relation to her mother now (in 2026) resonates with my own experience back in 2009 when I was engaged in a prolonged struggle to be appropriately consulted and informed in relation to my brain-injured sister, Polly.

We (Polly’s partner and wider family) were all denied access to some key information for the first seven months after she was injured (the period before I became her Welfare Deputy in November 2006).

An inquiry conducted by the Health Board (prompted by my formal complaint) concluded that: “Whilst the investigative officers found much good practice in respect of Ms PK’s [my sister, Polly Kitzinger’s] treatment and care […] they found significant failings in respect of compliance with the requirements of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and evidence of poor practice in relation to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 Code of Practice.” These failings include the clinical team neglecting to “provide Ms PK’s partner/family with sufficient information with regard to rationale for investigations undertaken, treatment changes, […] etc, to enable them to participate appropriately in respect to health and welfare decisions in Ms PK’s best interests”. [Cardiff and Vale University Health Board Investigation Report, 2011]

Even after I’d become Polly’s court-appointed Welfare Deputy (in November 2009), the problems continued. The Health Board investigation found failures “To give prior (sometimes any) information to the Welfare Deputy regarding several investigation and treatment decisions”.

There was also no attempt to seek my consent for these investigations and treatments, and this is particularly shocking since my Deputyship meant my consent was legally required in respect of most of those decisions.

The investigators concluded that “These failings highlight a general lack of understanding amongst professionals about the requirements of the Mental Capacity Act 2005…and especially about the role of the Court Appointed Deputy”. [Cardiff and Vale University Health Board Investigation Report, 2011] 

I’d like to think that understanding of the MCA has improved since then. In my experience, there’s been much more recognition, more recently, of the need for families and for Welfare Deputies to receive relevant information (at least in some settings). But it was very depressing to hear D’s account of what she’d encountered in relation to her mother, and I’ve heard similar accounts from other people., and the problem has been reported across a number of judgments ((see for example, Cwm Taf Morgannwg University Health Board v RW & Anor [2026] EWCOP 10 (T3), and NHS South East London Integrated Care Board v JP (by his litigation friend, the Official Solicitor) & Ors [2025] EWCOP 8 (T3), and London Borough of Lewisham v SL (by her litigation friend, the Official Solicitor) [2025] EWCOP 51 (T3)).) So while, in principle, it should obviously not be necessary to appoint someone as a Deputy (interim or otherwise) to ensure appropriate information-sharing, in practice, this might be a pragmatic solution.

However, I wasn’t entirely convinced that even granting the interim deputyship would work in practice for D in time for the next hearing – especially given the wide range of organisations from which she is seeking information, including across adult social care, the hospital, and the home care agents.  Even when an organisation is, in principle, cooperative – and there is no question about the information that should be released or the authority of the person requesting it, barriers can remain.

In my own experience, I encountered difficulties as Polly’s Welfare Deputy when I asked for copies of Polly’s medical records to be sent to the independent expert neuro-rehabilitation consultant that we commissioned urgently to review Polly’s condition, prognosis and best interests. The records did not arrive until 51 days after they were formally requested via my lawyer. This was in breach of the obligation to provide these records within 40 days under the legislation active at that time. When the records did finally arrive (after a lot of chasing), key information was missing e.g. the paperwork for a crucial series of clinical tests was incomplete and no radiology films were included (her chest x-rays, MRI scans, CT scans etc).

Of course, technology has advanced since 2009 – as has law and practice. Health and social care professionals are now more familiar with the Mental Capacity Act than they were in 2009; and also now have to comply with GDPR (and under current legislation must provide a patient’s records within one calendar month of receiving a valid request).

It may be that issues about where material is stored, how it can be shared, and with whom, is less problematic nowadays (or problematic in different ways). Back in 2009, I recall offering to photocopy a large lever-arch folder of paperwork myself to try to speed up the process. But many organisations now have electronic records and established systems in place for robust data sharing. D mentioned a particular software system deployed in her mother’s current placement. A quick online search found that this system (‘SystmOne’) – which is being offered for free to all care homes –  promises seamless access to records across diverse services. It claims to have a clear access pathway, ‘proportionate’ and tailored depending on the access level required (including for people holding lasting power of attorney and for Deputies). It looks, on the face of it, as though some of the core records D needs might be relatively easy to access.[4]

I look forward to attending the December hearing and seeing what information D will have received, what  decision-making authority she will seek as Deputy, and what the judge will decide.

Jenny Kitzinger is co-director of the Coma & Disorders of Consciousness Research Centre and Emeritus Professor at Cardiff University. She has developed online training on law, ethics and best interests and is on BlueSky as @JennyKitzinger and on Linkedin

Endnotes


[1] See also the Department of Health and Social Care statutory guidance on ‘Hospital discharge and community support guidance’ and a change made in January 2024: “the guidance now specifies that NHS bodies and local authorities should ensure that, where appropriate, unpaid carers and family members are involved in discharge decisions. This reflects the amendment to section 74(1) of the 2014 Care Act made by the Health and Care Act 2022”.

[2] This phrasing suggests the judge wants to create a Deputyship with the same wide-ranging powers as a P herself would have if she had the capacity to ask for the information herself. Given the range of interlinked decisions this daughter feels she may need to make, I can see why this is important and this framing of the order may help health and social care professionals to feel confident in information-sharing. But see: “Guidance for NHS regarding disclosure to individuals holding either a Lasting Power of Attorney or a deputyship.” This states that “relevant information can be disclosed to enable them [LPAs/Deputies] to discharge their role as attorney or deputy. This is not the same as the right of access under data protection law (Subject Access Request) as defined in Article 15, UK General Data Protection Regulation and Section 45 Part 3 Data Protection Act 2018, whereby a person can request all the information that a data controller has regarding them”.

[3] “Personal welfare deputies, principle and pragmatism, by Alex Ruck Keene KC (Hon) Local Government Lawyer, 21 January 2026

[4] For people with capacity to consent, some GP surgeries are currently trialling a new feature in the NHS App which allows a patient to submit an application to allow families and carers to access their records. https://www.nhs.uk/nhs-services/gps/health-services-for-someone-else-family-carer-access/apply-for-family-carer-access-nhs-app/. For myself, I’ve also supplemented my LPA and Advance Decision with a signed and witnessed letter stating that if I lose capacity to make my own health and welfare decisions then I’d like my wife, in so far as possible, to have access to all my records as if she were me (i.e., not restricted by health and social care staff decisions as to whether her request is ‘justified’ by its relevance to the decision that needs to be made).

P’s objections to early evening curfew are “compelling” evidence of deprivation of liberty after AGNI

By Celia Kitzinger, 12th October 2026

In recent months, we’ve observed dozens of hearings at which judges have ruled as to whether or not the residence and care arrangements of a protected party amount to a deprivation of liberty. I’ve observed some of these hearings myself; others have been reported by fellow observers.[1]  Taken together, they offer an emerging picture of how the Supreme Court’s decision in A Reference by the Attorney General for Northern Ireland [2026] UKSC 16 (AGNI) is changing the way deprivation of liberty is understood and determined in practice.

As expected, many people previously considered to be “deprived of their liberty” under the Cheshire West interpretation of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights are now being found not to be deprived of their liberty under the new AGNI approach. The consequence of this is that the “deprivation of liberty safeguards” [DOLS] – safeguards like independent assessments, a Relevant Person’s Representative (RPR), the right to review and challenge – are removed from them.  This is a significant and controversial legal development.  National charities have warned that it strips essential human rights protections from potentially hundreds of thousands of disabled people and is “the biggest rollback of disability rights in a generation”. 

Against that background, how courts determine whether someone is deprived of their liberty after AGNI is a matter of legitimate public interest. The question is not simply how the new legal test is to be understood in the abstract. It is how judges apply it to the circumstances of individual people, what weight they give to the different factors, and how they explain decisions that may determine whether a person continues to receive important legal protections.

The answer to these questions is often not transparent for public observers watching these hearings. In many cases, all the parties agree[2] that the AGNI interpretation means there is no deprivation of liberty and the matter is not explored in any detail. These cases are in court for other reasons: e.g., contact arrangements, breached orders, P’s capacity and best interests in relation to decisions in other domains. Deprivation of liberty can appear almost in passing, as an administrative matter to be signed off along the way. The reasoning may be brief, with little explanation of how the legal test applies to the particular facts or why the parties’ shared position has been accepted.

The result is a troubling gap in public understanding. Observers may watch decisions being made that remove deprivation of liberty safeguards without learning much about P’s living arrangements, the restrictions to which P is subject, or the features of their circumstances that now place them outside the legal definition of deprivation of liberty. We can see the outcome, but not necessarily how the court got there.

That gap would matter less if the application of AGNI appeared straightforward and consistent across cases. But my experience of contested hearings has left me with questions. I have observed 18 cases in which the parties disagreed about whether P was deprived of their liberty after AGNI. None has resulted in a published judgment. In these hearings, I have sometimes been surprised by the arguments advanced by the parties, by the way judges have engaged with those arguments, and by the conclusions they have reached.

This causes me some concern about the basis upon which deprivation of liberty decisions are made in non-contested cases. The fact that everyone agrees a person is not deprived of their liberty doesn’t in and of itself make that the correct decision. Of course, AGNI’s multi-factorial test leads to a wider range of factors being considered in arriving at a decision as to whether or not P’s circumstances are such as to constitute a deprivation of liberty and so judges can legitimately reach different decisions in what might appear to be very similar cases. It’s often said that decisions are now more “nuanced”, so maybe what looks to me like inconsistency across cases is simply exquisite judicial sensitivity to the unique fact pattern of each particular case. And I recognise that the implications of AGNI are still being worked out in practice and have evolved over the four-month period since AGNI, as successive judgments have been published.[3]  Nonetheless, it’s fair to say that judicial decisions about whether or not P is deprived of liberty are turning out to be problematic for a court that is said to aspire to transparency with regard to the way in which judges are arriving at their decisions. (Check out the Postscript to this blog post for the way in which listing practices add to the transparency problem.)

Where a decision determines whether a person retains important safeguards, it matters that we can understand the basis on which it is made. That is not an argument for treating every agreed position as suspect, or for expecting a lengthy judgment in every case. It is an argument for taking seriously the judicial responsibility to explain decisions sufficiently for them to be understood, particularly where the legal framework is new, its practical implications are still emerging, and the consequences for the person concerned are substantial.

It is against that background that I welcomed the opportunity to observe this hearing (COP 13851951) before District Judge Callaghan sitting in Chelmsford County Court on Friday 2nd October 2026, at which there was a dispute between the parties as to whether or not P’s residence and care arrangements constitute a deprivation of liberty. The different positions advanced by the parties were presented in oral submissions, and decided in an oral (ex tempore) judgment[4] over a hearing that lasted most of the day.

The hearing therefore offered something that is missing from many of the cases I have observed: an opportunity to hear the arguments on both sides, to see how the judge approached them, and to understand the reasons for the decision. I doubt the judgment will be published, so this blog post is likely to be the only public record of the court’s decision and of the process by which it was reached. Regrettably, this is the case for most court decisions about deprivation of liberty.

Background to this case

The young man at the centre of this case (P) is in his early 20s and has “severe autism and a learning disability”. He also has gastro eosinophilic duodenitis which requires him to follow a restricted diet. His mother says he has a diagnosis of PICA. but this is contested or “downplayed” by the ICB and the care providers, who acknowledge that P likes to put non-edible objects in his mouth but state that he rarely eats them.

He lived with his mother until he was 18 and moved to his current placement in 2021. He receives 24-hour care, funded through NHS Continuing Healthcare (CHC).  He lives in supported living accommodation, with care-agency staff supporting him on a 1:1 basis at home (though this reduces depending on the number of residents at any one time) and 2:1 when he is out in the community.  He has a Positive Behaviour Support (PBS) plan which permits staff to use physical restraint (a one arm release variation technique) as a last resort.

His parents are separated but he maintains a relationship with both of them and with his extended family. Each parent visits him weekly and also has contact by FaceTime. All parties except P’s mother consider it to be in his best interests to remain in his current placement with his existing care package. In any event, it has been determined during these proceedings that there is no available alternative placement on offer.

The dispute between P’s mother and the care providers

The current proceedings began with an application by the  ICB on 5th November 2024 (pre-AGNI) seeking authorisation of P’s deprivation of liberty at H House.[5] The proceedings have also involved a protracted dispute about P’s mother’s contact with him and with the staff responsible for his care.

At a hearing on 30th June 2025, HHJ Capon granted an interim injunction, endorsed with a penal notice, against P’s mother.  The ICB had applied for the injunction on an urgent basis, arguing that her behaviour threatened the stability of the placement, which was said to be “on the brink of giving formal notice”. The evidence relied upon concerned her conduct, which she disputes. A few months later, at a hearing on 31st October 2025, the injunction was replaced by an agreed “Schedule of Agreement” (also described as a “Contract of Expectations”). This largely reproduces the terms of the injunction.

The Schedule, which remained in place at the time of the hearing I observed, regulates P’s mother’s contact both with her son and with the staff caring for him. The ICB says it was necessary because of incidents in which she was allegedly rude to staff, removed items belonging to P, and visited without appointments or at inappropriate times, sometimes arriving early or late. The ICB also says – more recently, I think – that she sometimes fails to attend scheduled Sunday visits, upsetting P who is disappointed not to receive the expected visit. There have also been disagreements about P’s medical care. Under the Schedule, P’s mother has agreed not to initiate conversations or raise questions about his medical care.

From the ICB’s and care provider’s perspective, the Schedule is working well. P’s mother takes a very different view. She considers the restrictions unnecessary and disputes the account of her behaviour that led to them being imposed. She says that some of the difficulties arose because she was legitimately questioning the care her son was receiving, or because the placement had failed to provide her with information she needed, including information at handover about his medication and what he had eaten.

She feels that she has been “maligned” and “victimised” by the care provider after raising concerns about the quality of his care. As she put it to the court: “because I raised concerns, it led to an injunction being created against me to deflect those concerns. This is a pattern of behaviour from [the care provider]. When I raise concerns about any matters, I am met with contact restrictions”[6].

These are sharply contrasting accounts of the same relationship. The ICB and care provider consider the restrictions necessary to sustain the placement and manage contact; P’s mother considers them unjustified and connected to her attempts to raise concerns about her son’s care. The history matters because the dispute about P’s residence and care arrangements cannot readily be separated from the wider disagreement about the quality of his care, his mother’s role in his life, and the extent to which her concerns are being heard.

Why the case came back to court

After the last hearing, on 31st October 2025, everyone except P’s mother agreed that proceedings should now conclude. However, the parties could not agree on the terms of a final order.

P’s mother wanted to be released from the Schedule of Agreement.  She also wanted the search for alternative placements to remain open, since she had continuing concerns about the care P was receiving at H House. She also believes that he is deprived of his liberty there.

The final hearing was initially listed for 4th March 2026, but the proceedings did not conclude then. Further evidence was directed, and the final hearing eventually took place on 2nd October 2026, seven months later.[7] It was listed as a contested, full-day hearing.

During the hearing I observed, P’s mother agreed to remain bound by the Schedule of Agreement, as it became apparent that the ICB would otherwise apply for an injunction.  She continued to argue that these proceedings should not conclude.  However, there were still no available alternative placements for P, and the judge considered that her other concerns (about his healthcare and visiting arrangements) could be addressed outside the proceedings.

The hearing therefore focused primarily on whether P’s current residence and care arrangements amount to a deprivation of liberty under the law as clarified by AGNI. This is the issue I focus on in this blog post. But the wider context is important: the court was considering P’s liberty against a background of disagreement about his care, restrictions on his mother’s contact and involvement, and a prolonged dispute that has not resolved to her satisfaction.

The hearing

The applicant was NHS Mid and South Essex ICB, which is responsible for arranging P’s care, represented by Susanna Rickard of Serjeants’ Inn Chambers as counsel, and Beth Farrow of Mills & Reeve as the instructing solicitor.

There were three respondents: 

  • P (by his litigation friend the Official Solicitor), represented by Felicity Williams of Garden Court Chambers as counsel and Cerise White of Miles and Partners as the instructing solicitor.  (Interestingly, Cerise White also acted for the protected party in the case of Oxfordshire County Council v P and G [2026] EWCOP 33 (T2), one of the (now) five published judgments in this area.)
  • P’s mother (as a litigant in person on this occasion – she’d been represented by Anna Bicarregui of 39 Essex Chambers at the previous hearing); at this hearing the mother was supported by a McKenzie Friend.
  • P’s father (also as a litigant in person, as he had been at the previous hearing).

At the outset, the judge made clear that “this case has been before the court long enough and there needs to be resolution”.  Two versions of the draft order had been filed for her consideration. As she observed, “the only real difference is the deprivation of liberty point”.

Those opening remarks framed the task before the court: to bring protracted proceedings to a conclusion, primarily by resolving the question of whether P’s current arrangements amount to a deprivation of liberty.

Submissions concerning P’s deprivation of liberty

I’ll report on each party’s position in turn, in the order in which they made submissions.

The ICB’s position: P is not deprived of his liberty

Counsel for the applicant ICB pointed out that “the AGNI case has obviously changed the territory significantly”. The question of whether P’s residence and care arrangements now amount to a deprivation of liberty is one that the ICB “says candidly that it’s a lawyer’s question, and that must be correct”. 

The ICB Position Statement sets out (counsel said) “that it’s possible to fudge this and to make an order that used to be commonplace before Cheshire West to the effect that ‘to the extent that he’s deprived of his liberty, it’s authorised’. But (she said) that’s not appropriate here, “because there’s sufficient evidence for the matter to be determined. It is the submission for the ICB, having examined P’s care and his reaction to it, that this does not fall into a ‘deprivation of liberty’ and might be quite far away from it”.

I do not have the ICB’s Position Statement, so the account that follows is based on the oral submissions only. I have not been able to verify every passage against the written document.

Counsel summarised the ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ elements of the multi-factorial’ assessment required by AGNI. The objective element concerns confinement to a particular restricted space for a material period of time (the paradigm case being the prison cell) – and relevant factors include the possibility of leaving, the degree of supervision and control over their movements, the extent of their social isolation, and restriction of social contacts. 

Counsel argued that AGNI “elaborated beyond domestic case law on the way in which an individual’s response to their living situation is actually part of the multi-factorial assessment of whether the objective element of confinement is met … Valid consent is an autonomous concept within Article 5, not to be equated with capacity”.  Counsel referred to §3 of her Position Statement (which I don’t have) where she quoted from AGNI – and I think it was this extract she was quoting:

“…. an individual without legal capacity under domestic law, but who is conscious of their environment and has a basic understanding of their living circumstances so that they can express their view about their situation, who manifests their acceptance of the situation they are in, should have their opinion respected when an assessment is made of whether they are deprived of liberty under article 5.” (§53(2) AGNI). 

She submitted that this was relevant to P in this case because “he is ‘manifesting his acceptance of the situation he is in’  – to use the  Supreme Court’s words.  In fact, it is more than acceptance. He enjoys living where he is and he is thriving and happy there.” She added that the word his father had used was ‘flourishing’”.

Counsel described P as clearly aware of his living arrangements: “He’s an active and animated young man. He’s engaged with his carers and recognises them. He loves his home.” The significance of P’s positive response, she argued, is that “ultimately AGNI makes clear that the court has to ask whether P’s living arrangements amount to a detention that’s against his wishes, or does it constitute a supportive home environment”. 

Counsel accepted that P’s Personal Behaviour Support Plan provides for restraint as a last-resort intervention, but said it was seldom used.  “Overwhelmingly, P is happy in his own environment”. 

In §6 of counsel’s Position Statement, counsel had apparently set out  the kinds of behaviours that might indicate objection to a person’s living arrangements. I don’t have that document and I don’t know the source of the list she gave. I didn’t succeed in capturing all of the objections she cited but they included, conflict, arguments, attempts to leave, and physical restraint.  “In my submission,” she said, “that description is far from fitting P”.

She argued that P “can’t be described as merely acquiescing in his care. He is happy” – and that “the so-called restrictions that form part of P’s care are imposed solely for the purpose of enhancing his quality of life: (not for punishment or coercion, but for his protection (see §130 AGNI). 

Counsel concluded with a strongly positive account of P’s life at the placement.  “It is the opposite end of the spectrum to a prison cell. P is happy. P shares his home with another service user and they have a positive relationship – it is more akin to friendship than housemate. He has a very varied program of activities. He has rewarding family relationships. He goes out into the community. He is not isolated. There is no element of coercion. His care is facilitative of his well-being and happiness and quality of life, and his experience is positive.” 

She also relied on P’s father’s description of  P as “happy and content”. His father considers that P receives “outstanding care” and has “a very special bond with both staff and his housemate”.

Counsel’s conclusion was that, in these circumstances, “the court is very far from being able to find that the objective element of confinement is met in those circumstances”.

The Official Solicitor’s Position: P is deprived of his liberty

The Official Solicitor advanced a different position to that of the ICB: “Contrary to the position of Ms Rickard, the position of the Official Solicitor is that we are not at one extreme.  A more nuanced approach is needed.”

Counsel emphasised that  P is subject to several care plans: the NHS CHC statutory care plan, the placement care plan and the Personal Behaviour Support plan, which provides for  restraint as a last resort.  In addition, the Schedule governs how contact between P and his mother operates. The Official Solicitor submitted that these arrangements need to be considered together, rather than the placement being characterised simply as a supportive home environment.

Counsel read out some paragraphs from the Department of Health and Social Care’s {DHSC] preliminary Guidance published on 15th June 2026, which addresses the relevance of objection to the assessment of deprivation of liberty: “It should be noted that the issue of whether a person is objecting to the confinement is relevant to the question of objective deprivation of liberty. Where a person is objecting, then it follows that valid consent is unlikely to be present. If there is an absence of objection when the person is capable of objecting, then it is more likely that the person is not being confined.”

The guidance goes on to say that objection may take different forms, including attempts to leave, refusal of care or treatment, physical resistance to care, restraint or one-to-one support to manage behaviour, and the use of covert or sedating medication in circumstances where a person objects.

Counsel then identified what she considered to be the relevant indicators of confinement and control in P’s own circumstances. These included locked entry and exit doors; one-to-one support during the day and hourly observations at night; supervision during personal care; and the arrangements governing visits and contact.

She submitted that P is not free to leave.  He can only access the community with carers, and when he does, carers are on hand at all times.  One example was given: “if he goes the swimming pool, he is not permitted to go down the flumes because of the risk to him”.  More generally, “he isn’t able to come and go at will – that depends on the availability of carers”. 

Counsel also drew attention to the difficulty of ascertaining P’s preferences. He “can’t express his preferences easily”, she said, referring to a recent visit by his solicitor at which he had not been able to engage with her. She quoted the Supreme Court’s warning in AGNI that the views of people with impaired understanding may not always be easy to ascertain: “[I]t may sometimes be difficult to ascertain the true feelings or preferences of vulnerable individuals who do not have mental capacity to decide on their living arrangements. The approach should be practical and realistic. Where there is serious doubt, no inference of valid consent should be drawn” (§53(v), AGNI, my emphasis).

The Official Solicitor’s argument therefore placed emphasis not only on the restrictions in P’s daily life, but also on the difficulty of establishing his wishes and preferences with confidence. Against the ICB’s account of a young man who is happy and flourishing, the Official Solicitor invited the court to consider the extent of P’s dependence on others, the limits on his freedom to come and go, and the uncertainty surrounding his ability to communicate his views.

The central difference between the two submissions was not whether P enjoyed important aspects of his life at the placement. It was what that evidence, alongside the restrictions on his movements and the difficulty of ascertaining his wishes, meant for the legal assessment of deprivation of liberty.

P’s mother’s position: P is deprived of his liberty

At the previous hearing (when she was represented)[8], P’s mother had raised concerns about whether the care and support that P is receiving is in his best interests. She thought he was not being offered activities that would motivate him to leave the placement. She expressed concern that, due to staff shortages, P is usually unable to leave the placement after 8pm. She said his bedtime routine can start as early as 5pm and that he’s often had a bath and dinner by 6.30pm, which leaves him unstimulated.  This theme continued in today’s hearing.

For P’s mother, it was important that the judge consider an incident recorded in the hearing bundle, which she described as having occurred “when he wasn’t allowed to go out that night”.

It took some time to locate the relevant entry. The mother described an occasion when P asked a member of staff whether he could go out sometime after 6.30pm. The worker said no because the shops were shut. P then became “very, very distressed” and bit the service user with whom he lived.

The mother was concerned about the consequences of restricting P’s activities, both for him and for the other people living at the placement:  “My concern with this in general is that he’s a risk to the other service users that he lives with, because his behaviour escalates when he’s subject to restrictions”.

She contrasted this with the arrangements when she cared for P at home: “When I looked after him at home, he led and I followed. That isn’t the case at H Home”. On the night in question, an on-call worker had been available to take P out for a drive, although not out into the community for an activity. Without that intervention, she said, it was impossible to know how his behaviour might have escalated. In her view, restrictions on going out increased the risk of P harming other residents and being restrained.

She also drew attention to the physical environment. Although the residence was “homely”, and in a pleasant area, she described the communal space as very small, given that P and his co-resident are each supported by their own staff.

The relevant entry was eventually located[9] and the judge read it aloud. It was a staff record dated 4th July 2026 and it was broadly consistent with the mother’s account: when told he could not leave the home, P had bitten his co-resident and “head-locked” a member of staff (according to the records). 

The mother said that this was not an isolated example. She believed other entries showed that staff themselves were recording P’s distress when he was prevented from going out.placed the incident in the context of a longer-running disagreement about P’s evening activities. She told the court that, when proceedings began in 2023, she had asked for evening activities to be provided. Various promises had been made, she said, and she had agreed to drop her application to become P’s deputy. In her view, those promises had not been kept.

She described P as being detained at the placement after 8pm, contrary to his wishes and feelings: “He was used to going out at home. He’s finding it very difficult to be confined to H premises after 8pm. That’s one of the reasons I think he is deprived of liberty”.

Her concern was not simply that P had fewer opportunities to go out. She argued that the restrictions could lead to distress, which in turn could result in behaviour that harmed others and made restraint more likely.

She also described what she saw as a lack of meaningful evening activity. From 8pm until he fell asleep, she said, P has little stimulation and is confined to a small bedroom using his iPad. Staff put him into his pyjamas from 8pm in preparation for the overnight staff. By contrast, she said, she tries to take him out after 8pm when she can: “Recently we’ve been to the theatre. And on short breaks, when I take him out, we have evening activities. That’s when I say he thrives. He’s treated like a 25-year-old and not a 5-year-old who can’t go out after 8pm”.

Her account presented the evening curfew not merely as limits on P’s movements, but as restrictions she believed were inconsistent with his established way of life and had adverse consequences for his wellbeing and behaviour – sufficient to constitute a deprivation of liberty.

Finally – the contact restrictions. The contact restrictions in the Schedule of Agreement arose in a different context from the question of deprivation of liberty: the discussion concerned whether P’s mother would continue to agree to the Schedule. Their impact on P’s mother is relevant context, but it’s not necessarily the case that restrictions on her contact with P automatically establish that P is deprived of his liberty. Nonetheless, since the Official Solicitor had just identified the Schedule as one element of the overall arrangements the court should consider in making a determination as to whether or not P is deprived of his liberty, I listened to the mother’s submissions with that in mind.

P’s mother said that she was “banned from his home” and therefore had to take P out whenever she wants to spend time with him. This means spending the whole day with him in the community on Wednesdays and half a day on Sundays – arrangements she described as exhausting.

She explained that she had chosen supported living for P because she had become “burnt out” caring for him herself. She now feels that the ICB and care providers have placed her in an “unsustainable situation”, without flexibility over when she can see her son.

Alongside a full-time job and her own health issues, the arrangements have become difficult to maintain. Because she spends Wednesdays with P, she has to work on Saturdays, and she is also struggling to visit him every Sunday. She wants  greater flexibility and the freedom to visit him in his own home.[10]

Her account illustrated how the Schedule affected not only the practical arrangements for family contact, but also her ability to sustain her relationship with P. The significance of those restrictions for the legal question of deprivation of liberty was a matter for the court to assess as part of the overall circumstances.

Position of P’s father: P is not deprived of his liberty

P’s father, representing himself, initially said that he agreed with both the ICB and the Official Solicitor.  When the judge pointed out that they had taken opposing positions, he said that he would leave the lawyers to address the legal question of deprivation of liberty.

He did, however, offer his perspective on the restrictions imposed on P: “a lot of the restrictions that are being defined as deprivation of liberty are there for his safety. It doesn’t mean they are holding him prisoner. They are there for a reason”.

His submission emphasised the protective purpose of the restrictions. Whether that purpose answered the legal question was for the court to determine.

Judgment

After a recess for lunch, the judge returned to deliver her judgment. She set out the factual background to the case and summarised, in neutral terms, the opposing arguments made by the ICB and the Official Solicitor with respect to whether or not P is deprived of his liberty. She continued:“I go back to the evidence given by P’s mother today before me. I found that evidence to be compelling. She was not involved in the incident on 4th July and didn’t know about it until she read about it in the notes. It rang a chord with her because she knows her son is frustrated by not going out at night. I have heard that he is put in pyjamas at 8pm. On that date he was told he couldn’t go out, and he became agitated. That is clear evidence of a deprivation of liberty.”

The judge then considered the restrictions on P’s daily life more broadly. “When the court looks at the Guidance from the DHSC, […] find externally imposed restrictions […] there are locked doors, 1:1 or 2:1 supervision – which is essential for his needs, even when he’s with his mother – no independent community access, and supervision for medication and personal care. There’s also restraint – as a last resort, but it is there – and there are restrictions on his contact with his mother via the Schedule of Agreement. Finally, his finances are managed by his mother and not by himself[11].  The building is always locked externally. He lives behind locked doors. The premises are small, and become smaller still by the presence of carers. He is confined […]. So, the court decides that P is currently subject to a deprivation of liberty. There is a clear absence of valid consent.” 

The judge therefore found that P’s arrangements amounted to a deprivation of liberty and that there was no valid consent. She went on to approve the deprivation of liberty as necessary, proportionate and in P’s best interests.

Reflections

One interpretation of the Supreme Court’s judgment in AGNI was expressed by DJ Glassbrook at another hearing in a different case: “The Supreme Court said that if there are objections then, on the face of it, we’ve got deprivation of liberty”.[12] 

This is an interpretation we’re seeing quite frequently. The judgment in P’s case might be read as supporting it. P’s distress on 4th July 2026, expressed through agitation and biting another resident when he was not allowed to go out was described by the judge as “compelling” evidence for a deprivation of liberty. The locked doors, continuous supervision, restrictions on independent access to the community, and restraint formed part of the wider  picture.

The judge’s reasoning, as recorded in the judgment, does not expressly explain how she weighed the incident of 4th July against the evidence advanced by the ICB that P “enjoys living where he is and he is thriving and happy there” — a view also supported by his father. The ICB relied on this evidence in arguing that P accepted his living arrangements and that there was valid consent.

The judge clearly attached considerable weight to the evidence highlighted by P’s mother: an occasion when P was prevented from going out, became distressed and was restrained. Her conclusion was that this was evidence of deprivation of liberty and that there was no valid consent. But I was left wondering how she reconciled that conclusion with the evidence of P’s general happiness at the placement. Did she regard the incident as revealing something fundamental about P’s experience of the restrictions, notwithstanding his otherwise positive response to his home? Or did she give it particular weight because it was a concrete example of what happened when P’s wishes appeared to conflict with the care arrangements? The judgment does not expressly resolve those questions.

Neither of the represented parties referred in their oral submissions to case law other than AGNI.  I was nevertheless struck by some similarities between this case and Re AR (Whether restrictions amount to a deprivation of liberty) [2026] EWCOP 45 (T2), heard by HHJ Burrows about a month earlier.  HHJ Burrows judgment is worth a read in conjunction with thinking about this case, since he’s a Tier 2 judge with considerable COP experience (and also appeared in Cheshire West), and was recently described by 39 Essex Chambers as  “…undoubtedly taking the lead as regards the development of a body of judicial consideration of the world after AGNI“.

Like P, AR is also a young man in his 20s with autism and a severe learning disability. He too had lived in the family home until moving, as a young adult, into his current placement.  Both cases also involve restrictions on contact with family members. In Re AR, as in the case reported in this blog post,  staff had expressed concern about visits that were late or cancelled at short notice, which they described as “unsettling” for AR.

But HHJ Burrows concluded that AR was NOT deprived of his liberty and he listed the following matters as decisive:

(a) AR suffers from a condition that will always require a significant level of supervision. There is a need in his case to ensure a good level of routine and predictability so as to ensure his relative happiness.

(b) AR will always require restrictions on his movement. He will never be “free to leave” wherever he safely resides, and significant control has to be placed on his movements in and out of his residence.

(c) Management of his behaviour will always require a high level of supervision and control, including when necessary, restraint.

(d) Although he is not at his family home, he is at a place which he is able to treat as his own and to personalise his environment. He is able to make friends, and engage in activities in and out of the placement.

(e) These restrictions are in place for his own good, and are intended to ensure the best outcome for him.

(f) Although his residence at the placement involves restrictions, they are far away from the paradigm of the prisoner in his cell, or, for that matter the mental patient in his secure unit.

(g) These arrangements are relatively normal.

I am struck by how many of these observations could be made equally about P. Like AR, P requires substantial supervision; his movements will always need to be restricted for his safety; managing his behaviour will also need a high degree of supervision – with restraint  available as a last resort; he has relationships with others at the placement and takes part in activities (swimming and trampolining were both mentioned); and the restrictions are to protect his wellbeing. Yet DJ Callaghan reached the opposite conclusion: P is deprived of his liberty.

The comparison raises a question about the significance attached to P’s distressed response to the evening restriction, and the resulting restraint. On the material I have described, this appears to be one of the most significant points of difference between the reasoning in the two cases. But it is difficult to assess precisely how much it explains the different outcomes without a fuller account of the reasoning in each judgment (particularly DJ Callaghan’s).

Contact restrictions provide another point of comparison. In Re AR, the parents were permitted supervised contact (only), with their son at his placement on the second and last Wednesday of each month — a more restrictive arrangement than the contact schedule described in P’s case. HHJ Burrows recognised that contact could be a “significant” factor in determining whether a person was deprived of liberty. He observed that: “There may be situations where restrictions on contact with friends and family may be such as to change the character of the placement away from a home and closer to a place of detention”. But he concluded of AR’s circumstances: “This is, in my judgment, not one of them” (§67, Re AR).

The two judgments therefore leave me with a question. If the restrictions on movement, the need for supervision and the restrictions on family contact can be consistent with a finding of no deprivation of liberty in one case, but amount to a deprivation of liberty in another, what is it about the person’s experience of those arrangements, or the wider context, that tips the balance?

The only explanation I can come up with is the weight attached to P’s response to being prevented from going out in the evening. DJ Callaghan treated the incident as “compelling” evidence of deprivation of liberty. But the precise role played by that evidence in the overall assessment is not fully explained in the reasoning available to me from the ex tempore judgment.

This matters beyond these two cases. AGNI requires a multi-factorial assessment that (where possible) takes seriously the individual’s own experience of their circumstances. But where the balance between the factors is decisive, transparency about how the court weighs them becomes especially important. Without that explanation, it is difficult for observers to understand whether different outcomes reflect meaningful differences in the objective conditions and the individual’s subjective experience, or different approaches to applying the same legal test.

Celia Kitzinger is co-director of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project. She is on LinkedIn (here), and also on X (@KitzingerCelia) and Bluesky (@kitzingercelia.bsky.social)

Postscript: A transparency concern that listings never include “Is P deprived of liberty following AGNI” as a matter before the court

The public listing of this case appeared in CourtServe (the only way we normally get to learn about court hearings) as below.  The public listing said the hearing was about “WHERE P SHOULD LIVE & HEALTHCARE”. 

In fact, the matters before the court for this hearing were:

  • whether P is deprived of his liberty following AGNI;
  • whether to make a final best interests decision in respect of P’s residence (in the context of there being no available options) or whether, as P’s mother wanted, to keep proceedings live and direct the ICB to file evidence about potential alternatives
  • whether or not the “Schedule of Agreement” (contract of expectations) to which P’s mother had earlier agreed (meaning that an injunction with a penal notice against her had been discharged) should also now be discharged, since she objected to it (in which case the ICB intended to make a new application for an injunction)

We knew in advance, from observing an earlier hearing in this case (on 31st October 2025), that the listing did not accurately reflect the issues the judge would be asked to address today.  The question of “WHERE P SHOULD LIVE & HEALTHCARE” relates to matters from much earlier in the proceedings (which commenced on 5th November 2025) and does not reflect more recent developments.  Although the question of whether or not P was deprived of his liberty was the matter that occupied most of the court’s time, the phrase “deprivation of liberty” does not appear in the listing, and no member of the public for whom this was a compelling concern could have known from the public listing that this would be an interesting hearing to watch.

Conversely, I have selected and asked to observe hearings listed as being concerned with “deprivation of liberty” only to find, when I enter the courtroom, that in fact that is not an issue the court is concerned with that day.

Given the extent of legitimate public interest about the implications of the Supreme Court decision in AGNI for vulnerable people, and the way in which AGNI is being implemented in the Court of Protection, it is a significant problem for transparency  that court listings prevent us from accurately identifying those hearings at which the relevant issues will be aired in court.

Endnotes


[1] We’ve not blogged most of these cases (for reasons explained in the next paragraph of the main text), but links to those we have published about are available here: https://openjusticecourtofprotection.org/dol-in-the-cop-post-agni/

[2] In most cases, the person’s deprivation of liberty safeguards are removed without a court application in advance of, or immediately following, the next scheduled annual review process, as described by Joe and Sandra Preston in relation to their mother(-in-law) here: The irony and the AGNI.  No court application is required.  My own family is expecting the same to happen to our sister Polly: Polly and AGNI.

[3] I’m aware of only five published Court of Protection judgments, three of them by HHJ Burrows. They are: Oxfordshire County Council v P & G [2026] EWCOP 33 (T2); Re AR (Whether restrictions amount to a deprivation of liberty) [2026] EWCOP 45 (T2); Derby City Council v SM [2026] EWCOP 46 (T2); Re BM (Deprivation of Liberty) [2026] EWCOP 48 (T2) and Re PK & MK (Article 8 protections) [2026] EWCOP 52 (T2) – the last of these published subsequent to the date of this hearing. Additionally, two post-AGNI decisions about deprivation of liberty have been published by the Family Division: Re Mustafa (A Child) [2026] EWHC 2159 (Fam) and Essex County Council v MH, GH and ST [2026] EWHC 2328 (Fam). (There’s a helpful blog post about the two Family Division decisions here: “What do recent cases tell us about AGNI and deprivation of liberty for children and young people?”)

[4] I am grateful to the ICB’s legal team for preparing very helpful ‘Gardner documents’ (a case summary, list of issues and chronology) which have assisted in the accurate presentation of this case. I did ask for the Position Statements too, but they were not provided which means that I rely on the oral arguments alone in presenting the parties’ positions on how P’s care and residence arrangements do or do not constitute a deprivation of liberty.  In presenting these arguments I have drawn on my contemporaneous touch-typed notes and they are as accurate as I can make them, but unlikely to be verbatim. (The same applies to the ex tempore judgment of course.)

[5] There is a longer history to the proceedings, going back to January 2023 when the ICB initially sought authorisation of P’s care and support arrangements as a deprivation of liberty (approved in mid-October 2023) and made an order providing that annual renew of future deprivation of liberty authorisations would be via the streamlined Re X procedure.  Given what the ICB describes as ongoing  “strained” relationships and “difficulties and differences of opinion” between P’s mother on the one hand, and the ICB and care providers on the other, the Re X streamlined procedure was not appropriate in 2024.  In particular, P’s mother was disputing that P’s continued deprivation of liberty at H House was in his best interests.

[6] The specific incident P’s mother referred to was an occasion when P, visiting her at home was clearly in abdominal pain and “passed a stool with blue and white material in it”. She said she contacted the Deputy Manager and asked if they knew if P had swallowed something blue. They said not, but in her role as financial appointee she is given P’s receipts and found that he had been bought blue balls – and then later informed that he had a ball that he’d broken into small pieces but that staff had hoovered it all up. She referred the judge to a photo in the bundle – I think it was a sample of P’s stool which she had passed to the carers, who had assured her they would get it tested, but did not.

[7] The final hearing was initially listed for 4th March 2026. Rather than conclude the proceedings, the court directed the ICB to provide further evidence, which I understand concerned possible alternative placements. The seven-month delay before the final hearing in October appears to have had several contributing factors, including the need for further or better evidence about capacity, the parties’ inability to agree an order, the father’s unavailability on one of the dates initially listed for a final hearing, and a lack of confirmation from the court about subsequent hearing dates.

[8] Thank you to Claire Martin and Kim Dodd who both observed the hearing on 31st October 2025 and contributed to this blog post by checking my understanding of events before the hearing which I’m reporting on here.

[9] It seems there was a 1500-page bundle which the judge had only received around 8.30pm the night before the hearing, plus two supplementary bundles, each of 34 pages. This was, as the judge said, “unsatisfactory” for a final hearing. It was not, as I understand it, the fault of the parties: “I lay it squarely on the administration of the Court of Protection” (said the judge), saying that there was “only one admin officer actually doing any work in the building” when she called to ask for the bundle the day before.

[10] The judge did not make a ruling about this in her judgment – she simply encouraged “dialogue” about the arrangements but made clear that “what is important is that this placement is never undermined”. When subsequently asked by P’s mother about this, she expressed the view that flexibility would be desirable and made some suggestions about how that could work, saying: “this is a discussion I hope you’ll have with the ICB and the service provider”.

[11] The mother is P’s DWP and personal health budget appointee. In my view this is not an obvious indicator of confinement, but it had been raised as such by the Official Solicitor.

[12] There is no published judgment. This quotation comes from a blog post: ” Objections (and breached conditions) after AGNI