A young man failed by NHS South West London ICB and the London Borough of Wandsworth

By Daniel Clark with reflections from Sophie Monaghan and Claire Martin, 27th February 2025 

Note: On 31 March 2025 we received an email from the lawyer representing the ICB asking us to correct “significant errors in the reporting of the case”. We have addressed this (in red) in the text below, and in the new footnote.

The protected party, XY, is an autistic man in his twenties who previously had an active and sociable life. Over the past few years, his mental health has deteriorated. This resulted (in 2023) in a traumatic detention under the Mental Health Act 1983. 

XY returned home in 2024, and these proceedings (COP 13261362) relate to an application by his deputies for health and welfare (his mother, father, and siblings), who ask the court to authorise the deprivation of his liberty that arises from his care in his own home. The judge has now reconstituted the case so that it is the public bodies, not XY’s family, who are the applicants. This means that the job of presenting the case is on them, and not lay parties. 

I (Daniel) have observed three cases in this hearing: one in person on 3^rd October 2024 (“the October hearing”), one hybrid hearing which I observed remotely on 17^th December 2024 (“the December hearing”), and one fully remote on 6^th February 2025 (“the February hearing”). There were five observers in total at the February hearing, including Claire Martin, Sophie Monaghan, and me.  

All the hearings I observed were before District Judge Clarke, who sits at First Avenue House. As far as I can tell, she has had oversight of the case since the application was first made.  

The NHS South West London Integrated Care Board (“the ICB”) was represented by Ulele Burnham of Doughty Street Chambers. The London Borough of Wandsworth (“the LA”) was represented by Lindsay Johnson of Cornerstone Barristers. 

At the December hearing, the judge joined South West London & St George’s NHS Trust as a party to proceedings. At the February hearing, the Trust was represented by Eloise White-Thomson of Bevan Brittain LLP. 

XY has been represented by  Eleanor Leydon of 39 Essex Chambers, acting as his litigation friend via the Official Solicitor – though at the October hearing he was represented by somebody else whose name I didn’t catch. I observed that hearing in person and didn’t catch the barrister’s name because there was no opening summary, and no introductions. I will discuss the experience of what can only be described as “opaque justice” at an in-person hearing in a separate blog. 

XY’s mum, who is one of his deputies for health and welfare, is also a party to proceedings. While the other deputies are not parties, it has been clear that they all have the same position. XY’s mum was represented by Oliver Lewis, of Doughty Street Chambers, who has been acting pro-bono (that is, for free) and via direct access (that is, there are no solicitors that instruct him). At the hearing in December, he was joined by his pupil, Jordan Briggs. 

Unfortunately, Oliver Lewis was not available for the hearing in February nor will he be available for the next hearing listed for the afternoon of 31^st March 2025. It also became clear at the February hearing that there was no other barrister in his chambers who could act at the end of March. This means that XY’s mum will be unrepresented and, while XY’s mum would rather have formal representation, the judge was not willing to change the date of this hearing. 

This blog is in 5 sections. First (1), I will give a brief background to the case, and an overview of the three hearings I’ve. observed. Then I will discuss three themes across these three hearings: (2) restrictions on internet use; (3) the exclusion of XY’s family, who are also his deputies for health and welfare, and, (4) non-compliance with court orders.

Finally (5) Claire will reflect on the way in which this case exemplifies how reasonable concerns about inadequate support are often delegitimised.

I am grateful that the judge gave permission for position statements filed in advance of the December and February hearing to be disclosed to me (I didn’t ask the judge’s permission for the October hearing). In granting this permission, she made it clear that it did not create an obligation for the parties to share their position statement. As such, only the local authority and XY’s mum have elected to do so.

I am also grateful that the judge made provision for the Order made after the December hearing to be shared with me, which meant that I could be confident that I had understood what decisions had been made. The judge also made provision for the Order that listed the February hearing to be shared with me. This meant that I knew that the case would be back in court, which I otherwise may have missed (and also meant I could alert other members of the public to the case).

A brief background

Following an incident in 2024, the details of which I do not know, XY was detained pursuant to the Mental Health Act 1983. This detention, in a hospital not in his local area, was a traumatic experience.

Following some months detained in hospital, XY was discharged to his own property with the support of carers at a ratio of 2:1. That is to say, two people are with him at all times. During this time, his physical and mental health continued to decline. His care is funded by a mixture of funds from the LA and the ICB.

As I understand it, it was XY’s family (who are also his health and welfare deputies) who applied to the Court of Protection. It sounds like they did this via the Re X procedure because his care arrangements amount to a deprivation of liberty, and require the authorisation of the court. It is usual for the local authority in which a person resides to make this type of application, and I do not know why they failed to do so here.

The October hearing was predominantly concerned with trying to find a way forward. The public bodies had not complied with the judge’s previous orders (though there was no explanation why they were not complied with, nor what the orders actually related to);. The judge was therefore not clear on what restrictions she was being asked to approve. Despite being invited to do so, the judge declined to authorise the deprivation of XY’s liberty arising from his care arrangements as being in his best interests. This was because she had not seen an up-to-date care plan that was agreed between the parties. She also remarked that she has “concerns about how litigation has been conducted”. 

At the October hearing, Counsel for the ICB said there was hope of transcending the “impasse or the difficulties that have bedevilled the two statutory bodies working together”. This is a common theme in this case. The local authority and ICB have had a fractured response to supporting XY, with both of them disagreeing about what exactly they are responsible for. 

The core of this disagreement seems to be with regards to who is responsible for providing what services given the fact that XY is funded under s117 of the Mental Health Act 1983. He is in receipt of this funding because he has been detained pursuant to section 3 of the Mental Health Act, and is therefore eligible for funded aftercare. Mind explain that it is the responsibility of the ICB and local authority to provide aftercare services, “Sometimes there are disputes between different integrated care boards, local health boards and local authorities about who has to provide or pay for your aftercare services”. 

This means that, while shocking, the delays in this case are symptomatic of a broader problem, and are not specific to this case. 

At the December hearing, it was clear that very little progress had been made. In the words of the judge: “yet again there is an inability to identify who should be responsible for what”. There was nevertheless some agreement between the ICB and local authority as to who would file what evidence. It was also agreed that they would work together on creating “an umbrella care plan”. 

However, a letter from XY’s GP had raised concerns about his deterioration. As the judge put it, “I am told he is spending 23 hours in bed to the extent his muscles are wasting. He’s spending most of that time [unclear]. It’s probably impacting on his mental health…This is not something I should be seeing – a pattern of deterioration, not improvement…I am saying that there is enough to raise a suspicion that everything may not be alright. I am saying this matter should be an expeditious enquiry”. 

The judge set down a strict timetable for the filing of evidence, and listed a hearing before her at the end of March 2025. Oliver Lewis indicated that he was unavailable on this date but the judge told XY’s mum that, “I cannot fit this hearing at the convenience of your barrister. You are always welcome to attend unrepresented, and we will do our best to accommodate you”.

The timetable has already failed, necessitating an additional hearing, on 6^th February 2025. I will say more about this in section (4).

Restrictions on internet use

There is no dispute between the parties that XY lacks the mental capacity to make decisions about his internet use. It is also agreed that it is not in his best interests to have unsupervised and/or unmoderated use of the internet. This is as a result of the risk that he experiences in internet use. These risks have been briefly discussed in open court but it was clear that the judge and XY’s mum were keen to avoid the details, so I have decided not to report on them here. 

At the October hearing, the judge expressed concern that XY had been assessed as lacking capacity for his internet usage “but there is no plan to address what may be unhealthy use of the internet” – that is to say, what best interests decision should be made with regards to his internet use. Counsel for the ICB submitted that, given XY’s care plan was going to be reviewed later that month, “it seems appropriate for the review of that care plan to conclude”. Nobody disagreed, and the judge approved that direction of travel. 

At the December hearing, submissions were made on behalf of XY’s mum that Cyber Spider ought to be commissioned. Cyber Spider’s website explains that it provides assessments and interventions with the aim of developing a personalised ‘cyber care plan’.

Counsel for XY’s mum told the court that, “their reports have been very useful in providing the parties and the court [in other cases] on how certain websites can be blocked before certain times. XY is very technologically capable and Cyber Spider have the expertise to put in place software that blocks his ability to…without the provider turning off the Wi-Fi. It has to be done in a XY specific and autism informed way. There has to be some nuance”^[i].

The position of the local authority was that they’d made a public law decision not to commission Cyber Spider and therefore the Court of Protection had no jurisdiction to order its commission. There is however a distinction between Cyber Spider being commissioned and Cyber Spider providing a report on the options. 

Nevertheless, the judge decided instead to, “direct [that] the local authority will set out a best interests analysis in relation to use of internet and social media, and whatever its public law decisions are. And I will indicate that should include information that they have considered any free resources on CyberSpider’s website (because I can’t see how you object to that [Counsel for LA]). If you’re not happy, you may make a COP9 application for a further specific direction on the expert”.

The issue of internet use was raised again at the February hearing. This time, however, the judge’s patience in waiting for a decision had run short. It is quite unusual to observe a judge who appears angry but, on this issue, she clearly was. For example, she intermittently raised her voice as she spoke, and described the glacial speed of progress as “not acceptable”. She also moved around in her chair a lot (whereas in the October hearing she was relatively still) which seemed to me to be a sign of irritation. 

Counsel for the local authority told the court that a best interests decision had been made that XY’s internet use would, at all times, be supervised. What XY ought not to do on the internet, or what care staff should do if he did do those things, was far from clear.

The judge wanted to know who was responsible for implementing those best interests decisions. I have decided to quote (from contemporaneous notes) what happened in that exchange because it gets to the heart of the way that public bodies have been badly failing XY. The words in capitals are the judge’s own emphasis.

Judge: I am asking about restrictions on internet use. Anyone? [silence] Nobody? Does that notdisclose a SERIOUS problem?

Counsel for LA: I can see the court’s concern.*

J: So how are we going to remedy that? Because it is no good, with a vulnerable individual, determining they lack capacity and should have supervision, and then not knowing who is responsible. WHO is responsible for implementing it? 

ICB: [The Social Worker acting for the Local Authority] has raised her hand.*

J: [to social worker acting for the LA] Who is responsible?*

Social Worker acting for the LA: The restriction is part of the support plan.*

J: When did that start?

SW: It is part of his support plan.

J: That is not an answer. You took a best interests decision since last time. When did it start being implemented?

SW: I think it has been implemented …. [Support staff] have been doing it.

J: Since when? The last hearing?

SW: Since the best interests decision was taken.

J: Who communicates that they [the care provider] have to start doing the supervision?

SW: I sent an email to [the care provider]. They agree they will implement.

J: Who follows up to make sure it’s happening?

SW:  I am supposed to. It was supposed to be part of the review. I’m supposed to follow that up. 

J: And when will that happen?

SW: I will send off a date maybe in the next week. Yeah, I will do that.

J: It seems to me that we are yet again in the situation that there is a lack of responsibility clearly being defined about who is responsible. It is NOT acceptable that a best interests decision has been made and there is no information as to how it is being implemented and followed up… I appreciate the efforts to tell me about that but this is crucial. This is a young lad who has been on the internet [detailed risks] when he has no capacity to do so. So it seems to me that there needs to be further evidence about who is taking responsibility, how it is working.

This was one of the most remarkable exchanges I have ever observed in court.  At the end of this exchange, in which the judge did intermittently raise her voice and placed stress on key words, the represented parties were silent. As Claire Martin discusses at the end of this blog, it was actually XY’s mother who broke the silence despite the fact that it was the public bodies who were being reprimanded.

In sum, the judge was angry, the representatives of the public bodies had no answers, and the social worker seemed to give solutions only when prompted.

The judge has stressed at all three hearings I have observed that her job is to establish whether the restrictions on XY’s liberty are proportionate and in his best interests. It is not the role of the court to interfere in the on-the-ground care management. 

And yet, as a result of what can only be described as incompetence on the part of the local authority, she is now having to micromanage care planning and care.^[ii]

The exclusion of XY’s family

It had been the position of XY’s family that his internet use played a large part in his mental and physical deterioration. At the October hearing, this appeared to be dismissed by both the local authority and ICB. By the time of the February hearing, they were finally listening. 

However, XY’s family had been left out of the loop. XY’s mum told the court in February that, following the best interests decision about supervision of internet use, “we were given less than 24 hours to respond to the document [a care plan] from them”.

This is not the only issue on which the public bodies have ignored XY’s family, who are also his court-appointed deputies for health and welfare. Toward the end of 2024, the ICB made a decision to reduce the level of support that XY receives, from 2:1 to 1:1. This had been enacted toward the end of January 2025, and a few days later XY “ejected a support worker from his home”. 

This meant that the carer had to sit in their car, outside the property, while XY was alone and unsupervised inside the property. XY’s mum, representing herself during the February hearing, told the court that XY’s family had informed the public bodies that this reduction in support needed to be done at XY’s pace. 

In other words, this parlous situation could have been avoided if the public bodies had just listened to those who know XY best.

The judge was concerned by this development. She directed the ICB to have a meeting within 24 hours to discuss the appropriate level of support for XY. While she continued to decline to authorise a care plan as being in his best interests, she did authorise the deprivation of liberty that would arise from close supervision (either 1:1 or 2:1).

Frustratingly, this is not the only time that XY’s family have been excluded. In the February hearing, XY’s mum also told the court that, “we’re not consulted in [the drafting of] any of the care plans”. 

Counsel for the ICB responded that XY’s mum’s “anxiety was raised in that she was not in the email loop…that is an administrative error that arose in the context of the emails [about] these proceedings”.

What I found most startling about this was that I had been (accidentally) included in emails between the parties. If I had been copied into these emails, why wasn’t XY’s mum? How is it that a family member and party to proceedings can be excluded from email chains, but I – a public observer – am (erroneously)included? 

The judge noted that this is an unacceptable state of affairs. As she put it, “there appears to be a disconnect between various people taking decisions and the level of involvement of the deputies…so I will include a recital reminding the parties you [XY’s mum] are an unrepresented party [who is also a deputy] and they must comply with their obligations to consult on best interests decisions under s4 of the Mental Capacity Act, and they should do so with a sufficient time to consider and respond to anything before the deadline of any filing that they have to do”.

The very fact that this recital had to be included demonstrates that the public bodies have utterly failed in their duties. Sadly, it was not exactly new. At the October hearing, the judge directed that the Order contain a recital “encouraging all parties to work together”. 

Non-compliance with court orders

Non-compliance with court orders is another issue that has plagued the case. At the October hearing, the judge stated that “not all of those directions [made at a prior hearing] have been complied with”. She raised this again at the end of the hearing: “I am concerned that the directions made on the last occasion have not been fully complied with, and I continue to remain concerned”.

On Monday 3^rd February 2025, the judge made an Order, without notice to the parties, that set down a hearing for that Thursday (6^th February 2025).  This was because it had come to the court’s attention (via an email from XY’s mum) that the parties were not complying with the timetable for filing evidence she had set down at the December hearing. 

In her opening summary at the February hearing, the judge acknowledged that “this is not the first occasion on which the timetable has somewhat slipped and so I listed this hearing, and required attendance of the parties, in order to look at what directions might be needed to keep this matter on track”.

It was the universal position of the parties that there was (in the words of Counsel for the local authority) “no need to disturb the hearing date in March”.

XY’s mum, who was representing herself, told the court that, “I don’t have faith in anything being filed on time because we haven’t seen that yet”. 

Even when new directions were being made at this February hearing, the parties did not offer any indication as to how they would be followed. 

The judge authorised XY’s deprivation of liberty arising from 24 hours of supervision on a maximum of a 2:1 basis. This is the only deprivation she was willing to authorise. She also directed that the ICB and Trust have a meeting about these matters within 24 hours, and that she wanted to see minutes of the meeting and a witness statement: “Who is going to provide an update? [no response from any party] Deafening silence”. 

Once again, the judge had to expressly state that XY’s mum will also be provided with the update. The fact that the judge felt like she had to say that a party should receive communications demonstrates to me just how fractured and dysfunctional the relationship has become. 

The judge concluded the hearing with a word of warning to the public bodies. 

“This matter has been going on a lengthy period of time, it is in nobody’s interests. Sometimes action needs to be taken urgently. It seems to me that this is one of those matters. If there are problems, I expect you to make an application to vary the dates…If there are further delays, I will consider whether to make a costs order, and that order today is simply postponing that consideration…I will CERTAINLY consider if there are any further defaults, unless there are good reasons and an application in advance to meet the date.”

While the threat of a costs order may hang heavy over the heads of the public bodies, it is surely the case that they should need no such threat. A very vulnerable adult is being sorely let down by the incompetence of public bodies. If the threat of a costs order is what it takes to make them actually do something – so be it. But it shouldn’t be this way. 

This case will return to court on the afternoon of Monday 31^st March 2025. 

Reflection I by Sophie Monaghan (Consultant Clinical Psychologist)

I am struck by the frustration and desperation of  P’s mum for the continued deterioration of her son’s well being. That she, as an expert in her son, and with rights as his carer and Deputy for Health and Welfare, is needing to take things to the CoP to get it moving.

Despite all this she presented as calm, and indeed I was struck by her preparedness and ‘professionalism’ – far more than the huge number of other people in the call.

The paralysis of action/diffusion of responsibility was striking. When we understand how this level of risk and concern for a client would play out at the clinical level (with the case being heard at the CoP for goodness sakes!), I am staggered that the NHS Trust seemed so relaxed, ill-prepared and ‘off-the-ball’.

Where does it end for XY?

It feels the direction is so sad and it felt that XY was lost in all this.

Reflection II: How reasonable concerns are delegitimised 
by Claire Martin, Consultant Clinical Psychologist

I observed the February 6^th 2025 hearing in this case, remotely, with four other public observers. There were a lot of people on the remote link, and there were several people in the courtroom, including the judge and two training judges, P’s mother, and other people whose identities I don’t know. 

I wrote down thirteen other people’s names on the remote link, who were connected with the case in some way. These people included all counsel for the hearing (for the ICB, the Local Authority, for P) a social worker and a doctor for the NHS Trust. I think there were solicitors on the link too. Given the number of people involved in this young man’s case, I was shocked at how poorly his care, their communication and the trajectory of the CoP proceedings were going. 

Daniel has described the judge’s exasperation at the slippage of court-ordered timescales and the fact that this hearing had been called by the judge to try to get things back on track. 

I will focus on some of the language used in the hearing and consider how XY’s mother is framed and positioned in the case. 

Daniel wrote this, above. It got me thinking:

“Frustratingly, this is not the only time that XY’s family have been excluded. In the October hearing, XY’s mum told the court that, “we’re not consulted in [the drafting of] any of the care plans”. 

Counsel for the ICB responded that XY’s mum’s “anxiety was raised in that she was not in the email loop…that is an administrative error that arose in the context of the emails [about] these proceedings.”

What I found most startling about this was that I had been (accidentally) included in emails between the parties. If I had been copied into these emails, why wasn’t XY’s mum? How is it that a family member and party to proceedings can be excluded from email chains, but I – a public observer – am (erroneously) included?”

Yes. How is it that a family member and party to the proceedings can be excluded from email chains? It is curious that it’s XY’s mother and not one of the legal professionals being excluded. XY’s mother is not only representing herself at this hearing (since her counsel was unable to represent her): she is also XY’s deputy for health and welfare and is one of the people in his life (I am guessing) most likely to know an awful lot about him – his preferences, likely responses to things such as care, actions and attitudes of others, the environment around him. She is very likely to be a resource to the care system and now, legal teams, involved in trying to work out how best to help XY. It doesn’t seem as if she’s being treated as a resource. 

The word ‘anxiety’ used in relation to XY’s mother is interesting to me. Did XY’s mother tell counsel for the ICB that she (a party in the case) was ‘anxious’ about being left out of emails for the hearing? I don’t think I would have felt ‘anxious’ about it – I think I would have felt angry and would have wondered whether this was deliberate, given the context that XY’s mother has also said that she is not consulted about drawing up his care plans. 

Positioning someone as ‘anxious’ casts them in a certain light – a bit fretful, nervous, worrisome. Working in the health service, I often hear families’ concerns or reasonable complaints framed as them being ‘anxious’ about their loved one’s care. I think it can be a manoeuvre to delegitimise their (often perfectly reasonable) concerns and belittle their status as a full participant. Conversely, I don’t hear the word ‘anxious’ being used about powerful professionals when they speak up or raise concerns. 

In her book ‘Complaint’, Sara Ahmed talks about ‘what we can learn about power from those who complain about abuses of power’. She says in the introduction:

“To be heard complaining is not to be heard. To hear someone as complaining is an effective way of dismissing someone. You do not have to listen to the content of what she is saying if she is justcomplaining …..” 

Could it be that XY’s mother raising issues regarding her exclusion from her son’s care and court proceedings is seen as ‘just complaining’ and, therefore can be dismissed by imputations of ‘anxiety’ and (so common) explanations of ‘administrative error’? Certainly during the hearing, even though counsel for the ICB said she had apologised to XY’s mother, I did not hear anyone say that they would look into how on earth she wasexcluded from the emails, or not consulted about her son’s care plans.

Often the ‘complainer’, by complaining, becomes the problem – rather than what they are complaining about. If you’re ‘anxious’ about something – that’s ultimately a ‘you’ problem, isn’t it? 

As Daniel notes, it is quite remarkable that a judge finds it necessary to include a recital that parties must take note of s4 of the MCA 2005, with the judge saying to XY’s mother:

“I agree there is a disconnect – that there is a disconnect between people and yourselves as [deputy] for [XY]. I am going to include in the recital, reminding all parties that you are an unrepresented party and MUST be consulted under best interests decisions under s4 of the MCA and they should do so within sufficient time to consider and respond before the deadline of any filing that they have to do.” [Judge’s emphasis] 

In this 2017 research paper, called “‘It’s sometimes hard to tell what patients are playing at’: How healthcare professionals make sense of why patients and families complain about care”, the researchers interviewed many health care professionals and concluded: 

We find that interviewees rationalised patients’ motives for complaining in ways that marginalised the content of their concerns. Complaints were most often discussed as coming from patients who were inexpert, distressed or advantage-seeking; accordingly, care professionals hearing their concerns about care positioned themselves as informed decision-makers, empathic listeners or service gate-keepers. […]  We note that it was rare for interviewees to describe complaints raised by patients as grounds for improving the quality of care. (Adams M, Maben J, Robert G. ‘It’s sometimes hard to tell what patients are playing at’: How healthcare professionals make sense of why patients and families complain about care. Health. 2018;22(6):603-623. doi:10.1177/1363459317724853) 

At the hearing, XY’s mother said the following: 

I’m very grateful for you picking this up and holding the hearing today – I don’t have a lot of faith of things being complied with – they have not done so far. We are not consulted about care plans, not listened to. He’s not eaten anything except two oranges since Tuesday …. [Missed] carer …. locked out of house, [carer] sitting in the car for day and night shifts. He continues to lose weight, you can barely pull his trackies up … Doctor’s report on independence – [but there’s] no access to crash pads. The care-coordinator [name] from [place] is helpful – but can he be part of proceedings? He has made recommendations to the care company which have not been heard. […]  [XY] is in crisis NOW. The internet – it’s not going to work, it’s not practical [the plan the LA has put in place]… it’s been 24 hours now without supervision. I don’t want to delay the hearing [at end of March]– nothing seems to get done without the hearings….]. [emphasis of XY’s mother]

It was upsetting to hear a mother who has clearly been trying her best to be helpful to services providing care to her son, to have been repeatedly shut out and not listened to. It is important to say that, throughout the hearing, XY’s mother was calm, measured and did not appear at all ‘anxious’ or emotional. Goodness knows how she managed that though. 

I found the last part of the exchange (which Daniel quotes above) between the judge and XY’s social worker, about responsibility for implementing the plan for internet use, exemplified what XY’s mother was expressing about his poor, disjointed, care: 

Judge: It seems to me that we are yet again in the situation that there is a lack of responsibility clearly being defined about who is responsible. It is NOT acceptable that a best interests decision has been made and there is no information as to how it is being implemented and followed up… I appreciate the efforts to tell me about that but this is crucial. This is a young lad who has been on the internet [detailed risks] when he has no capacity to do so. So it seems to me that there needs to be further evidence about who is taking responsibility, how it is working.

XY’s mother: I would say on the best interests decision, we were given less than 24 hours to respond to a document from them, we did it. We pointed out that all these interventions … would not work…. 

Sara Ahmed again: “To be heard as complaining is not to be heard”. 

It seemed to me that the judge was having to micromanage a very badly conceived and implemented best interests care plan for XY, given that his mother – and again, deputy for health and welfare and a party to proceedings – is not heard and included by services looing after her very vulnerable son. 

XY’s mother: Thank you and thank you for bringing this hearing today and getting things back on track.

I don’t think our courts should have to be performing this function, forcing health and social care bodies to carry out their basic functions and to cooperate with one another, and include (as they legally must) a person’s family in the discharge of their duties. 

Daniel Clark is a member of the core team of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project. He is a PhD student in the Department of Politics & International Relations at the University of Sheffield. His research considers Iris Marion Young’s claim that older people are an oppressed social group. It is funded by WRoCAH. He is on LinkedIn, X @DanielClark132   and Bluesky @clarkdaniel.bsky.social.

Claire Martin is a Consultant Clinical Psychologist, Cumbria, Northumberland, Tyne and Wear NHS Foundation Trust, Older People’s Clinical Psychology Department, Gateshead. She is a member of the core team of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project and has published dozens of blog posts for the Project about hearings she’s observed (e.g. here and here). She is on X as @DocCMartin and on BlueSky as @doccmartin.bsky.social

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^[i]Claire Martin has written about a previous case in which a judge considered restrictions on internet use in a way that did not lose sight of the protected party: ‘The point is this – she is scared and vulnerable’: Judge about Laura Wareham. See also: “For now, it’s a ‘no’”: Court considers access to Grand Theft Auto, by Gill Loomes-Quinn

^[ii] Multiple blogs published by the Open Justice Court of Protection Project document a tendency for judges to be clear that it is not their job to micromanage care planning and delivery. For example:  How much court ‘oversight’ should there be in long-running COP cases? By Claire Martin; Tony Hickmott: Not the happy ending everyone had hoped for by Amanda Hill & Lucy Series; Tangled webs, ‘enmeshment’, and breakdown of trust: Re A: (Covert medication: Closed Proceedings) – an implementation hearing  By Claire Martin‘Micro-management’ or appropriate case management by the court for a ‘dangerous young man’? By Claire Martin

Footnote concerning changes to this blog post made Monday 31st March 2025

On 31st March 2025, the Open Justice Court of Protection Project received an email from a lawyer on behalf of NHS South West London ICB asking us to ensure that “some significant errors in the reporting of the case, affecting the ICB are corrected”. We were asked to “give this matter your urgent attention and ensure that the relevant corrections are published forthwith but in any event by Friday 4th April 2025“.

The following two “inaccuracies“/”misattributions” were identified in that letter:

1. “Counsel for the ICB: I see the court’s concern”. This transcription wrongly attributes a comment made by Counsel for the Local Authority to Counsel for the ICB. 

2. “ICB: [Social Worker] has raised her hand.” This comment suggests that the Social worker was acting for the ICB and suggests that the interchange that took place was with an ICB representative. In fact, the social worker in question acts the Local Authority. You are asked to make clear that, in so far as the transcript refers to comments or responses from the social worker, those are references to the social worker who acts for the Local Authority and not of the ICB.

This is how we have responded.

1. We apologise for having wrongly attributed the sentence “I see the court’s concern” to the Counsel for the ICB when we accept (based on the notes taken at the same hearing by another observer) that this sentence was in fact uttered by Counsel for the Local Authority. We have made the correction (in red) to the original text.
2. We accept that the Social Worker was acting for the Local Authority and not for the ICB and we are happy to make this clear in the text. We had not expected that the quotation used (the accuracy of which is not in dispute) to give rise to a different interpretation, and certainly did not intend to convey any implication that the Social Worker was acting for the ICB. We have amended the original text (see amendments in red above) to make clear that the Social Worker was acting for the Local Authority.

We apologise to the ICB for any embarrassment caused by these two matters.