A ‘good news story’: Kidney dialysis trial for 17-year-old with learning disabilities

By Avaia Williams, 22 October 2023

Sana, a 17-year-old girl, is at the centre of this case. She has Joubert Syndrome, a rare genetic condition that leads to abnormal brain development. In Sana’s case, unfortunately, this has also led to her suffering with Stage 5 kidney failure, and, without haemodialysis, Sana will die within a matter of days or weeks.

Sana has severe difficulties with understanding and communicating information, especially that regarding complicated medical procedures that are being proposed and she is not able to give or to withhold consent to treatment. There are concerns from her doctors that treatment would be burdensome, that Sana would find the process hard to tolerate, and that she might interfere with a Central Venous Catheter (“CVC”), a tube usually inserted into the neck or chest to facilitate dialysis, and require restraint for dialysis to take place. The hospital was therefore reluctant to treat her without a court order. They brought the case to court because the provision of life-sustaining treatment in this case was one they considered to be “a finely balanced issue” – and under these circumstances an application should be made (as per the Supreme Court’s decision in NHS Trust v Y and subsequent guidance).

The Hearing

This case (COP 14158703) was heard remotely in the Royal Courts of Justice before the Vice President of the Court of Protection, Mrs Justice Theis, on 18th October 2023. This was the substantive hearing following urgent directions and arrangements on Monday 15th October 2023.

The applicant was the Northern Care Alliance NHS Foundation Trust, the Trust responsible for Sana’s care. They were represented today by Vikram Sachdeva KC of 39 Essex Chambers.

Sana was the first respondent and was represented (via her litigation friend, the Official Solicitor) by Ben McCormack of Garden Court North Chambers (pictured above) and Damian Cullen from the Office of the Official Solicitor. Also present were GCN’s current pupil barristers, Helen Peden and Alexa Thompson.

Sana’s mother, Maryam Nogourani, the second respondent, was represented by Victoria Butler-Cole KC, also of 39 Essex Chambers.

Sana’s father, Majid Hosseini, was also present, but not officially represented – although it was said by Counsel for Sana’s mother that he shares the mother’s views.

Sana’s parents were both assisted by an interpreter who was present throughout the hearing on the video platform translating the proceeding via a separate phone-line which the parents held between them.

 Pre-Hearing Discussions

Interestingly, prior to the hearing formally beginning, all parties were present via MS Teams for some ten minutes or so and took the opportunity to discuss some administrative points – such as confirming the existence and details of reporting restrictions, amending draft orders and discussing next steps. Such discussions, at least when courts are sitting in-person, tend to take place outside the watchful eye of the public –  in the robing room or whispered between advocates sitting on counsels’ row. 

The advocates were ironing out of the details of the (agreed) draft substantive order.  What many lay observers may not be aware of is that, in many public law hearings, the lawyers draft the orders which they want the judge to make, and the judge goes through these orders during the hearing, making minor (or sometimes major) changes. In this case, finalising the draft order seemed to include arranging the next hearing date, the agreed plan going forward, and minor procedural matters due to an earlier consideration that the mother may not have been entitled to receive legal aid (an issue which, as it turned out, proved irrelevant as such aid was available). 

Counsel for the Trust (Vikram Sachdeva KC)

Providing a very useful summary for the benefit of the observers present, Counsel for the Trust gave an overview of Sana’s diagnosis, explaining that this has led to end stage kidney disease and learning disabilities, which make it hard for Sana to understand what is happening. Particularly, she struggles to understand why a CVC line would be inserted and why she would then have to sit still, for up to four hours, three times a week, on dialysis for the rest of her life (subject to her receiving a transplant). He expressed that she “has had some behavioural reactions to needles” as well as the fact that “nurses’ uniforms are enough to distress her.” The hospital has proactively begun desensitisation therapy in order to get Sana used to these procedures, but due to the urgency of the treatment required, this has not been completed.

Counsel for the Trust went on to explain that “the nature of this treatment is such that the tube cannot be pulled out due to risk of […] bleeding and infection” further pointing out that “it is possible that some restraint might be required during dialysis […] It is not a small undertaking.” He explained that all parties have effectively agreed to this treatment provided a follow up review takes place with the court in a matter of weeks once it is clearer how Sana is reacting to the treatment. Anticipating possible complications, Counsel stated that “if it appears that she [Sana] needs significant sedation requiring an anaesthetist, we need to consider whether that is appropriate”.

Following this, Mrs Justice Theis inquired about the practicalities of making this order, asking “what will happen on the ground […] is the CVC line going to be put in this week?” Counsel confirmed that, provided the order was made, the line would go in on Friday and dialysis would start shortly after. Further, he confirmed that Sana would stay in hospital during this period to ensure there is oversight.

Mrs Justice Theis, showing concern for Sana, asked about the measures which would be taken to reduce and manage the risk of the CVC line being knocked or ripped out. In response, Counsel for the Trust read out relevant parts of the draft substantive order and capacity declaration for the benefit of the observers, referring to bespoke clothing items that would be used to support Sana to keep the CVC undisturbed.  (It is often the case that all parties other than the observers will have copies of such papers and so advocates regularly proceed on the assumption that there is no need to go over these in any detail or will simply refer to “paragraph X of the order” – this makes it incredibly difficult for observers to follow proceedings.)

Before Counsel for the Trust or Mrs Justice Theis could clarify further, one of Sana’s clinicians who was present for the hearing (and one of the few people whose name is confidential by virtue of the Transparency Order) stepped in to clarify the matter regarding the clothing, saying that the garments had not yet been obtained but that “a charity […] has been contacted to obtain these.” Mrs Justice Theis was quick to ask whether the charity in question were “aware of the request and the urgency.” The clinician clarified that they “had not yet had a response as of coming onto the call today, it may be that if that charity cannot assist, we might be able to find a seamstress through a different pathway.” The court’s concern around the clothing was alleviated with the clarification that “A tight fitting high neck top is sufficient” whilst Sana is in hospital and “the bespoke clothing is more relevant when [Sana] is feeling better and more active”.

Counsel for the Mother (Victoria Butler-Cole KC)

Counsel for Sana’s mother opened her brief submissions by noting that both parents were eager to begin the dialysis, saying they “are very enthusiastic about dialysis and more confident than the doctors that Sana will be able to tolerate it well”.

In response to the submissions of Counsel for the mother, Mrs Justice Theis raised two points. First, she made clear that she was very aware of the real person at the heart of this case, noting that she “had the pleasure of seeing the video of Sana dancing, she clearly enjoys dancing”. (She may have been referring to the video reproduced in this Mail Online article.) The mother was smiling and nodding at this point.  The judge commended “the creativity of the Trust in being able to, what has been termed desensitise, which may not be the right word, but help Sana get used to what the treatment may involve”.  This work, she said has been “impressive”, noting that the Trust have gone so far as to provide a miniature dialysis machine for Sana’s favourite doll, Mario (shown with Sana in the picture above).

There was also an application from the mother for the standard Transparency Order that applies to Court of Protection cases (which prohibits identification of the person at the centre of the case, and their family) to be lifted. “There may come a time when an appeal is made for a live organ doner”, said Counsel, “and this is much more likely if the family’s names can be used”. She added that similar cases (e.g. the William Verden case, reported here by his mother) showed that “there is no negative impact on families from coverage of these sorts of cases: it’s a good news story.  Someone needs treatment, and they’re going to get it!”. Mrs Justice Theis made clear her view that removing anonymity in this case would pose “no particular concern”.

Counsel for Sana (Ben McCormack)

Counsel for Sana (via her litigation friend, the Official Solicitor) stated that they “consider this to be a case where the proposed treatment is in Sana’s best interests” and that “this isn’t a finely balanced decision at all, it is fairly straightforward.” He went on to recognise that “Nobody’s mind can be closed to the fact that dialysis is a form of treatment that has a lot of ups and downs and it might have ups and downs for Sana in particular ,who might not understand what is happening or why”, but reminded the court of the person in this case and that it is “manifestly in her best interests that this treatment starts. Part of the best interests decision is the court trying to work out who the person is. What are her feelings […] what are her values […] for any of us who come along to Sana’s life late in the day […] it is extremely helpful to have videos and the words of people who know her like her mum […] it really brings her to life for the court. What it shows is somebody who is happy despite her illness, who is in good spirits, who is able to adapt and handle quite a lot of what has been thrown at her.  She is sitting in a hospital bed, but she is retaining her joy and happiness […] Nobody wants to ignore the fact that she has some difficulties…but we also have a happy joyful young person.” With this, Counsel explained that they welcomed the hospital’s agreement to start treatment.

In respect of the Transparency Order, Counsel for Sana informed the court that the Official Solicitor herself, Sarah Castle, had taken an interest in the case and agreed that discharge of the Transparency Order in respect of Sana and her parents is something that should be done. As to whether the Trust should be named, the Official Solicitor took a neutral stance.

Response from Counsel for the Trust (Vikram Sachdeva KC)

Providing brief input, Counsel for the Trust noted that the most up-to-date version of the Transparency Order (as edited during the hearing) prevents only the identification of any of Sana’s specific treating clinicians. No party opposed this variation.

Input from the Press Agency (Brian Farmer)

Also present in the hearing was Brian Farmer, a reporter with the Press Association. Mr Farmer had turned his camera on at this point and indicated that he wished to speak. Mrs Justice Theis allowed this and – at least in the eyes of somebody entering the legal profession, one steeped in tradition and formalities, especially in the Royal Courts of Justice – a rather casual conversation between an accredited reporter and a High Court Justice took place. Whilst I understand Mr Farmer frequently intervenes in proceedings, raising concerns regarding reporting restrictions, experiencing this for the first time did, admittedly, throw me. 

Mr Farmer explained that he wished to raise several points that he “seem[s] to raise regularly, and I would like to ask you [Mrs Justice Theis] because it is you [i.e. the Vice President]. Why can’t we name the clinicians? I know about the Abassi case and  I understand in cases like Charlie Gard and Alfi Evans where clinicians are being harassed. But in this case, it’s nothing but good news. You’ve praised medical staff for good work. Why on earth would the clinicians or medical staff be at risk? The family should have the chance to praise them?”

Responding, Mrs Justice Theis stated “I take on board what you have to say Mr Farmer, but we are at the very early stages of what is going to be difficult treatment. Everybody will want it to go one particular way. We don’t know how it is going to go, and – without speaking for Mr Sachdeva –  I imagine that is what lies behind that position. If you want to be able to name the clinicians it is better to be dealt with at the review hearing […] I would be reluctant to do anything at the moment.”

Mr Farmer then raised another interesting question, the answer to which many lay observers may find useful: “is there any reason why we can’t see witness statements?”.  Mrs Justice Theis explained that  “within the rules […] the order can be seen but the evidence cannot be seen without the leave of the court. If there is agreement to that, in circumstances, as long as all the parties have the opportunity to make representations and the court has considered those, then in principle that could be done. But each case is different.” (So, we can see witness statements if we ask to and the court decides to authorise it.). Counsel for the Trust interjected that it is Rule 5.9 of the COP Rules which states:

‘(1) Subject to rules 5.12 and 4.3(2), a person who is not a party to proceedings may inspect or obtain from the court records a copy of any judgment or order given or made in public.
(2) The court may, on an application made to it, authorise a person who is not a party to proceedings to—
(a) inspect any other documents in the court records; or
(b) obtain a copy of any such documents, or extracts from such documents.’

Finally, Mr Farmer checked that images of Sana – if provided to the press by the parents – could be used. They could, and they now appear in the press, credited to the Press Association for which Brian Farmer works, alongside his articles.

Reflecting on this interaction between Mr Farmer and Mrs Justice Theis, I found the interventions that Mr Farmer raised to be not only relevant, but also very concisely and succinctly put. (Mr Farmer would not make too bad an advocate!). Mr Farmer allowed the court, through his questions, to explain WHY the restrictions regarding reporting the identity of the clinicians were in place and to identify the law preventing routine access to evidence. In all cases, but especially in a case with such a serious subject matter, as Lord Hewart famously said: “justice must not only be done, but must also be seen to be done” (Rex v. Sussex Justices, [1924] 1 KB 256).

Input from the Father

Finally, Mrs Justice Theis was aware that, although it had been submitted that the father shared the views of the mother, he was not formally represented by Victoria Butler-Cole KC, and that she “should ask the father for his views“. Through the family’s interpreter, the father said that “Yes, I agree with everything”.

Judgment

Mrs Justice Theis delivered a brief yet clear judgment. (It’s not been published at the time of writing.) She first noted that it was agreed by all parties that the previous versions of the TO, which prevented Sana or her family from being identified, should be varied as agreed by counsel. She then continued: 

“It is in Sana’s best interests to undertake the procedure to insert the CVC line this Friday and then soon after start the haemodialysis treatment. The dialysis will involve Sana sitting still for three to four hours up to three times per week in order to receive the necessary treatment […] It will require enormous support, not only by her parents but also the medical team that will support her.” Mrs Justice Theis noted that the risks of Sana interfering with the CVC would include “bleeding, air embolism, and [the] inherent risks of infection.”

“I would like to commend this particular Trust for the enormous care that they have taken. They have engaged with a dummy dialysis machine and a dummy CVC line […] and have also replicated that for her favourite doll, Mario, so she has been able to see that Mario has the same procedure as she will.” She finally ruled that “the treatment proposed, as difficult as it may be, has the best chance of success. Whilst there are inherent risks in relation to this treatment […] it is quite clear that those risks are heavily outweighed [by the chance of success]. I agree with the Official Solicitor, this is not a finely balanced best interests decision. It is a clear decision on the evidence that the order now sought is in Sana’s best interests.”

In her closing words, Mr Justice Theis again demonstrated the humanity in this case, “I sincerely hope that the treatment this Friday to put in the CVC and the dialysis that follows goes well and I hope that I shall be reading positive evidence by the time of the next hearing.” 

Reflections

This hearing, quite literally, concerned life or death matters. At the heart of the case was a teenager, whose best interests were evidently considered by all parties. The fact that this case was a non-contentious matter, that being one where all parties, in principle, agree on the proposed course, was extremely interesting to see put into action, advocates coming together to act as a cohesive and supportive unit, with the interests of Sana clearly the only driving force.

Despite the case being non-contentious and there being clear agreement by all parties, I have still learned numerous things by attending this hearing.  One which I hope to carry forward is the confidence and ability to challenge matters such as overly restrictive Transparency Orders. Being able to raise these concerns during the course of a hearing is in the best interests of all:  it allows the advocates to make immediate representations and allows for the judge to amend the order immediately – principles which surely support open justice. For a case which demonstrates the implications (particularly with respect to costs) of not facilitating journalists (or indeed other public observers) concerned with transparency issues) see Celia Kitzinger’s reflections in N v Kent County Council (also a case heard by Mrs Justice Theis).

What was also striking about this case was the humanity involved. Everybody was clear that this matter was about a real person. For me, the anecdotes about her dancing, her interests, her existence, were constantly reminding all that this wasn’t a moot or a game of playing lawyer: the submissions and decisions made would decide the fate of a human being, a 17-year-old girl. It can be easy to become hardened to such matters when you see then so often, but Sana’s case reminded me of the lives, the stories, the feelings, and the wishes which are present in every case in every court across the country.

I am hoping to attend the review hearing in Sana’s case on the 13th of November 2023 and would encourage anybody who is able to do so to also attend. The interests of justice are served not only by advocates and judges, but also by observers ensuring that justice is seen to be done.

Avaia Williams is an unregistered barrister and founder of the Nightingale Rights Initiative. He will begin his pupillage next year at Parklane Plowden Chambers where he will practice in the Family Courts and Court of Protection. He regularly tweets @AvaiaLaw

Tampering with equipment or failings in care? A fact-finding hearing (Part 1)

By Deborah Airey, Amanda Hill (Anna), Jordan Briggs, Nikki Bowsley, Febienne Green, John Harper, Daisy Long, Gill Loomes-Quinn, Claire Martin and Tom McBride (co-ordinated and curated with an introduction by Celia Kitzinger), 18 October 2023

Note: This blog post was ready to publish on 24 July 2023 but publication has been delayed until today because we wanted to ensure that all witness evidence was complete before we published anything. The hearing was adjourned on 31 July 2023 due to illness of one of the advocates with the father not yet having finished his witness evidence, and without witness evidence from either the grandmother or the mother. The hearing resumed after the court break on 9 October 2023 and the family have been giving evidence over the last few days. Evidence is now complete. Our decision to delay publication until all the witnesses had finished giving evidence is discussed in two earlier posts: see A judicial embargo and our decision to postpone and Fact-finding hearing: “Little short of outright war”. Because I felt uneasy about publishing this blog post back in July as originally planned, I selected out an edited version of just the Introduction and published that alone – along with an account of why I felt unable to publish the whole thing. So if you think you’ve read the Introduction before, you probably have – and that’s why. I’ve retained the same Introductory text here (with just a few minor amendments and corrections) because I originally wrote it to introduce the 10 blog contributions that follow, and I want to maintain the integrity of the original design of this blog post. You could read the Introduction again to refresh your memory about the background to the hearing – or just skip to new material which starts two paragraphs above the first subheading indicating the beginning of the blog contribution by law student Tom McBride (1. From abstract legal principles to emotion in the courtroom).

Introduction

Fact-finding hearings are relatively rare in the Court of Protection – certainly before Tier 3 (the most senior) judges. We’ve previously published only one blog post about a fact-finding hearing (before HHJ Tindal, here: “Abuse and coercive control? A fact-finding hearing and exoneration”) – plus another about a fact-finding hearing that was abandoned (before HHJ Lopez, here:  Fact-finding, ‘magnetic importance’, and the consternation of colleagues: A final hearing adjourned).

Fact-finding hearings arise when one party makes allegations against another that are of significance and will impact upon decisions that need to be made – like where the vulnerable person at the centre of the case (P) will live, or the contact they will have with family members. 

In this case, the ICB (Integrated Care Board) is making serious accusations against the family.  

They say the parents have been intimidating, threatening and challenging to staff and used rude or abusive words to them (thereby breaching injunctive orders from a previous hearing).  

They say both parents and the grandmother have tampered with G’s medical equipment, including the equipment used to deliver oxygen, suction and feeding, and that they’ve placed G at risk of harm by interfering during her medical care.

There are counter accusations from G’s father, supported by the mother and grandmother.  He says that staff at the care home have placed his daughter at risk of harm by failing to provided proper care.  He says they’ve not properly maintained her airway and lungs, her oxygen supply, her tracheostomy, or feeding tubes.  He says they’ve failed to ensure she has adequate equipment which is properly set up, and that they’ve failed to maintain her personal hygiene, have used unsafe secondary ventilator settings, and failed to administer essential medications.  

These are all very serious allegations – both those by the Care Home and ICB against the family, and those by the family against the Care Home.

The outcome of this hearing will be that the judge, Mr Justice Hayden, will decide the facts of the matter – and those “facts”, as determined by the judge, will have a profound impact on future decisions made for G: on where she lives, who cares for her, and the time she spends with the three closest members of her family.

G is 28 years old with a progressive neurological condition. She is in a low awareness state, has a tracheostomy and ventilator, and requires skilled 24/7 care.  She moved from Hospital (where she’d been for the previous 14 years) to a Care Home in mid-August 2022.  Clearly, things have not gone well in the last 11 months.

Her family wanted her to come home rather than move to a care home, but in a previous judgment (in December 2021)  Hayden J ordered she should move to the Care Home because an immediate move home was “fretted with risk” and “might set G up to fail” so that that “she would have no further chance to return to her parents’ care“.  The move to the Care Home was intended, initially, as a step-down from hospital care “to smooth out the transition to any return home” (from the December 2021 judgment, Re G [2021} EWCOP 69).

An unusual feature of this case is that G’s father has made audio-recordings on his telephone when he has visited his daughter in the Care Home.  Some of these have been played in court.  They provide powerful contemporaneous evidence of what was said on particular occasions  – listening to them helps to determine who said what and whether or not (for example) a family member was screaming or shouting at staff, whether they were “rude”, how long it was before someone reported a fault with equipment, and so on.  Memories and records of these events provide one source of evidence. The recordings provide another.  There are also contemporaneous – usually handwritten and initialled- care records maintained by the Care Home, which provide another source of evidence about what happened.  Some of these care records have been displayed on screen in the course of the hearing.

The hearing is taking place in a courtroom in the Royal Courts of Justice.  There is also a video-link and some people are participating remotely.  This includes G’s grandmother and some of the witnesses.

The lawyers are all in the courtroom and the barristers are easily recognisable as such because they are wearing wigs. If you join a few minutes before the hearing starts, you’ll often see them putting them on (sometimes their jabots, too) – and complaining about them being “itchy”.  Their instructing solicitors sit behind them, usually alongside their clients. Both parents are in the physical courtroom.  So are some observers (right at the back) – and sometimes the PA journalist, Brian Farmer, appears for parts of the hearing.  He wrote an article about the case after the first day of the hearing which appeared in The Independent: “Parents and grandmother accused of ‘tampering’ with woman’s medical equipment”.

The barristers addressing the judge (so-called “Leading Counsel” in this case) are:

If you click on the links, you’ll see photos of them – though they look a bit different dressed up in court (“robed”). 

The grandmother does not have a legal team. She appears as a litigant in person, which is why she is able to cross-question the witnesses – whereas the lawyers do the cross-questioning for the other members of the family.

Other people visible in court if you join by video-link might include: 

They are “junior” only in the sense that they are not (yet) KCs – “Kings Counsel” – i.e. those barristers (or solicitor advocates) and who’ve been recognised for excellence in advocacy, who are seen as leaders in their area of law, who generally take on more complex cases requiring a higher level of expertise.  Junior counsel have a very important but less visible role to play in this hearing, and they support senior counsel (the KCs) in court – for example by finding the correct material or references as witnesses are examined, allowing senior counsel to focus more on formulating their questions.

The witnesses – so far including the Safeguarding Lead, some health care workers, the clinical lead from the care home and some nurses –  are sometimes in the physical courtroom, and sometimes on the remote link. There are more witnesses to come.   

Each witness is ‘sworn in’ or asked to make the (non-religious) ‘affirmation’ that they will tell the truth.  Each has submitted one or more written statements and is asked to confirm they are true – or make any corrections.  Then they are questioned about what they’ve said to “test their evidence” – and sometimes their statements are compared with what they or others wrote at the time in the care home records,  or with an audio-recording. It’s clear from watching that this is a very stressful experience for them. The judge is trying hard to reduce their stress and explain to them how the process works.

The evidence and questions are focussed around a few specific events.  For example, there has been a focus on a couple of occasions when G’s oxygen was not reaching her and there are different views about how that came about. Another concerns an occasion when G was transported from hospital back to the care home with a cracked piece of ventilation equipment: the nurse says it was a “hairline crack”; the father has a photograph (which was displayed on screen) showing a piece of equipment completely broken through.  On another occasion, the parents returned late from a day out with G and the night nurse asked them to hand over G at the front door rather than admitting them into the Care Home: she alleges that G’s mother shouted at her and (deliberately?) injured her foot with the wheelchair by continuing to push G’s wheelchair into the building.

In this blog post, ten people who’ve watched part of the hearing (none of us has managed to watch all of it) write about their experience.  For some, it was the first time they’d ever observed a Court of Protection hearing.  Others are seasoned veterans.  Some have a legal background –  as law students or paralegals. Many have personal or professional experience in relevant areas – e.g. as a disabled disability rights activist, a Safeguarding Adults Practitioner, a family member and litigant-in-person of a different P in another case, a trainer for court witnesses, and a psychologist.  What is gathered here is a kaleidoscope of different responses, from a range of perspectives, from members of the public who watched this hearing and reflected on it.

For me, the ten accounts gathered here demonstrate unequivocally the value of transparency in the Court of Protection. They demonstrate, in particular, why transparency should not be limited to journalists and “accredited lawyers” (as is the case under the Family Transparency Pilot at the moment).  These are accounts by members of the public about their experience of seeing justice being done, at first hand, and their reflections on that.

Bear in mind that these reflections were written after the first four days of a projected nine day hearing (added note: which has in fact continued, so far, for 14 days, with at least two more days to come, for final submissions) They cover only some of the witness evidence relied on by the ICB and nobody had – at the point this pieces were written – heard any witness evidence from the family. This is a hearing in progress – and it’s possible that we may all change our minds about some matters, or develop different (perhaps more nuanced) perspectives as the hearing progresses. These are simply snapshots of the hearing-so-far on the particular dates and times when the observers were watching it. We will be publishing a second blog post like this one with diverse views from people who have watched the second half of the hearing – and probably some more sustained reflections from observers commenting on the hearing as a whole.

1. From abstract legal principles to emotion in the courtroom

By Tom McBride 

This was my first time observing a Court of Protection hearing. Having just finished my second year studying law at University, I’d had a few brief encounters with the concept of the court: I knew it was set up by the Mental Capacity Act 2005, and that it makes decisions on behalf of those who lack the mental capacity to do so for themselves. Overall, however, my understanding was entirely abstract, and lacking in depth; my university course had so far favoured a rigorous education in the more traditional legal disciplines like tort and contract over an exploration of more contemporary (though no less important) topics like the Court of Protection.  

As a result, I’m not sure what to expect as I wait at my desk to be admitted to the Microsoft Teams meeting on the morning of Friday 21st July 2023 (day 4 of the hearing). After a few minutes, I’m let in, and I watch through my laptop as the courtroom slowly fills up. This was a hybrid hearing, taking place in a physical courtroom whilst simultaneously being viewed by online observers (and one party, plus some witnesses) via Teams. The screen, split up into three different video feeds (showing the witness box, the judge’s chair, and the remainder of the courtroom), gradually becomes busier as barristers, witnesses, observers and staff enter through a door in the corner of my screen. I hear bits and pieces of hushed audio through microphones set up in the courtroom, though nothing is clearly audible. Initially, I assume this is because the remainder of the microphones are yet to be turned on; later, I learn that it is in fact only this microphone which works, which becomes apparent to me when a barrister asks a witness to speak more loudly so that her audio can be picked up.  

It’s not long until Mr Justice Hayden crosses my screen, disappearing from the edge of one video only to reappear in another as he sits down, and the hearing commences. We’re launched straight into the action as a barrister begins to cross-examine the witness, a healthcare worker previously involved in an encounter with the protected party (G)’s father, in order to determine the sequence of events that had taken place during the interaction. At times, the cross examination is tense: the witness has difficulty recollecting certain events; the barrister disputes whether certain statements are true; and questions often revolve around small yet significant details, like G’s oxygen saturation levels or the likelihood of administering certain treatments to a patient. Factoring in occasionally choppy audio, piecing together the interaction becomes a daunting task, and I’m left with a sense of uncertainty which lingers long after I stop observing the hearing. 

And yet, in the midst of the confusion, one thing does remain perfectly clear: the proceedings in this court are deeply personal, and deal with matters touching upon core elements of the human experience. 

Occasionally during the cross-examination, Mr Justice Hayden redirects questioning towards how the witness felt in the presence of G’s father: the emphasis should not be on what he did, but how he made her feel. His motivation for doing so is to maintain the focus of the hearing on what might be best for P. The question at the heart of this case, we are reminded, is to determine what is in the best interests of a young woman who is unable to make this decision for herself. 

At one point, we listen to a recording of the interaction. Amid several panicked voices and frantic hospital alarms, we hear a father’s soothing voice as he tries to calm his daughter during what is an undeniably stressful medical situation. The judge acknowledges that G is not yet at the end of the process of neuro-degeneration, and might be able to recognise her father. The witness admits that G occasionally responds to her father’s attempts to placate her. On this occasion, she says, she became visibly less anxious in his presence. Once again, we are reminded of the humanity of those involved in the hearing (not least the young woman at its very centre) and the significance of the matters at stake. 

My experience of observing was a moving one, and this wasn’t something that I’d expected. Maybe I was naïve. Or maybe I’ve just spent too long studying law in the abstract, blissfully ignorant of the highly emotive matters raised in courts like these on a daily basis. 

After observing the hearing for a few hours, I’m left with no sense of certainty as to what course of action would be in G’s best interests. What I am left with, however, is an urgent sense of hope that the judge is able to get it right. 

2. A disability rights perspective: When ‘service user voice’ is like walking a tightrope

By Gill Loomes-Quinn (@GillLoomesQuinn)

I have lots of experience of observing Court of Protection hearings, having previously spent time in the Court of Protection (CoP), at First Avenue House in London, as part of my PhD research; and then observing in my role as co-director of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project (including observations before this judge). This means that I have prior experience of observing how the court engages with the lives of disabled people deemed to lack mental capacity to make specific, often significant, personal decisions. I am aware of the (sometimes draconian) outcomes of Court of Protection proceedings, and the ways in which these can constrain and circumscribe the fundamental rights and freedoms of those at the centre of such proceedings. I have also observed Court of Protection judges go to considerable lengths to ensure that the ‘protected party’ (as the person at the centre of a CoP case is typically called) is given opportunities to participate in proceedings, and that decisions they make reflect that person’s values, wishes, feelings, and beliefs.. And, as a disabled person and user of social care myself, I inevitably interpret my observations through the ‘lens’ of my own experiences of health and social care services, and the treatment of disabled people by wider society. 

The part of the hearing I observed (on the afternoon of Friday 21st July 2023) examined the evidence of a nurse working as part of G’s care team. Unsurprisingly, it was difficult to join the proceedings at this point – after three and a half days of witness evidence had already been presented – and make sense of the details, and this was exacerbated by the fact that (to me, at least) the sound quality via the remote link was suboptimal.  But what quickly became apparent to me was the complexity of G’s care needs and the gravity of the events around which the parties were in dispute. 

I was especially concerned by an exchange between the witness and G’s grandmother concerning the management of G’s ventilation, when the oxygen supply had apparently been found by G’s grandmother to be off, and the witness was being questioned as to assertions that G’s grandmother may have been responsible for this – seemingly with the alleged aim of casting aspersions on the abilities of the staff to care for G. It is hard to think of a need more profound than that of ventilation, and the potential catastrophic consequences of failure in this regard highlight G’s vulnerability. 

I was therefore surprised by the demeanour of the witness when answering questions – particularly those of G’s grandmother. I say ‘particularly’ firstly because a prolonged exchange between the witness and G’s grandmother took up most of the afternoon’s proceedings, and secondly because I would perhaps have expected a demonstration of more emotion – and ‘care’ – when discussing such potentially serious events with a member of G’s family. Giving evidence in court is likely to be a daunting and stressful experience, and witnesses may not perform in the witness box according to their everyday character or demonstrate the ways in which they may typically interact with G while caring for her. However, the witness came across to me as glib and often defensive in her manner; as well as having a poor, under-prepared, recollection of the events in dispute. For example, when asked if G had particularly ‘complex’ care needs, representing challenges that may lie outside of the witness’s prior experience, she answered in the negative – indicating (in tone and body language as well as word choice) that G’s care was quite routine and within her skillset. It was only on further and more specific examination by G’s grandmother that she acknowledged a novel aspect of G’s care routine – i.e., moving between the ventilation circuits in bed and in her wheelchair. It worried me that she seemed to show such a casual attitude towards complex care needs. I found the witness’s seemingly unfounded certainty and lack of reflexivity profoundly troubling and it reflected on the social context underpinning the incidents being discussed.  

It is hard to put into words the everyday ‘tightrope’ reality of relying on paid strangers to meet one’s basic needs. My own situation is in many ways far removed from that of G and her family – G has clinical needs, and (from what I could ascertain during the hearing) intellectual and communication impairments that I do not; and much of the time I am able to advocate for myself, so my family is fairly minimally involved in my social care. However, elements of what I observed touched some rather sensitive nerves. 

My reflections on the hearing centred mostly on what it revealed about the power relations between ‘service users’ and our families, and the paid staff and service providers on whom we rely for our treatment and care. Hearing the witness talk about the incident with G’s oxygen, I was struck by how easy it appeared for her to maintain the belief that a grandmother might deprive her disabled granddaughter of oxygen purely to make a point. I observed how certain she appeared in her assertion that she had undertaken routine checks when coming on shift – as she put it: “I can’t understand because I always check the oxygens, always, especially G…” and later  “…and if someone else is in the room I always get them to check it”. I recognise that stress can encourage defensiveness, but in someone with such a degree of responsibility for a profoundly vulnerable disabled person, I would hope for a more rigorous, robust, and reflexive approach to practice, and an ability to consider that a mistake may have been made. 

I also put myself in the position of G’s family. I was reminded of times when I have been anxious or unhappy about aspects of my care. I have had carers who have made me uncomfortable and scared in my own home; and while service providers advertise “person-centredness” and “choice and control”, I know from experience that it is possible for ‘professionals’ to pathologize discomfort, distress, anger, and fear; and to locate any ‘blame’ for the breakdown of care packages in the people who use services, rather than those who work within them. And I am painfully aware that I need them exponentially more than they need me – that is not a comfortable position from which to be seen to be ‘making a fuss’. I felt these power dynamics underpinning the proceedings on Friday, and while I am obviously aware of how little I know of the facts of this case, and how abstracted that knowledge is, I imagined the incidents discussed in court in the context of this fundamental power imbalance and saw things stacked against G and her family.

I find the opportunity to observe CoP hearings such as that of Friday afternoon invaluable in helping me to incorporate into my own disability rights politics and activism the experiences of disabled people and families – in very different circumstances to my own but experiencing intersecting, overlapping oppressions, walking the same ‘tightrope’ as me, though wearing very different shoes. I know that such insights make my activism more inclusive and socially just than it would otherwise be, and I consider that a moral imperative. 

3. A safeguarding perspective

By Nikki Bowsley

I am a Safeguarding Adult Practitioner and I have been attempting to observe a hearing in my area of interest, safeguarding, for several months and have until today, been unsuccessful for a number of reasons including not getting a response to my request to observe, hearings being vacated, and my own work commitments not allowing me the time.

After a speedy response to my request (sent to the Open Justice Court of Protection Project rather than the RCJ) to observe the case being heard at 10am on Wednesday 19th July 2023 (the second day of the hearing) I received an MS Teams link and joined the proceedings. 

Having never observed a Court of Protection case before, I was fascinated by the questioning of the witnesses by the barristers and the judge’s role of ensuring that witnesses understood what was being asked, keeping barristers on track and to time, and taking on board all the information being presented in order to help him with his own decision-making.

The hearing itself was complex with allegations of family members tampering with G’s medical equipment and being aggressive to staff caring for their daughter (or granddaughter) and although I only managed to observe a snapshot (3 hours) of the case as a whole, which was running over a number of days and which is not yet complete, I feel I gained a valuable insight. 

In my role as a safeguarding adult practitioner, I provide safeguarding advice and support for health practitioners working across a variety of health services including community nursing, general practice, and rehabilitation units. We have had a number of cases where clients have been under the Court of Protection, and I have recently supported a practitioner in completing healthcare plans requested by the court. Observing the court proceedings for this case gave me a clearer understanding of how those individuals deemed to be incapacitated are supported via best interest decision making.

4. A Bar course student perspective

By Deborah Airey (@airey_deborah)

On Tuesday 18th July and Wednesday 19th July 2023, I unexpectedly found myself with an empty calendar. As I was keen to use the time productively, I decided to observe a Court of Protection hearing. I scanned the Open Justice Court of Protection Project twitter feed (@OpenJusticeCoP) and came across this case due to be heard by Hayden J. 

I was drawn to this hearing in particular as it was starting that morning (Tuesday 18th was Day 1 of the hearing) which meant I would understand the context. 

Moreover, as the case features four King’s Counsel (KC) I considered it an excellent opportunity to observe expert cross-examination. 

As it was the eleventh hour, I contacted Celia Kitzinger directly and was provided with the Microsoft Teams link. Subsequently, I observed the first two days of the hearing and found the case insightful. There are four comments I wish to make.

First, counsel for the applicant provided an introductory summary. This was not for the benefit of counsel or the Judge as they were familiar with the matter. Rather, Hayden J emphasised that it is important for observers to understand the case. As a first-time observer in the Court of Protection, this provided useful context to the hearing and allowed me to follow the examination and cross-examination of witnesses.

Second, I was impressed with the video and audio quality of the hearing. As the hearing was hybrid, some parties and witnesses attended court in person and some attended via Microsoft Teams. From my perspective as an observer, this worked effectively as the parties could see and hear the witnesses and vice versa. Where the audio was unclear, questions and answers were clarified by counsel or Hayden J. This meant that no one was disadvantaged by the hybrid nature of the proceedings. Although those observing online initially could not see the witnesses giving evidence in person, this was remedied by the second day of the hearing. As a result, online observers were able to see Hayden J, most of the advocates and all witnesses giving evidence. This brought the case to life and made it easy to follow. Moreover, there is only one Teams link for the entire proceedings, allowing ease of access over all the days of the hearing.

Third, the cross-examination by counsel, notably Parishil Patel KC, did not disappoint. As a Bar Course student, I have recently completed the cross-examination module. Although this was in the context of a criminal trial, cross-examination was used in the Court of Protection to the same effect, namely, to challenge the reliability of witness evidence. This is precisely what I observed.. Parishil Patel KC asked concise questions, followed up when witnesses did not answer the question asked, and challenged inconsistencies in the evidence. As a result, this was an invaluable learning experience for any aspiring barrister.

 Finally, and most importantly, I was struck by the humanness of the case. During my LLB degree, I studied medical law, so I had some awareness of the subject matter. However, as this was an academic study, I had limited experience of the emotional aspect. In opening the proceedings, Hayden J acknowledged that this case is ‘incredibly sad’. This comment demonstrated from the outset that although Judges make legal decisions, they are also human. Furthermore, the emotions of some witnesses ran high during cross-examination when much of their evidence was undermined. Importantly, Hayden J reassured the witnesses that it is the role of counsel to ‘test the evidence’ and ask difficult questions. Once again this demonstrates the humanity and sensitivity of Hayden J. It is important for the public to see this side of Judges as it aids understanding and adds credibility to judicial decisions.

Overall, I would encourage anyone, but particularly Bar Course students, to observe a Court of Protection hearing. Not only is it an excellent learning opportunity, but it is vital that the public have the opportunity to see how these important decisions are made.

5. An opportunity to watch cross-examination in practice

By Febienne Green (febiennea1999@gmail.com)

I had the opportunity to remotely attend a Court of Protection hearing in front of Mr Justice Hayden, sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice on 20th and 21st July 2023 (the third and fourth day of the hearing).  I witnessed four healthcare professionals giving evidence and being cross-examined in a fact-finding hearing.

It was especially interesting to see the cross-examination skills utilised throughout the hearing both by counsel and by a Litigant in Person. 

From one barrister, I witnessed the methodical breaking down of a witness’s evidence to both guide the witness towards the barristers’ intended point whilst simultaneously making the witness’ evidence seem unreliable. During a line of questioning regarding intimidation from the father towards healthcare staff, the barrister established what the father was doing in the room with his daughter, the answer being – holding her hand. His questions included ‘is holding his daughter’s hand, intimidating?’ and ‘is comforting, intimidating?’ thereby establishing his intended point that the father was not intimidating and that the witnesses evidence was unreliable.

This made an interesting comparison with another barrister’s use of limited and succinct questions to quickly establish the existence of a positive professional relationship between a family member and healthcare staff therefore completing his line of questioning. 

Finally, I was impressed by the cross-examination conducted by a Litigant in Person (P’s grandmother), who displayed a thorough analysis of the electronic and paper bundles. She utilised nurses’ notes to guide the witnesses through questions regarding multiple accounts of tampering with medical equipment. She established who was in the room at certain times and therefore whether it would have been possible to tamper with medical equipment unnoticed. 

As I aspire to practice as a barrister, I found observing this hearing especially interesting, due to its demonstration of cross-examination skills by five parties, four of which were legally represented. 

6. A view from the Royal Courts of Justice: Attending in person

By John Harper (@JohnLHarper_)

I observed this hearing on Thursday 20 July 2023, in person, in the Royal Courts of Justice, Court 45. (It was Day 3 of the hearing.)

It was very easy to observe in person. I arrived at the RCJ in plenty of time, I checked with the desk in the main hall whether I am okay to observe this hearing and asked for directions to the courtroom.  I knew from the RCJ Daily Cause List which is linked to from the Open Justice Court of Protection Project home page that the hearing is in Court 45. I then waited outside until all parties were let in by the court usher just before 10.30am.

I am a Healthcare Litigation Paralegal and aspiring barrister. Court of Protection is an area of law in which I would hope to build a practice when at the Bar. I therefore wanted to observe this hearing because it involves eminent KCs and fascinating issues. In particular, I was interested in seeing how the advocacy differed from other areas I have seen during mini-pupillages such as personal injury.

This day of the hearing involved evidence from nurses and healthcare staff involved in P’s care. While watching the proceedings, I focused on the following: (1) How explicitly will importance be given to P’s welfare and best interests? (2) How will the fact that “the processes of the Court of Protection are essentially inquisitorial rather than adversarial” (Cheshire West and Cheshire Council v P [2011] EWCOP 1330 [52]) impact the barristers’ examination of witnesses? (3) In a hearing which is dealing with such sensitive and serious issues, what will the atmosphere be like in court?

Here are my thoughts on each point in turn.

1. The protected party is at the centre: As this is a fact-finding hearing which relates to conduct between G’s parents and healthcare staff, I expected the importance of putting the protected party at the core of matters to be merely implied.  This was not the case. Rather, it was constantly clear that G’s best interests were at the heart of this hearing. This was most noticeable during Ms Sophia Roper KC’s examination of each witness. As she appeared on behalf of G (by her litigation friend, the Official Solicitor), the thrust of Ms Roper’s questions addressed whether and how the alleged “tampering” and intimidatory conduct of the parents have impacted the ICB staff’s ability to care for G. Ms Roper’s examinations, which came after all the other parties’, always served as a potent reminder that at the centre of the issues before the court lies an individual for whom it is crucial to ensure the best quality care is upheld. The importance of putting focus on G was further highlighted by Hayden J. One example which struck me was when a witness admitted that it was hard to tell how G responds to care when her parents are present compared to when they are not. Hayden J brought the witness back to her previous comment about being able to “bond” with G and suggested to the witness that that surely is a two-way thing which implies involvement from G. The witness agreed and was then able to expand on her answer about building a relationship with G – how it is easier on days the parents do not visit. Hayden J’s comment reassured me that the court is adamant to put G at the focus of matters, painting the most complete picture of her in order to come to the most informed decision on the issues in hand. 

2. Cross examination in an ‘inquisitorial’ court: I do not think the form of the barristers’ examinations differed greatly from other (adversarial) jurisdictions I have observed. This, I thought, may be because the hearing is dealing with alleged breaches of an injunction. As such, this possibly means that counsel for the parties against whom the accusations are made must adopt a more adversarial approach than would otherwise be needed.  I thought Mr Parishil Patel KC (who is acting on behalf of G’s father and undertook the majority of the cross-examination) treated each witness with respect and courtesy, but also with forensic rigour. For example, when he had to push for an answer from a witness who addressed a question other than that which was asked, Mr Patel would bluntly say “you’ve not answered the question I asked” and “that’s a different question. Can I ask you to answer to the question I’ve asked?”.  He also explicitly challenged some accounts given in the witness statements (e.g., “that’s not right, is it” or “that’s not correct, is it”). Even though these remarks put the witness under pressure, in my opinion this robust examination was appropriate for Mr Patel to represent his client to the highest standard as it allowed him to accurately and effectively pinpoint inconsistences in the witnesses’ statements. 

3.  Atmosphere in court: The demeanour of counsel and Hayden J surprised me. They were all dealing with serious issues concerning an extremely vulnerable patient, but the mood in court did not always match that same seriousness. For example, when Ms Roper asked the remote witness whether she could see her on the video-link, she replied “yes, I can see you there in the corner” to which Ms Roper quipped “that’s where they keep me.”  I thought such instances of humour were a really positive aspect of the hearing because they relaxed the witnesses and provided everyone a brief respite before sensitive details of the witnesses’ accounts were once again explored. I understand that others may hold different views on occasional banter in court. For example, in one hearing P’s daughter felt it undermined the impartiality of the court’s process by displaying how ‘pally’ some professionals are with one another, leaving others (and her) feeling like outsiders (“Remote Justice: A Family Perspective”).  On the contrary, I believe that familiarity benefits the court’s process. In the small world of the Bar, practitioners will be against each other time and time again and will undoubtedly develop firm friendships with opposing counsel. Rather than seeming “pally” and therefore risk ostracising others, intermittent informality can actually help them feel more welcome, calming a witness’s nerves and preventing observers feeling like they are intruding on a strictly private matter. I can attest to the latter. Also noteworthy are the exchanges Hayden J had with each witness after they gave evidence. Two examples I noted were,

  1. He told one witness that, although he must listen to many people in this hearing, her voice has been heard as loudly and as clearly as anybody else’s.  
  2. He commented to a witness nurse how lovely it is to hear her speak so eloquently and warmly about G’s care, and that it is no doubt a good thing that G has been able to experience that with her.

These remarks were sincere, personable and reassuring. Moreover, Hayden J rotated his whole body each time towards them on screen (and away from the lawyers in the courtroom) – giving them his full personal attention. This undoubtedly made a visual impression to all that each witness was valued.

I took away a great deal just from the one day I have observed of this hearing thus far. In sum, I learnt that (1) should the type of hearing require it, the advocacy from counsel can put witnesses through their paces and firmly challenge their evidence; (2) not every second of the hearing must be of utmost seriousness and that occasional informality can make the process seem more human; and (3) above all is the constant effort from all parties to place P at the centre of discussion.

7. A different voice – cross-examination by a family member

By Anna (@AnnaJonesBrown)

I didn’t quite know what to expect when I asked to observe one afternoon, Friday 21st July 2023, Day 4 of a 10-day hearing before Mr Justice Hayden. I’ve observed COP hearings before but not one like this, with cross-examination of witnesses.

The case is a very sad one, with family and care workers accusing each other of not caring for P properly. The afternoon I observed, there was just one witness, a nurse involved in the care of P. I watched with interest as three barristers representing different parties, all in the same physical court room as the witness was, taking turns to question the witness. But what really took me by surprise was the representative of the fourth party questioning the witness, appearing remotely – it was G’s grandmother (N), representing herself as a Litigant in Person (LIP). 

I was an LIP in my mother’s hearing. I’ve described the experience in a blog post here: ‘Deprived of her liberty’: My experience of the court procedure for my mum – and I am writing under the same pseudonym I used when I wrote that post, because I am bound by the court’s Transparency Order in relation to anything I say publicly about my mother’s case. 

 My role involved having an opportunity to speak in the hearing and make sure my family had a formal voice in proceedings. But I didn’t have to cross examine witnesses, so I was really interested to see what would happen.  

What a cross examination! N had clearly prepared diligently and thoroughly for this case.  I don’t know what career N had before, but to my lay person’s eyes she could have been a qualified barrister. 

Despite the fact that she must have had a lot of emotions whirling around inside her, she stayed calm and focused. She used the witness’s name frequently, a touch which made the relationship between the two of them personal: they had come across each other many times before. She forensically went through the evidence, gently but effectively challenging the witness as to a number of events and how they had been recorded. The fact that she had been present at those events herself no doubt added to her knowledge, although the same could not be said of the witness, who frequently seemed unable to recall the events herself. N had expert knowledge of the complex medical interventions which G needed. She never once seemed angry or upset, despite the fact that she herself had been accused of tampering with her granddaughter’s medical equipment. When she was pushed by the judge, for example to be clear about what her question was, she remained polite and courteous, always calling him “My Lord”. At one point when the witness was having difficulty finding the evidence, N asked “Do you need a bit of time (Name)? ” and then “You seem to want to accuse me”, very matter-of-factly. I find it hard to believe that I would have stayed so reasonable in those circumstances. It was very impressive!

From reading the judgment from an earlier hearing in this case, I knew that G’s family now have very restricted contact with her as a result of a previous court order due to problems with their behaviour, including N’s behaviour. It’s easy to develop an opinion of what the family is like from reading a judgment like that. 

All I can say is that I saw a woman who seemed to care deeply about her granddaughter, who came across as completely credible and who wanted to see her granddaughter looked after as best as possible.

Hearing somebody from the family cross-examine one of her granddaughter’s carers, as opposed to a cross-examination through the filter of a legal professional, brought home the fact that the case is about real people and real people’s lives, with profound consequences for them.  

My opinion is only based on one afternoon observing an extremely complex case and it has made me appreciate (yet again) the difficult job a judge in the Court of Protection has to do. 

8. A Litigant in Person attempts cross-examination: Telling your story and access to justice

By Jordan Briggs (@JordBriggs)

I observed cross-examination in this hearing during the afternoon of Thursday 20 July 2023 (Day 3 of the hearing).  I saw the cross-examination of two nurses – witness one (“N1”) and witness two (“N2”) – both by professional barristers, and by a litigant in person (G’s grandmother).

I am a paralegal working in the Court of Protection department of a London law firm, and will undertake a specialist Court of Protection pupillage with Doughty Street Chambers in October 2024. I have previously observed COP hearings and blogged for the OJCOP Project, including on cross-examination.  Here, I will limit my reflections to the nature and purpose of cross-examination, to supplement my remarks in the blog I wrote arising from the William Verden hearing.

As background to allow analysis of what follows, I remind (or inform) the reader that, conventionally, cross-examination has three purposes. First, to elicit evidence in support of your own case. Second, to undermine the witness’ credibility or evidence. Third, to challenge disputed evidence. 

Sometimes multiple purposes are discharged simultaneously. For example, a question might cast doubt on a witness’ evidence (i.e. purpose two) and, in so doing, create conceptual space for us to prefer the evidence offered in support of our own case (i.e. purpose one). Nevertheless, these purposes are advanced in professional cross-examination.

With this in mind, I will briefly analyse a few examples of the cross-examination conducted by the barristers and by the litigant-in-person. In summary, whilst the barristers discharged two of cross-examination’s conventional purposes, the litigant-in-person did not. This risks an inequality of arms and unequal access to justice, albeit a minor risk in this case.

First, the barristers. The barristers deployed commonplace tactics to undermine witness’ credibility – eliciting that the witness had not directly perceived an event, meaning their account of that event should be given less weight. For example, on behalf of the father, Parishil Patel KC addressed N1 on the re-hoisting of G. N1 said re-hoisting would have been done safely. Mr. Patel KC asked “You weren’t in the room for re-hoisting, were you?”. The witness answered “No”. This was done to suggest that, because N1 did not directly witness re-hoisting , we might doubt her account that it was done safely. This opens the door to our believing the father’s account; that re-hoisting was unsafe.

Similarly, on behalf of the mother, Joseph O’Brien KC addressed N2 on the checking of G’s oxygen. Mr. O’Brien said  “In your witness statement, it says the oxygen was checked. Did you check it?”. The witness said “No, no, I wasn’t in the room, but I was under the impression it was checked”. Mr. O’Brien said “Let’s be more precise. ‘Being under the impression’ either means it was always done [that way] or you were told it was done [in this instance]. Which was it?”. The witness said “It may well be that I presumed”. This was done to suggest that, because N2 did not witness oxygen being checked, checking might not have occurred at all. This supports the mother’s allegations of mismanagement. 

We turn to the litigant-in-person, namely G’s grandmother.  She was polite, calm, focused and clearly knew her way around the bundle. But her cross-examination was very different from those conducted by the barristers. For example,  G’s grandmother addressed N1 on G’s oxygen circuit. The grandmother said “Can you remember who set that up, [witness one]”?. N1 said “No”. The grandmother said “I remember you saying ‘That was me’. Do you remember that?”. N1 said “No”. The grandmother said “Well, I remember that”. N1 said “Okay”. 

What was the purpose of this questioning? I think it crystallised when the grandmother asked “Can you understand that I might have been concerned about that – that, even though someone experienced had set up [the oxygen circuit] it was still incorrect?”. To me, this implied the grandmother was using cross-examination to tell her story, or to seek its validation. In other words, the grandmother was sincerely worried about what she perceived had happened to G, and sought validation that her response was not irrational. 

The same inference could be drawn when the grandmother draw attention to a photograph in the bundle, displaying a red wound on G’s skin. The grandmother referred to witness one’s evidence, saying “You said that the skin looks slightly discoloured. Would you say it looks slightly discoloured?”. N1 said “it looks excoriated. I might have used the wrong wording.” The grandmother agreed, then took the point no further.

If the grandmother felt the hearing was a podium from which to tell her story, I can sympathise. However, this tactic does not automatically get one’s desired outcome in litigation. There is some evidence suggesting that judges can be persuaded by narrative stories, such as those litigants-in-person can provide (see: “(Dis)passionate law stories” by Blix and Minissale in Journal of Law and Society).  However, there is also evidence that judges can overlook litigants-in-person’s stories because litigants-in-person lack the ‘discursive competence’ of trial lawyers (see: “The importance of being heard” by Tatiana Grieshofer in Language and Law). In this case, I felt the latter was a risk. The grandmother’s cross-examination was less piercing and convincing than the barristers’, which made her case feel rather weak. Sometimes, such inequality of arms creates a risk of unequal access to justice (i.e. if you can’t put your case persuasively, a judge might not give it the weight it deserves). However, in this case, I think the risk is minimal because the grandmother’s concerns were shared by the mother and the father (who were legally represented) and because, wholly characteristically, Mr. Justice Hayden treated all parties in this case with respect and dignity.

Nevertheless, the difference between the barristers’ and the grandmother’s cross-examination was stark. It provides an opportunity to reflect on the three conventional purposes of cross-examination, and on the need for heightened judicial circumspection to minimise inequality when litigants-in-person attempt to perform the art.

9.  Do your homework or shoot your own credibility down in flames

By Daisy Long (@DaisyDosses) 

I am a former social worker – now director of DCC Interactive which is an independent training and development organisation: I’m also a Visiting Fellow at Bournemouth University. Over 25 years of practice and teaching, I have been to courts of various descriptions and trained many professionals in preparing for the experience of providing statements.

There are two key things that I always make sure I do.  First, I do my homework. Preparation for giving evidence should never be optional and I always make sure I revisit my own statements and know what evidence is going to be put to me as far as is possible. Speculation and presumptions never go down well with our colleagues in the justice system.  Second, I always show my ‘working outs’ in any statements I make. I often joke in the training room that it’s a bit like long division at school (pre-calculator days!): the working outs are the important bits, the bits that show you are credible, balanced in your view and which support the credibility of any professional judgement being offered. 

Unfortunately, the witness I observed on this occasion seem to have done none of these things and it was a masterclass in looking defensive and unprofessional, the very things we focus on preventing in the training room! Training is available from us and other quality providers – I would encourage anyone who is going to court for anything as a professional to seek some out!

I observed the hearing before Mr Justice Hayden on 21st July 2023 from 10am until 4pm (Day 4 of the hearing).

The biggest reflection for me from this part of the hearing was the value for health and social care professionals of doing your homework before giving evidence as a witness in the Court of Protection.

I watched a witness being cross-examined – a nurse involved in G’s care. Her evidence was scheduled to last for just an hour but as it turned out lasted all day.

The witness didn’t appear to have done her homework and the barristers were taking no prisoners around that.  A key message I give to trainees is “always be prepared and show your workings out” and this was a master class in how not to do it! 

While the witness was clearly anxious about being sat in the box, she also was unprepared and was unable to answer basic questions which slowly chipped away at any professional credibility that she may have started with that morning.  

The witness described difficulties in practice – saying that family members are ‘difficult’ ‘intimidating’ and ‘aggressive’. She has accused Dad of tampering with vital medical equipment and therefore not acting in P’s best interests, which if true is a serious claim on behalf of the care-provider. However, what became clear, through the course of the multiple hours the witness was examined, was that no one had actually seen anything, and that the conflict between the parties meant that presumptions and inferences had dictated actions rather than a factual account of what had actually taken place. Was the equipment on in the first place? That was a very real question and the witness said first that she had checked, then that someone had assured her it was on. The audio recording in which she was exclaiming that it was off was played, and it seemed that she hadn’t seen what she said she had, and when she stated that her staff had said the equipment was on, the barrister for G’s father (Parishil Patel) rightly queried whether that meant she trusted her staff more than G’s family members – a daunting position to be in when in the witness box.

 As one of the barristers bluntly pointed out when the witness stated that in her opinion the family member had tampered – ‘it is not a matter for your opinion: did you or did you not see him tamper with the equipment?’. 

This cross examination was obviously difficult for the witness. We watched her slouched on the stand, contradicting herself, denying statements which were available in audio-recording evidence, and she seemed to me to become angry several times at the line of questioning, and I think I saw her pointing forcefully at the barrister in one of her responses in the morning examination (though two other observers I’ve checked this with didn’t see that).

Her evidence really didn’t provide reassurance that she was credible or competent in her statements or claims, and although the witness was not on trial (it was a civil case and she is not a respondent or party in her own right), the lack of preparedness and professionalism overshadowed any actual points she may have had. I am curious to hear from other witnesses to balance what is currently a pretty damning view of a nursing team and their ability to work alongside families who take an active role in their relative’s care and support.

A good statement and accurate case records are worth their weight in gold, for making sure the protected party’s best interests are kept at the centre, and also for our own accountability and defensibility as professionals. This hearing was a blueprint for how to shoot your own credibility down in flames.

10. Troubling witness evidence

By Claire Martin (@DocCMartin)

I am a clinical psychologist in the NHS. I work with older people, including people living in care homes. So, I was interested in this hearing as I knew (having read the two previous judgments) that G was very likely now living in a care home and there would be exploration of what exactly was happening in G’s care.

I observed the hearing for most of Thursday 20th and the afternoon of Friday 21st July 2023 (Days 3 and 4 of the hearing). I observed five witnesses (and took detailed notes for the latter four of those witnesses): a Safeguarding Lead, three registered nurses and one senior health care assistant, all of whom were part of G’s care team at the care home. 

In my view, the care home team’s witness evidence was roundly dismantled by counsel for G’s parents, and by G’s grandmother (who is a Litigant in Person). I was astonished at how easily it was shown that the witness statements, for key occasions in contention, did not align with contemporaneous notes at the time. And further, that the witnesses had not properly checked this, either before signing their witness statements or before they appeared in court. The cross-examinations that I observed suggested to me that the ‘system’ around G may have colluded (not necessarily consciously or deliberately but as a result of staff culture) to implicate the parents and the grandmother as disruptive agents. I don’t think they expected their records to come under the level of scrutiny that a court hearing brings to bear – and as I watched the hearing unfold, the credibility that they started with slowly dissolved. 

Here are some examples taken from the cross-examination of witnesses by counsel for G’s father, Parishil Patel KC.

Nurse A witness evidence – Thursday 20th July 2023 

Counsel for father (Parishil Patel – PP) asking Nurse A about an incident transporting G back to the care home from hospital, when there was a crack in G’s equipment that ensured oxygen reached her tracheotomy. The court was shown a photograph of the cracked equipment, so the fact that it happened was established in court: 

PP: He told you there was an issue about transporting G back with a broken port and said ‘I don’t know if I can speak to you or someone else’.

Nurse A: I can’t recall.

PP: You said ‘I will go and see [manager] and come and find you’.

Nurse A: I remember saying ‘I will get a manager to speak to you’.

PP: What he didn’t say was that YOU personally had put G’s life at risk.

Nurse A: That’s how I perceived it. I don’t know who else he would have been accusing – it was me who brought her back with my two colleagues.

PP: Can I suggest to you that was what you perceived rather than what he said to you.

Nurse A: I can’t recall exactly what conversation was used.

PP: What we were told was that [G’s father] then went to G’s room.

Nurse A: Yes.

PP: And you went back into the office.

Nurse A: Yes.

PP: And then [manager] came down to see [father and mother]. 

Nurse A: Yes, I think she did.

PP: And what she told them was that you’d been left upset by the conversation with them and needed a bit of time to compose yourself and couldn’t work on the unit at that point and that you said he’d accused you of putting her life at risk and was hostile and intimidating.

Nurse A: Yes, I felt intimidated by him.

PP: Is that your perception?

Nurse A: Yes.

PP: You were probably upset that they thought you and your team had put her life at risk.

Nurse A: Can you repeat? 

PP: You were upset, weren’t you, because what was being said to you, and what [father] wanted to say to [Manager] was that something serious had happened in relation to the respiratory port.

Nurse A: Yes

PP:  And because you were upset you perceived [father] as being hostile and threatening and intimidatory to you.

Nurse A: He wasn’t aggressive. It was more-  He spoke calmly, but it was the things he was saying to me.  It was the accusation of putting G’s life at risk. I remember being taken aback and I couldn’t speak. I was quite taken aback. I don’t think I said anything much to him. I said ‘I’ll get a manager to speak to you’.

PP: You’ve had a lot of interaction with [father and mother]

Nurse A: Yes.

PP: And your relationship is quite cordial and civil.

Nurse A: Yes, I’ve had quite pleasant interactions with them.

PP: And general chit chat, and what they’d been up to.

Nurse A: Yes. I will always try to keep atmosphere bright for G.

This exchange was interesting to me. In her witness statement, Nurse A had said that the father was ‘intimidating and hostile’, yet on the witness stand she said ‘he wasn’t aggressive – it was more-  He spoke calmly’. She acknowledges that it was simply the raising of the serious concern (about G’s equipment being faulty on a journey from the hospital – a potentially life-threatening situation for G) that she found upsetting. 

It left me wondering exactly how – if it WAS the case that G’s equipment had been faulty – the father could possibly have raised his concern without the nurse’s feelings about the concern taking precedence, as the manager’s response indicated. 

Senior Health Care Assistant (SHCA) witness evidence – Thursday 20th July 2023 

(Cross-examination about the same incident as Nurse A was questioned about above. Parishil Patel referring to the SHCA’s witness statement)

PP:  You are about to receive a plan of the building.

SHCA: Yes, I have it.

PP: Look at the bottom set of rooms. … That’s where they were standing when you were in the dining room.

SHCA: Yes.

PP: It has doors. Were they closed or open?

SHCA: Open

PP: What you say is that you heard [father] talking to [Nurse A]. You say his ‘tone of voice was very hostile and intimidating’.

SCHA: Yes.

PP: When we heard from her today, she said the tone was NOT intimidating, although she felt intimidated. 

SHCA: I can’t speak for her.

PP: Does that change your evidence?

SHCA: No. I can’t comment on how she felt when he was talking to her.

PP: It didn’t change your perception.

SHCA: No.

PP: You wrote this statement in January this year.

SHCA: Yes.

PP: You then wrote a second statement … in April, three months later. 

SHCA: Yes.

PP: When you wrote the second statement, did you check any records or look at any documents?

SHCA: Erm I was looking through my previous statement, yes, and relevant documents.

PP: Right, because when you refer to THIS incident in April your account is different: ‘He was forceful and blunt’.

SHCA: Yes

PP: That’s not the same as intimidating and hostile, is it?

SHCA: I think it can be the same.

PP: Would you say there’s anything wrong with someone making a direct, forceful point?

SHCA: It depends on how it’s delivered. If it makes people feel uncomfortable, then it’s not okay, no.

PP: That’s different – that’s how it’s being received – would you agree?

SHCA: No. The way I heard it, it was intimidating to [Nurse A]. 

Again, what I observed was the focus being on how Nurse A felt (as Parishil Patel said, ‘how it’s being received’) rather than what actually happened – either the original concern about care or the manner in which it was raised. I continue to wonder when, in this care home, a relative can ever raise a concern in a direct way without that being received as ‘intimidating and hostile’? 

Nurse B (20th July 2023) and Nurse C (21st July 2023) witness evidence

Both Nurse B and Nurse C had written in their witness statements that they had seen things that, under cross-examination, it turned out they had not seen and it transpired were assumptions: 

Nurse B 

PP: I am going to ask you to turn to your witness statement at [reference]. When you wrote it, did you look at other contemporaneous records?

Nurse B: I think I had before I wrote it. I didn’t have it with me when I wrote it.

PP: The events of 9th December 2022. You were on shift looking after P.

Nurse B: Yes, with a colleague.

(Parishil Patel described an occasion when P had to be taken to hospital by ambulance, and P’s father arrived soon after. Nurse B had referred to this occasion in her witness statement – in particular to the oxygen provision to G, which was in contention. ) 

PP: You talk about what happened when [father] arrived at the hospital. Is it the same oxygen cylinder as in the ambulance?

Nurse B: I don’t know as I was doing the handover with the doctor on site.

PP: So, you can’t tell us if she was on same oxygen cylinder as at [the care home].

Nurse B: They are connected to paramedics’ oxygen in the ambulance, then reconnected when we arrive, but that will be the hospital oxygen.

PP: I want you to focus on what happened, rather than procedure.

Nurse B: Okay.

PP: P had been struggling with SATs all day.

Nurse B: Yes, that was one of the reasons we were sending her in. 

PP: So, the ambulance is called. At that point is she on the oxygen she has been on?

Nurse B: No. She was on the wall oxygen until paramedics came. We wouldn’t change that until we knew the clinical decision.

PP: At some point the paramedics put her on the stretcher –  or you?

Nurse B: It would have been our staff.  I was with Nan [P’s grandmother] as she requested to speak to staff.

PP: What you say is ‘once she was ready to be transferred, staff completed all usual checks prior to transfer’.

Nurse B: Yes, we check. We have all the equipment needed to take to hospital. It’s not the daily checklist.

[…]

PP:  You say [in your witness statement] that her oxygen was checked at this juncture. Did you check it?

Nurse B: No, I wasn’t in the room.

PP: So, this is what you’ve been told?

Nurse B: Yes, I was under the impression.

PP: Either this is normally what happens or you were TOLD it did happen? 

Nurse B: It may well be that I presumed. That is what we do when we transfer a patient. It would have been the paramedics who would have put the oxygen on.

PP: So even though it is your care staff transferring her to stretcher, are you sure that it was the paramedics responsible for changing her oxygen? 

Nurse B: You’d have to ask the paramedics.

(The judge clarified where Nurse B was at this point (not in the room with G).)

PP: Am I right in saying that the rest of paragraph 11 is what you’d assumed again, rather than direct knowledge?

Nurse B: Well … I would keep an observation as a duty of care

PP: Please be careful – I am talking about being in the room before she goes in the ambulance. You were not monitoring her SATs machine.

Nurse B:  No, not in the room. But I was in the ambulance.

Judge: Can I take you through this very carefully so I know what you are saying precisely. Were you told- did you see … or not … the procedures?

Nurse B: No,  the other checks I was presuming they would have-

PP: So ‘would have’ is not ‘did’. Did you SEE the usual checks prior to transfer?

Nurse B: No.

PP: The oxygen you said was checked at this juncture – did you see it was checked?

Nurse B: No.

Nurse C

PP: You said before lunch that [father’s] modus operandi is that he points out what’s wrong because he’s tampered with the equipment. … You say that there are occasions in which the family pointed out there was less water than there should be [in the cup of the oxygen equipment] and that they tampered with it?

Nurse C: I’m not saying deliberately, but if they checked the cup then… 

PP: What do you think they’ve done, taken a syringe? 

Nurse C: I don’t know. There’s no accounting for it.

PP: So, what have they done? It is your field [of expertise]

Nurse C: I don’t know. I can’t accuse someone can I?


Judge: Well, you are doing. You are accusing them [unclear]

PP: How is it you say they take the water out?

Nurse C:  A syringe. 

PP: Have you seen them do that?

Nurse C: There are syringes about.

PP: P is always on observations, isn’t she? Have your staff members ever said that they suspect they have used a syringe to take the water out?

Nurse C: No.

PP: So, this is speculation.

Nurse C: Yes

All in all, I was astonished that what looked to me like speculation and assumptions, and witness statements that weren’t supported by contemporaneous notes had been put forward as evidence in a court hearing.

For me, the evidence of all four care home staff seemed unreliable and this casts doubt on the claim that family members are tampering with equipment.  

If, in fact, family members ARE tampering with equipment, then the unreliability of the staff evidence is very dangerous to G.

Either way, I found what I observed over these two days very troubling indeed. 

*****

This hearing continues with more evidence from staff at the care home, and from P’s father, mother and grandmother. We hope to publish future blog post covering these developments, as well as the final submissions from the parties and the final judgment.

Celia Kitzinger, who curated and introduced the 10 contributions above, is co-director of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project. She has observed more than 450 hearings since May 2020 and written more than 100 blog posts. She is on LinkedIn (here), and tweets (or X-es) @KitzingerCelia

Footnote: All material purporting to be direct quotation from the hearing derives from contemporaneous notes made by individual contributors to this collective blog post. Everyone has tried to be as accurate as possible, but because we are not permitted to audio-record hearings, they are unlikely to be 100% verbatim. Where possible we have cross-checked quoted material against the notes of one or more other observers.

‘Failed Re X’: Deprivation of liberty and Re X (the streamlined process) – a social work perspective

By Eleanor Tallon, 10th October 2023

The words “Failed Re X” has appeared in Court of Protection lists recently – like the two reproduced below. 

‘Re X’ is the term used to refer to the streamlined process through which the Court of Protection (CoP) can authorise a ‘Deprivation of Liberty’ (DoL), as established in the case of Re X and others (Deprivation of Liberty)[2014] EWCOP 25.

Essentially, the streamlined process is designed for non-contentious cases which allow for judicial review without an oral hearing (or ‘on the papers’). 

Sometimes, though, ‘Re X’ applications are made, and upon reviewing the evidence, the court decides this streamlined process is not appropriate and the case needs to be heard. 

That is what the listings above refer to as a ‘Failed Re-X’.

In this blog post I’m going to explain the ‘Re X’ procedure in context and consider what sorts of cases lead to ‘Failed Re X’ hearings in the Court of Protection. I will cover:

  1. Deprivation of Liberty and ‘Cheshire West’
  2. The difference between ‘DoLS’ and ‘CoP DoL’ 
  3. Re X (streamlined process)
  4. Why the Re X process might ‘fail’

I am a registered Social Worker and Best Interests Assessor, and I work independently as an expert witness (ISW) for the Court of Protection. The aim of this explanatory blog is to provide a basic overview of the above, so it is likely to be most helpful for professionals and members of the public who don’t work in this area. 

‘Deprivation of liberty’ (DoL) 

Most readers will be familiar with the term ‘deprivation of liberty’ (DoL). There is no statutory definition of what constitutes a DoL. This is determined by case law, such as Stork v Germany [2005], which identifies the three elements of a DoL:  

(a) the objective component of confinement in a particular restricted place for a not negligible length of time; 

(b) the subjective component of lack of valid consent; and 

(c) the attribution of responsibility to the state.

In plain language, a DoL could be described as the combination of restrictions placed on a person’s freedom and movement (that in sum amount to a deprivation of liberty) to which the person lacks capacity to consent. 

A whole range of criteria must be considered and applied to the specific facts according to the person’s concrete situation, such as the type, duration, effects and manner of the arrangements in place. The distinction between ‘restriction’ and ‘deprivation’ (of liberty) relates to the degree or intensity, and is not one of nature or substance (Guzzardi v Italy, 1980).

If it is identified that a person is deprived of their liberty, the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)provides that the person ‘shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful (Article  5).

So, where Article 5 (right to liberty) is triggered, the relevant legal framework must be followed to ensure that the person has an independent check on the arrangements, and if a DoL is unavoidable, they must have access to appropriate representation and legal appeal (these are the legal safeguards). 

Cheshire West and the ‘acid test’ 

In 2014, a landmark Supreme Court judgment was given by Lady Hale, which formulated the ‘acid test’ to determine whether a DoL is taking place (P v Cheshire West and Chester Council [2014], or ‘Cheshire West’ as it is more commonly known). The acid test in effect widened the definition of DoL and made clear the factors which are not relevant. 

The acid test is met when:

  • The person is under continuous[i] supervision and control; 
  • The person is not free to leave (in a permanent sense); 
  • The arrangements are ‘imputable to the state’ (i.e., the arrangements are known, or ought to be known by the state); and
  • The person lacks capacity to decide on the arrangements.  

The following factors are not relevant: 

(a) the person’s compliance or lack of objection; 

(b) the relative normality of the placement (whatever the comparison made); and 

(c) the reason or purpose behind a particular placement. 

A detailed commentary by Dr Lucy Series on the Cheshire West judgment is available here.

The legal safeguards: DoLS and CoP DoL applications (Court of Protection)

The Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS) framework was introduced in 2007 under Schedule A1 of the Mental Capacity Act (2005), and applies in care homes or hospitals to those aged over 18. A request for a DoLS authorisation is made by the care home or hospital to the Local Authority (i.e., the ‘Supervisory Body’)

The Supervisory Body allocates a Best Interest Assessor (BIA) to complete the combined assessments (i.e., ADASS Form 3) which includes the mental capacity and best interests assessment on whether the person should reside in the specific setting, for purposes of the care and treatment (that give rise to a DoL). 

If the person lacks capacity to decide on the arrangements, the BIA reviews whether the arrangements amount to a DoL, whether this is least restrictive, and whether it should be authorised by the ‘Supervisory Body’ in the person’s best interests. A mental health assessor must confirm if the person has a mental disorder, and whether a DoLS authorisation would be incompatible with any applicable legislation under the Mental Health Act 1983.

When a DoLS authorisation is in place, the person is appointed a Relevant Person’s Representative (RPR). This could be a friend/ family member or a trained advocate, whose role (in summary) is to monitor the arrangements and whether the person is objecting to the DoL (this could be verbally or through behaviour). 

If it appears that the relevant person would wish to legally challenge the authorisation, the RPR has a responsibility to make an application to the court on their behalf, and the Local Authority must also take steps to ensure an application is made where an appeal is required (see RD & Ors [2016] for relevant guidance). 

An application to appeal the DoLS authorisation is  brought to the Court of Protection under section 21A of the MCA 2005. Under section 21A, non-means-tested legal aid is provided to cover the legal costs for ‘P’ (the protected party).  

If a deprivation of liberty arises in any setting other than a care home or hospital (e.g. in supported living, or in the person’s own home) or if the person is aged 16-17 years old (and the person lacks capacity to decide on the arrangements) a welfare application to the Court of Protection is required[ii]. 

Once an application is made to the Court of Protection, the Judge considers the complexity of the matter and directs whether or not ‘P’ should be joined as a party, and whether a Litigation Friend/ Accredited Legal Representative or another form of representation under Rule 1.2 (Court of Protection Rules 2017) is needed to ensure that P’s ‘voice’ is heard. A Rule 1.2 Representative could be a friend/ family member, or trained advocate.

Ultimately, the Judge decides whether the arrangements are least restrictive and in the person’s best interests. If appropriate, the Judge will make an order to authorise the arrangements. Other factors may need to be considered, for example an order for a tenancy agreement to be signed (where there is no Deputy or Power of Attorney over property and affairs). 

However, in all cases other than section 21A (a legal appeal of a DoLS authorisation), any legal aid funding would be means tested, which is a relevant factor when considering whether P should be joined. This continues to be a debated issue in terms of ‘P’ having equal access to legal representation whether the DoL arises in a care home/ hospital or another setting.

Streamlining the Court of Protection Process: ‘Re X’

The broadened definition of DoL resulting from the Cheshire West judgment nearly a decade ago now led to a huge increase in referrals for Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS) authorisations being made to Local Authorities, and to an increase in applications made to the Court of Protection for DoL authorisations. Both Local Authorities and the Court of Protection struggled to bear the weight of the influx.

In August 2014, just a few months after the Cheshire West ruling, the then-President of the Family Division, Sir James Mumby, devised a streamlined process to provide a more speedy and manageable  response for non -contentious community DoL applications (Re X and others (Deprivation of Liberty) [2014]).  It was designed to address “the practical and procedural implications for the Court of Protection of what all informed opinion agrees is the large increase in its caseload which will follow in consequence of the Supreme Court’s decision”.

Essentially the streamlined process distinguishes between DoL cases to be dealt with out of the courtroom (i.e., ‘on the papers’), whilst allowing the court to give proportionate attention to cases where P may be objecting, or where there are other controversial issues which require more in-depth scrutiny by way of an oral hearing.

For non-contentious cases, it was considered in Re NRA & Ors [2015] not necessary for P to be joined as a party where a family member or friend was properly able to act as their Rule 1.2  Representative.

A new legal form was created to support the streamlined process. So, for a Re-X application the commissioning body submits a COPDOL11 form, along with all the supporting documentation.

Requirements for Re X and ‘Failed’ applications

Though the Re X process may be more streamlined (in comparison to when an oral hearing is required), there is still a significant amount of work required for the COPDOL11 application to be reviewed and for an order to be given. 

The evidence includes (but is not limited to) the mental capacity assessment (COP3), evidence of mental impairment (from a medical practitioner), care and support plans, details of the restrictions that amount to the deprivation, statement of best interests, wishes and feelings of P, consultation with other relevant persons, witness statements, and the draft order. 

Commissioning bodies must make proper enquiries and need to be thorough when presenting their evidence to the court, as this is the basis on which the appropriateness of following the Re X process is decided. Where the evidence is insufficient, further information will be requested, such as more comprehensive evidence around the restrictions in place and why these are proportionate, or further views may be sought from those involved with P.

If, from the evidence submitted, there are any suggestions that P might be objecting to the arrangements or other complexities with the case, and the Judge considers that the application is not suitable for the Re X process, then case management directions will be given for an oral hearing. 

Full and frank accounts of such objections must be made explicit within the submission. An example of where a Local Authority was heavily criticised for their failure to provide accurate information to the court is the case of LB Barnet v JDO & Ors [2019], and this demonstrates what not to do. 

An excellent guidance note by 39 Essex Chambers sets out how to make proper use of the COPDOL11 form, and in particular, what might trigger a subsequent “failed Re X” application: 

The [COPDOL11] form and guidance require the applicant to consider certain triggers which may indicate that the application is not suitable for the streamlined process. The triggers are:

(1) any contest by P or by anyone else to certain of the key requirements of the form (age, evidence of unsoundness of mind, lack of capacity, the care or support plan and best interests);

(2) any failure to comply with the requirement to consult with P and all other relevant people in P’s life and to canvas their wishes, feelings and views;

(3) any concerns arising out of information supplied in relation to P’s wishes and feelings/any relevant person, concerns about P’s litigation friend/Rule 1.2 representative, any matters suggesting that the matter needs particular judicial scrutiny;

(4) any objection by P;

(5) any potential conflict with a relevant advance decision by P or any decisions under an LPA or by P’s deputy;

(6) any other reason that should lead the court to that think that an oral hearing is appropriate. 

“Judicial Authorisation of Deprivation of Liberty” (July 2022) 39 Essex Chambers

 Concerns about 16/17 year olds

The guidance note quoted above continues: “In addition, following the Re KL [2022] EWCOP 24, it is prudent for any application in relation to a 16/17 year old to make clear that the applicant is simply using the form as a vehicle to provide the relevant information, and that they do not anticipate that the court will be able to determine the application without an oral hearing.“

Applications for DoL authorisations regarding 16–17-year-olds have spotlighted the worrying issues around practices in respect of restraint and transitional arrangements for young people in care settings. Often the arrangements are unstable and significantly restrictive:

One of the most concerning recent developments in social care has been the huge growth in the number of children with highly complex needs made subject to deprivation of liberty (DoL) orders.

For many, these have involved moving into unregistered placements – without Ofsted’s regulatory oversight – with severe restrictions placed on their movement and access to technology, constant supervision, often by multiple staff members and significant use of restraint (Community Care, 2023).

A seminar on Deprivation of Liberty and young people was delivered by 39 Essex Chambers in March 2023, where it was discussed that (in respect of 16-17 year olds who lack capacity) the Court of Protection is unlikely to consider the streamlined procedure as appropriate. The judgement of KL: A Minor (deprivation of liberty) [2022] gives a detailed set of reasons which would indicate the process wouldn’t be suitable. It was envisaged that in most cases, the court is going to ‘call in’ applications for an oral hearing, in which case the young person may be joined as a party with appropriate representation sought, adding further layers of judicial scrutiny. 

Delays in Re X: from a Social Work Perspective 

As part of the Re X application, the Rule 1.2 Representative is required to make a statement to the court outlining the representative’s views on whether the arrangements are in the person’s best interests, without which the application cannot proceed. Where there is no friend or relative who is able, appropriate, and willing to act as the Rule 1.2 Representative, a paid representative (such as an Independent Mental Capacity Advocate or another trained advocate) is required and due to resource constraints, this can be difficult to obtain causing a delay in the process.

I spoke with a local authority DoLS Team Manager who said that just before the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, applications were stayed for a considerable number of months. Applications are now proceeding in a much shorter timeframe, though there are ongoing issues around appointing a Rule 1.2 Representative when there are no appropriate friends and family willing to take on this role. She said:

“Some local authorities are commissioning advocacy services, whereas some are selecting not to do this – leaving this responsibility with the CoP and Ministry of Justice, who have recruited Court Appointed Visitors, which does not mirror the parallel role of the RPR in DoLS. When the individual subject to the DoLS is ‘unbefriended’ and would otherwise have no friends or family visiting, the paid representatives are generally expected to visit every 6/8 weeks – whereas a Court Appointed Visitor might only get to see the person once a year. This would leave such individuals with less visits and scrutiny than the current DoLS framework. Rule 1.2 Representatives need be spot-purchased or added into advocacy contracts by the authority to enable representation and support for this judicial process.” 

Additionally, she said it can be very difficult for the staff responsible for the applications to balance this against the demands of other work pressures, which can cause further delays. There is a call to make the Re X process more efficient and ADASS are currently consulting with local authorities to look at how this can be achieved. Any further improvements would be welcomed.

Final thoughts 

The role of the court is not to decide whether a person should be deprived of their liberty: it is to review whether a deprivation of liberty arising from the care arrangements is “a necessary consequence of the least restrictive available option that best promotes P’s best interests” (Re NRA & Ors [2015] EWCOP 59 para 41).

Both the DoLS framework and the Court of Protection are concerned with promoting autonomy and ensuring that people are not deprived of their liberty in an arbitrary manner. The task of ensuring that all people deprived of their liberty have the safeguards (of independent review and access to legal appeal) is an ongoing challenge. 

To give a flavour of the current pressures, the reported number of DoLS cases that were not completed as of April this year was an estimated 126,100 (NHS Digital, 2023) and there were 872 applications to the Court of Protection for judicial authorisation of deprivation of liberty in the first quarter of 2023, though this number is unlikely to be representative of the number of applications that should be made (39 Essex Chambers, 2023).

The Re X process seeks to ensure legal scrutiny in a proportionate measure to the level of complexity, for those who are deprived of their liberty where the DoLS regime is not an option. The Liberty Protection Safeguards were set to replace the current frameworks (covering all settings and applying to 16-year-olds and above) however this scheme has been ‘shelved’ for the foreseeable future (see here for more information).

The Court of Protection is currently reviewing the Re X application procedure. Local Authorities are urged to continue to review their processes to make best use of the resources available within the existing legal frameworks.

The streamlined application was devised to meet the minimum requirements for compliance with Convention and domestic law, by abbreviating the procedural requirements of the standard COP1 application process. The difference between the standard and the streamlined court procedures is the intensity of scrutiny. The COPDOL11 process is very definitely not a ‘rubber-stamping’ procedure but it relies on judicial antennae alone to identify from paperwork if/where further enquiry is required (KL: A Minor (deprivation of liberty) [2022] para 56)

In sum, although “Failed Re X” sounds as though something has gone wrong, in fact this is the Court of Protection working as it should – making proactive use of resources and using ‘judicial antennae’ to identify the cases that should not be decided simply on the papers and bringing them into the courtroom for full investigation.

Eleanor Tallon is an Independent Social Worker and Best Interests Assessor. She can be contacted via her website mcaprofessional.co.uk and found on LinkedIn. She also Tweets @Eleanor_Tallon


[i] The person may be permitted to go out unsupervised but if they didn’t return then steps would be taken to locate them and bring them back, see Stanev v Bulgaria [2012])

[ii] There are some circumstances where another legal route may be needed, particularly relating to 16–17-year-olds (professional legal advice would determine the appropriate pathway).

Time pressures for a decision about haemodialysis

By Daniel Clark, 8 October 2023

This case (COP 14013508) concerns Isaac, a young man with a diagnosis of learning disability and “Autistic Spectrum Disorder”. Isaac enjoys people watching, as well as looking at street scenes on his iPad. He does not like hospitals or medical interventions. He also has end-stage kidney failure.

At a hearing in April 2023, Mr Justice Hayden was asked to rule on Isaac’s best interests to receive haemodialysis, a transplant, or palliative care. At that time, desensitisation work was being carried out with the view that (eventually) haemodialysis would be possible, and after careful probing of the witnesses, Hayden J gave an ex tempore judgement that it was in Isaac’s best interests to proceed with the desensitisation work and be placed on the waiting list for transplantation, in the hope he will eventually be able to tolerate haemodialysis. There have been two previous blog posts about this case: Ruby Reed-Berendt and Bonnie Venter wrote in detail about the evidence at that previous hearing (The most complex of best interests: Organ donation, learning disability, and the options on the table), and I wrote about the way in which Hayden J ensured that Isaac did not ‘go missing’ amidst the medical technicalities of the witness evidence ( “A lively personality” in a complex medical case). Six months later, at this hearing on Friday 6th October 20023, I was keen to discover what had unfolded since then.

Thanks to one of the lawyers in the case, we learnt that the advertised time for the start of this hearing, given as 10.30am in the official Royal Courts of Justice listings, was wrong: it was actually planned to start the hearing at 10.00am. That was helpful to know and meant I did not miss any of the hearing, which I observed remotely. And I didn’t receive a Transparency Order, but do have one from the last time I observed this case.

It was a hybrid hearing. In the courtroom was Mr Justice Hayden and Katie Gollop KC, of Serjeants’ Inn Chambers, representing the Applicant Trust.  Joining on the Teams video link were: Parishil Patel KC, of 39 Essex Chambers, representing Isaac via his litigation friend, the Official Solicitor; Victoria Butler-Cole KC, also of 39 Essex Chambers, representing Isaac’s parents (who had previously represented themselves); Bridget Dolan KC, of Serjeants’ Inn Chambers, representing the ICB; and Isaac’s mother and father, sharing a camera as they did in the hearing in April.

The hearing
Unfortunately, the sound was not ideal at the start of this hearing, and I struggled to hear those in the courtroom. However, I could hear enough to be able to follow the substance of the submissions by Counsel for the Trust.

Counsel stated that “the programme of desensitisation has been embarked upon and most recently that has involved taking [Isaac] to [a unit] and putting a tube next to his skin, getting the dialysis machine, getting him used to the room and the noise“. Although “he has done better than many thought he would”, the multi-disciplinary team (including people from the Community Learning Disability Team) “consider that there are real problems with him doing haemodialysis whilst conscious because there have been some instances which, if they occurred whilst there was a live session, would have put him and possibly other staff at risk”.  I could not hear quite clearly what had happened but it sounded as though Isaac had been, at times, standing up and moving around. I also heard the word “agitation” but not the surrounding context. What I did hear clearly was that “there was a time when he was in considerable distress”. 

If haemodialysis were to proceed, the hospital could begin it as early as next Thursday or Friday, which “would be in time to avoid hospitalisation”. To start it in the last week of October, which it sounded like was when a next hearing on this matter was originally scheduled for, would most probably be too late. 

On this basis, Hayden J seemed inclined to make a decision as to whether haemodialysis was in Isaac’s best interests during this hearing. He explained he was “instinctively drawn to giving it a try but that’s an entirely human reaction…I have to hear what the challenges are likely to be.” He therefore rose to allow the barristers time to decide how he should hear the evidence. 

I stayed on the platform during the brief break, whilst the barristers had these discussions. It’s fair to say that it was unanimously agreed that there was not time to consider the evidence; the situation needed a full day hearing, which could not happen then (the judge had already delayed another hearing by an hour). Further, there was an expert witness who Counsel agreed needed to give evidence. However, he was unavailable until the following week. Finally, the doctor clarified that his view was that a decision would need to be made next week but, he thought, haemodialysis could start the week following.

When the judge returned, Counsel for the Trust explained that the parties were in agreement that the hearing should take place the following week, and that they would be happy (if necessary) for it be heard before another judge. Initially, the judge did not seem too inclined to follow this course of action, and he briefly heard evidence from the doctor. It was only then that the position of the Trust became clear – although it’s possible that Counsel had already laid this out and I had just been unable to hear it.  

The doctor explained that Isaac’s blood tests showed he is becoming progressively more ill as a result of his kidney failure. Blood tests show his GFR (Glomerular Filtration Rate) which shows how well the kidneys are filtering waste) had been declining since April, and his potassium is now rising for the first time, which has the potential to cause death. Generally speaking, the doctor explained, this is when a patient would be invited to start haemodialysis. However, “the position of the Trust is that we would not want to start [Isaac] on haemodialysis because we don’t think it’s in his best interests to do so… If we had to start haemodialysis, we can only do it by proactively sedating him three times a week and we don’t think that’s in his best interests”. It could be the case he had to be sedated three times a week for “months, even years potentially”. 

Even trialling haemodialysis was something they did not see as in his best interests because they would be proactively sedating him three times a week. It is possible that even after a transplant, Isaac would require dialysis in the immediate aftermath to encourage the kidney to work. The doctor felt there was a need to hear from the hospital where the transplant would take place so as to ascertain their views on this.  He also identified that, whilst sedation has been used to facilitate haemodialysis for another person in another hospital, the circumstances were not identical. For Isaac, the levels of sedation would be heavier. The doctor stated it would be best to hear from the expert (who the barristers had mentioned earlier) to ascertain the difference in the two cases.

Moving forward
Hayden J re-scheduled the hearing for the following week. Given the fact that there had been some technical difficulties, he decided all Counsel and witnesses (where possible) should be physically in the courtroom. However, there will be a video link for Isaac’s parents (unless they wish to attend in-person) and for public observers. The judge actually said that “members of the public are entitled to join by video conferencing platform”, which I thought was a clear and explicit commitment to open justice.

It is worth pointing out that it was only by chance that the judge could re-schedule the hearing at such short notice: another case he was due to hear had just applied to vacate as they have an agreed order. The judge had also briefly explained problems with finding available judges. I couldn’t hear the exact detail but it seemed indicative of the pressure the judicial system is under (issues I wrote about in another blog post: A court system creaking under its own weight: Transparency challenges). I should also point out that the judge was very clear that the time and diary pressures of the court should not be central to decision making: it is the best interests of Isaac that are of importance.

This case will return to court on Tuesday 10th October 2023, and will be heard over the duration of a day by Mr Justice Hayden.

Daniel Clark is a member of the core team of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project. He is  a PhD student in the Department of Politics & International Relations at the University of Sheffield. His research considers Iris Marion Young’s claim that older people are an oppressed social group. It is funded by WRoCAH. He tweets @DanielClark132.

Mental Capacity, Disability, and ‘Voice’: A Socio-Legal Exploration 

By Gill Loomes-Quinn, 4th October 2023

Editorial Note: Many congratulations to Gill Loomes-Quinn, co-director of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project, who successfully defended her PhD thesis “Mental Capacity, Disability and ‘Voice’: A socio-legal exploration” at her viva (oral examination) on Monday 2nd October 2023. Her PhD research was supervised by Anna Lawson and Celia Kitzinger and examined by Chrissie Rogers and Amanda Keeling.This blog post is the 3-minute introductory summary with which she opened the viva. Congratulations from all of us to Dr Loomes-Quinn!

Summary of PhD by Gill Loomes-Quinn

 My thesis is a socio-legal study of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (“the MCA 2005”) in practice. It develops and employs an analytic framework of “social voice” to explore how socio-legal practices inscribed by mental capacity law impact the lives of disabled people – particularly those deemed to lack the mental capacity to make specific decisions.

Study Outline

I carried out qualitative research comprising two studies of the construction of “social voice” as it relates to the MCA 2005: 

  1. Firstly, I used thematic analysis of a dataset of 15 semi-structured interviews with disabled activists to explore participants’ views on the advance care planning provisions set out in the MCA 2005. 
  2. The second study is an ethnography of the work of the Court of Protection. I observed 14 hearings and interviewed professional stakeholders. From this, I developed case studies of two hearings: the first a challenge under the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS) and the second an application for property and affairs deputyship. 

Key Findings

  • I found that “Social voice” offers an analytic framework through which to examine the intersubjective nature of relationships between the State and minoritised, socially marginalised demographic groups (such as disabled people) in the context of legislative developments.
  • In practices concerned with the MCA 2005, I found that factors such as disability discrimination, accessibility, and public welfare/resource issues function alongside discourses of law and legality in the construction and regulation of relationships between the individual, the State, and wider society.
  • In exploring how disabled activists engage law and legality in their views on advance care planning under the MCA 2005, I found they had several disability-specific concerns, including discrimination and ‘ableist’ social attitudes. A role for Disabled People’s Organisations (DPOs) in facilitating access to advance care planning under the MCA 2005 was indicated. 
  • The ethnographic study of the Court of Protection produced ‘thick description’ accounts of the “social voice” of two classes of social actor – a ‘protected party’ and a Litigant in Person. My findings point firstly to structural and procedural barriers affecting the participation of the ‘protected party’ and describe the role of key people in mitigating their effects. In observing the involvement of the Litigant in Person in a court hearing, a tension was identified between the policy-identified responsibility of the judge to mitigate against procedural disadvantages faced by the litigant, and the court’s overriding concern for the best interests of the ‘protected party’.  

Significance and Implications

This thesis offers an analytic framework for empirical socio-legal study of the impact of law on the relationship between the individual and the State – with particular focus on the intersubjective nature of law in (and as) practice.

It also points to ways for disabled people and our organisations to include in our activism the experiences and concerns of those in our community deemed to lack mental capacity. And, perhaps most fundamentally, contributing to the articulation of what it means to “have a voice” it offers tools for resistance when this “voice” is threatened. 

Gill Loomes-Quinn is a disabled scholar-activist, and co-director (with Celia Kitzinger) of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project. She is also proud to be a convenor of the Participatory Autism Research Collective (PARC). Gill tweets @GillLoomesQuinn

Her day in court: Attorney fights to clear her name in the face of accusations from her brother and the Public Guardian

By Georgina Baidoun, 2nd October 2023

The hearing I observed (COP 13977140, listed for 12 noon on 18 September 2023 before HHJ Spinks sitting in Cambridge County Court) was a “final” hearing to last for two days, with the issue before the court being “Discharge/conduct of deputy or attorney, application by Public Guardian”. 

Committing to a two-day hearing was a first for me. My previous observations have usually been no more than a couple of hours, often much shorter, being mainly “directions” hearings. I’m not sure I would want to do it again! 

When I saw the details, as listed by the Open Justice Court of Protection Project on Twitter/X, I knew immediately it was probably the case I had been waiting for and I felt I had no option.

 There are very few hearings involving the Public Guardian, they are seldom open to observers and, when they are, they are usually in person with no remote access for observers. At the last one I observed, the OPG representative expressed surprise and dismay at my presence because he had thought the hearing was private (I blogged about it here). On this occasion I overheard a conversation – I think between the OPG barrister and the OPG investigator – to the same effect.

With this background, I was agreeably surprised when I asked for a copy of the OPG’s position statement and, after a few days, received it from their very helpful barrister. By that time, I had already drafted this blog post, so it was interesting to see the discrepancies between it and my understanding of the case based only on what I heard in court. Because the respondents were not represented, there was no way that I could ask for their position statements  – so I now have a slightly lop-sided perspective, which was not the case during the hearing. I have made a few revisions as a result but tried to keep more or less to what I actually heard. Interestingly, the position statement shows that this was originally intended to be yet another “attended hearing” (i.e. in person). I don’t know what caused the change, but it was possibly to accommodate the OPG investigator, who attended remotely.

My special interest in the OPG is in relation to property and financial affairs and stems from the very poor treatment to which I was subjected when I was acting as COP deputy for my mother’s affairs. In particular, after my first annual report, they insisted that I pay back a gift that I had made and, when I refused, threatened me with a range of consequences, including taking me to court to remove me as deputy. I was very keen to go to court because I doubt the legal grounds on which the OPG makes its decisions and welcomed the opportunity to obtain some transparency. It didn’t happen because my mother died and, anyway, it appears from a Freedom of Information request I made that such threats are seldom carried through.

This case concerned an attorney rather than a deputy and I imagine that there are more cases involving attorneys (compared with deputies) because – unlike the situation with deputies – the initial process of becoming an attorney involves very few checks. I sensed that the situation was similar to mine, however, in that the attorney believed that her actions were in keeping with her legal responsibilities and also that the OPG’s administration was badly flawed. Furthermore, she felt that she was being defamed by their accusations and that their behaviour towards her lacked understanding and humanity. She had clearly put her heart into preparing for the hearing, as demonstrated by the fact that she had produced over 300 pages of evidence and claimed to have spent £900 on photocopying. (The entire “bundle” of evidence before the court totalled over 1000 pages!) She represented herself, possibly influenced by the cost of employing a lawyer but I think also because she was so sure she was in the right and that the truth would prevail. Like most people in her position, she had no idea how the judge would expect the hearing to be conducted.

Joining the hearing

I received the link from the Cambridge court at 9.15 on the Monday morning (impressive!) with the heading ‘URGENT HEARING 18th September 2023 at 10:30AM’. I duly opened the link at 10.20 and waited… An hour later I rang the Reading hub to see what was happening but they still had the start time as 12 noon (as per the listing). Sometime after noon, the hearing did in fact commence. It was, I think, only my second experience of a hearing where most of the participants were present in the courtroom. 

Present remotely were myself and the OPG investigator. (For information about OPG investigations, check out “How we do investigations at OPG”.)

Present in the physical courtroom were:
His Honour Judge Spinks
Mr Alex Cisneros representing the Public Guardian as applicant 
First respondent, one of P’s two sons and a co-attorney (A)
Second respondent, P’s only daughter and a co-attorney (B)
Third respondent, P’s other son and a co-attorney (C)

None of the respondents was represented.

The camera was managed extremely well so that the witnesses were in view when giving evidence and the judge was in view at least some of the time when he was addressing the court. For some reason the OPG barrister was almost never in view – possibly due to logistics. I only found out his name when I emailed Celia with what turned out to be a poor attempt at a phonetic version!

The case

The way the hearing was listed was a little vague but it was, in fact, to consider the discharge of all three respondents from their roles as attorneys for both property and financial affairs and health and welfare for their mother, P. The three siblings held their attorney roles both jointly and severally and the OPG sought to replace them with a professional Court of Protection deputy for property and financial affairs, leaving the role of attorney for health and welfare unfilled. This was explained to me by Mr Cisneros at the start of the hearing at the Judge’s request. I had to work out the rest for myself!

It transpired as the hearing progressed that Son A had, in the beginning, been in accord with his sister as to the use of their parents’ assets (they were attorneys for both their father and their mother, but their father had died by the time this investigation began). He had agreed that in reality she would be the only one accessing their accounts because she was the only one looking after them on a day-to-day basis, including eventually moving in with them to give 24-hour a day care. He did have access to P’s bank statements, however, and eventually became concerned by some of the transactions. He had failed to get his sister to engage with his concerns and, as a result, had contacted the OPG.

To avoid paying a professional deputy, Son A had volunteered to be appointed sole attorney; this would be a separate decision once the existing arrangements were revoked, which is why at this stage he was a respondent and not an applicant. (Son C took no significant part in the proceedings except to express his support for his sister.)

I presume that what came next is standard procedure. The OPG started an investigation, putting the powers of attorney into abeyance and appointing an interim professional Court of Protection deputy for property and financial affairs. The investigation included asking for records of all expenditure, which B had provided in what appeared to be meticulous detail, going back some ten years. Since the OPG only ask attorneys to provide records of their activities in exceptional cases I would be very surprised if many attorneys have kept such detailed records, although it is clear that they are expected to do so. 

The OPG investigator acknowledged that B had been very open during the investigation but said that some of her explanations had become “confused and changed slightly”. He had had no contact with the other two attorneys.

The evidence

The judge said that it would be impossible to go through all the evidence in the time allotted and that, although the OPG were not currently considering requesting that costs be awarded against the respondents, their position might change if resolution could not be achieved in two days. He suggested that the court concentrate on some of the major items of expenditure. He pointed out that the OPG were not requesting repayment of the money B was accused of spending inappropriately (a total of over £80,000 was later mentioned in this context) so she did not have to justify every item. (I don’t know why the OPG were not asking for repayment because they did in my case; I suppose that could come at a later stage, but the judge didn’t in any way suggest it as a possibility.)

B was not happy with this arrangement and, although the OPG’s barrister started off as instructed, a considerable amount of time was in fact spent talking about minor as well as major items. B was clearly very angry that the work and the care that she had put into looking after her parents had been, as she saw it, completely disregarded and that questions were being asked about such things as who paid the bill if they went into a café together. So, the discussion ranged from bills of less than £10 through to the cost of purchasing a car. There was also some time spent on a sum of £10,000 that the OPG initially said was unaccounted for, but then admitted was a transfer between accounts.

B was particularly exercised by the terminology “issues of concern” on the OPG spreadsheet and did not seem reassured when the OPG investigator said that this was simply his way of signifying things that needed to be looked at further. 

The issue of capacity

This was an interesting area. Questions were raised as to when decisions were made; whether they were made by B or by her parents; were they before or after P lost capacity; and what capacity had been lost and what retained on each occasion? The power of attorney had been registered with the parents’ bank well before P lost capacity to manage her money, and B claimed that P’s capacity was, in any case, variable. Even after she had been medically assessed as being unable to make “financial decisions of complexity”, she was still capable of making choices as to how she wanted to spend her money. B said that her father had always managed the couple’s finances and they had never had bank or credit cards.

An underlying issue?

Some of the questions put to B concerned very large amounts of cash that she had taken from her parents’ bank accounts and kept at home. The OPG said she had talked about trying to avoid care costs (P was now in a care home) and she strongly refuted this, given that P was the sole owner of a house of considerable value. She said that her father had always kept large sums of cash and felt more secure being able to see it rather than having it in the bank. This made some sense given his declining faculties, including eyesight. However, it isn’t hard to imagine that B might have preferred to safeguard a certain amount of cash so that it would not be taken into account when, before the house was sold, the Local Authority made its initial financial assessment. The position statement shows that the Local Authority were now paying care home fees due to depletion of assets. B knew that she would have to repay the debt later but, in such circumstances, liquidity can be a real problem.

The judgment: A pragmatic decision

Looking at the government website, it seems to me that the duties of an attorney, as opposed to the duties of a deputy, are not closely defined and certainly there was no attempt at this hearing to come to a decision about whether or not B had contravened them on any particular occasion. In the end, just as the court was set to rise on the second day, the judge managed to pluck agreement out of nowhere, as far as I could see, although I might have lost some concentration! All three attorneys agreed that, whatever the rights or wrongs of B’s actions, because the relationship between them was irretrievably broken, they were incapable of continuing. Son A withdrew his request to act as sole deputy for the same reason.  The judge ordered that a professional deputy should be appointed.

All three siblings agreed that they could still continue to act together as P’s attorneys for health and welfare and the OPG accepted that on the grounds that there were no immediate decisions to be made now that P was reliant on the Local Authority for care home provision.

B’s day in court

Despite unhappily agreeing to the decision, B continued to express her disappointment at the way things had turned out. She had wanted to clear her name and felt that that had not been achieved. She asked about making a complaint about the OPG and the judge said he was sure there must be a complaints procedure. I did so want to tell her not to bother; I have been through all that, including trying to take my case to the Ombudsman, and it doesn’t work. 

Afterword

According to the blurb for a forthcoming book, Powers of Attorney for Property and Finance: A user’s guide by Ann Stanyer, more than six million powers of attorney are now registered in England and Wales and it does seem to me that it is an area potentially fraught with difficulty, with far too little general knowledge or detailed guidance. I am hoping the book will fill this important gap.  

Georgina Baidoun was the lay Court of Protection Deputy for her mother’s Property and Financial Affairs until her mother died in 2021. Because of the difficulties she experienced with several applications to the Court, and with the Office of the Public Guardian in connection with her annual report, she has retained an interest in these areas, including attending recent Court of Protection Users Group meetings. She is keen to share her experiences in the hope that she can help others who have to engage with these institutions with very little help or guidance.  Georgina is the author of many previous blog posts including: A property and affairs application: Observations about P’s role and who should pay costs; Office of the Public Guardian steps in when attorneys don’t agree; and Unusually, this applicant had to pay costs in a Property and Financial Affairs case – the penalty for wasted work. She tweets as @GeorgeMKeynes 

Photo by hao wang on Unsplash

‘The horse has already bolted’: Transparency in a case of “brain-stem death”

By Celia Kitzinger, with Brian Farmer, 24 September 2023

On 9th July 2023, Andy Casey – then a healthy young man – was on a night out when he was assaulted in a pub garden.  He was punched on the right side of his head and fell to the ground, with catastrophic injury to his brain. An ambulance took him to St George’s Hospital where, from the point of admission, he was found to be in the deepest form of coma, and four days later his treating clinicians suspected that his brain stem had died.  This was subsequently confirmed by formal brain stem testing.  This meant he met the legal definition for death in England.

Normally, withdrawal of organ support follows within 24-48 hours of the clinical diagnosis of brain stem death. In this case, though, the family did not accept the results of the tests and reported seeing Andy move in ways that they considered indicated that he was not brain stem dead. An attempt at mediation failed, and the Trust made an application to the Family Court for a declaration that Andy Casey was dead, and that therefore organ support could be lawfully withdrawn.  

The judge heard evidence from the family and from clinicians and concluded that “Mr Casey died on 16 July 2023 at 11.51pm” (i.e., when brain stem testing confirmed his death). He further declared that: “in the circumstances, it is lawful for a consultant or other medical professional at the hospital part of the St George’s University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust to (a) cease to mechanically ventilate and/or to support the respiration of Andrew Casey, (b) to extubate Andrew Casey, (c) cease the administration of medication to Andrew Casey and (d) not attempt any cardio or pulmonary resuscitation upon Andrew Casey when respiration and cardiac output ceases” (§79 and §81(ii) St George’s University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v Casey [2023] EWHC 2244 (Fam)).

This sad story has been widely reported in the media as the case has unfolded – and Andy Casey’s name, and those of his family members, as well as the name of the hospital where he was being treated, have been included in these reports from the outset. Here’s an example from Sky News.

The family of a brain-damaged man have called for certainty when doctors decide if he is brain dead.

Andy Casey, from south London, has been in St George’s Hospital in Tooting for a week after being punched in the back of the head.

The 20-year-old’s family say doctors treating him at the hospital want to do a brain stem test to assess whether he is brain dead before removing life support.

The family oppose the test, citing questions over its reliability after two recent cases where the test was used to wrongly declare living people as dead.

Mr Casey’s mother Samantha Johnson told Sky News the test is “not 100% accurate”.

She said: “If they do this test and it comes back zero activity, they can turn off the machine … it’s not a 100% accurate test so there could be a chance that my son could pull through this.

“I believe my son is fighting. He needs this chance and I’m going to fight no matter what.”

Family of 20-year-old man fear he could be wrongly declared brain dead due to ‘unreliable’ test, Sky News, July 2023

The names of the family, and the Trust and the hospital are used throughout reporting of this case and are also used in the final judgment.  

This is unusual – both in the Family Court and in the Court of Protection – and this blog post  describes how this came about.  

It’s an interesting case to consider for families who don’t want reporting restrictions in relation to their own cases in the Family Court or the Court of Protection. 

It’s sometimes claimed that the Family Court and the Court of Protection are operating in secret, imposing “draconian” reporting restrictions which prevent families from speaking out about court cases in which they are involved.

Of course, many – perhaps most – families involved in these court hearings do not want their stories in the Daily Mail.  But some do, especially when they believe that injustice is being done, or that the life of their relative is at stake.  There may be lessons here for families who want to speak out.

Reporting Restrictions Order: 23 August 2023

Initially, there were reporting restrictions in place preventing identification of the Trust, Andy himself and Andy’s mother. Observers were sent the Order approved by Mr Justice Moor on 23rd August 2023. 

3. For the purposes of these proceedings: 

a. The Claimant shall be referred to as “A Hospital Trust”; 

b. The Person the case relates to shall be referred to as “A”; 

c. The Defendant (A’s mother) shall be referred to as “B”. 

Publishing Restrictions 

4. This Order prohibits the publishing or broadcasting in any newspaper, magazine, public computer network, internet site, social network or media including Twitter or Facebook, sound or television broadcast or cable or satellite programme service of any information (including any photograph, name and/or address) that is likely to lead to the identification of any of the following; 

a. A, who is the subject of these proceedings; or 

b. Any member of A’s family, including B; or 

c. The name of the Applicant NHS Trust; 

d. Any of A’s treating clinicians (clinical and non-clinical), including those who have taken a part in or been referred to in these proceedings. 

IF, BUT ONLY IF, such publication is likely to lead to the identification of A as being the person receiving treatment or as a party to these proceedings, whether such identification be to the public at large or to those who know A, or have encountered A as a fellow patient or being a party to these proceedings. 

Reporting Restriction Order, 23 August 2023

The problem with this Order was that by the time it was issued (in August 2023) there had already been media reports (and a fund-raising page) naming Andy, his family members, and the hospital (though not his treating clinicians) in ways that make it easy to connect them with these legal proceedings.  They include the Sky News report quoted above, which was published in July 2023.

Varying the Reporting Restriction Order: 8 September 2023

Both the Official Solicitor (Emma Sutton KC, acting as Advocate to the Court) and Brian Farmer – as the journalist covering the hearing – drew the judge’s attention to the fact that the information prohibited by the reporting restriction order (RRO) was already in the public domain. 

The Official Solicitor said, that “reconsideration of the terms of the RRO is likely to be needed at the outset of the hearing” – comparing it to an earlier case in the Court of Protection concerning William Verden (Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust v William Verden (by his litigation friend, the Official Solicitor) & Ors [2022] EWCOP 4 (see §§9-11 in particular), where there had also been lots of media publicity before the case reached court.

Brian Farmer (journalist with the Press Association) wrote to the judge as follows:

Dear Judge

1: I can see from the Alerts Service explanatory note that this case is a little unusual because Mr Casey’s mother appears to have disengaged.

2: However, the problem from the media’s point of view is a familiar one.

3: There has been publicity about Mr Casey’s case (names have been named) and the publicity has indicated that litigation is likely if not underway.

4: We’d want to be able to report developments and finish the story. Those developments (and probably the end of the story) will be outlined to you in court.

5: This is the jigsaw identification problem with which everyone in the Family Division is so familiar: names have already been named, how do we end the story if we can’t name Mr Casey or the Trust in court reports? 

6: Anonymous reporting won’t work: outlining the facts without names will create the simplest identification jigsaw.

7: There are obvious public interest issues:

i)      We ought to be able to report court hearings, even private hearings.

ii)    We ought to be able tell people about the consequences of violence (and here I’d make the well-known, “what’s in a name… a lot press would say” (1) point).

iii)  We ought to be able to report the issues that arise, and the difficulties doctors, families, and judges face, in these kinds of cases.

8: You’ll obviously have to balance [Articles] 10 and 8 but I’m not sure whose 8 rights you are protecting. Realistically, ending the story isn’t going to undermine Mr Casey’s 8 rights; they’ve already been undermined by reporting. I would make a similar argument in relation to Mr Casey’s mother and family.

9: We’d say you shouldn’t impose a blanket ban on reporting. (We’d then ask if we could report the ban and make “secret justice” arguments.)

10: These problems have been solved many times before in a series of treatment cases (Gard, Evans, Battersbee etc). We’d say you should let us name the names which have been already named – just as judges did in Gard, Evans, Battersbee etc.

Email from Brian Farmer sent to Mr Justice MacDonald

The parties’ positions

The position of the Trust – represented by Abid Mahmood – was that the reporting restrictions should  continue, despite publication of some of the case details.  

“It is not necessarily the position that persons will be able to link the previous reports in the media to this case when it appears on Bailii or the like”, he argued.

The Trust’s motive for retaining the reporting restrictions was clearly to protect staff. 

Counsel referred to a message sent by Christine Casey via Facebook on 14 July 2023 inviting the public to attend the hospital to protest: “…if it says 0% then there turning his machines off so now we need as many people as possible to come up after the test to protest to make sure his machine don’t get turned off please share this status”.  And since then (he said), a covert recording device was found in P’s room – designed to look like an air freshener with a device for recording at the back. 

In their skeleton argument, the Trust acknowledged that “the family deny any connection to it [the covert recording device]” but added “it is obvious that the Hospital staff are employees who need to be able to get on with their work.  Hospitals are always stressful and difficult places even without complications with protests and covert recording devices.  The Trust owes duty to its staff.”  

The Trust quoted the judgment in a Court of Appeal case (which also concerned a case of “brain death”): 

“The manner in which social media may now be deployed to name and pillory an individual is well established and the experience of the clinicians treating child patients in cases which achieve publicity, such as those of Charlie Gard and Alfie Evans, demonstrate the highly adverse impact becoming the focus of a media storm may have on treating clinicians. The need for openness and transparency in these difficult, important and, often, controversial cases is critical but can, in the judgment of the court, be more than adequately met through the court’s judgments without the need for identifying those who have cared for Midrar…” (§102, Re M (Declaration of Death of Child) [2020] EWCA Civ)

Judge: I’m sorry to interrupt,  but none of those actions would be restricted by a reporting restriction on the name of the Trust. Family already know it. Friends know it. And members of public know it. An Order preventing reporting of the name of the Trust wouldn’t prevent that mischief.

Counsel for Trust: If members of public want to, it would really be only a simple step to put into search engine the name of the Trust and locate the names of the treating clinicians. We propose that the Trust be referred to as “a London Hospital Trust”

Judge: The horse has bolted, Mr Mahmood. The name of the Trust is already out there. […] I really struggle with the idea that in circumstances where the name of Trust is already in the public domain, I should artificially restrict it. Ms Sutton – […] do you have any submission?

Official Solicitor: Yes, it’s straightforward. The family want to speak out. The only issue is that the clinicians are appropriately anonymised….

The judge checked that the family’s legal representatives (James Bogle and Paul Diamond) also supported relaxing the reporting restrictions.  They did.

Decision on reporting restrictions

The judge said he was “entirely satisfied” that the Order should be varied to allow “naming of Andy and identification of the Trust”.  

The Official Solicitor checked that the intention was that the Order would also permit naming Andy’s mother, the first respondent – albeit that she was not in court today – Samantha Johnson; and his siblings, seeking to join as third and fourth respondents, Christine Casey and Joe Casey.  “Yes”, said the judge.

In his judgment, Mr Justice MacDonald names all of these people – and more (Joe Casey’s partner, Macy Jo Phelan, who gave oral evidence in court), as well as naming the Trust and the hospital.  He refers briefly to the reporting restrictions in §5 of his judgment:

“… the court determined that it was appropriate to relax the terms of the Reporting Restriction Order (RRO) to permit the naming of Mr Casey and the identification of members of the family and to permit the naming of the Trust and the hospital.  Both these steps were taken in circumstances where those details were already in the public domain as the result of coverage in the press. I was not prepared to relax the current restrictions on publishing the names of the treating clinicians involved in this case.”

§5 St George’s University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v Casey [2023] EWHC 2244 (Fam)).

Reflections

“Reporting Restriction Orders” (RROs, in the Family Court) and “Transparency Orders” (TOs, in the Court of Protection) raise difficulties for family members who want to speak out about their court case. They’re often made without the family really understanding what they mean, or knowing how to ask for them to be changed.

As I’ve said previously, these reporting restrictions,  “[impact] upon their [families’] freedom of expression more severely than it does observers , because in speaking about (for example) “my son” or “my mother”, under their own name, in connection with a COP hearing, they are “likely to identify” that person as a P in the Court of Protection”.

In a witness statement submitted to Mrs Justice Lieven last year, I described my concerns:

32. Many of the families I’ve supported through serious medical treatment cases find themselves angry about being “silenced” or “gagged”.  They have come to believe that the TO protects clinicians, not P.  Some of the family members who’ve contacted me through the Open Justice Court of Protection Project say similarly that the court is attempting to silence them because of their criticisms of the healthcare or legal systems.  Reporting restrictions are viewed as damaging P, not protecting them. Most have not, in fact, been willing to challenge reporting restrictions – believing it will be another expensive court battle, or that they are bound to lose anyway, or simply because they are too stressed and exhausted by the situation that has led to the court hearing in the first place. Some fear ‘reprisals’ against P if they are seen as ‘difficult’ family members.

33. I am currently supporting two members of the public seeking variations of the TO – neither of whom recalls any discussion at all, at the outset of their relative’s COP case,  about the restrictions it would impose upon their Art.10 rights.  What they remember is being “reassured” by lawyers that their names (and that of their relative) would not be made public, and that the family’s privacy would be protected – but not that they would lose the right to speak out. 

34. It seems that there is no proper explanation or ‘anxious scrutiny’ of reporting restriction orders with family members.  When supporting family members with cases that have not yet reached court, I explain the TO to them, and help them to engage in a balancing exercise, both in relation to their own rights to privacy and freedom of expression, and in relation to P’s.  In a couple of cases, I have recommended publicising as much as possible in advance of the application to the court, such that “the cat is already out of the bag”, in terms of what is publicly available and a TO restrictive of their Art 10 rights is then less likely.  For 

Celia Kitzinger, Anxious scrutiny or boilerplate? Evidence on Transparency Orders

For families like the Caseys, ensuring that “the horse has already bolted,” or “the cat is out of the bag” can be a very effective strategy for preventing the “draconian” reporting restrictions which sometimes earn the courts a reputation for “gagging” families and for conducting proceedings in “secrecy”. Letting a journalist or public observer know about the hearing in advance is also likely to be of assistance in that they, too, might have arguments to present in court for varying or discharging reporting restrictions.

Celia Kitzinger is co-director of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project. She has observed more than 470 hearings since May 2020 and written more than 100 blog posts. She is on LinkedIn (here), and tweets @KitzingerCelia

(1) This is a reference to the well-known observation by Lord Rodger at §63 In re Guardian News and Media Ltd and others [2010] UKSC 1: “What’s in a name? ‘A lot’, the press would answer. This is because stories about particular individuals are simply much more attractive to readers than stories about unidentified people. It is just human nature. […] A requirement to report it in some austere, abstract form, devoid of much of its human interest, could well mean that the report would not be read and the information would not be passed on. Ultimately, such an approach could threaten the viability of newspapers and magazines, which can only inform the public if they attract enough readers and make enough money to survive.”

Access challenges in the Family Court: On not being allowed to watch the Indi Gregory hearing 

By Rhiannon Snaith, 20 September 2023

Indi Gregory is a six-month-old baby girl who has mitochondrial disease, a rare and incurable genetic condition that drains energy from the body’s cells. She also has a hole in her heart, and soon after her birth underwent operations on her bowel, and her brain to drain fluid. 

Despite doctors advising that it may be kinder to let Indi die, her parents Claire Staniforth and Dean Gregory want her treatment to continue. As there is disagreement between the hospital and the parents, Nottingham University Hospitals NHS Trust has made a court application asking the judge for a declaration that it would be in Indi’s best interests not to receive additional life-sustaining treatment or painful interventions, and that it’s lawful for her clinicians to withhold those treatments. The parents oppose this application. There was a hearing on 15 September 2023 in the Family Court.

What I know about this case – and the 15 September hearing – is based on media reports such as these: “Judge to decide on ending critically ill baby girl’s life support”; “Parents of critically-ill Indi Gregory begin High Court fight to continue life support treatment”.  

I am a PhD student researching media representations of end-of-life decisions. I have observed several hearings in the Court of Protection (COP), all of which have provided me with invaluable insights into the court process, and the complex nature of end-of-life decision-making. My experience of COP hearings has enhanced my understanding of these issues and enabled a more informed analysis of media coverage and portrayals of these cases. I’ve written (or contributed to) five blog posts about COP hearings:

So, when I heard that there was going to be a hearing about Indi Gregory, I was keen to observe it. The previous cases I’ve watched have all concerned adults (mostly in prolonged disorders of consciousness) – this would be an interesting counterpoint, and it was also attracting considerable media attention.  I want to understand how the media portrays the complex medical and ethical dilemmas that arise in court hearings of this kind, and how media framing – including the language, narratives, sources, and imagery used in reporting – can impact and shape public understanding of end-of-life decisions. Researching and analysing how cases such as these are discussed and portrayed in the media can provide an insight into how public discourse and understandings are influenced, how societal attitudes are constructed and how the media navigates legal rulings about sensitive topics.

Access to the Family Court

Alas, this hearing was not in the Court of Protection – which hears cases about adults – but in the Family Court – although the judge hearing the case, Mr Justice Peel, also often sits in the Court of Protection. I submitted a request for the link, but I was told (via email) that the hearing would be private. According to Family Court rules, this this means that I’m not permitted to attend because only accredited journalists and “legal bloggers” (who have to be qualified lawyers) are allowed to do so.

The Court of Protection generally conducts hearings in public, allowing members of the public to attend and to report on the proceedings subject to certain restrictions outlined in the Transparency Orders. By contrast, the Family Court primarily conducts hearings in private which means that attendance is limited to journalists and lawyers – and there is no automatic right for them even to report on what they observe. 

A journalist who has worked indefatigably for transparency in the Family Court, Louise Tickle, has recently tweeted about this.

The Family Court implemented a ‘Transparency Pilot’ at the end of January 2023 (expected to last for one year) which allows ‘pilot reporters’ (consisting of journalists and legal bloggers) to attend and report on cases, subject to compliance with restrictions noted in the Transparency Orders. (More information about the Transparency Pilot is available on the Judiciary Website (here) and on the Transparency Project website. )The pilot limited to three locations – Cardiff, Carlisle and Leeds – and, unlike the Transparency Pilot in the Court of Protection (launched in 2016 and now incorporated into daily practice), which allows ordinary members of the public to observe, the Family Court’s transparency pilot does not. 

Following the email informing me that I would not be able to attend, Celia Kitzinger let me know that she had been granted access to the hearing. Although she is neither an accredited journalist nor a “legal blogger” (according to the definition of the Family Court), the judge had said she could observe. In an attempt to enable me, too, to have access, Celia informed court staff that I was a PhD student studying media representations of end-of-life court decisions and that she was supervising my observations of court hearings, all of which had been Court of Protection hearings so far. We were then told that it should be okay for me to observe, and Celia forwarded me the link. 

It was a ‘hybrid’ hearing, and most people attended in the physical courtroom at the Royal Courts of Justice. After joining the link, I spent some time in the waiting room before being admitted. On admission, I was asked to explain – in front of all the assembled lawyers – who I was and “which party I was for”.  Following my explanation, I was told that it was a private hearing that I was not allowed access to, and I was publicly removed. For me, the whole situation was highly stressful especially having to speak in court and then be removed, despite having previously been told that I would be allowed to observe. I left feeling frustrated and disappointed. 

I would have been very interested in observing this case. I believe allowing both journalists and public observers to be present has a range of benefits – as is apparent from reports arising from both the Court of Protection and from the criminal courts. As Celia Kitzinger has said, in her “Evidence for Ministry of Justice Consultation on ‘Open justice: The way forward‘”

Despite the claim that journalists are “the eyes and ears of the public”, there are, as evidenced below, significant differences between what journalists ‘see’, ‘hear’ and report about court hearings, and what members of the public ‘see’, ‘hear’ and report. Open justice requires that we have direct access to the court and are able to observe for ourselves the process whereby judges and lawyers are “doing justice” with our own eyes and our own ears.

Evidence for Ministry of Justice Consultation

Access to the Family Courts for members of the public, as well as journalists, would supports a diverse range of perspectives, improve transparency, and enhance public understanding and engagement. As I have addressed in a previous blog (here), the benefits of having both media coverage and a blog written by a public observer about the case are substantial. Each piece offers a unique perspective of the case, oftentimes with public observers offering knowledge and expertise from a range of backgrounds. 

As Celia Kitzinger says:

…. one case that attracted a lot of media attention concerned whether it was in the best interests of William Verden, a teenager with a learning disability, autism and ADHD, to have a kidney transplant. Media reports (e.g. here) were short, pithy, factual, and aimed at a general readership.  But members of the public who observed the hearing and blogged about it did so from specific professional and personal viewpoints and presented sustained and in-depth examination of the issues involved: from the perspective of a medical ethicist and mother of an autistic child (Imogen Gould); as an academic researcher on kidney donation (Bonnie Venter); and as a trainee barrister focusing on advocacy in the court (Jordan Briggs).  

What journalists ‘see’, and report is organised with reference to whether it’s (in their terms) ‘a story’ or not.  Members of the public observe court hearings through a multiplicity of very different lenses.  Compare for example media reports of the case of the woman with agoraphobia ordered by the court to give birth in hospital with the blogs from our contributors, who include a woman with agoraphobia, a medical ethicist, and some midwives.  Each of them brings her or his own unique personal and professional experience to bear, and each of them speaks authoritatively to a specialist constituency in relation to whom they are able to engage with acknowledged expertise.  

A fundamental difference between press accounts and the blogs authored by members of the public is that while journalists, by and large, focus on communicating “the facts” and the story behind them, members of the public regularly provide commentary on the case they’ve observed, reflections on their experience of observing it, and make connections with their own personal and professional experience. 

Evidence for Ministry of Justice Consultation

The newly-formed “Courts and Tribunals Observers’ Network” is a UK-based initiative focused on how the public can be supported to observe courts and access court information in digital and physical environments. The Network has raised concerns about the “two-tier’ system whereby some categories of observers (journalists and lawyers) get privileged access to the courts.

This case is back in court on 27 September 2023, and I plan to make a written application to observe it in advance of the hearing. Given what I’m reading about the Family Court, I don’t hold out much hope of success, but it seems worth trying – given the huge media impact of the case, and its importance for my own research project in understanding how the media reports on cases such as these.

Rhiannon Snaith is an ESRC-funded PhD student at the School of Journalism, Media and Culture at Cardiff University. Her research focuses on media representations of decisions about life-sustaining treatment, specifically for those without the capacity to make such decisions for themselves. She has previously blogged for the Project here and here.  You can learn more about her work by checking out her academic profile and her Twitter profile. 

Who cares for P? “Pragmatic harmony” finally breaks out in court

By Hartej Singh Saund-Matharu, 19 September 2023

In my first observation of a Court of Protection (CoP) hearing – and first blog – I will take you through who I am and my interest in the Court of Protection, the background of the case my experience of the hearing, and my analysis/reflections of the outcome of the hearing. Professor Celia Kitzinger also observed this hearing and shared some of her notes with me (referenced accordingly). My experience of the hearing, and my thoughts about it (as opposed to my observations of it) are italicised and in blue.

Introduction to the author 

I am Hartej Singh Saund-Matharu (he/him), a recent first-class law (LLB hons.) graduate from Cardiff University. I am currently studying the Bar Course at the Inns of Court College of Advocacy with the help of an Exhibition and Frank & Burris Gahan Scholarships from Inner Temple. 

My interest in the CoP first arose from studying the law of capacity and consent in my Healthcare, Ethics & the Law module. Having done previous work experience in care homes and hospices, I had observed the outcomes of the decisions made in the CoP from a clinical level and was intrigued to understand the legal perspective on CoP matters. Further to this work experience, I accrued over five years of NHS work as an administrator in GP practices. A primary care perspective on CoP matters gave me better insight into the relationships between public bodies such as Trusts, Integrated Care Boards (ICBs) (albeit they were only CCGs [Clinical Commissioning Groups] when I was last in this job) and local authorities (LAs). This job also helped me understand medical terminology, which oftentimes can be lost to lay persons. Consequently, after an invite to the National CoPPA conference in Cardiff last year, I was enlightened about many of the recent developments and issues in the CoP by speakers such as Senior Judge Hilder, Mr Justice Hayden, Mr Ian Brownhill, Ms Emma Sutton KC and Mr Thomas Jones, just to name a few. In particular, I was introduced to Professor Kitzinger of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project who gave us lots of insight into the transparency issues that face public observers wanting to attend CoP hearings. (This will be discussed further at the end of this blog.) 

As a barrister, I am looking to practice in family (specifically child protection) and CoP law. It is those parties who are vulnerable and who may not have the capacity to consent that I wish to aid via participation in decision making on their behalf (of course, even as opposing counsel). The majority of my mini-pupillages have been in child protection law in South Wales, although I am open to (and looking for) any experience working with vulnerable/disabled clients, particularly in the CoP. 

Background/experience of the case 

This case, Re HJ (COP 14131686), was listed for 10:30am on 13 September 2023 before Poole J in the Royal Courts of Justice (RCJ). 

Professor Kitzinger, at 11:20, informed me that the LA opposed the application to determine ‘which public body or bodies bears responsibility for commissioning of HJ’s social care and whether it is lawful for the Council to cease to commission HJ’s social care’ on the grounds that “[t]he Administrative Court is the appropriate forum for the Trust to challenge the Council public law decision”.  

Thankfully, the audio and video worked well at this point and Poole J, before the hearing, confirmed that all the public observers had received the TO. In fact, he stated (as I paraphrase), that ‘I have been informed that the public observers have received the TO but if there are any public observers that haven’t, please inform the court now’, to which there was silence. 

Ms Power helpfully provided an introductory summary to the hearing (as recommended by the now former Vice President of the CoP), specifically mentioning that it was mostly for the benefit of the public observers. Ms Power introduced the counsel present who comprised of herself for the applicant NHS Trust and her instructing solicitor as Ms Ellie Ward,  Ms Susan Wright of Garden Court Chambers for P (with the instructing OS being Ms Tasha Bibby, a paralegal from Biscoes – P wasn’t present himself; Ms Chiara Cordone of 39 Essex Chambers representing the ICB (who are not a party to the proceedings) and Mr Pollard as the instructing solicitor (who was, as I mentioned, the reason for the CVP link), and finally Mr Michael Paget of Cornerstone Barristers representing the LA. Representatives from the LA, ICB, and NHS Trust were also present. P’s mother (who normally attends the hearings) was not present. Nor was P’s father (who doesn’t normally attend).  

In particular, the key issues which were highlighted by Ms Power orally from the applicant’s PS were:  

  • In circumstances where P has no medical reason to be in hospital, which body (or bodies) bears responsibility for commissioning P’s social care package while he is awaiting his discharge from hospital.  
  • Whether it is lawful for the second respondent to cease commissioning P’s existing social care.  
  • It is reiterated that the parties should not allow the commissioning issue to distract attention from the main challenge of finding a suitable placement for H. Finding a suitable placement for P is an absolute priority. P has exhibited very challenging behaviours in hospital such as assaulting a member of the nursing team. Dr H, Consultant Psychiatrist, recommends a specialist placement in order to reduce the anxiety and challenging behaviour and explains that remaining in hospital is unlikely to be helpful to P. 
  • The applicant Trust looks forward to receiving an update on potential providers and hopes that some meaningful progress has been made since the last hearing.  
  • A Deprivation of Liberty Order and a best interests decision are needed.  

The latest development is that a possible placement has been identified and is going through the commissioning process (and will need adaptations – boarding up windows and changes to door handles). 

In sum, the underlying issue is discharge to an appropriate placement  – since as Poole J later said, “if there were an alternative placement we wouldn’t be here at all, because he’d be moving into it”.   

In the submissions by Ms Power, which were often counterpointed by Mr Paget, it became clear that Poole J focussed on speeding up the arrangements for transfer as much as possible, and encouraging the parties to sort out between themselves who would commission the care, thereby avoiding having to make a declaration himself. This focus seemed to be as a result of developments with possible placements now in hand. 

This approach is pursuant to the notable case of N (Appellant) v ACCG and others (Respondents) [2017] UKSC 22. The important principle that stems from this case is that a Judge cannot order any public body to exercise a discretion. 

Professor Kitzinger, helpfully provides paraphrased transcripts of interactions between Poole J, Ms Power and Mr Paget. (As usual for these blog posts, these are based on her contemporaneous touch-typed notes and are as accurate as possible, given that we are not allowed to audio-record hearings, but cannot be taken to be verbatim). 

Power hopes that P can be moved on Friday – in which case it would be ‘disproportionate to move him to the family suite’, so he’d stay on the ward until then. 

Poole J: If he’s to remain on the ward until Friday, at least, then the court is asked, is it, to authorise the deprivation of his liberty there, for that period with the restrictions previously authorised to remain?

Ms Power: Yes, and should say that for the duration of P’s stay on the paediatric ward, the status quo can continue. However, that does not extend to provision of care if P is moved to the relatives’ suite. So, we have a lacuna if P is moved to the relatives’ suite. And if he’s not to be moved to relatives’ suite, we’ll have to close the paediatric ward.  

Poole J: He can’t go to the relatives’ suite until something is sorted out about the care package. He can’t go to a placement because there isn’t one. He can’t go home. So, you are asking me to decide that it’s in his best interests to stay where he is. The Supreme Court has said in previous cases involving children that the scarcity of placements is “a national scandal”. This is a very similar situation isn’t it. 

Ms Power: I respectfully agree. It is a national scandal and there’s a limited amount any of us in this courtroom can do to address that. 

  1. In circumstances where insufficient places are available in registered secure children’s homes, is the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction to authorise a child’s placement in unregistered secure accommodation lawful? 
  1. If it is, what legal test should the courts apply when determining whether to exercise the inherent jurisdiction? 
  1. Is a child’s consent to the confinement of any relevance when determining whether to exercise the inherent jurisdiction? 

The appellant, T, was a 15-year-old child who was subject to a care order. The local authority, CBC, wished to place T in secure accommodation. Since there were no places available in registered secure children’s homes, CBC applied to the High Court for orders under its inherent jurisdiction authorising T’s placement in non-statutory accommodation. T had consented to the restrictions on her liberty in the placements sought and submitted that the orders restricting her liberty were, therefore, unnecessary. 

The High Court did not consider that consent to be valid, and duly made the orders sought by CBC. T seeks to challenge those orders. She does not object to the placements or the restrictions on her liberty but wishes to be recognised as capable of consenting in law. 

Case summary In the Matter of T

The Court of Appeal dismissed her appeal. T now appeals to the Supreme Court. 

And it was held: 

The Supreme Court unanimously dismisses the appeal. It holds in particular that the use of the inherent jurisdiction to authorise the deprivation of liberty in cases like the present is permissible but expresses grave concern about its use to fill a gap in the child care system caused by inadequate resources. 

Press summary: In the matter of T (A Child) (Appellant) [2021] UKSC 35 On appeal from: [2018] EWCA Civ 2136

Judge asks whether Friday is realistic – it sounds as though it isn’t. 

Poole J: Mr Paget, Friday has been mentioned as a suggested date for P to move. I think the court is invited to authorise his deprivation of liberty in his present circumstances, then it is hoped that arrangements can be made for transfer into the community. How realistic is that? 

Mr Paget: I am not able to say that to the court. [The Care Provider] has not provided us with a care plan to be able to commission. I hope just as much as Ms Power, or her clients do that this happens by Friday.  

Judge tries to speed things along by adjourning and putting pressure on Care Provider 

Poole J: Is it possible to contact [the Care Provider] now and ask them when the care plan will be sent? You could say that the High Court is mid-sitting and wants to know. The court is looking for some levers it can pull to get what everyone wants as the right outcome.  

(Whispered conversation between Paget and person behind him – possibly the instructing solicitor or CC representative?) 

Mr Paget: We have been using soft powers to encourage [Care Provider] to produce these documents, but it won’t result in him being able to move by Friday we don’t think. 

Poole J: (to Ms Power) What’s the end date by which the Trust will accept his continued stay in the paediatric ward before it says “no longer” because the twenty-bed ward would be shut. 

Ms Power: Friday. I have asked my client to reflect on what the position would be if a firm move were confirmed for Monday.  If the court were to rise while enquiries are made of [Care Provider], should it not merely be asked about the care plan, but also about the timeline for adaptations. Which do seem relatively minor. 

Poole J: Yes, if just boarding up the windows. This is a case of pressing urgency. The issue then is if P is to remain at hospital for want of any alternative …. I don’t want to address that. But I will need to. I shall I do that at 2pm. 

Ms Power: If P’s stay is to be prolonged or open-ended, I fear I must submit it would become necessary to look substantively at the application for moving him to the relatives’ suite […] to avoid the catastrophic outcome of closing a 20-bed ward. And we are seeking declaratory relief in relation to who bears the cost. 

Mr Paget begins his submissions:

(Mr Paget explained the process – details of P are given to the providers. The providers decide whether they have capacity and whether they are suitable given P’s needs. If so, providers work up 3 documents (i) costings; (ii) risk assessment; (iii) fully worked up care plan.  Those documents are then considered by a panel, and if the panel agree it’s the right placement, then they draw up a commissioning agreement.  In this case, the provider has submitted provisional costings and a risk assessment, but not, as yet, their care plan. They want to see P again tomorrow before providing it.  It had been hoped that would happen yesterday – but it didn’t; and the risk assessment only came through at 5.30pm.) 

Poole J: So, from here, what’s the expedited timetable? 

Mr Paget: As soon as the care plan is provided, we will convene the panel. 

Poole J: But when will that be? They haven’t said? 

Mr Paget: No. We hope we can do that this week.  

[…] 

Poole J: I would benefit from knowing when [the care provider] can do that, because then dominoes will fall rapidly into place. 

Mr Paget: Procedurally yes, but the adaptations-  they hadn’t told us how long those will take.  

Poole J: Are they bespoke? 

Mr Paget: Yes. 

Poole J: In children’s cases of a not dissimilar nature, these have been done within 24-48 hours – the whole process. 

Mr Paget: We are alive to the urgency of process. We don’t want to discharge to placement that will fail. 

Poole J: No, but the current situation is a failure. […]  Well, there we are.  It’s not clear when the placement will be available – if it will be available. 

The Court then adjourned for lunch. I think there may have been a problem with sound for me on return, as I missed some of the early part of what follows (and rely on Professor Kitzinger’s notes).

Conversation in court after lunch and before the judge returned. 

Ms Power: (to Mr Paget) “Go first if you have an update” (can’t hear what Paget says) 

Ms Power: “End of next week?! That would not come as welcome news to my client. 

That’s too long.  Why don’t you say that to the judge and then I’ll probably need a moment to take instructions.” 

Poole J returns.  

Mr Paget: reports that the panel will have the care plan and will meet on Monday (remotely) and will make the commissioning decision “immediately thereafter” and “the care provider will adapt in that week, ready for transfer, and assembling the care team, ready for transfer on 25th September.” 

Poole J: That’s a week on Monday.  

Ms Power: We invite the further use of soft power to speed it up a bit. Perhaps if the care plan could be provided by 2pm on Friday rather than at close of play, the panel could convene on Friday afternoon rather than hold it up until Monday. It may seem a small thing but then adaptations could be made over weekend…. 

Poole J: I am not here to make directions about how soon adaptations can take place. That is not my role. I have my answer as to what the projected timetable is. Mr Paget can tell me whether it’s worth pressing further, but this should be done outside court. 

[…] 

Poole J: Care plan, yes on Friday and panel on Monday morning. Well, Mr Paget, the court would be gratified to know if the care plan can be provided by 2pm instead. 

Mr Paget: (sounding slightly irritable) They are abundantly clear on the situation.  Asking them again won’t get a different decision. 

Judge rose to enable parties to discuss it at around 14:45. 

On return at 15:14: 

Ms Power: A certain amount of harmony has broken out. The ICB is prepared to commission care for P on the Relatives’ Suite, so the subject matter of my application falls away. 

Summary Ruling from Poole J  

I’m concerned with [P] [and with regards to the TO]. He turned 18 only last week, so he is an adult. He has relatively recently been diagnosed with autistic spectrum disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder. He did live with his mother, but a significant deterioration in his condition and his behaviour led her to be unable to care for him at home. She has not attended today by choice. She has attended previous hearings in this case. The protected party’s father is aware of the proceedings, he has so far chosen not to participate in them. He [P] was admitted earlier this year to hospital in July and briefly detained under s2 of the Mental Health Act 1983 and he was discharged from that detention on the 24th of August 2023. His behaviour has put himself and others at risk. He was involved, as I’ve heard today, in an assault on a member of staff at the hospital and whilst at home he ran in front of vehicles on a public road. I’ve read the assessment of him by Dr H, who I believe took the decision to discharge him from detention under s2 in August.  

The paediatric unit, where he is currently accommodated, is a 20-bed ward. I am told that six beds are out of commission due to P’s presence. I was told at the opening of this hearing, that the Trust is considering moving patients out and indeed even closing the ward due to his continued presence there and the risks that that presents both to him and the others. That would be an extraordinary consequence of the unavailability of suitable adult care for him in the community.  

He does have complex needs and the case has been before the court on six occasions, since the 25th of August – as many as 5 times last week when this case was before the court. And I’m afraid that it appears to me there was during that period no concrete progress. Today at the hearing after further enquiries, the LA, told me through Mr Paget counsel, that a care provider who has already been identified by them and who had indicated that it was willing to provide care for P at a placement in the community, needed until close of play, which I took to be 4pm on Friday 15th September, to produce a detailed care plan. That and other necessary documentation, if provided to a commissioning panel, that could meet on Monday and make a decision on Monday. Adaptations would be required for the planned accommodation for the placement. And I have been told that they can be completed by the end of next week, such that the placement could in principle be available if commissioned for P to transfer to it on Monday 25th September. That is the planned timetable. It isn’t in any way a guaranteed timetable, for example, the commissioning panel has still to make a decision about commissioning the community placement.  

I’ve encouraged the LA through Mr Paget to have a Plan B and he assures me that they have as much in mind and actively consider alternatives. The Trust position at the opening of the hearing, was that it was highly reluctant, to say the least, to continue to accommodate P. The Trust could simply just discharge P into the community because he has no medical and that includes physical or mental condition. There is no medical reason for him to remain in hospital. It is purely because of the lack of anywhere else for him to be accommodated that he continues to reside there. The Trust then would be extremely reluctant for the reasons I have already articulated for him to continue residing in the manner in which he does at the paediatric ward at the Trust hospital. However, it would continue to accommodate him, notwithstanding the cost to other patients and their families and to him, but not indefinitely, and the Trust is very concerned about the timetable that I have already referred to. It has accommodated him for nearly 3 weeks already, with the costs – I don’t mean just financial costs – but the consequences for him and others that I’ve referred to. So, it is unappealing for the Trust to face another 12 days of that.  

An alternative which had already been noted was to move P to a family suite within the hospital. That is a suite where families of terminally ill patients can stay close to them at the hospital or in the hospital grounds. Mrs Justice Morgan said that she was ‘dismayed’ by that prospect, as would anyone given the consequences for the families of those other patients. However, this is a case where there are many disagreeable consequences of various decisions that could be made. I have to be concerned at present with P’s best interests. He lacks capacity, there are grounds/reasons to believe he lacks capacity, as previous judges have foun,d and I do again, to conduct this litigation and make decisions about his residence and care. Therefore, the court has to consider and put itself in his shoes and consider what decision should be made about residence and care in his best interests.  

After standing the matter down for some time, the court has been told that the ICB, which I think I am in right in saying is not a party to these proceedings, but appears and I’m very grateful to it, that the ICB is willing on a pragmatic basis, itself to commission care for P upon him moving to the family suite within the hospital. They have thereby unlocked the possible provision of that care because previously, if I can be excused for putting it this way, there has been something of a standoff between the parties in relation to the commissioning of care within that particular setting. The condition is that it is done without prejudice to the ICB’s position, that it is in fact the LA’s responsibility to commission such care. It is also and without prejudice to any other cases. The ICB is anxious to report that this is not a precedent to other cases but a pragmatic decision taken in the individual circumstances of this case. The third qualification is that the ICB is not in a position to monitor and deploy the package. It is willing to commission and will rely upon the other parties, but with the LA feeding into it to monitor and deploy the package of care. I repeat that I am extremely grateful to the ICB for unlocking that part of this difficult case. In those circumstances, the Trust is willing to continue to accommodate P in the hospital, but with a view to him transferring to the family suite once preparatory work has been done. This will allow an opportunity also for the OS to make contact with P and for P’s own wishes and feelings about the move to the family suite to be ascertained. I am told, and have no reason not to accept, that P himself is keen to make that move, but the OS has not had an opportunity to make contact with him to discuss that particular issue. In these circumstances, I’d argue that general liberty to reply in relation to this order on short notice and so, if necessary, if for example there was an extreme adverse reaction from P to the proposed move to the family suite, depending on the circumstances, the matter could be brought back before me if available for further application and review.  

In any event, I should review this case again reserved to me on the 20th of September because by that time, firstly any move to the family suite should have taken place and I could be updated on that,. Secondly, the commissioning decision should have been made in relation to the community placement and I can be updated on that. And thirdly, it should be clear by then that the adaptations necessary to the community accommodation were on track and that the placement should be available for P to move into on the 25th of September. In the alternative, if that is not on track, I can review the case and make the appropriate orders if necessary. In order to accommodate that hearing, which will be a remote hearing at 10 o’clock on the 20th of September before me, which I will list for 1 hour, updating evidence will be required from the LA and the Trust and I give permission for the OS to adduce any further evidence by way of attendance notes for example, which should be provided by 4pm on the 19th of September. 

I have to consider the position in the interim in relation to P’s deprivation of liberty. Previously, at the court hearings I’ve alluded to, authorisation has been given for the deprivation of P’s liberty with a number of restrictions that are set out most recently in the annex to Mrs Justice Morgan’s order of the 8th of September 2023. They include, as I’ve already referred to, supervision by staff and a 2:1 ratio at all times in his room and other security measures. They also include monitoring during toilet visits, windows of his room are boarded up – that is not for any reason other than at his own request because he becomes distressed when the room is not at the ground floor, at the view he can see through the window and so prefers to have the windows boarded up. The doors closest to his room on the ward are also locked. He is not free to leave the ward unaccompanied. There is no permitted restriction in relation to physical restraint, so the annex reads ‘no physical restraint to be used at present with P verbal de-escalation to be instead used’. Items that he could use to harm himself are removed from his possession. In terms of those restrictions, there is no doubt that they amount to deprivations of his liberty to which he is unable to consent and they are is imputable to the state. I am satisfied that the continuation of those restrictions within the hospital, whether on the paediatric ward or on the family suite are necessary, proportionate and in his best interests. In particular, I have in mind that there is nowhere else for him to go and that he has become in fact more calm and settled of late with these provisions in place, that they are permissive, that in some ways he welcomes the feeling of security and that physical restraint is not amongst the restrictions which are permitted.  

I therefore do give the authorisation of the deprivation of his liberty within the hospital, either on the paediatric ward or the family suite and I do so until 23:59 on the 20th of September where I’m due to hear and review this case earlier that day. It is unedifying for public authorities to dispute with each other in litigation, the responsibility of the care of a highly vulnerable young adult and for resources to be taken up in litigation when what is needed is a collaborative pragmatic approach. What I’m pleased to report, is that that is the approach that has been taken today and the pragmatic agreement as to how to move forward has been reached after discussions today.  

I acknowledge that that has not always been easy for the parties involved, who are mindful of more general principles, but I am grateful to them for the work that has been done today. I would also like to record my thanks for all the staff that have been involved in the care of P – not an easy job and it appears that they are doing an excellent job and that he has become more settled as a result of that. I am grateful to the Trust and to the staff for all they have done to care for P and continue to do so.  

Following the summing up, a question was raised about the TO and whether where P lives or might be cared for might become apparent if specific security measures were described, and an amendment was made. 

At the end of the hearing, I received another email from Ms Ellie Ward, who wanted to confirm that I was present for the amendments to the TO and understood its terms.  She informed me that, cnce the amendments were formalised, she would send the amended TO to again. I am yet to receive this new TO.  

The next hearing is listed at 10am for 1 hour on Wednesday 20 September 2023 before Poole J. 

Hartej Singh Saund-Matharu (he/him) is a Bar Course student at the Inns of Court College of Advocacy, first-class Law (LLB Hons.) graduate, and recipient of two Inner Temple scholarships. He is an aspiring Court of Protection and Family Law barrister. He has accepted an offer for pupillage at 30 Park Place commencing in September 2025. His LinkedIn is https://www.linkedin.com/in/hartejsinghsaundmatharu/  

Photo by Casey Horner on Unsplash

Man on children’s ward due to no suitable placement

By Ahmed Hussain, 19 September 2023

This case concerns a young man who has recently turned 18. He is currently present on a paediatric ward despite having been ready for discharge back in August (about three weeks ago). This situation has arisen due to the lack of suitable placement options. Furthermore, he cannot live with his mother, as he did previously, because there was a serious deterioration in his behaviour and condition (autism and obsessive-compulsive disorder). 

In desperation to get him off the children’s ward (where he assaulted a staff member and threw an object which hit a child), the hospital Trust has applied to the court for an order that he be moved to the Relative’s Suite within the same hospital. This is usually used for families whose child is dying. It will be unavailable to such families whilst the young man is living there.

The hearing

As a law student at King’s College London, much of my time is spent reading about the law in books and articles. Observing a Court of Protection hearing has ‘brought the law to life’ because I am effectively following people’s legal issues ‘in real time’ as they are decided before the court. I was also keen to watch practising barristers deliver their oral submissions in court as I could employ some of the techniques they use in my own advocacy, both in moots and in my future professional practice. 

The hearing I observed was scheduled for 10:30am on 13 September 2023. However, the official start time was pushed back to 11:30am and the actual start time was well after mid-day. When the hearing did start, it was held in a hybrid format with the judge, Mr Justice Poole and counsel for the parties being present in London whereas I was observing remotely via a CVP (cloud video platform) link. This set-up worked well as I was able to clearly hear and see the court proceedings throughout. 

Eloise Power for the applicant, University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust began with an introductory summary of the case. The person at the centre of the hearing (P), the 1st respondent, was represented by Susan Wright. via his litigation friend the Official Solicitor. The second respondent was West Sussex County Council, represented by Michael Paget. In addition to counsel for the parties, there were other people present at the hearing. There was a barrister representing the Integrated Care Board (ICB), instructing solicitors for the applicant and respondent, the Divisional Director of Nursing, and the Assistant Director of Adult Operations. Most observers joined via video link; however, Brian Farmer from the Press Association was present in the press bench (see this media report: “Man staying in hospital’s children’s ward in West Sussex”).

The applicant was seeking a deprivation of liberty order so that P could be kept in the hospital now and moved to the Relative’s Suite. Mrs Justice Morgan in the previous hearing had expressed great concern about this move because it would mean families couldn’t use it, but Eloise Power for the applicant highlighted that the situation would be much worse if P continued to stay in the children’s ward. This is because six beds are currently out of commission to accommodate P and the Trust is considering closing the entire ward due to his presence.  

The applicant was also seeking a two-part declaration. The first question to be addressed was who is responsible for commissioning P’s social care package when there was no medical reason for him to be in hospital and while he is waiting for discharge from hospital. The second question was whether it is lawful for the second respondent to cease commissioning P’s existing social care. The main area of contention between the applicant and the respondents was the issue of who should pay for P’s care if or when he is moved to the hospital suite. The problem was that he could not be moved until this was agreed and if he was not moved by Friday, the Trust was considering closing the whole paediatric ward. 

To resolve the ‘stand-off’ which had occurred regarding the provision of care, the ICB who were not a party to the proceedings but were represented by Chiara Cordone said that they would be willing to commission care for P upon him moving to the Relatives Suite. They said (and the judge accepted) that they were making this offer without prejudice to their position, and it should not establish a precedent because, in their view, care should really be provided by the local authority.

Michael Padget, for the second respondent said that they had sourced a potential care provider who would be willing to provide both care and a suitable placement for P. They have given a provisional costing and risk assessment, but they have not created a fully worked-out care plan; they want to see P again before providing that.

At the end of the hearing, Mr Justice Poole delivered an oral judgment. He gave authorisation to deprive P of his liberty with the same restrictions that were in place before. These include supervision by staff at all times on a 2:1 basis, plus additional security arrangements, supervised toilet visits, the requirement that his windows be boarded up (which he asks for) and that the doors closest to the room are locked and he is not free to leave the room on his own.  The judge said that care staff are limited to the use of de-escalation techniques rather than physical restraint to manage P’s behaviour. These restrictions were justified on the basis that they are necessary, proportionate and in P’s best interest. This deprivation of P’s liberty in the hospital will last until 11:59pm on 20 September 2023. This will be reviewed by the court on the morning of 20 September 2023 at a 10:00am hearing before Poole J.

It is expected that by this time, any move to the Relative’s Suite should have been made and the commissioning decision should have been made, and the adaptations to the community accommodation such as the windows being boarded up and door handles being secured, should be on track. If this has not happened, then the case can be reviewed.

Reflections

After the hearing had ended and the judgment was delivered, I reflected on what I had learnt. I am still a very new Court of Protection observer – this is only the second hearing I’ve observed – so I was able to consolidate my understanding of the Court and the various terms and roles associated with it. For example, I gained a greater awareness about the office of the Official Solicitor which acted as P’s litigation friend due to his lack of capacity to instruct a legal team. This means that the Official Solicitor can decide the instructions given to the barrister who represents P in court; in accordance with the Mental Capacity Act 2005, these instructions should be in P’s ‘best interests’.

 One of my main observations during this hearing was that the style of advocacy adopted by the barristers was very inquisitorial due to the focus on working collaboratively for what is in P’s best interests. This contrasts with the much more adversarial style I have observed in criminal cases or when I have watched and taken part in moots at university.

I also learnt about the dire situation in social care in relation to secure placements. Unfortunately, the demand for a secure placement is far greater than the supply. This means that people who need this type of accommodation find themselves in wholly inappropriate settings. In May 2022 the Daily Mail reported that 62 children needed a secure placement, but there were only two available. These secure placements are incredibly important for children because they help to “keep children safe, restore stability to their lives and assess their needs and identify the supports needed in the future.”  The hearing I observed was just the tip of the iceberg of a much bigger problem.

I am incredibly grateful for the opportunity to attend this hearing; I hope to attend even more in the future. I would also encourage others to attend a hearing because the work done in the Court of Protection, which is based on the Mental Capacity Act 2005, overlaps with a range of legal practice areas such as human rights, family law and medical law so there is bound to be something of interest for everyone. 

Ahmed Hussain is a final year Law student at King’s College London. His LinkedIn profile is here: linkedin.com/in/ahmed-hussain-987b791b3 He tweets @ahmedhussainlaw

Photo by Izabelly Marques on Unsplash