Reducing restrictions for a person deprived of his liberty: internet use, access to services and ensuring appropriate support

Senior Judge Hilder (and the OS) seemed very familiar with how difficult it can be to ensure that organisations follow through on their responsibility and how easily a timetable can slip.

When compliance is not consent: Applying AGNI when P is sedated and objecting

This hearing the opportunity to see how the Court is approaching the Supreme Court’s new, multifactorial test for deprivation of liberty following A Reference by the Attorney General for Northern Ireland (AGNI).

A remarkable turnaround: Updating the “vile judgment” case

By October 2025, the local authority had concluded that 24-hour live-in care was no longer necessary and sought court approval to replace it with four daily care visits supported by assistive technology. The court agreed, bringing an end to all restrictions on contact between Caroline and her mother.

Fit to discharge or fit to section?

The family members are adamant that the new care providers are “the worst agency they’ve been involved with” and report receiving somewhere between 50 and 100 distress calls each day from P in which she begs them to prevent her having to go home with those carers. Their view is that if P returns home with this care provider, then her quality of life at home would be no better than her remaining in hospital.

What happens to restricted patients after AGNI? SJ Hilder considers the consequences

At first sight, this appeared to be a straightforward example of the post-AGNI legal framework in practice. The applicant local authority invited the court to discharge the COPDOL order. But there was a complication. The P in this case is a “restricted patient”, living in the community under “conditional discharge”.

“What your mother wants and what is best for P may not be the same thing”: Judge seeks family engagement and clarification of immigration status 

I hope that the practical plan put in place by DJ Clarke will enable the family and professionals to collaborate effectively and ensure that the Official Solicitor can obtain P’s wishes and feelings. Ultimately, the decisions being made are about P’s life, and his voice must be at the centre of those decisions.

Objections (and breached conditions) after AGNI

Despite the obvious importance of establishing the legal basis of P’s confinement (is it or isn’t it a ‘deprivation of liberty’?), this judge – like others I’ve watched since AGNI –  gave priority to considering whether P’s residence and care arrangements were in his best interests and the least restrictive necessary.

Polly and AGNI: A family reflection on deprivation of liberty

Polly has lived her life in the context of both the ‘ordinary usage’ of ‘liberty’ with its powerful social and political symbolism, and also the more peculiar legal definitions created by judicial interpretation of mental capacity legislation.

From Cheshire West to AGNI: Rebalancing Protection, Autonomy and Human Rights

One positive consequence of the AGNI judgment may be that it encourages professionals to refocus on their own responsibilities under the Mental Capacity Act. By reducing the number of cases that require formal deprivation of liberty authorisation, there is an opportunity for practitioners to develop greater confidence in undertaking capacity assessments, making best interests decisions and applying the Act in day-to-day practice.

Considering ‘deprivation of liberty’ in a family home setting after AGNI

HHJ Burrows determined that there is no deprivation of liberty for a young woman living under constant supervision and control in an annex to the family home. It was clear from his comments in court that he did so with considerable reluctance, referring to “deeply philosophically difficult” arguments.