Another case of s.21A delay (with a happy ending)

By John Harper, 27 October 2023

On Thursday 19 October 2023, I observed a remote hearing (COP 13627234) before Theis J, Vice President of the Court of Protection, sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice. An earlier hearing in the case was blogged here: “A s.21A challenge for a restricted patient: A ‘shocking’ delay”.  

The case concerned a challenge by Mr N to the Local Authority’s deprivation of his liberty on the grounds that it did not meet two qualifying requirements of s.21A(2) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, namely (1) the mental capacity requirement and (2) the best interests requirement (see Sch. A1(3) para. 12(1)). 

Mr N has a diagnosis of treatment-resistant schizoaffective disorder and has been living in a care home following discharge from hospital. He is also a restricted patient under ss.37 and 41 of the Mental Health Act 1983.

Procedural history

The s.21A application was made in October 2022 but was not heard until 5 July 2023 (and even then, a determination was still not reached). At the July hearing, Theis J made her dissatisfaction known: “It’s shocking, frankly. Here we are 8 months later, effectively having the first hearing” and, “all I can do is express my despair. There’s delay building on delay” (quoted from the earlier blog). 

One reason for the delay was that Kent County Council was originally of the position that the Court of Protection did not have the jurisdiction to discharge a DOL authorisation for a restricted patient under s.21A, and instead such an application ought to have been made to a Mental Health Tribunal. However, this position was withdrawn following a roundtable meeting immediately prior to the 5 July 2023 hearing.

At the July hearing, an order was made directing that expert evidence on Mr N’s capacity was to be obtained, as well as Mr N’s wishes and feelings regarding the placement, and it provided for a further directions hearing (the one I observed) to be listed before the final hearing.

The hearing on 19 October 2023

This brings us to the hearing I observed. In relation to ease of access, it ran fairly smoothly on this occasion. I emailed both rcj.familyhighcourt@justice.gov.uk and rcj.familylisting@justice.gov.uk at 10.15 and received a reply about 30 minutes later attaching the link for the hearing which was listed for 2pm. 

The only hitch was that a Transparency Order was not sent to me. I requested this in another email to the rcj.familylisting address, but there was no reply (and I understand from the Open Justice Court of Protection Project that it is vanishingly rare for a Transparency Order to be obtained from that source: if it is sent – and it isn’t always – it is usually sent by one of the advocates). It was important I received the Transparency Order because the July hearing had given rise to some discussion regarding the naming of Kent County Council (see “Varying reporting restrictions to name Kent County Council in “shocking” delay case”).  Upon reading the blog, I was reassured that Kent County Council could be named, but I would of course liked to have seen the Transparency Order myself to confirm this. 

Although the hearing I observed was a case management hearing, it led to the proceedings being concluded because the two qualifying requirements in contention had been resolved. 

First, the expert’s opinion (accepted by all parties and by the court) was that Mr N does not have the requisite capacity in relation to deciding where he should reside. Second, shortly after the 5 July 2023 hearing Mr N had moved residence, and it was agreed between the parties that his new placement meets the best interests criteria. Mr N is settled and content in his new residence as shown by him engaging well with activities and seeing his mother more frequently. It was also agreed that the restrictions on his liberty were necessary and proportionate. If he were free to go out into the community on his own, he would be very vulnerable because of his poor road sense, his behaviour towards others, and the risk of exploitation. The new care home has available the required support to keep him safe.  

The Official Solicitor’s position was therefore that Mr N should continue to be deprived of his liberty at his current residence, subject to review in the usual course of events (due in April 2024).  As such, the Official Solicitor was content for the application made in October 2022 to be dismissed and for the final hearing to be vacated, bringing these proceedings to an end.

Mr N attended the hearing with a support worker, and Mr Storey called for a slight pause during his own submissions when Mr N got up and briefly went out of frame. Upon his return, the support worker said they were just “adjusting themselves”. Mr N being accommodated in this way gave the positive impression that his attendance in the proceedings was valued. Also noteworthy was Mr N’s reaction to Theis J’s summing up of him being content in his new residence, to which he held up his hand signalling “ok” to confirm that the new residence was an improvement for him. This was nice to see and served as a reminder that, as always in COP proceedings, there is an individual at the core of proceedings who is affected by the decisions of the court.

The question of delay

Despite the good news regarding Mr N’s change of residence, Theis J was focused on trying to figure out what caused the delay in getting the application heard.  As requested at the previous hearing, an agreed chronology of events had been sent to the court. 

Counsel for the Official Solicitor (Mr Scott Storey) and counsel for the Local Authority (Ms Alison Harvey) both gave submissions on this. 

It was put forward by Mr Storey that “in a nut shell, a number of factors culminated to cause the unsatisfactory delay in this case,  but the jurisdictional was significant”.  The OS’s position statement (sent to Celia Kitzinger, but not to me), reads as follows:

  • “The Official Solicitor acknowledges that there appear to have been various overlapping factors which culminated to cause delay in progressing Mr N’s section 21A application, which all involved in these proceedings can take stock of. That said, the Official Solicitor submits that an unnecessary hurdle (which otherwise may have progressed the proceedings more promptly) was KCC’s jurisdictional challenge. This was misguided (for the reasons advanced in the Official Solicitor’s position statement dated 4 July 2023 [A7-13]) and was effectively abandoned by KCC at the hearing on 5 July 2023 [D74]. This was not a discrete legal point but a jurisdictional challenge (as reflected in KCC’s position statement dated 21 March 2023 [A1- 4]) therefore, in essence, a challenge to whether the court could hear, and thereby exercise powers within, the proceedings at all. Further, it engaged the interface between the 2005 Act and the 1983 Act, the complexity of which Charles J commented upon in Secretary of State for Justice v KC & Anor [2015] UKUT 376 (AAC) at [9]: “[i]n particular in respect of a deprivation of liberty, the relationship between the MHA and the MCA is not straightforward”. This required the Official Solicitor to obtain full advice; for Mr N’s solicitors to apply for Legal Aid funding for junior and leading counsel; and for the Official Solicitor to carefully consider her position, given the effect of KCC’s application was a challenge to Mr N’s fundamental right to have the lawfulness of his detention speedily reviewed pursuant to Article 5(4) of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’), as incorporated into domestic law by section 21A of the 2005 Act.”

The Official Solicitor’s view was that where a party seeks to challenge the court’s jurisdiction to hear a s.21A application (which engages P’s fundamental right to have the lawfulness of his detention speedily reviewed pursuant to Article 5(4) of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’)), that party should file a COP9 application clearly setting this out in accordance with Practice Direction 13A at the earliest opportunity.

By way of reply, Ms Harvey explained that the Local Authority has acted on advice throughout the proceedings and had sought a Roundtable Meeting with the Official Solicitor to discuss the jurisdictional issue. Ms Harvey conceded that there had not been parallel planning, such as resolving of the question of capacity while the jurisdictional issue was ongoing. 

It also became clear that the delay in listing the hearing was caused by counsel unavailability, albeit possibly via the court erroneously asking for such availability. What ensued thereafter was (said Theis J) “a merry-go round of correspondence … which built in yet further delay so that, when a date was offered, somebody said they could not do it and then there was more correspondence regarding availability. So, the hearing intended to take place soon after the order of Her Honour Judge Cophey on 22nd March 2023 did not get listed until 5thJuly 2023“.

Theis J firmly reminded the parties’ representatives that, “it is not, save in exceptional circumstancesfor court orders to be disregarded in this way. The directions are for the first date of court availability and are not subject to counsel availability. Please could this be fed back to your legal teams – to list the matter is to list the matter as to when the court is available, not for when counsel is free.” 

Theis J, in bringing the hearing to a close, said “where there is a court order listing a hearing on the first available date for a Tier 3 Judge, that is what it means, and it is not subject to anybody’s availability unless that is specifically provided for in the order. The legal representatives in particular should have reminded the court of that. Then there would have been a much earlier hearing date. … It is regrettable that the delay is there. Fortunately, in this case, I don’t think it has been too detrimental for Mr N other than having the uncertainty about the ongoing proceedings.

Reflections

I was surprised that the court remained determined to figure out the reasons for the delay in getting the application heard despite there being a positive development since the last hearing, such that the case could now be concluded. 

My immediate reflection on the exploration and complaints made by Theis J was that they were to remind those in court, and to signal more widely, that matters in the Court of Protection must be dealt with expeditiously because they relate to such serious issues like deprivation of liberty. Theis J’s comments seemed not just to be the venting of judicial frustration but came from a sincere concern for the detrimental effect delays could have on a protected party (P). 

It is clear from other blog posts published by the Open Justice Court of Protection Project that there has been judicial dissatisfaction over delay in other s.21A cases too.  

A post called “Justice delayed” documents delays in obtaining an appropriately qualified psychiatrist to assess P’s capacity, and further delay caused by adjournments in order to allow the Local Authority more time for a possible placement for P to be identified. The judge, in expressing their frustration, recognised that P “must be wondering whether the court cares”. 

A post called “Delay in a s.21A challenge to the capacity requirement” describes a substantial delay in collecting evidence on P’s capacity and, in that case, it was brought to the court’s attention that the delay had been harmful to P. An outcome in which he merely continued to be detained while waiting for another hearing would cause “great distress” to P. In response, the judge requested best interests to be considered in parallel with dealing with the question of capacity.  

As the former Vice President of the Court of Protection has repeatedly stated and in many contexts (including but not limited to medical contexts) “delay will invariably be inimical to P’s welfare” (e.g. here).

Furthermore, in the case of s.21A challenges in particular, these delays prevent P from exercising their right under Article 5(4) of the Human Rights Act 1998 to “take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”

It has been an interesting learning point for me to observe Theis J take time to analyse the causes of the delay and make her concerns known in the hearing, and also to learn of similar previous instances of judicial complaint in the face of unreasonable delay alongside the legislative provisions which expressly stipulate against it. It is good that judges are giving short shrift to unreasonable delays due to inefficient management of cases and going to some lengths to express why it is not acceptable. However, one cannot help but feel discouraged when similar cases keep coming along with substantial delay, requiring judges to express their concern over and over again. It gives the impression that the Local Authorities and other parties are not taking heed of such judicial comments, or – if they are – that there are apparently insuperable practical barriers in the way of implementing judicial advice, meaning they are ultimately in vain. 

What this ultimately means is that there will be case after case in which protected parties will once again be left wondering whether the court cares.

John Harper is an Advocate at DAC Beachcroft and an aspiring barrister. He is interested in Court of Protection and hopes to build a practice in this area when at the Bar.

Tampering with equipment or failings in care? A fact-finding hearing (Part 2)

By Amanda Hill (Anna), Pippa Arnold, John Harper, Gail Heslop, Ellen Lefley, Celia Kitzinger, Claire Martin, Tess Saunders and Ann Wilson (co-ordinated and curated with an introduction by Celia Kitzinger), 25 October 2023

Introductory Editorial Note

This is the second collective blog post about a fact-finding hearing before Mr Justice Hayden, observed (in part) by more than 30 members of the public. The first collective blog post is here: “Tampering with equipment or failings in care? Part 1”.  The case has been the subject of two previous judgments by Mr Justice Hayden:  Re G [2021] EWCOP 69 and Re G[2022] EWCOP 25.  They provide essential background.

Fact-finding hearings arise when one party makes allegations against another that are of significance and will impact upon decisions that need to be made – in this case, where the vulnerable person at the centre of the case (G) will live, and the contact she’ll have with family members. The ICB (Integrated Care Board) is making serious accusations against the family, including that they’ve tampered with G’s medical equipment, putting her at risk of harm. The family have made counter-accusations saying that staff at the care home don’t provide safe or adequate care.  For more information about the background to this case, and for some responses to the first part of the hearing,  do read the earlier blog post. We’ve also documented aspects of this case in two previous blogs: see A judicial embargo and our decision to postpone and Fact-finding hearing: “Little short of outright war”

This collective blog post is composed of a  kaleidoscope of 9 different pieces from people who observed the second part of the hearing (in late July or, after the adjournment, in October 2023).  Each presents a different ‘snapshot’ of what they experienced of the hearing from a range of perspectives, including that of carer, family member of a vulnerable person, social worker, justice policy expert, former litigant-in-person in the Court of Protection, psychologist, and paralegal.  The case is still ongoing at the time this blog is published and it’s likely we’ll be publishing further reflections on the closing statements and eventual judgment.

Where we’ve quoted from the hearings, we’ve relied on contemporaneous notes and they’ve usually been cross-checked with at least one other observer.  They are as accurate as we could get them but as we’re not allowed to audio-record hearings, it’s unlikely that they are entirely verbatim – especially as (as various bloggers note) the audio was of poor quality for parts of this hearing for people watching remotely.

1. Representation and dignity for disabled people

By Ann Wilson

Thank you for providing me with the opportunity to observe yesterday’s  court proceedings.

I was heartened to see the judiciary expertly at work and doing justice in open court.

The family have tragically overcome many difficulties and travelled a long way on their sad and fraught  journey with their daughter in care.  l hope they will find comfort and  continued strength to achieve the best outcome for their precious daughter and can hereafter tenderly care for her safely at home. I trust the court will help this young woman, and her family, following what must have been a very harmful and distressing time for them.

Like so many families, I know the pain of seeing your relative neglected in care and unable to move without the assistance of others. Care homes, in our family’s experience, are profit-making businesses mostly staffed by poorly-paid untrained staff struggling to make ends meet. I have seen totally false allegations made by care home staff/ manager to protect themselves against families and to justify neglect when funding has been reduced and one-to-one care removed by the Integrated Care Board.  Court protection is vital.

.Thank you for all the Open Justice Court of Protection Project has done to help us show the world of care for the disabled. They need representation and dignity.

2. A total breakdown of the relationship between those caring for G and her family

By Pippa Arnold

I observed the sixth day of this hearing via MS Teams (25th July 2023 – all day). The Open Justice COP Project provided a summary of the case so far, and I was keen to observe given that  it centred medical treatment (which is my primary interest in COP proceedings) and the serious nature of the allegations being made by the care home. Moreover, Mr Justice Hayden had been quoted in a newspaper article (here) as having said “in 10 years, I have never had to try a case like this in the Court of Protection” which intrigued me.

Ms Khalique KC (Counsel for the Applicant – the ICB and care home company) informed the court that there were 3 witnesses to give evidence that day. 

The first was a senior healthcare assistant at the care home. When giving her oath, I noticed how nervous she was, as she was shaking and taking deep breaths. I had presumed that this was because giving evidence can be a daunting task, but I later realised that G’s father (who she had alleged purposely intimidated her, shouted at her, and singled her out whilst she was caring for G) was also in court. We later found out that the witness now only cares for G at night times as she was suffering from panic attacks when G’s family attended during the day. Furthermore, the witness clearly cared for G stating that she “loves caring for [G], she’s an amazing young woman”, and so, it was difficult for her to talk about these times when she was very unwell. 

This witness’ evidence took approximately 3 hours and so, the court did not break for lunch until nearly 2.00pm. When she was being cross-examined by Mr Patel KC (Counsel for G’s father), I thought that Mr Justice Hayden was very supportive of the witness. For instance, one of the main issues related to an allegation that G’s father had tampered with her medical equipment. Mr Patel KC had established that G was taken to hospital around 9am that morning and visitors were not allowed into the care home until 10am. Consequently, he stated that G’s father never went to the care home on the day in question and instead, went straight to the hospital. The witness responded timidly with “ok”. Mr Justice Hayden then told the witness not to give into Mr Patel KC and if she thought what he was saying was wrong, she should say so. The witness took this onboard and subsequently told Mr Patel KC that she was “100% certain” that she had seen G’s father at the care home that day. 

When the witness finished her evidence, Mr Justice Hayden said that he hoped she did not have to go through a hearing like this one again, which acknowledged the distress it had caused her and demonstrated how unusual fact-finding hearings are in the COP.   

This was my first experience of observing a COP hearing where witnesses were cross-examined. I found it interesting as the nature of cross-examination differs from the COP’s usual collaborative approach. Despite Counsel and G’s grandmother (as she acted as a litigant-in-person) having to ask difficult questions and challenge the witness’ credibility, they were not unduly harsh and were conscious of her emotions. For instance, Mr Patel KC acknowledged that the witness was getting upset and so he stated that he did not want to sound as though he was criticising her, before asking if she would like to take a break. G’s grandmother also told the witness that she knew that she cares for G very much. 

The facts of this case were upsetting, as it demonstrated a total breakdown of the relationship between those caring for G and her family. I will be interested to see how this matter progresses and what Mr Justice Hayden concludes as, in my opinion, Counsel did cast doubt on the accuracy and credibility of the Applicant’s witnesses’ accounts on the day I observed. 

3. The importance of accurate record-keeping

By Gail Heslop

As a social worker, I often read court judgments to inform my practice. Many of these key judgments are made by Mr Justice Hayden, so after reading an overview of this case before Mr Justice Hayden (Fact-finding hearing: “Little short of outright war”), I was intrigued – and keen to experience for myself the court process on the basis of which he arrives at his judgments.  

I emailed the Open Justice Court of Protection Project and received the video-link promptly, along with some information about joining with my camera and mike turned off, and the fact that there was a Reporting Restrictions Order which would be sent to me by the court staff (and I received it the next day).

It was a multi-day hearing and I watched just the morning of Tuesday 25th July 2023 (the sixth day of the hearing). The main event that morning was that a Senior Health Care Assistant from G’s care home was in the witness box, giving evidence relating to the family’s alleged tampering with equipment. Her written evidence had been submitted to court and now she was being sworn in (or affirmed) and cross-examined about it by each of the parties in turn – mainly by counsel for G’s father, Mr Parishil Patel (PP).  Some of her written records were put up on the court screen for everyone to see while she was being asked details about what happened.

As I start writing about the experience,  I am reflecting on all the different perspectives I am writing it from. 

  • As a social worker, Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards Assessor (and former carer).  I am currently a social worker who has been in practice for 13 years.  Before this, like the witness, I was a carer for 7 years. In this time, and in both roles, I have written lots of records myself and also overseen other workers’ written records. In fact, I now train people on the importance of keeping accurate written records and being clear about the difference between fact and opinion. As a social worker, I often come across complex safeguarding concerns involving paid carers and family members being accused of wrongdoing which has put the person at risk. 
  • As an expert witness in the Crown Court  (and I’ve also prepared evidence for the Court of Protection). I recall that, even as a professional, I was ill-prepared for my first time presenting evidence in a Crown Court as an expert witness. Unlike this witness, I was merely being asked for my professional opinion – my own practice and the accuracy of my written records was not in question. It was really only on arriving at the court that  I realised the gravity of what I was actually being asked to do. Counsel for the prosecution advised me what to expect and that was the first time it dawned on me who would be in the court room; the defendant and their family, the victim’s family, the judges, court staff and all the various counsel. I was told I would be at the centre of the court on an elevated stand before the judges (plural in the case I attended) and any others in attendance and that I would be cross examined by the defence, who quite frankly would be trying to discredit any evidence that I gave which went against their client. I had some really good advice from colleagues beforehand which was if you don’t know,  say you don’t know. This might seem obvious but when you are under pressure there can be a temptation to try to guess, but you’re in a court room which is relying on you to be as accurate as possible.

On the morning I observed,  the witness was extremely nervous. She was visibly shaking, hyperventilating, and at times crying, making her hard to understand or even inaudible. As a social worker, I’m  trained to empathise and build up a rapport with the people I support, so I was interested to see if the judge and counsel would pick up on this and how they would respond. I was pleased to see that Mr Justice Hayden stopped the witness on several occasions  – at one point stressing that her role in the care home was ‘much more demanding than what’s going on in this court room’. He gave practical advice to support her to reduce her anxiety, and patiently gave repeated prompts for her to speak up. I also noted the counsel acting for G’s father was patient and showed no outward signs of frustration, despite a very long examination where the witness needed support to find documents (one of the junior barristers came to the witness stand to help her): and she also needed to have a 15-minute break due to her distress. 

I found myself wondering what preparation and support this witness had had. Had her manager come to court with her today? Was she given (paid) time to prepare for giving evidence? Did she  have the opportunity to come and look around the court before the hearing? (Many courts offer this in recognition of how stressful being a witness is.) In my experience, many people who are anxious will begin to relax as they focus on the questions, but I observed that this witness did not –  despite everyone’s support. I felt that everyone in the court was very mindful of this and when it became too much for her, they took appropriate steps to support her as much as possible.

At the start of the cross-examination, the witness was asked about her written record of an incident whereby she recorded that the wet circuit for G’s ventilator (the ventilator plugged into the wall in her room in the care home) “appeared to have been tampered with” and pieces “seem to have been swapped over”. It was on a day when G was taken into hospital.  The family had been in G’s room at the care home to pick up some of her things, and the witness had concluded that the parents must have tampered with it. 

Counsel for G’s father (Mr Parishil Patel [PP]) pointed to evidence (from other care home records) that the parents could not have tampered with the equipment because they were not in the care home that morning: “Let me put to you that they were not there that morning. That they went directly to the hospital having been telephoned and told that G was being transferred”. The witness reacted by saying “okay”. The judge intervened to say: “Don’t say ‘okay’ and give in to him. Did you see them?” “I’m 100% sure” she said, and the judge replied:  “Stand up to him. Don’t just cower. I know you’re nervous, but stand up to him”.

Witness: From what I recall, on that day they came to collect her belongings when G wasn’t there.

PP: They did, but that wasn’t until 8.30 in the evening. Could it be that you’ve misremembered this incident completely

Witness: Not completely, no.

PP: Maybe you’ve misremembered the date.  What stuck out in your memory that day was the circuit in G’s room was wrongly set up and you have gone from the fact it’s wrongly set up to “[the parents] must have tampered with it”. And there are other explanations aren’t there, other than [the parents] tampered with the equipment?

Later (after the witness had taken a break to deal with her extreme anxiety), Counsel for the father returned to the question of “other explanations” that might account for the equipment being wrongly set up.  

There were questions about the checklist that the care home use to do checks on equipment and to ensure appropriate infection control. At one point Counsel suggested if something was not on the checklist it is unlikely to have been done. However, from my own experiences of working in care, I know some things are done automatically without the need for a checklist, due to experience. So, it does not seem unlikely to me that something not on the checklist might have been looked at and checked, especially if it involved something as serious as oxygen delivery. 

As questioning continued, more written records completed by the witness were viewed, including an occasion when G’s sats (oxygen saturation levels) had dropped below safe levels while she was being hoisted in her room and G’s father intervened to help his daughter. The father is someone – everyone accepts – who has developed expert knowledge about his daughter’s medical care over the last 28 years, and he’s her primary family carer, and has developed a great deal of skill in dealing with her needs.  The witness said he was ‘man-handling’ G:

PP: You say dad was “manhandling” – six lines up from the bottom – is that what you really mean? I put to you that suggests he was rough with her.

Witness: Not rough – but it  would have been safer to do it with the hoist, the equipment that was right in front of him

PP: You’re not allowed to manually move her, are you?

Witness: No

PP: That doesn’t mean that [Father] hasn’t worked out over the years that’s a safe way of moving her. 

Witness: The sling and hoist equipment were there ready to use. We could have handled that situation

PP: What was necessary was for her position to be corrected as quickly as possible?

Witness: Yes, but there was equipment there. It could have been done more safely. It’s not a criticism of [Father] but it’s how we’ve been trained – to use the equipment that’s there.

I was struck by the witness’  lack of empathy for G’s father at the time of the incident, when he was observing his daughter clearly in distress and acting to relieve it.  The witness did not seem to recognise the impression using the term “man-handling” would give to others. For me, I view man-handling as inappropriate contact with another person, perhaps roughly without good reason or consent.

Counsel moved on to ask about written records relating to an ambulance journey to hospital. This was a confusing interaction and I am not entirely sure what was being claimed or counter claimed.  According to G’s father, the oxygen had not been properly delivered to his daughter during this ambulance journey.  In her written report, the witness had stated (three times) that the oxygen used was care home oxygen and that it had been properly checked – but she now said that it was the paramedics’ oxygen

Witness: She went on paramedic oxygen. I’m 100% sure. We don’t do that.

PP: You saw that with your own eyes, did you?

Witness: I did yes.

PP: So why did you put three times in your records that it was [Care Home] oxygen that was used

Witness: That was clearly an error on my part – at the end of a 13-hour shift when I was feeling upset.

//

PP: Being on oxygen means being connected to it, the valve being turned on, and the dial, the flow meter, being turned from 0 to something. And you can’t say, can you, that before she left [the Care Home] that all of those three things were done.

Witness: All I can say, is the paramedics were doing it.

PP: So, is your evidence, NOW –  because the paramedics weren’t part of the original note – that you didn’tcheck the connection?

Witness: It’s their equipment. I’m not going to check someone else’s equipment. 

When the judge intervened to say “I think it’s being suggested to you that G’s oxygen would have been off all the time from the Care Home to the Hospital”, the witness said she thought that can’t have been the case because if so, “I don’t think she’d be here today”.

I was only able to observe for the morning, but I feel this gave me a really good insight into the evidence as presented by one witness.

 On the basis of what I saw, I was left with the sense of either one of two possible scenarios.  This could be a case where G’s family had tampered with equipment in ways that might have harmed her, but poor record-keeping was likely to make this difficult to prove.  Or it could be a case where inaccurate and unfair record-keeping had resulted in G’s family being unfairly accused and deprived of contact with their daughter.  Either way, the person at the centre of this, G, was likely to be suffering.

Observing this case has really reinforced my recognition of the importance of accurate record-keeping. I will definitely be using examples from this case in my training sessions to support workers to recognise what can happen when we don’t record factual, accurate information and consider the language we are using in doing so. 

It has also made me reflect on how much we expect from care staff. The witness may well have had some basic recording training, but I doubt very much there was training around recognising her own biases. 

This Senior Health Care Worker does not work in isolation.  She is part of a team. Where was her supervision, her debriefs and where was the support she needed to recognise the importance of accurate record keeping and how to do it properly? Even if these structures were in place, it is clear from the situation in court that these were not enough. I have no doubt the witness will take away learning from this experience  – but at what cost to her own wellbeing and to that of G and her family?

4. Perspective from a justice policy expert

By Ellen Lefley (@JUSTICEhq  LinkedIn)

I used to practice as a barrister in the North East of England, where I had a mixed common law practice working in family, civil, and criminal courts, but not in the Court of Protection. I now work for JUSTICE, a law reform and human rights organisation which aims to improve the justice system to make it fairer, more accessible and more equal.

I watched the hearing for the whole day on 27 July 2023. I decided to do so because at the time JUSTICE was responding to the Ministry of Justice’s consultation on Open Justice, which closed in September 2023. (We highlighted the work of the Court of Protection Open Justice Project in our response.)

The hearing started in the middle of the care manager’s evidence, which had clearly begun the day before. I was able to pick it up and follow, and I’m not of the opinion that time should be used to explain everything from scratch each day, just in case someone new is listening. There has to be some responsibility on the observers to either attend the whole case, or to expect to have to pick things up as they go. There are limits to this of course – e.g., very specialist jargon or abbreviations may be worth re-explaining a few times during a case, if it is important to understand what is going on and it’s not inferable what it means. In this case there were already two previously published judgments and a summary of the issues before the court (and details about the parties involved and their representatives) available from the Open Justice Court of Protection Project website

I’m going to make comments about 3 areas: (1) remote justice (2) cross examination (3) the judge.

1. Remote justice

Getting the link from the Open Justice Court of Protection Project was straightforward, more so than when I have had to, in the past, get a link with only a generic court email address. 

In comparison to previous remote hearings I have attended, the main setback seemed to be the audio. The audio was unclear in parts, and at times there was a slight lag. Sometimes it cut out completely, namely when people spoke over each other. I winced a few times when the witness was cut off mid-sentence, and the audio for both witness and advocate suffered. The fact that the judge was quite interventionist also made it more difficult, with advocate, judge and witness talking over one another. However, the judge is a little different – when he cuts off the witness to tell him that he wasn’t answering the question, you can understand it more. When the barristers did it, it was a little more frustrating – they had asked the question and I wanted to hear the answer!

Viewing the documents in the case on the screen, as they were referred to in cross-examination, was excellent. I understand this was done to ensure remote witnesses could participate, but as an observer I was very grateful to benefit, even if unintentionally. The number of times as a law student – and sometimes as a pupil – I sat in hearings in which paperwork was referred to which I didn’t have, and I disengaged as a result! So much in cases these days is written and never read aloud in court, particularly in civil proceedings. There is also something more engaging about seeing the handwritten notes on screen.

During the period I was watching, there was a disruptive episode of note: someone had accidentally unmuted themselves and was loudly talking. The judge, witnesses and advocates paused, and it became clear that the remote observer was discussing someone’s care. The microphones were then disabled by the court – it said on my screen “you can no longer unmute” – suggesting that all observers had originally had the opportunity to unmute themselves and disturb proceedings in the first place. Perhaps to disable microphones for observers from the start in future would make a lot of sense? But I suppose the court hoped it wouldn’t be necessary. Also, I don’t think the learning point is that someone accidentally unmuted, but rather that remotely observing a hearing will be treated, by some, less seriously than attending in person. Someone clearly just had the hearing on in the background and wasn’t listening, and was in fact talking about other things – very private things – presumably in their line of work. This is not to be unrealistic about how busy people working in social care are: however, there is clearly a potential for remote attendance and observation to be treated casually, and this can impact the proceedings negatively.

2. Cross-examination

I was observing the care manager’s evidence: he was a witness for the applicant (the ICB).  There was a clear lack of patience with him from some of the barristers, one of whom was cross-examining quite curtly. Some things written down look neutral, but when said in a harsh tone can be quite sharp: “I can’t hear you you’re going to have to speak up. // If you don’t know you don’t know – don’t guess”. I understand this tone – it is a strategy with witnesses to send a message to them – they mustn’t think they can squirm away from difficult questions – they must answer them and it’s a no-nonsense exchange. It didn’t feel inquisitorial though, but very adversarial – a bit like we were in the criminal courts, not the Court of Protection. That may be in part because this is a fact-finding hearing. And when you have institutional witnesses making allegations against family members, and you are for the family, I do understand that style of advocacy. But the problem was that it made the witness quite defensive. At one point the judge had to step in – “you are not on trial here“. After he did that, you could see the witness relax and get more confident in saying simply: “I don’t know”. This was really important, and after the judge said that, he less often said “I would have, I must have, etc.” and instead produced more precise recollections, or admitted he could not recall. I wondered what the value of more reassurance earlier on would have been, or a different style of questioning. 

The grandmother, who was a litigant in person. also cross-examined the witness when I was watching. I always struggle with litigants in person cross-examining because it’s just so rarely ever fair. And unfairness makes me upset. This time I found it extremely moving – not for my usual reasons, but because she questioned clearly and with grace. The judge didn’t over-intervene, but tried to assist her to get to the point. And, yes, she did do that thing where in asking a question she was really making a submission – but frankly, so did the trained legal advocates. At the end, she made a really powerful point when questioning the use of the word “thriving” in G’s records, pushing back on the idea she was thriving both medically and emotionally. The judge even remarked on her having a gift for asking succinct questions. I think this was part kindness, but also part truth. I left the hearing in awe of her composure given the subject matter and the difficulty of the task. 

3. The judge

Finally – the judge. You could tell he was interested in the humans at the centre of this case and their relationships. He made remarks about personalities, asked about the morale of the care staff in the centre of the case (“rock bottom“), and remarked that an outing arranged by the care staff with the family – I missed the occasion, perhaps a birthday? – was “one glimmer of light in an otherwise miserable case”. He was obviously concerned by the level of conflict in the case between the family and the care staff, in which clearly polarised positions have become entrenched. 

I wouldn’t be surprised if the judge had in his mind a case of his from 2 years ago: Lancashire County Council v M and others (Lancashire Clinical Commissioning Group intervening) [2021] EWHC 2844 (Fam). This was a family court case but with similar entrenched conflict between professionals and family, in which the judge actually had the benefit of a psychologist report. Among other things, the psychologist (Dr Kate Hellin) explained that the high needs of the child, their complex care, the high stakes of life and death, the pressures on care resources (exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic) had all impacted the emotional climate. As a result, the system around the child, including professionals and parents, became 

“… sensitised and inflamed. Feelings have run high and perspectives have become polarised and entrenched.[ M] and [F], individual professional staff and their organisations have become stuck in polarised beliefs about each other. It has become difficult for the parents and for professionals to respond moderately in ways that sooth rather than exacerbate the dynamic tensions between the different parts of the system.” (§16 Lancashire County Council v M and others (Lancashire Clinical Commissioning Group intervening) [2021] EWHC 2844 (Fam).)

In that case, the psychologist’s analysis did not apportion blame. It recommended therapeutic “system theory” intervention, and noted that the court as a neutral authority, had in fact “diluted the emotional intensity of the polarised ‘them and us’ dynamic which previously existed between the parents and the health/care providers”.

Given this is a fact-finding hearing, and there are live allegations still in play, I don’t know whether the court can have the same effect here, nor if it should if any of the allegations are found to be proven. 

It is perhaps too early to be contemplating the court having a diluting effect on the conflict in this case. But I’m sure this judge, if he has the chance to and it is appropriate, will be more than willing to try.

5. Updates from the RCJ in-person  from 27th and 28th July 2023 

By John Harper (@JohnLHarper_)

I’m an Advocate at DAC Beachcroft and an aspiring barrister, interested in Court of Protection and hoping to build a practice in this area when at the Bar. I observed several days of this hearing in person in the Royal Courts of Justice.

Thursday 27th July 2023

  • There was a transparency issue on Thursday. The fact that I observed in person meant that I knew that Hayden J was going to sit again at 5.30pm. This was not made clear to those observing remotely because Hayden J rose and left it to Ms Khalique and her team to sort out, as it was their witnesses that had to confirm they were able and happy to give evidence that evening. If I hadn’t overheard counsel arranging this, then – like those watching remotely for whom the court sound was muted – I would not have known the court was going to resume that evening, and would not have been able to update Celia and for word to be spread around via Twitter.
  • The fact that Hayden J has consistently sat late in this hearing show his, and all parties’, unwavering commitment to keeping this hearing on track, undoubtedly mindful of the impact of this hearing on the family. 

Friday 28th July 2023

  • Before the hearing started, I noticed how courteously the parties treated each other. For example, I saw the parents speaking cordially with the representative of the Official Solicitor. This made clear to me that, even though each party comes to the hearing with a different perspective and aim, proceedings which about such serious and contentious issues can nevertheless be conducted amicably. This surely makes the whole experience a more positive one, or at least less negative. 
  • The examination-in-chief of G’s father was unusually lengthy. Hayden J granted Mr Patel 30 minutes, but it in fact lasted around an hour and a half. Most of this time was Mr Patel and Hayden J asking questions about the Father’s relationship with G and the contextual landscape on which this hearing lies. Although I imagine the reason for doing this was not for the benefit of those observing, it nevertheless proved to be so. While the Father passionately spoke about his daughter, I noticed that there was a distinct quiet in the courtroom. It seemed that the utmost respect was given to the Father to talk about his daughter uninterrupted and with everyone’s undivided attention.
  • Another thing that struck me was how much Hayden J appeared to put his cards on the table. He admitted to the Father, who has recorded over 100 hours of his visits to G’s care home and the conversations he has had with staff, that he “cannot think of a single occasion when covert recordings have not damaged the case of the person who advances them”. Furthermore, he intervened quite heavily during Ms Khalique’s cross-examination, directly challenging the Father on the truth of what he was saying. For example, the Father spoke positively of the working relationship with hospital staff when G was a patient there prior to moving to the care home and Hayden J questioned him by saying that there was actually great deal of conflict there. The Father insisted that this was only towards the end. Hayden J disputed this and said the conflict lasted years. I think Hayden J’s interventions were useful because they showed the parents and their counsel the size of the hurdle they must overcome in order to prove their side of the story in this fact-finding hearing. This, possibly in a counter-intuitive way, levels the playing field in my view because the parties have more of an idea of Hayden J’s current position and the points on which he must be persuaded.

6. Reflections on facts, emotion, and the limits of collaborative care

By Tess Saunders

I am an assistant psychologist working within the Older Adult Psychology team. When my clinical supervisor, Dr Claire Martin (a member of the core team of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project) suggested that I come along with her to observe a hearing, I remember feeling a mixture of excitement and trepidation. 

In my role as an assistant, I have had limited experience of legal issues within healthcare and I was extremely unsure of what to expect from the day. Claire explained to me that this was a fact-finding hearing, the purpose of which is for the judge to consider whether allegations made by the parties are true. Claire also reported that this case had been ongoing for a long period of time and she had observed previous hearings in which care home staff had given evidence. It was only then that the significance of this case began to dawn on me. My nerves only built when Claire informed me that I would be observing the cross-examination of P’s father. I didn’t imagine I would be able to observe such a notable part of a hearing and I felt extremely lucky to do so.

Having remotely observed a different hearing at First Avenue House a few days earlier, I had expected this hearing to be much the same. The judge was alone on the call in the previous hearing and the other parties were also attending remotely.  However, in the current hearing on Friday the 6th of October 2023, the court met in person. Having never been into a courtroom before, remotely or in person, it reminded me only of a film set. I reflected that this ignorance of the justice system was likely indicative of my privileged position in society, having been fortunate enough to have never experienced the Court of Protection in a personal capacity before this exposure in a professional context. I was also surprised at the level of respect that the judge commanded.  I had underestimated the strict power hierarchies which the court follows.

At the beginning of the hearing, I felt like I was trying to catch up with all the information that I had missed. Despite reading a blog post about the case so far (“Adjournment and interim judgment – Hayden J’s fact-finding hearing”), I felt like I had a lot to catch up on.  The summaries that the barrister gave of the incidents they were focussing on helped me get up to speed. 

During the hearing I was particularly struck by the sheer level of conflict between the family and the care home staff. Throughout the day the disputes between the two parties were evident, with the father referring repeatedly to “counter allegations” being waged between the groups. Working in mental health services, I have seen the value of collaborative working between families and care staff and I felt concerned about the implications of this conflict on P’s care. I believe that the best care results from joint working between families and carers to achieve shared goals, and it seemed hard to imagine that P was benefitting from this. The incident that Nageena Khalique KC (counsel for the ICB) raisedwith the allegation that P’s father had tampered with P’s oxygen, particularly prompted these reflections for me. The atmosphere of suspicion between the care staff and P’s parents became apparent to me as this incident was described and I began to realise the extent of the barriers to collaborative care in this case.

This antagonism was further emphasised when a covert recording of an interaction between care staff and P’s parents was played to the court. In the formal and solemn environment of the courtroom, I found this recording extremely powerful and it emphasised to me the emotions behind this hearing. Working in psychology, I am familiar with people expressing their emotions, but in the court-room it appears that facts are given priority over feelings. For the purpose of the hearing this made complete sense, however I wondered how this felt for the P’s father during his cross-examination. I imagine it must have been extremely painful to relay the facts of these incidents without expressing the fear and anxiety that they must have evoked. I wondered what the impact of holding back these emotions might be on people giving evidence to the court and what the repercussions of this would be. I could only imagine that having to remain composed for the court would lead to a release of emotions later on. 

In the recording, we heard care staff becoming frustrated at P’s parents for not leaving the unit and for “intimidating staff”. In my work in a children and young people’s service, I have experience of the parents and guardians of service users enacting behaviour which could be interpreted as threatening. Therefore,my first instinct was to feel empathetic for the care staff trying to complete their work in a challenging environment. However, on further reflection I considered the impact on P’s father of being  labelled as ‘intimidating’. Might this limit his ability to raise concerns about P’s care or to ask questions about issues he does not fully understand? I was impressed by P’s father’s composure, both in the recording and during the hearing, and reflected that he is likely to be a strong advocate for his daughter and that this might be viewed as a threat by some care staff.  

During the examination P’s father directly contradicted and denied the accounts given by nursing staff:

Nageena Khalique: … You hadn’t told the staff about this [the need for G to be suctioned] had you?

Father: No, that’s not correct. 

NK: So that’s the difference. 

Fa: On that day we were repeatedly asking staff for suction …

NK: Well let’s look back at the records for that day [found records – on view – read out notes, referred to meeting held between nursing team and family and that P needed monitoring.] You were recorded as asking throughout the shift but in fact [unclear] …. at that point you had not raised concerns to staff, that’s right – isn’t it?

Fa: No that’s not right.

It appears that a great rift has come between the family and staff and I wondered whether such a rupture in this relationship can possibly be repaired. At the end of the day’s observation, I was left feeling somewhat pessimistic about any resolution between the two parties. 

This also emphasised to me the extremely difficult job facing Mr Justice Hayden to weigh up all the relevant, and often contradictory, information in this case and to process this into a coherent judgment. In terms of how Mr Justice Hayden managed the hearing, I admired the way he allowed P’s father  space to explain his point of view and I was also particularly moved by his final words of the day: “I think it would be helpful if you enjoyed what may be our last weekend of sunshine this year and took some time off from this case”. I felt reassured that Mr Justice Hayden was considering the emotional and physical toll of participating in the court for all parties and encouraging them to take care of themselves. 

My experience of observing this hearing has given me a new-found respect for the courts and the role they play in disentangling these complex situations about a vulnerable person’s care. This case has made me reflect on the power dynamics between service users, their families and care staff and consider the limits of collaborative care when these dynamics are in place.

7. The tables are turned: A litigant in person is cross – examined 

By Anna (@AnnaJonesBrown)

She “is a litigant in person, a powerful advocate in her case, one of the most articulate lay persons I have heard in quite some time”. That’s what Mr Justice Hayden said about P’s nan (N) at the end of this day’s hearing, on Monday 9th October 2023. 

I have blogged before about my experience of watching N cross-examine medical staff in this tragic case. I was very impressed with how she conducted herself. So, I wanted to see what would happen when she appeared in the witness box to be cross-examined herself. I was particularly interested because I had been a litigant in person in my mother’s COP case (and blogged about it here: “’Deprived of her liberty’: My experience of the court procedure for my mum”.  I found it very stressful, despite the efforts of the legal professionals to put me at ease. But my situation was nowhere near as difficult as this case. N had the task of cross-examining witnesses and was now being cross-examined herself. And she was being accused of tampering with her granddaughter’s medical equipment.  It should be stated that nobody is suggesting that she did this to cause her granddaughter harm. It seems to be clear to everybody that she cares deeply for her. The suggestion by staff at the care facility where G is being looked after is that she did this to make them seem incompetent, because the family are not happy with the placement, and want G to come home.

N was on the stand for over 2 hours on this day. She was cross-examined by Nageena Khalique KC, Counsel for the ICB, although the judge himself interjected very frequently (and will be further cross-examined by other Counsel at a future hearing). I noticed that something in her demeanour had changed since 21st July 2023, almost three months previously, when I had observed this case before. N retained her spirit under cross-examination, remained polite and respectful and clearly still fighting for what she believed was right. But she seemed less hopeful. More downhearted. Older. Sometimes she couldn’t hear. At one point she said “my eyes and ears aren’t what they were” as she asked Nageena Khalique KC to repeat a question. She also struggled occasionally to find the right document in the court bundle. This was a reminder that this litigant in person (LIP) was not a legally trained professional (as far as I know) but a family member who seemed to be post state retirement age. Maybe this change was due to the situation of being in the witness box rather than at the end of a computer line, as she had been for the previous hearing. And now she was the witness and didn’t know what questions were coming. And she was representing herself. I know from my own experience how much being involved in a COP case can impact a family, and it would be hard to argue against the view that, given the circumstances of this case, a family’s experience could be much harder. Maybe the change was because three months had passed without resolution, despite the urgency mentioned back in in July. And also, something had clearly happened the weekend before this hearing, which was referred to just after she had taken the oath.

She was asked by the judge whether there was anything she wished to say in addition to her witness statement. She replied that everything continues to happen, especially last weekend and it was traumatic for G. The judge reminded her that this hearing was a factual enquiry and that he was “not going to open that box at all”, that it was important she concentrated on herself. N replied that she was concerned for G’s safety and wellbeing. This exchange reflects the tone of the afternoon: N conveying how her primary concern was G’s safety and wellbeing and the judge focussing on gathering facts. This was, after all, a fact-finding hearing. The problem is that the facts are disputed. 

In this blog I will focus on certain aspects of the cross-examination I observed:

  • What I learned and discerned about N as a litigant in person 
  • How N feels about G
  • N as a family member of a “P” in the Court of Protection
  • The judge and counsel addressing N

The reason I have decided to focus on these aspects is that I want to get behind the type of person this LIP appeared to be, what came across as important to her as a family member and how I felt she was treated by the legal team. 

N as a litigant in person 

I had already formed a certain view of N from seeing her in the hearing back in July. In my eyes she had performed impressively as a LIP. I wondered who the person behind the litigator was. I learned a bit more about her background in this hearing. For example, at one point in the hearing, Nageena Khalique KC was reporting that staff felt undermined and how staff morale could be negatively affected because N stayed in the room when a staff member was training another staff member with an aspect of G’s care (hoisting). The judge was keen to understand whether N could see how staff could feel undermined in that situation. He asked N about her experience of training. She mentioned that she had been a UK training manager. She said that her motto had been “always catch them doing something right”. The judge also asked N how she would feel if she was the manager and this was her staff. She replied that she would feel as though she had let them down with their training and for the fact that they felt understaffed. These exchanges gave me an insight into the type of manager that N might have been, caring about her staff and wanting them to succeed. Not the type of manager that I have sometimes seen, who blame staff for mistakes and who don’t show them positive values. 

The judge seemed to accept that N’s managerial experience meant that she could answer some in-depth questions about choices. He even said:  “If you were a barrister, I would be asking….what the long-term options are”.  He suggested to her that she was aware of resources and options, so what were her thoughts? At this point there was a glimpse of how exasperated she must have felt, because she replied that with the amount of resources the whole case had cost, G could have been home. I didn’t catch the judge’s reply but her response to him was  “I didn’t mean to be disrespectful”. I should say that she didn’t become over-emotional at any point and this was one of the very rare times when her composure slipped slightly.  

Another comment that revealed something of N’s character was when Nageena Khalique KC showed her a statement from a member of the medical team and the person had written something that N disagreed with. Counsel asked: “Do you agree that this statement is clear about how your presence in G’s room undermines the staff?” N replied: “Those are the words she has written down. I would not have said ‘are you calling me a liar’, I would have been more articulate.” And I could believe that she would have been.  

After the glimpse of N as a manager, it was also very clear that N had spent a lot of time caring for G. She stated that she had been involved with G’s care for years, and had spent two days a week with her during the time that G had been in hospital. This demonstrated her dedication to G and in my eyes why she felt that what she had to say about G’s care should be listened to. 

I don’t feel that many people could successfully challenge N’s knowledge of aspects of the case.  At one point Counsel said that two nurses had separately said that they had checked the oxygen. Quick as a flash, N replied “I don’t believe that (X) is a nurse” (it seems she was a Health Care Assistant).  Not only did she know this, but she was careful in her language, saying “I don’t believe” rather than “She isn’t”.

Counsel pursued a line of questioning leading N to consider how the oxygen could have come to be off when it was supposed to be on. Counsel suggested that there were only three possibilities: 

  1. That there were repeated errors by different members of staff
  2. A rogue staff member
  3. G’s Dad or N had tampered with it. 

Counsel asked N to agree that these were the only three options. At this point the judge noted these possibilities down and repeated them to N. Nobody came up with any other possibility. Counsel asked: “Can we discount a rogue member of staff as being highly unlikely?” N agreed. Counsel then suggested that it is extremely unlikely that it is (caused by) repeated errors by professional staff. N said that she didn’t agree, and that it could be an explanation. Counsel asked for confirmation: “you think there are multiple errors by different staff members?”  N said, yes, it could be a common error in procedure. And she repeated something she had said earlier to the effect that  ‘nobody ever saw me tamper with the oxygen, I was never alone in the room’.

N was also not frightened of voicing serious concerns about the evidence. When one of the observation documents had been shown on the screen, she mentioned that there was something about it that was troubling her. There was an empty space in the middle of a paragraph and then a side note, written by a staff member, about N and oxygen. The exchange was along these lines:  

Counsel:          “what are you suggesting?” 

N:                    “I’m saying that it looks as if the note had been changed.  

And: 

Counsel:          “Are you suggesting that’s not true?” 

Nan:                “That oxygen was off when I walked in the room”

The judge seemed shocked by this exchange: “Are you saying she is stitching you up?…It is a fabrication? This note, “suspiciously in the margin “ is a fabrication, untrue? A stitch up?

N replied that it may be a defence by them (the staff). 

The judge carried on: …. “but is therefore an attack on you?  An extremely experienced nurse is fabricating evidence?” 

N replied that it was the same nurse who swore in front of G she hated the family. 

The judge will have to decide the facts about this episode. I noticed that N was examining each document very carefully.  I could see how conscientiously she had prepared for her role as a Litigant in Person, and the preparation must have helped her in her role as a witness.   

At one point, the judge questioned N about an account by a staff member. N replied by listing four members of the medical team, and saying that they all have different accounts, so which account is the true one? The judge replied by asking: “Well, if they are all against you, they aren’t getting their story straight, are they?” to which she replied instantly: “No, M’lord”.   

How N feels about G

To my mind, anybody listening to N can tell that there is a real sense of urgency about this case and how it is resolved. Time is ticking on. And N clearly believes that the situation is worse now than it was in July for G. 

At one point my notes say (N speaking): “My sole focus was keeping her safe, when you see her now, a shadow of her former self…..I’m petrified for her safety …..when I take her back she starts crying when I ring the bell…..she hates it there”.

Another exchange involved the judge getting N to concede that the staff cared for G and were trying to do their best by her. The exchange went along the lines of: 

Judge: Do you remember that nurse, I can’t remember her name, who said, “when I see G, I see a woman of my own age, and I think “what would I like to be doing ?” What do you think? 

N:  The OS went to visit and they (the nurses) said they wanted to do a lot of things, like take her out shopping, take her to Blackpool. But in the last 12 months they haven’t done them. We’ve phoned and we say ‘what has G done today, has she sat up?’ and the answer is ‘no, she’s been in a bed all day’. 

Counsel suggested that the medical staff were trying to help G, not harm her 

Nan replied: “I have never accused anybody of doing anything on purpose.”

The judge then stated that it is “still your belief”.

N replied that she didn’t believe they were doing it “on purpose”, but were “negligent, and getting worse in terms of cleanliness”, and that couldn’t be in G’s best interests. 

When asked what she feels G needs, she said, she needs the input of family, freedom to go into the community. “Her whole life is upside down”. And she should be moved to a place of safety with access to family (There is, of course, an injunction restricting the amount of time the family can spend with G.)

N as a family member of a ‘P” in the Court of Protection

N clearly feels that the family’s view and experiences have not been taken into account enough when decisions have been made about G, and what is in her best interests. This aspect really resonated with me, I must admit, even though there wasn’t as much at stake for us.  My siblings and I felt that we had not been consulted enough as part of the s21A Deprivation of Liberty appeal that went to the COP. Decisions were being made by professionals who had very limited knowledge of my mum.  

Counsel asked N whether she could approve of the new move (when she moved to her current placement after a number of years in hospital) “in a dispassionate way”. N replied that she had cared for G for years, including 2 days in hospital every week “and nobody consulted me at all”.

N also said that she was never consulted as to P’s care despite being a main carer. “I’ve read the Mental Capacity Act and it talks about consulting family and what should happen, least restrictive (etc).” She added: “she (G) was discharged without consulting with family”.  

Counsel also asked her: Did that make it, do you think, difficult to accept anything that the staff suggested, and follow that request? 

N replied: not if it was in G’s best interests. I found it hard when staff who didn’t know her said “don’t rub her tummy like that”. This particular insight into the intimate care N provided for G touched me. 

One line of questioning that came up multiple times, from Counsel and the judge, was that N was questioning G’s care by experienced medical staff when she wasn’t medically qualified herself.  For example, Counsel asked N if she believed her opinion was better than the clinicians? Nan replied: “yes, based on my experiences with G”. At one point, the judge pushed her on the fact that she has had no medical training, to which she replied, “I’m not medically trained but I can spot when things go wrong”. And at another time, Counsel stated that something was “a clear example of you refusing to accept the decision of a medically trained professional.” 

The judge and counsel addressing N

I would like to end by making some observations on how Counsel and the judge treated N. Firstly, there was, of course, robust questioning of N by Nageena Khalique KC. She pushed N very hard. At times, to me, it felt almost like how I imagined a criminal court would be. But of course, I am a lay person. I’m not sure I would have handled the questioning as well as N did. She never lost her temper or seemed defensive. Towards the end of the cross-examination, Counsel persistently pushed N to admit that she challenged medical decisions, with an example of which hospital G should be admitted to when she fell ill and was in severe pain. N stated that she wasn’t challenging, she was asking questions. The exchange continued until Counsel stated: “you were challenging the decision because you thought you were right, rather than step back and let the staff do their job”. At which point, in her final words before the cross-examination ended and after a long day in court, N said “Yes, I did challenge the decision.

As for the judge, I felt he was doing his best to understand N’s position, even if he didn’t agree with her. Some of the statements he made along the way were: “I’m trying to understand your beef”; “Why would she do that? I don’t understand Mrs N, I really don’t

“Everybody wants the best for G, but we differ in our views”. 

At one point, when N stated that “nobody has thought about the effect of this on G and on the family”, the judge reacted strongly: “I have ensured that people think about G.”

He seemed to me to be hinting that the family could have changed the way they acted in order to achieve their goals. For example, he said: “have you thought of other strategies?”and “Did it ever occur to you to suggest to {Father] that you should back off, let the medical staff get on ..?”  This was around the issue of compromise and collaboration with medical staff. 

The judge also stated: “Mrs N, sometimes when I listen to your evidence, you question professional decisions and there is never the slightest doubt in your voice that you are right”. 

These last exchange did make me feel a little uneasy. Should a family have to “play the game’, adopt ‘strategie’s, if they are truly concerned for their loved one’s safety and well-being? Or is it just a necessary part of the fight? Clearly, for the family in this case, it is a question of life and death. 

Conclusion

I am fully aware that I watched this cross-examination with the particular perspective of a family member who has acted as a Litigant in Person in a COP case, and that viewing the case through this lens influences how I see it. 

At the heart of this case is a family who have cared for a loved one with multiple complex needs for much of her life, and on the other side there are trained and experienced medical professionals, who don’t have the same intimate knowledge of the patient they are looking after. Clearly the relationship between the two sides is irreconcilable. As the judge mentioned there has been a “colossal breakdown”. It is a bleak situation for G and her family. 

As a family member of a P (protected party in the Court of Protection) myself, it is hard not to put myself into the shoes of the family. The judge will decide on the facts. I admire the way that N conducted herself. Towards the end, she said about P: “all her life it’s been a battle to get help”. In my opinion, N could not have fought any harder or behaved with more dignity in such very difficult circumstances. 

8. Who are the ‘experts’ in G’s care? A care system and family at an impasse. 

By Claire Martin (@DocCMartin)

A key aspect of the conflict in this case is about who has proper expertise in G’s care.  Is it the family, who have cared for her – including delivering medical interventions for which they’ve been trained for her individually – for over 13 years?  Or is it staff with professional qualifications and experience in G’s medical condition and treatments.

In this blog contribution, I reflect upon the positioning of ‘expertise’ in this case – the overall balance of which seems to reinforce professional over family expertise.

Where is ‘experience’ and ‘expertise’ located? 

Mr Justice Hayden has published two previous judgments about this case:  Re G [2021] EWCOP 69 and Re G [2022] EWCOP 25.  

His judgments acknowledge “the huge input” (§57, [2021] EWCOP 69) this family makes into G’s care: she receives “devoted round the clock support and care from her parents” (§2, [2022] EWCOP 25).  In the earlier judgment (but not the later one) he acknowledges the dedicated involvement and medical understanding of G’s father in particular. For example, he “is at the hospital every day, often early in the morning and participates in [G’s] medical care” (§47 [2021] EWCOP 69)and “his grasp of the medical issues of this case is impressive” (§43 [2021] EWCOP 69).  The judge also notes that, since G’s father had taken over the care of G’s catheter in hospital, she had experienced ‘no further urinary infection’ (§48 [2021] EWCOP 69).

However, when I searched the two published judgments for the words “expert” and “experience(d)”, I found these terms always indexed the staff or other professionals and were never used with reference to the family. 

The “experts” mentioned are “neurologists” (§12), and Dr Andrew Bentley, a Consultant in Intensive Care and Respiratory medicine” (§25) – rather than the family (both quotes from [2021] EWCOP 69). 

And people with “experience of G’s condition” are “the local hospital” (§19)Dr D “a Consultant in Respiratory Medicine and Clinical Lead for Ventilation at B NHS Trust” who “has over 25 years’ experience of managing long-term ventilation in the community and 12 years’ experience of dealing with tracheostomy ventilated patients involved in the transition from child to adult medicine”.   The local hospital has “significant experience of G’s condition” (§19) and the carers at G’s current “experienced nursing home” (§67)  “are all experienced with the techniques required in ventilatory support” (§52) (all quotes from [2022] EWCOP 25).

During the part of the hearing I observed on Friday 6th October 2023, when the Father was cross-examined, the expertise of the staff was continually highlighted.

Both Nageena Khalique (NK), counsel for the Integrated Care Board, who was cross-examining G’s father) and the judge, Hayden J, repeatedly referred to staff as ‘senior’ or ‘experienced’. For example (addressing G’s father): “a very experienced nurse with a long history of working in ICU” (NK); “extremely experienced nurse” (NK); “an incredibly senior doctor” (Judge); “a very senior experienced nurse” (Judge); “this undoubtedly experienced nurse” (Judge). 

The following Monday (9th October 2023), Anna (author of the previous section of this blog post) observed the Grandmother (N) being cross-examined and she notes the emphasis placed on the expertise of  “experienced medical staff” by contrast with the experience of the family members who aren’t medically qualified.

One line of questioning that came up multiple times, from Counsel and the judge, was that N was questioning G’s care by experienced medical staff when she wasn’t medically qualified herself.  For example, Counsel asked N if she believed her opinion was better than the clinicians? Nan replied: “yes, based on my experiences with G”. At one point, the judge pushed her on the fact that she has had no medical training, to which she replied, “I’m not medically trained but I can spot when things go wrong”. And at another time, Counsel stated that something was “a clear example of you refusing to accept the decision of a medically trained professional.” (from Anna, above) 

Later, on 17 October 2023, Jenny Kitzinger observed G’s mother giving evidence (and shared her notes with me) and again I saw the same pattern (e.g. addressing G’s mother: “You’d agree [nurse] is a highly experienced, qualified, excellent nurse at [care home]?” (NK))

I wondered why there was this repeated emphasis on the expertise and experience of the staff.  Was it to position G’s father (in particular, since he takes a more active role in G’s medical care) as less experienced or less expert in the care of his daughter? Was it to indicate that the health care professionals were the ‘real experts’, above scrutiny and criticism due to their experience and seniority? Was it being suggested that senior and experienced professionals are unlikely to make mistakes in the care they provide? 

Here are some examples: 

Suction equipment

An incident had occurred which led G’s father to raise a concern that G’s tracheostomy suction equipment was not correctly set up. 

NK: [There is] an allegation that staff failed to set up her suction. The evidence from [member of staff] … she gave a reasonable explanation that she left it in a sterile bag. You did not accept her clinical judgment and the reasons she gave, did you?

[The nursing notes were on view for the court – and observers –  to see.]

Father: What we’d encountered …. it wasn’t just the final piece [of equipment]… what we’d always been told in our training … in an emergency, it would be too long. [I lost some parts of what P’s father was saying but the father is talking here about training that he and G’s family had received from the hospital where G had been an inpatient for thirteen years. He was expressing a view that the piece of equipment was not readily available – because it would need to be removed from the sterile bag before it could be used – and his belief from the training he’d been given was that it should have been removed already, in case of an emergency.]

NK: She’s a very experienced nurse with a long history of working in ICU (Intensive Care Units). She said the tube was next to bed and ready to go when needed, literally seconds …. You don’t accept that was a good clinical decision, do you?

Father:  [Responded by describing more nuance to the incident than was being presented by the care home team

Record Keeping

There was also an issue with the ‘authoritative’ (or otherwise) nature of care home records completed by the “experienced” professionals. The father repeatedly said that he did not accept the accuracy of the care home nursing records for when the family raised concerns.  

On the day in question, for example, “we were repeatedly asking staff for suction’” he said.  But Nageena Khalique showed several entries from care home records stating that the family had not raised this issue until around 5pm. 

Judge: [Father’s name] you say that you had repeatedly mentioned the need for suction. Are you saying that on this occasion, despite your request …. there were no notes written up on those requests?

Father: Yes

Judge: You have accused an incredibly senior doctor … of dishonesty … a very senior experienced nurse of [lost] … you say the purpose … [lost]. 

Father: When I say she behaved dishonestly, was where she had planned discharge for two years without informing the family. That’s very different. [Referring here to a hospital consultant where P was a long-term inpatient, not a current doctor in P’s care]

(Later)

NK: Contemporaneous records on the day show this. I’m not going over that again with you [Mr – Father’s surname]. The second incident on [date] in relation to the safeguarding referral on the same day – we are still dealing with [nurse X] evidence –  [Nurse X] is an extremely experienced nurse, [she is] fastidious in carrying out her checks. There is no reason that she would have missed [lost] ….. do you agree?

G’s father did not agree, and his evidence rested on what he described as repeated errors in G’s care, noticed and raised by the family, that he asserted he and his legal team had evidenced in the hearing. 

Mother’s reliance on Father’s expertise [drawn from Jenny Kitzinger’s notes]

Judge (to mother):  Is there anywhere in these statements where you’ve preferred the view of nurses or carers against [Father] and [Grandmother].

Mother: No. 

NK: There’s a difference between being able to understand and use medical language and being a medical practitioner. [Grandmother] rates [Father’s] understanding of [G’s] medical needs up there and sometimes surpassing the knowledge of medics. Do you share this view? 

Mother: [G] wouldn’t be here without [the] doctors and nurses.

NK: If [Father] with all his experience says X is better for [G], with all my experience … and a medical professional says ‘I hear what you are saying but actually I think Y is better’, whose opinion would you defer to?

Mother: I can’t answer that because I know there are times when we go with what the doctor says is right.

G’s mother expressed a view that one particular nurse at the care home ‘had it in for’G’s father, saying:  “She felt threatened by his knowledge from day one – she felt intimidated by it”.

NK: You (?) interfered with equipment to paint a picture of highly experienced staff as incompetent.

Mother: No

NK: [reading from nursing notes: ‘Dad challenged … regarding decision not to get her in her chair. Staff didn’t think that appropriate as she’d only just got back from hospital’] Did you accept the clinical decision?

Mother: [explanation of why father was right and staff were wrong]

Judge: Just answer the question!

NK: You’d agree that [nurse] is a highly experienced, qualified, excellent nurse at [care home]?

Mother: That’s what they say, yes.

NK: Any reason to disagree with it? 

Mother: That’s what they say [partly inaudible]

Judge: That just sounds childish and petulant [and judge then went on to underline nurse’s vast experience and expertise]

Mother: There are things she’s not told the truth about. 

So, this is a family whose members insist on their own experience, skill and expertise in caring for their daughter.  While accepting that G is dependent on medical care from doctors and nurses, they feel in a position to assess and to criticise the quality of that care, from their own knowledge base, and to point out errors.  

While this may be an extreme example of such dynamics, tension or conflict between staff and the parents of children with complex needs seems very widespread. 

Research on parents of children with tracheostomies and complex needs shows that parents are properly considered ‘experts’

G in this case is now an adult. However, she was in hospital for 13 years, including during childhood and her parents moved their lives to be with her (she was in hospital nowhere near their original home) and her father (and mother) has been trained in her care. This seems not to be unusual in cases such as these. There is quite a lot of research about ‘expert parents’ and the experience of parents and professional teams needing to share their experience and care for children with these complex needs.

I have looked at three research papers, from 1984, 2001 and 2023.

The experience of stress in parents of children hospitalised with long-term disabilities” by VE Hayes and JE Knox, 1984, Journal of Advanced Nursing 9(4): 33-41

Negotiating lay and professional roles in the care of children with complex health care needs” by S Kirk 2001, Journal of Advanced Nursing 34(5): 593-602

Providing care for children with tracheostomies: a qualitative interview study with parents and health professionals” by Hall N, Rousseau N, Hamilton DW, et al. . BMJ Open 2023;13:e065698

Depressingly, they all point to the same repeating tensions over the forty-year period.

The 1984 research shows how parents’ detailed understanding of their own child’s needs can come into conflict with that of ‘experts’:

The paper from 2001 explicitly refers to how parents (like G’s father in this case) are trained in the care of their own child to a very high level. 

And this, recent 2023 paper exploring the experience of both health care professionals and parents caring for children with tracheostomies reiterates earlier research that parents often become experts in their own children’s care. G’s father, in the hearing I observed, frequently referred to ‘training’ he had received from the hospital. This is echoed below in the interviews from parents and health care professionals: 

I wonder how ‘expert’ in G’s care (in particular)  the ‘senior’ and ‘experienced’ staff at the care home are? The HCPs’ quotes above would suggest that adequate training for staff, even otherwise very experienced staff, is often lacking, and that parents are often the ‘experts’ in their own child’s care. There is a seniority and experience to this parental role. 

“Tracheostomies can be associated with potentially fatal risks such as airway obstruction, mucus plugging, tube displacement, bleeding and infection. Parents, professional healthcare providers (HCPs) and other carers must undergo a comprehensive training programme and competency assessments in order to manage required aspects of care, including providing suction, stoma care, tube changes and resuscitation. Training, knowledge and confidence in delivering this type of care can remain a challenge for parents and HCPs alike.”

Given the research indicating the precariousness and complexity of this kind of care, it seemed to me to be rather cavalier of the ICB (and the local Safeguarding Lead) to suggest that there are “normal things that are missed day to day”. Especially since their own protocols (discussed during the hearings) are for two members of staff to sign off a checklist that each step in G’s care has been completed. I might have misinterpreted the evidence – and perhaps things being missed regularly in this kind of care is usual and expected – but I can understand why the family might be vigilant to any such errors. I can also understand how a staff group might become exasperated by repeated ‘raising of concerns’ – though an alternative response to such concerns might be to trigger a review of skills to identify gaps in training. 

Is there something else as well, though? Caring for someone is not just about tasks. This case, and the research, highlight the relational nature of such complex care. Health care staff need to have the interpersonal (as well as technical medical and nursing) skills and ability to see themselves as partners – colleagues almost – of parents who are trained in their relative’s very specific care. Professionals need to be able to accept that they might not always be the ‘expert’ (as would an ‘expert parent’ of course). 

Throughout this hearing, I felt uncomfortable listening to the repeated statements about different professionals being ‘very experienced’ or ‘very senior’. The fact they are ‘experienced’ and ‘senior’ seems irrelevant to me. It felt as if seniority was being presented in order to exempt them from scrutiny or criticism, or to claim that it makes it unlikely that they will make mistakes. I don’t think that’s helpful to the professionals themselves. I understand that counsel for the ICB would be aiming to elicit admissions in cross-examination that would undermine the witnesses’ statements. I was surprised, though, that I observed the judge also emphasise (to P’s mother and father) the professionals’ expertise yet did not (in the hearings I observed in July 2023) emphasise the father’s expertise to the care home staff when they gave evidence. 

Wherever ‘expertise’ lies in this case, what I observed in court led me to form the view that the relationshipbetween the family and the health care team as reached such a point of attrition that nothing the family does (or the health care team does) is viewed in good faith, and both sides ‘see’ only the errors of the other. 

The family repeatedly stated that they regularly feared for P’s welfare (and this has been a feature described in previous judgments). Health care teams can be formidable for families. Though this family (in particular P’s father) was presented as ‘intimidating’ to staff, it is always important to remember that, no matter how we (professionals – and I include myself in this as an NHS worker) might feel, health care professionals have a lotmore power than families do. We have our ‘expertise’ to refer to, and organisations to back us up. Having to leave someone you love in the care of others is often difficult, even when things are working well. When you are terrified for their wellbeing (whether that is because of a view that the care being offered is inadequate or just due to the life-threatening nature of their condition, or even worse, both) it must be extremely difficult. 

This is a family that has given up their lives and livelihood to be with G at the hospital, daily, for thirteen years. I think the ICB’s case rests on the suggestion that the family are so driven by their distrust of the care home’s skills, and that because the family is so knowledgeable about P’s care, they would somehow carefully calibrate interference withG’s equipment so as not to put her life at risk (e.g. knowing F would be okay on room air for a period of time) but to make the care home look incompetent, in the hope of achieving their goal for G to be allowed to live at home. Parishil Patel (for G’s father) had previously noted though, that there was always a staff member observing G, and no one had seen any family member tamper with her equipment. As an observer, I found my responses and inner questions see-sawing. 

I don’t know whether G’s family has been tampering with her equipment in order to cast the care home as negligent and secure a move home for her. If they have been, they would all (G’s father, mother and grandmother) have colluded in potentially putting G’s life at risk by interfering with her life-sustaining equipment. Of course – both could be true: the family could have been tampering and the care inadequate. 

Perhaps the question facing Mr Justice Hayden is not who has most expertise in caring for P, but rather whether G is most at risk from the care home’s relative lack of experience and inadequacy in caring specifically for G (if established as fact), or from the expert family’s campaign of tampering (also if established as fact) to get her away from the inadequate care home. 

Somehow the trust between this family and the entire system involved in G’s care has completely broken down. Everyone seems utterly worn out by the current impasse, whatever the rights and wrongs, and I very much hope that a resolution can be found that means that G is well cared for and has contact with the family that loves her. 

9. How does a judge decide on the “facts”?

By Celia Kitzinger (@kitzingercelia)

This is a fact-finding hearing.  The judge has undertaken to pronounce on which of the competing accounts of the witnesses in this case is factually accurate.  To take just two examples from the plethora of allegations and counter-allegations in this case:  

  • Is it a fact that (as the care home allege) G’s father tampered with her oxygen on the dates claimed? 
  • Is it a fact (as the family allege) that the care home allowed G to be transported with a dangerously cracked part to her ventilation equipment? 

We hope and expect that judges will get it right when they decide that this or that did or did not happen, but as Lord Bingham[i] says: “judges are not, on appointment, invested with some magical gift of second sight; they are not clairvoyants; they were not there when the disputed events took place… All they can do, coming to the case well after the disputed events, is to try to piece the story together and attempt, on the basis of all available evidence produced in court, to reach a sound factual conclusion”.  I’m curious as to how judges set about this task.

I’ve listened to roughly half of the evidence provided over the multiple days of this hearing, and having heard so many variant accounts from different witnesses,  I have to say that I don’t know how I would go about deciding what happened in these – and all the other  – incidents under dispute.

The judge is charged with making a decision about the “facts” in accordance with the civil standard: that is “on the balance of probability”.  To find that something is a “fact” it has to be (in his opinion) more likely than not that it happened.  It doesn’t have to be “beyond reasonable doubt” that it happened (that’s the criminal standard).  Defining “facts” in this way is unsatisfactory, of course, to seekers after “truth”, but it’s a pragmatic compromise in situations where – as in a case like this – fact-finding even to this civil standard seems a daunting enterprise.

Obviously, Mr Justice Hayden has listened to all the evidence, and he has access (as we observers do not) to a lot of written statements by the people who gave evidence, and also – I believe – from people who didn’t give oral evidence in court.  He’s also had the opportunity to ask questions of the witnesses.  There are audio-recordings of some interactions (many more, I think, than have been played in court) and pages of care records and medical notes – all of which have some claim to independence from the witnesses’ reconstructed memories of past events.  

There are still written closing statements to come from all the parties, in which they’ll lay out the evidential basis they see as relevant to their positions, and they’ll also present them orally in court, and no doubt Hayden J will interrogate them.  But then the judge will have to decide what is “fact” and what isn’t.  And I’m puzzling about how judges do that, and what special skills they might bring to the fact-finding exercise.

According to Sir Mark Hedley, an eminent former Family Division judge, judges are fallible and the truth is elusive.  He acknowledges that judges may get it wrong: “our system is constructed on the basis of fallible judges evaluating fallible evidence given by all too often fallible witnesses” and “the pure whole truth is not always accessible… we cannot directly read the hearts, minds and consciences of those who appear before us[ii].  Judges just do the best they can, but “however conscientiously we apply ourselves, we are bound to get some cases wrong.  I have heard myself saying to new judges that if you can’t hack the idea of getting a case wrong, this is not the job for you.  What is more, we will rarely, if ever, discover which ones they are”.[iii]

According to practising barrister, Andrew Goodman, “many judges admit to a fairly strong intuitive approach which develops with experience.  They will fit the facts to a gut feeling of whether someone is lying, or of where the justice in the case rests” (Goodman, 2018, p. 15). I have watched many judges in action, and I have no doubt that the “intuition” of one judge might well differ from the “intuition” of another – and that both might have intuitions different from members of the public watching a hearing, especially those with experience as a care provider or care service user or a family member of a vulnerable person.

In assessing witness credibility (should we believe what a witness says?) judges are advised consider questions like these[iv]:

  • Is the witness a truthful or untruthful person?
  • Is he, though a truthful person, telling less than the truth on this issue?
  • Is he, though an untruthful person, telling the truth on this issue?
  • Is he telling the truth as he sees it, i.e. has his memory registered events correctly?
  • Is his memory subsequently influenced by unconscious bias or wishful thinking or by conversations with others?
  • Has his memory become fainter or more imaginative with the passage of time?
  • What is the probability that he was mistaken?
  • Is his evidence motivated by hope of gain, the desire to avert blame or criticism, or misplaced loyalty to one or other of the parties?
  • Is the witness’s evidence consistent with what is agreed or clearly shown by other evidence to have occurred?
  • Is the evidence self-contradictory or otherwise inconsistent with a previous statement of the same witness?

It’s widely acknowledged that – even under oath or having made an affirmation to tell the truth – witnesses do lie, often about peripheral issues as much as the substantive matter of the case. They may lie out of shame, panic, fear, distress, or emotional pressure: this has to be considered as part of fact-finding, without assuming that because a witness has lied about some things, this mean they’ve lied about everything else.[v]

Judges are warned against being too influenced by a witness’s “demeanor” – a term used as a legal shorthand to refer to the appearance and behaviour of a witness in giving oral evidence as opposed to the content of the evidence.  Historically, “demeanor” was seen as key to judicial decision-making:”Witnesses … may have in their demeanour, in their manner, in their hesitation, in the nuance of their expressions, in even the turns of the eyelid, left an impression upon the man who saw and heard them which can never be reproduced in the printed page[vi].”

Since then, it’s increasingly been recognised that it is “usually unreliable and often dangerous to draw a conclusion from a witness’s demeanour as to the likelihood that the witness is telling the truth[vii]. Lord Bingham quotes, with approval, Mr Justice MacKenna on this matter: “I question whether the respect given to our findings of fact based on the demeanour of the witnesses is always deserved. I doubt my own ability, and sometimes that of other judges, to discern from a witness’s demeanour, or the tone of his voice, whether he is telling the truth. He speaks hesitantly. Is that the mark of a cautious man, whose statements are for that reason to be respected, or is he taking time to fabricate? Is the emphatic witness putting on an act to deceive me, or is he speaking from the fullness of his heart, knowing that he is right? Is he likely to be more truthful if he looks me straight in the face than if he casts his eyes on the ground perhaps from shyness or a natural timidity? For my part I rely on these considerations as little as I can help.”[viii]

From what I’ve read of an admittedly limited literature on judicial fact-finding, I can’t say that I’m full of confidence about the process.  It seems quite likely that there are many occasions when there’s a disparity between what a judge has determined are “the facts” of a situation, and the actual truth of the matter. As one analyst has put it, the judge’s findings of facts represent the judge’s subjective reactions to the witnesses’ stories in conjunction with whatever other evidence is presented.  Facts are ‘made’ by the judge and may be “hopelessly incorrect”.[ix]  Moreover, these judicially created “facts” are very hard to displace subsequently – they form the bedrock of the case on which later decisions will be made, and subsequent appeals to them heard.

The problem is that there doesn’t seem to be a better way of proceeding.  Best interests decisions for vulnerable people – e.g. whether (as in this case) they should have contact with their families and under what circumstances, whether they should live at home or in a placement – depend on the “facts” of the case.  And when those are disputed, someone has to decide on what those facts really are.  

Taking evidence from witnesses or inspecting documents and, failing agreement, subjecting that evidence to the assessment of an independent and impartial arbiter, is the only system we have for then arriving at findings of fact.”[x]

Footnotes


[i] Bingham, T.  2000.  The Business of Judging. Oxford University Press p. 1

[ii] Hedley, Mark 2016 The Modern Judge: Power, Responsibility and Society’s Expectations. LexisNexis, pp. 27, 28.

[iii] Hedley, Mark 2016 The Modern Judge: Power, Responsibility and Society’s Expectations. LexisNexis, p 28.

[iv] The first eight questions are taken from Lord Pearce in Onassis v Vergottis [1968] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 403 at 431, cited in Goodman, A. 2018 How Judges Decide Cases (Second Ednt) Wildy, Simmonds & Hill. Pp.19; the last two from Lord Bingham, also cited in Goodman.

[v] see R v Lucas [1981] QB 720

[vi] Lord Shaw in Clarke v Edinburgh & District Tramways Co Ltd 1919 SC (HL) 35, 36

[vii] The Queen on the application of Sri Lanka (SS) [2018] EWCA Civ 1391, 36

[viii] Quoted in Bingham, T.  2000.  The Business of Judging. Oxford University Press p. 9.  It’s also widely observed that the reasons for distrusting reliance on demeanour are magnified where the witness is of a different nationality or cultural background from the judge and is either speaking English as a foreign language or is giving evidence through an interpreter – see the Equal Treatment Bench Book for further reasons to be concerned about the supposed judicial capacity for deciding credibility from the appearance and demeanour of a witness. 

[ix] Frank, J 1973 Courts on Trial. Princeton University Press

[x] Thomas EW 2005 The Judicial Process Cambridge University Press p. 323

Application to appeal the finding that Andy Casey is dead

By Daniel Clark, 24 October 2023

Andy Casey was 24-years-old when he was punched in the head in a pub beer garden, and suffered a catastrophic brain injury and minor neck spinal fractures. He was admitted to a Neurointensive Care Unit, and began to receive organ support. Given his deteriorating condition, the hospital suspected that his brain stem had died, which would mean he was medically dead.

His family did not agree to brain stem testing taking place and consequently – although it’s not clear that they needed to (see Alex Ruck Keene’s commentary on this point here) – the Trust applied to the Court of Protection for permission to carry out brain stem testing.  Testing was authorised by Mr Justice Peel on 16 July 2023. Late that evening, after the tests were appropriately carried out, death was diagnosed. Death was then confirmed by the tests being repeated early on 17July 2023. However, the family believed they saw signs (mostly hand movements and an attempt to breathe by himself) that were incompatible with brain stem death.

The Hospital Trust therefore made an application to the court seeking a declaration that Mr Casey had died on 16 July 2023 at 11:51pm, and that it was therefore lawful for life-sustaining medical intervention (including mechanical ventilation) to cease. Since doctors considered Mr Casey to be dead, this application was made to the Family Division (not to the Court of Protection).

The case has been widely covered in the media, which identifies Andy Casey and his family members, which is why the family’s names can be used in reporting this case (see: “‘The horse has already bolted’: Transparency in a case of ‘brain stem death‘”).

In his judgment, the High Court judge, MacDonald J, stated that, “I am also satisfied that what the family are seeing are in fact well recognised base reflexes that can survive brain stem death. Cruelly, the flattering voice of hope convinces those that love Mr Casey that these are signs that Mr Casey is not dead”.* He ruled that Andy Casey died on 16 July 2023 at 11:51pm, and that it is lawful for all medical intervention to cease. 

This appeal, before Lord Justice Peter Jackson and Lady Justice Asplin in the Court of Appeal, was brought by Andy’s brother and sister, and Andy’s mother. It was heard on 27 September, 2023. Anyone interested in watching the recording of the hearing can do so on YouTube: just click here.  

Representing the parties were: Bruno Quintavalle, for Andy’s mother, Samantha Johnson; James Bogle, of 10KBW, and Paul Diamond, for Andy’s brother, Joe Casey, and sister, Christine Casey; Abid Mahmood, of No5 Barristers’ Chambers, for St George’s University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust; Claire Watson KC of Serjeants’ Inn Chambers, instructed by the Official Solicitor, acting as Advocate to the Court.

Hearings in the Court of Appeal
When a judgment is appealed from a Tier 1 or Tier 2 judge in the Court of Protection, the appeal is heard by a more senior (Tier 3) Court of Protection judge – but appeals against decisions by Tier 3 judges (i.e., those sitting normally in the Royal Courts of Justice) are heard by the Court of Appeal (whether they originate in the Court of Protection or – as here – in Family Division of the High Court). That is what happened in this case.

The primary focus of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project is cases that are heard in the Court of Protection, but we also try to follow cases that begin in the Court of Protection (as this one did for determination of death) as they proceed through subsequent hearings and the appeal process – which sometimes also extends to the Supreme Court, as we blogged about in this case: Capacity to engage in sex: Nine responses to the Supreme Court Judgment in Re. JB.

We’ve blogged about two previous hearings in the Court of Appeal.

The first (“The most complex Covid patient in the world: Planning for a re-hearing after a successful appeal”) concerned discontinuation of ventilation for a woman who was diagnosed as being in a minimally conscious state. On that occasion, the appeal was granted, the original judgment of Mr Justice Hayden ‘set aside’, and the case returned to Mrs Justice Theis in the Court of Protection

The second (“How not to do open justice in the Court of Appeal”) also concerned an appeal against a decision of Mr Justice Hayden, this time for a young woman with anorexia. On that occasion, the conditions were not amenable to open justice, as skeleton arguments were refused to the public. Again, that appeal was allowed.

Many hearings in the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court are live-streamed – but this can be patchy, and it’s not always clear in advance which ones will be live-streamed and which can only be observed in person.  Celia Kitzinger recently attempted to observe a hearing in the Court of Appeal only to be told on the day that it would not be live-streamed and (after it had started) that she could not observe via a remote link – despite the fact that a remote link was set up for one of the family members: the subsequently published judgment (Re VA [2023] EWCA Civ 1190) is no substitute for actually observing justice-in-progress.  We don’t know how it’s decided which hearings are live-streamed and which are not, but have submitted a Freedom of Information request to find out (it’s here).

Transparency matters

Live streaming created a major difference between this Court of Appeal hearing and the type of hearings I’m used to observing in the Court of Protection.  Also, unlike the Court of Protection, the recording has been made publicly available (here: https://www.judiciary.uk/live-hearings/re-ac/).

Usually, when we want to observe a hearing in the Court of Protection, we have to email the Court to ask for the link. Quite often, we get no response and have to follow up that request with further emails and a phone call. Sometimes we are never sent the link – there is simply no reply. The effect of live-streaming was that this stress was taken away, which meant I had time to comfortably re-read the judgment under appeal prior to the hearing beginning.

Like Court of Protection hearings, Court of Appeal hearings can also be subject to reporting restrictions – although these are comparatively few in this case (as explained in this blog).  However, the identity of the treating clinicians is protected by a Transparency Order. Given this hearing was live-streamed, and there was therefore no list of attendees, the judge began the hearing by way of clarifying that the treating clinicians are not to be identified. It is also reiterated in the published judgment.

An appeal cannot be made on the basis that a party thinks a previous judge got it wrong (I imagine in many cases there’s a party that think the judge is wrong). According to the government’s website, a party can only appeal if a decision was wrong because of a procedural or legal error in the original judgment. New evidence may also be ground for appeal, and this appeal took into account all three. 

This meant that there were lots of legal and procedural issues raised. I will not cite every legal reference made, but anybody interested can find them in the published judgment or by watching the hearing online.

On admitting new evidence

Before getting to the grounds of appeal, the judges took some time to consider whether or not to admit new evidence that had been submitted late the day before. First, there was a letter from the sister of Lewis Roberts – a young man who had been incorrectly diagnosed with brain stem death, and who is making a significant recovery. Second, there was a new video that Andy’s family stated showed him moving his hand – something that they argue is incompatible with a diagnosis of brain stem death. Finally, there was an email from an expert that the family had found, who had agreed to examine Andy. 

The judges rose to look at the evidence, and in the brief break I searched online for Lewis Roberts’ name. There is a plethora of articles about his continuing recovery (e.g. “’Miracle’ teen recovering after Leek van crash”) and I could understand why Andy Casey’s family would cite his case as proof that brain stem testing is not a reliable means to diagnose death. 

However, as was later made clear in the judgment (at paragraph 29), the case of Lewis Roberts is very different from Andy Casey’s: he recovered after four days, and in that time period he had an operation. 

Nevertheless, the judges agreed to “admit the statement of Ms Roberts out of respect for her and her family, even though it is doubtful whether it strictly meets the test for the admission of evidence on appeal”.  However, the judges declined to admit the video evidence and the email from another doctor because “it adds nothing to information that was already before the judge or this court”. 

Five grounds of appeal

Very early in the hearing, Jackson LJ remarked that “it seems to me there are 5 issues”, which he listed and reproduced in the published judgment. I cannot be sure whether he did this solely to ensure he had understood the written submissions or whether he also did this to assist any public observers in following the rest of the hearing. Either way, it certainly did make the hearing easier to follow than it would have been amidst all of the legal technicalities.

I am going to take each of grounds of appeal in the order that the judge identified. Counsel for Andy’s mother agreed with grounds 2-4 and appeared to align himself with 1 and 5 but did not speak in depth on them.

It is worth pointing out that in their written and spoken judgment, the judges made it clear that “amid all the legal arguments, we have not lost sight of how much Mr Casey’s family and friends care about him”.  I thought that this was a very clear and important reminder of the human side of this case, and kept Andy (and his family) at the centre – despite all of the complex legal arguments.

Ground 1: The proceedings were not fair because the judge refused to allow the family to instruct another expert


It was argued by Counsel for Andy’s brother and sister that, because they objected to the diagnosis of death, “it was logical for them to seek a second opinion”. He argued that it was “wrong in principle” for this to be refused because it was central to the question before the Court: namely, is Andy dead?  Without this expert, they had not been able to make their case. The result was to “tie their hands”. 

The judges refused this ground of appeal because “the test for the admission of expert evidence is whether it is reasonably required to determine the proceedings”. However, in this case, multiple opinions had been sought from within, and outside of, the treating Trust. Furthermore, the family had received advice from another doctor but they did not call him as a witness. 

The judges therefore stated that “this was not a request to be allowed to obtain a second opinion…In reality, the application was made in the hope that something else would turn up”. 

In essence, they were satisfied that the Trust had sought multiple opinions to safeguard Andy against a potentially erroneous declaration of death. 

Ground 2: The proceedings were not fair because Mr Casey was not represented by a litigation friend
In the initial proceedings in the Court of Protection, Mr Justice Moor had added Andy as a party, and appointed the Official Solicitor as his litigation friend. 

The Official Solicitor argued that this was of no effect because she had not agreed to act, though MacDonald J did invite the Official Solicitor to act as Advocate to the Court. The Official Solicitor further submitted, as explained in MacDonald J’s judgment, that it is not ordinarily the case that a person is added as a party in instances when they have been declared dead following testing. 

The argument from Counsel was that the Court had effectively pre-judged the fact that Andy was dead – which was wrong because this was precisely the matter that the Court had to determine. This, it was argued, was a violation of his Article 2 (right to life) and Article 6 (right to a fair trial) rights. 

The judges refused this ground of appeal too. They stated that “the argument is in any case a purely formal one and there was no serious procedural error warranting intervention by this court”. The participation of his family and “the surveillance of the Official Solicitor as Advocate to the Court” ensured sufficient safeguards were in place. Furthermore, this was an issue that MacDonald J addresses in his judgment. 

Ground 3: The judge was wrong in law to treat brain stem death as the legal test for death

Andy was declared dead as a result of brain stem testing. Counsel for Andy’s mother reminded the Court (and informed those observers, like me, who didn’t know) that the brain stem test is formed of two parts. First, there are bedside tests, such as testing for responses to stimuli. Second, there is an apnoea test, which involves ventilation being withdrawn to see if the patient will attempt to breathe independently. 

Counsel went on to argue that the apnoea test was contraindicated by the presence of a spinal injury, though this seemed (at least to me) to be dismissed out-of-hand during the hearing because further opinions had been sought on the nature of his spinal injury. It had been agreed that the nature of his spinal injury was not such that it would make the results of the apnoea test invalid. 

Regardless of this, given that there is not a statutory definition of death, it was wrong (the Applicants submitted) for the judge to treat brain stem death as if it were a legal definition. The judges did acknowledge there is a lack of statutory definition, but they pointed out in their judgment that the approach “reflects a widely accepted consensus in this country for almost 50 years and that brain stem death, correctly diagnosed, is the proper indicator of death in the legal sense.” 

They also considered the fact that the Code of Practice for brain stem testing is being reviewed, and that Lewis Roberts had been declared dead incorrectly. However, they did not think either fact had relevance to this case. First, MacDonald J had confirmed with the consultant chairing the review that the content of that review did not affect this case. Second, the circumstances of Lewis Roberts’ recovery were very different: “he revived four days after his injury and following a head operation: the position of Mr Casey is sadly very different”. 

Ground 4: The judge was wrong in law to use the civil standard of proof when making a finding of death
This argument was quite easy to follow. Given the seriousness of the issues to be decided – namely, whether somebody is dead – the court should use the criminal, rather than civil, standard of proof. That is, the judge must be confident beyond reasonable doubt that somebody has died, rather than somebody has died on the balance of probabilities. Both Counsel put forward that MacDonald J was required to engage in ‘anxious scrutiny’ of the issues, and this would be achieved by applying the criminal standard of proof. 

In their judgment, the judges acknowledge that the idea of arriving at a decision after anxious scrutiny “is not so much a principle of law as a statement of the obvious”. They had no doubt everybody treated this “as a question of profound importance”. Nevertheless, they ruled that MacDonald J was right to apply the civil standard of proof.

Furthermore, they also ruled that “in reality the evidence went well beyond” the civil standard “and would in my view have satisfied any standard of proof”. This is because Andy had not just undergone brain stem testing: he had also undergone various brain scans, in an attempt to demonstrate to his family the accuracy of the diagnosis.  

Ground 5: The judge was wrong in law not to have carried out a best interests assessment, and thereby he effectively reversed the burden of proof
The judges succinctly put it in their judgment that this argument was that “a best interests assessment should always be carried out to ensure that individuals are not denied essential legal protections”. In my mind, I connected this argument with Ground 2, concerning Andy’s lack of litigation friend.

During the hearing, Asplin LJ probed this suggestion further. She asked Counsel whether what they proposed was entirely circular: that “even taking the best interests route, you arrive at the same place – whether it’s in his best interests to ventilate…Are they not, in this case, entirely bound up?” 

Counsel for Andy’s brother and sister disagreed, arguing that there was doubt in this case and therefore the most appropriate option was to make the hearing one concerning best interests rather than declaration of death. Further probing from Asplin LJ made it clear that Counsel felt this approach circumvented the need for the court to determine the “controversial” issue of whether somebody is dead.

Again, this ground of appeal was refused. In the case of Re M, which was referred to throughout the hearing, Sir Andrew McFarlane ruled it was “plainly correct” that a best interests assessment need not be undertaken where the weight of the medical evidence finds that the person has died. 

Given the rejection of all of these grounds, the judges concluded that:  “The evidence before the judge that Mr Casey had died was complete, reliable and compelling. It overwhelmingly led to the conclusion that he was no longer alive and a declaration of death was the only decision the judge could properly have made. I recognise that this outcome is hard for Mr Casey’s devoted family and friends, but I would refuse permission to appeal”.

Concluding remarks
At the end of the hearing, there was talk of the fact that Andy Casey’s family would lodge an appeal with the European Court of Human Rights.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeal granted a brief stay on their order (i.e. it would not be implemented immediately). This was important because, without that stay, the life-sustaining support may have been withdrawn only for the European Court to find that the order was unlawful. By the point of that (hypothetical) finding, it would be too late, and the ruling of the European Court would have no practical application. 

Celia Kitzinger and I were not able to find any information about this on the Court’s website, and I therefore got in touch with one of the barristers, who confirmed that an application was made but it is understood that this was not accepted. 

This means that there are no further legal avenues for Andy Casey’s family to turn to, and it is likely that his organ support has now been withdrawn. 

This case sheds light on the difficult issue of ‘brain death’ and the wider question of what it means to be “dead” – explored in detail by Victoria Butler-Cole and Benjamin Tankel here: “Brain death and the law”.  

When I first heard about this case, I was deeply moved by it: my own brother is around the same age as Andy Casey was, which was a connection I couldn’t shake from my mind. This case has been desperately sad, the pain of which I cannot begin to imagine. 

I hope that Andy’s family and friends can find some comfort in his memory. 

Daniel Clark is a member of the core team of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project. He is a PhD student in the Department of Politics & International Relations at the University of Sheffield. His research considers Iris Marion Young’s claim that older people are an oppressed social group. It is funded by WRoCAH. He tweets @DanielClark132.

*Author’s note: Quotations not in italics are taken from the published judgment of Lord Justice Peter Jackson and Lady Justice Asplin, unless otherwise stated (St George’s Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v Andy Casey and others [2023] EWCA Civ 1092). Quotations in italics are from my own contemporaneous notes taken during the hearing.

A ‘good news story’: Kidney dialysis trial for 17-year-old with learning disabilities

By Avaia Williams, 22 October 2023

Sana, a 17-year-old girl, is at the centre of this case. She has Joubert Syndrome, a rare genetic condition that leads to abnormal brain development. In Sana’s case, unfortunately, this has also led to her suffering with Stage 5 kidney failure, and, without haemodialysis, Sana will die within a matter of days or weeks.

Sana has severe difficulties with understanding and communicating information, especially that regarding complicated medical procedures that are being proposed and she is not able to give or to withhold consent to treatment. There are concerns from her doctors that treatment would be burdensome, that Sana would find the process hard to tolerate, and that she might interfere with a Central Venous Catheter (“CVC”), a tube usually inserted into the neck or chest to facilitate dialysis, and require restraint for dialysis to take place. The hospital was therefore reluctant to treat her without a court order. They brought the case to court because the provision of life-sustaining treatment in this case was one they considered to be “a finely balanced issue” – and under these circumstances an application should be made (as per the Supreme Court’s decision in NHS Trust v Y and subsequent guidance).

The Hearing

This case (COP 14158703) was heard remotely in the Royal Courts of Justice before the Vice President of the Court of Protection, Mrs Justice Theis, on 18th October 2023. This was the substantive hearing following urgent directions and arrangements on Monday 15th October 2023.

The applicant was the Northern Care Alliance NHS Foundation Trust, the Trust responsible for Sana’s care. They were represented today by Vikram Sachdeva KC of 39 Essex Chambers.

Sana was the first respondent and was represented (via her litigation friend, the Official Solicitor) by Ben McCormack of Garden Court North Chambers (pictured above) and Damian Cullen from the Office of the Official Solicitor. Also present were GCN’s current pupil barristers, Helen Peden and Alexa Thompson.

Sana’s mother, Maryam Nogourani, the second respondent, was represented by Victoria Butler-Cole KC, also of 39 Essex Chambers.

Sana’s father, Majid Hosseini, was also present, but not officially represented – although it was said by Counsel for Sana’s mother that he shares the mother’s views.

Sana’s parents were both assisted by an interpreter who was present throughout the hearing on the video platform translating the proceeding via a separate phone-line which the parents held between them.

 Pre-Hearing Discussions

Interestingly, prior to the hearing formally beginning, all parties were present via MS Teams for some ten minutes or so and took the opportunity to discuss some administrative points – such as confirming the existence and details of reporting restrictions, amending draft orders and discussing next steps. Such discussions, at least when courts are sitting in-person, tend to take place outside the watchful eye of the public –  in the robing room or whispered between advocates sitting on counsels’ row. 

The advocates were ironing out of the details of the (agreed) draft substantive order.  What many lay observers may not be aware of is that, in many public law hearings, the lawyers draft the orders which they want the judge to make, and the judge goes through these orders during the hearing, making minor (or sometimes major) changes. In this case, finalising the draft order seemed to include arranging the next hearing date, the agreed plan going forward, and minor procedural matters due to an earlier consideration that the mother may not have been entitled to receive legal aid (an issue which, as it turned out, proved irrelevant as such aid was available). 

Counsel for the Trust (Vikram Sachdeva KC)

Providing a very useful summary for the benefit of the observers present, Counsel for the Trust gave an overview of Sana’s diagnosis, explaining that this has led to end stage kidney disease and learning disabilities, which make it hard for Sana to understand what is happening. Particularly, she struggles to understand why a CVC line would be inserted and why she would then have to sit still, for up to four hours, three times a week, on dialysis for the rest of her life (subject to her receiving a transplant). He expressed that she “has had some behavioural reactions to needles” as well as the fact that “nurses’ uniforms are enough to distress her.” The hospital has proactively begun desensitisation therapy in order to get Sana used to these procedures, but due to the urgency of the treatment required, this has not been completed.

Counsel for the Trust went on to explain that “the nature of this treatment is such that the tube cannot be pulled out due to risk of […] bleeding and infection” further pointing out that “it is possible that some restraint might be required during dialysis […] It is not a small undertaking.” He explained that all parties have effectively agreed to this treatment provided a follow up review takes place with the court in a matter of weeks once it is clearer how Sana is reacting to the treatment. Anticipating possible complications, Counsel stated that “if it appears that she [Sana] needs significant sedation requiring an anaesthetist, we need to consider whether that is appropriate”.

Following this, Mrs Justice Theis inquired about the practicalities of making this order, asking “what will happen on the ground […] is the CVC line going to be put in this week?” Counsel confirmed that, provided the order was made, the line would go in on Friday and dialysis would start shortly after. Further, he confirmed that Sana would stay in hospital during this period to ensure there is oversight.

Mrs Justice Theis, showing concern for Sana, asked about the measures which would be taken to reduce and manage the risk of the CVC line being knocked or ripped out. In response, Counsel for the Trust read out relevant parts of the draft substantive order and capacity declaration for the benefit of the observers, referring to bespoke clothing items that would be used to support Sana to keep the CVC undisturbed.  (It is often the case that all parties other than the observers will have copies of such papers and so advocates regularly proceed on the assumption that there is no need to go over these in any detail or will simply refer to “paragraph X of the order” – this makes it incredibly difficult for observers to follow proceedings.)

Before Counsel for the Trust or Mrs Justice Theis could clarify further, one of Sana’s clinicians who was present for the hearing (and one of the few people whose name is confidential by virtue of the Transparency Order) stepped in to clarify the matter regarding the clothing, saying that the garments had not yet been obtained but that “a charity […] has been contacted to obtain these.” Mrs Justice Theis was quick to ask whether the charity in question were “aware of the request and the urgency.” The clinician clarified that they “had not yet had a response as of coming onto the call today, it may be that if that charity cannot assist, we might be able to find a seamstress through a different pathway.” The court’s concern around the clothing was alleviated with the clarification that “A tight fitting high neck top is sufficient” whilst Sana is in hospital and “the bespoke clothing is more relevant when [Sana] is feeling better and more active”.

Counsel for the Mother (Victoria Butler-Cole KC)

Counsel for Sana’s mother opened her brief submissions by noting that both parents were eager to begin the dialysis, saying they “are very enthusiastic about dialysis and more confident than the doctors that Sana will be able to tolerate it well”.

In response to the submissions of Counsel for the mother, Mrs Justice Theis raised two points. First, she made clear that she was very aware of the real person at the heart of this case, noting that she “had the pleasure of seeing the video of Sana dancing, she clearly enjoys dancing”. (She may have been referring to the video reproduced in this Mail Online article.) The mother was smiling and nodding at this point.  The judge commended “the creativity of the Trust in being able to, what has been termed desensitise, which may not be the right word, but help Sana get used to what the treatment may involve”.  This work, she said has been “impressive”, noting that the Trust have gone so far as to provide a miniature dialysis machine for Sana’s favourite doll, Mario (shown with Sana in the picture above).

There was also an application from the mother for the standard Transparency Order that applies to Court of Protection cases (which prohibits identification of the person at the centre of the case, and their family) to be lifted. “There may come a time when an appeal is made for a live organ doner”, said Counsel, “and this is much more likely if the family’s names can be used”. She added that similar cases (e.g. the William Verden case, reported here by his mother) showed that “there is no negative impact on families from coverage of these sorts of cases: it’s a good news story.  Someone needs treatment, and they’re going to get it!”. Mrs Justice Theis made clear her view that removing anonymity in this case would pose “no particular concern”.

Counsel for Sana (Ben McCormack)

Counsel for Sana (via her litigation friend, the Official Solicitor) stated that they “consider this to be a case where the proposed treatment is in Sana’s best interests” and that “this isn’t a finely balanced decision at all, it is fairly straightforward.” He went on to recognise that “Nobody’s mind can be closed to the fact that dialysis is a form of treatment that has a lot of ups and downs and it might have ups and downs for Sana in particular ,who might not understand what is happening or why”, but reminded the court of the person in this case and that it is “manifestly in her best interests that this treatment starts. Part of the best interests decision is the court trying to work out who the person is. What are her feelings […] what are her values […] for any of us who come along to Sana’s life late in the day […] it is extremely helpful to have videos and the words of people who know her like her mum […] it really brings her to life for the court. What it shows is somebody who is happy despite her illness, who is in good spirits, who is able to adapt and handle quite a lot of what has been thrown at her.  She is sitting in a hospital bed, but she is retaining her joy and happiness […] Nobody wants to ignore the fact that she has some difficulties…but we also have a happy joyful young person.” With this, Counsel explained that they welcomed the hospital’s agreement to start treatment.

In respect of the Transparency Order, Counsel for Sana informed the court that the Official Solicitor herself, Sarah Castle, had taken an interest in the case and agreed that discharge of the Transparency Order in respect of Sana and her parents is something that should be done. As to whether the Trust should be named, the Official Solicitor took a neutral stance.

Response from Counsel for the Trust (Vikram Sachdeva KC)

Providing brief input, Counsel for the Trust noted that the most up-to-date version of the Transparency Order (as edited during the hearing) prevents only the identification of any of Sana’s specific treating clinicians. No party opposed this variation.

Input from the Press Agency (Brian Farmer)

Also present in the hearing was Brian Farmer, a reporter with the Press Association. Mr Farmer had turned his camera on at this point and indicated that he wished to speak. Mrs Justice Theis allowed this and – at least in the eyes of somebody entering the legal profession, one steeped in tradition and formalities, especially in the Royal Courts of Justice – a rather casual conversation between an accredited reporter and a High Court Justice took place. Whilst I understand Mr Farmer frequently intervenes in proceedings, raising concerns regarding reporting restrictions, experiencing this for the first time did, admittedly, throw me. 

Mr Farmer explained that he wished to raise several points that he “seem[s] to raise regularly, and I would like to ask you [Mrs Justice Theis] because it is you [i.e. the Vice President]. Why can’t we name the clinicians? I know about the Abassi case and  I understand in cases like Charlie Gard and Alfi Evans where clinicians are being harassed. But in this case, it’s nothing but good news. You’ve praised medical staff for good work. Why on earth would the clinicians or medical staff be at risk? The family should have the chance to praise them?”

Responding, Mrs Justice Theis stated “I take on board what you have to say Mr Farmer, but we are at the very early stages of what is going to be difficult treatment. Everybody will want it to go one particular way. We don’t know how it is going to go, and – without speaking for Mr Sachdeva –  I imagine that is what lies behind that position. If you want to be able to name the clinicians it is better to be dealt with at the review hearing […] I would be reluctant to do anything at the moment.”

Mr Farmer then raised another interesting question, the answer to which many lay observers may find useful: “is there any reason why we can’t see witness statements?”.  Mrs Justice Theis explained that  “within the rules […] the order can be seen but the evidence cannot be seen without the leave of the court. If there is agreement to that, in circumstances, as long as all the parties have the opportunity to make representations and the court has considered those, then in principle that could be done. But each case is different.” (So, we can see witness statements if we ask to and the court decides to authorise it.). Counsel for the Trust interjected that it is Rule 5.9 of the COP Rules which states:

‘(1) Subject to rules 5.12 and 4.3(2), a person who is not a party to proceedings may inspect or obtain from the court records a copy of any judgment or order given or made in public.
(2) The court may, on an application made to it, authorise a person who is not a party to proceedings to—
(a) inspect any other documents in the court records; or
(b) obtain a copy of any such documents, or extracts from such documents.’

Finally, Mr Farmer checked that images of Sana – if provided to the press by the parents – could be used. They could, and they now appear in the press, credited to the Press Association for which Brian Farmer works, alongside his articles.

Reflecting on this interaction between Mr Farmer and Mrs Justice Theis, I found the interventions that Mr Farmer raised to be not only relevant, but also very concisely and succinctly put. (Mr Farmer would not make too bad an advocate!). Mr Farmer allowed the court, through his questions, to explain WHY the restrictions regarding reporting the identity of the clinicians were in place and to identify the law preventing routine access to evidence. In all cases, but especially in a case with such a serious subject matter, as Lord Hewart famously said: “justice must not only be done, but must also be seen to be done” (Rex v. Sussex Justices, [1924] 1 KB 256).

Input from the Father

Finally, Mrs Justice Theis was aware that, although it had been submitted that the father shared the views of the mother, he was not formally represented by Victoria Butler-Cole KC, and that she “should ask the father for his views“. Through the family’s interpreter, the father said that “Yes, I agree with everything”.

Judgment

Mrs Justice Theis delivered a brief yet clear judgment. (It’s not been published at the time of writing.) She first noted that it was agreed by all parties that the previous versions of the TO, which prevented Sana or her family from being identified, should be varied as agreed by counsel. She then continued: 

“It is in Sana’s best interests to undertake the procedure to insert the CVC line this Friday and then soon after start the haemodialysis treatment. The dialysis will involve Sana sitting still for three to four hours up to three times per week in order to receive the necessary treatment […] It will require enormous support, not only by her parents but also the medical team that will support her.” Mrs Justice Theis noted that the risks of Sana interfering with the CVC would include “bleeding, air embolism, and [the] inherent risks of infection.”

“I would like to commend this particular Trust for the enormous care that they have taken. They have engaged with a dummy dialysis machine and a dummy CVC line […] and have also replicated that for her favourite doll, Mario, so she has been able to see that Mario has the same procedure as she will.” She finally ruled that “the treatment proposed, as difficult as it may be, has the best chance of success. Whilst there are inherent risks in relation to this treatment […] it is quite clear that those risks are heavily outweighed [by the chance of success]. I agree with the Official Solicitor, this is not a finely balanced best interests decision. It is a clear decision on the evidence that the order now sought is in Sana’s best interests.”

In her closing words, Mr Justice Theis again demonstrated the humanity in this case, “I sincerely hope that the treatment this Friday to put in the CVC and the dialysis that follows goes well and I hope that I shall be reading positive evidence by the time of the next hearing.” 

Reflections

This hearing, quite literally, concerned life or death matters. At the heart of the case was a teenager, whose best interests were evidently considered by all parties. The fact that this case was a non-contentious matter, that being one where all parties, in principle, agree on the proposed course, was extremely interesting to see put into action, advocates coming together to act as a cohesive and supportive unit, with the interests of Sana clearly the only driving force.

Despite the case being non-contentious and there being clear agreement by all parties, I have still learned numerous things by attending this hearing.  One which I hope to carry forward is the confidence and ability to challenge matters such as overly restrictive Transparency Orders. Being able to raise these concerns during the course of a hearing is in the best interests of all:  it allows the advocates to make immediate representations and allows for the judge to amend the order immediately – principles which surely support open justice. For a case which demonstrates the implications (particularly with respect to costs) of not facilitating journalists (or indeed other public observers) concerned with transparency issues) see Celia Kitzinger’s reflections in N v Kent County Council (also a case heard by Mrs Justice Theis).

What was also striking about this case was the humanity involved. Everybody was clear that this matter was about a real person. For me, the anecdotes about her dancing, her interests, her existence, were constantly reminding all that this wasn’t a moot or a game of playing lawyer: the submissions and decisions made would decide the fate of a human being, a 17-year-old girl. It can be easy to become hardened to such matters when you see then so often, but Sana’s case reminded me of the lives, the stories, the feelings, and the wishes which are present in every case in every court across the country.

I am hoping to attend the review hearing in Sana’s case on the 13th of November 2023 and would encourage anybody who is able to do so to also attend. The interests of justice are served not only by advocates and judges, but also by observers ensuring that justice is seen to be done.

Avaia Williams is an unregistered barrister and founder of the Nightingale Rights Initiative. He will begin his pupillage next year at Parklane Plowden Chambers where he will practice in the Family Courts and Court of Protection. He regularly tweets @AvaiaLaw

Tampering with equipment or failings in care? A fact-finding hearing (Part 1)

By Deborah Airey, Amanda Hill (Anna), Jordan Briggs, Nikki Bowsley, Febienne Green, John Harper, Daisy Long, Gill Loomes-Quinn, Claire Martin and Tom McBride (co-ordinated and curated with an introduction by Celia Kitzinger)18 October 2023

Note: This blog post was ready to publish on 24 July 2023 but publication has been delayed until today because we wanted to ensure that all witness evidence was complete before we published anything. The hearing was adjourned on 31 July 2023 due to illness of one of the advocates with the father not yet having finished his witness evidence, and without witness evidence from either the grandmother or the mother. The hearing resumed after the court break on 9 October 2023 and the family have been giving evidence over the last few days. Evidence is now complete. Our decision to delay publication until all the witnesses had finished giving evidence is discussed in two earlier posts: see A judicial embargo and our decision to postpone and Fact-finding hearing: “Little short of outright war”. Because I felt uneasy about publishing this blog post back in July as originally planned, I selected out an edited version of just the Introduction and published that alone – along with an account of why I felt unable to publish the whole thing. So if you think you’ve read the Introduction before, you probably have – and that’s why. I’ve retained the same Introductory text here (with just a few minor amendments and corrections) because I originally wrote it to introduce the 10 blog contributions that follow, and I want to maintain the integrity of the original design of this blog post. You could read the Introduction again to refresh your memory about the background to the hearing – or just skip to new material which starts two paragraphs above the first subheading indicating the beginning of the blog contribution by law student Tom McBride (1. From abstract legal principles to emotion in the courtroom).

Introduction

Fact-finding hearings are relatively rare in the Court of Protection – certainly before Tier 3 (the most senior) judges. We’ve previously published only one blog post about a fact-finding hearing (before HHJ Tindal, here: “Abuse and coercive control? A fact-finding hearing and exoneration”) – plus another about a fact-finding hearing that was abandoned (before HHJ Lopez, here:  Fact-finding, ‘magnetic importance’, and the consternation of colleagues: A final hearing adjourned).

Fact-finding hearings arise when one party makes allegations against another that are of significance and will impact upon decisions that need to be made – like where the vulnerable person at the centre of the case (P) will live, or the contact they will have with family members. 

In this case, the ICB (Integrated Care Board) is making serious accusations against the family.  

They say the parents have been intimidating, threatening and challenging to staff and used rude or abusive words to them (thereby breaching injunctive orders from a previous hearing).  

They say both parents and the grandmother have tampered with G’s medical equipment, including the equipment used to deliver oxygen, suction and feeding, and that they’ve placed G at risk of harm by interfering during her medical care.

There are counter accusations from G’s father, supported by the mother and grandmother.  He says that staff at the care home have placed his daughter at risk of harm by failing to provided proper care.  He says they’ve not properly maintained her airway and lungs, her oxygen supply, her tracheostomy, or feeding tubes.  He says they’ve failed to ensure she has adequate equipment which is properly set up, and that they’ve failed to maintain her personal hygiene, have used unsafe secondary ventilator settings, and failed to administer essential medications.  

These are all very serious allegations – both those by the Care Home and ICB against the family, and those by the family against the Care Home.

The outcome of this hearing will be that the judge, Mr Justice Hayden, will decide the facts of the matter – and those “facts”, as determined by the judge, will have a profound impact on future decisions made for G: on where she lives, who cares for her, and the time she spends with the three closest members of her family.

G is 28 years old with a progressive neurological condition. She is in a low awareness state, has a tracheostomy and ventilator, and requires skilled 24/7 care.  She moved from Hospital (where she’d been for the previous 14 years) to a Care Home in mid-August 2022.  Clearly, things have not gone well in the last 11 months.

Her family wanted her to come home rather than move to a care home, but in a previous judgment (in December 2021)  Hayden J ordered she should move to the Care Home because an immediate move home was “fretted with risk” and “might set G up to fail” so that that “she would have no further chance to return to her parents’ care“.  The move to the Care Home was intended, initially, as a step-down from hospital care “to smooth out the transition to any return home” (from the December 2021 judgment, Re G [2021} EWCOP 69).

An unusual feature of this case is that G’s father has made audio-recordings on his telephone when he has visited his daughter in the Care Home.  Some of these have been played in court.  They provide powerful contemporaneous evidence of what was said on particular occasions  – listening to them helps to determine who said what and whether or not (for example) a family member was screaming or shouting at staff, whether they were “rude”, how long it was before someone reported a fault with equipment, and so on.  Memories and records of these events provide one source of evidence. The recordings provide another.  There are also contemporaneous – usually handwritten and initialled- care records maintained by the Care Home, which provide another source of evidence about what happened.  Some of these care records have been displayed on screen in the course of the hearing.

The hearing is taking place in a courtroom in the Royal Courts of Justice.  There is also a video-link and some people are participating remotely.  This includes G’s grandmother and some of the witnesses.

The lawyers are all in the courtroom and the barristers are easily recognisable as such because they are wearing wigs. If you join a few minutes before the hearing starts, you’ll often see them putting them on (sometimes their jabots, too) – and complaining about them being “itchy”.  Their instructing solicitors sit behind them, usually alongside their clients. Both parents are in the physical courtroom.  So are some observers (right at the back) – and sometimes the PA journalist, Brian Farmer, appears for parts of the hearing.  He wrote an article about the case after the first day of the hearing which appeared in The Independent: “Parents and grandmother accused of ‘tampering’ with woman’s medical equipment”.

The barristers addressing the judge (so-called “Leading Counsel” in this case) are:

If you click on the links, you’ll see photos of them – though they look a bit different dressed up in court (“robed”). 

The grandmother does not have a legal team. She appears as a litigant in person, which is why she is able to cross-question the witnesses – whereas the lawyers do the cross-questioning for the other members of the family.

Other people visible in court if you join by video-link might include: 

They are “junior” only in the sense that they are not (yet) KCs – “Kings Counsel” – i.e. those barristers (or solicitor advocates) and who’ve been recognised for excellence in advocacy, who are seen as leaders in their area of law, who generally take on more complex cases requiring a higher level of expertise.  Junior counsel have a very important but less visible role to play in this hearing, and they support senior counsel (the KCs) in court – for example by finding the correct material or references as witnesses are examined, allowing senior counsel to focus more on formulating their questions.

The witnesses – so far including the Safeguarding Lead, some health care workers, the clinical lead from the care home and some nurses –  are sometimes in the physical courtroom, and sometimes on the remote link. There are more witnesses to come.   

Each witness is ‘sworn in’ or asked to make the (non-religious) ‘affirmation’ that they will tell the truth.  Each has submitted one or more written statements and is asked to confirm they are true – or make any corrections.  Then they are questioned about what they’ve said to “test their evidence” – and sometimes their statements are compared with what they or others wrote at the time in the care home records,  or with an audio-recording. It’s clear from watching that this is a very stressful experience for them. The judge is trying hard to reduce their stress and explain to them how the process works.

The evidence and questions are focussed around a few specific events.  For example, there has been a focus on a couple of occasions when G’s oxygen was not reaching her and there are different views about how that came about. Another concerns an occasion when G was transported from hospital back to the care home with a cracked piece of ventilation equipment: the nurse says it was a “hairline crack”; the father has a photograph (which was displayed on screen) showing a piece of equipment completely broken through.  On another occasion, the parents returned late from a day out with G and the night nurse asked them to hand over G at the front door rather than admitting them into the Care Home: she alleges that G’s mother shouted at her and (deliberately?) injured her foot with the wheelchair by continuing to push G’s wheelchair into the building.

In this blog post, ten people who’ve watched part of the hearing (none of us has managed to watch all of it) write about their experience.  For some, it was the first time they’d ever observed a Court of Protection hearing.  Others are seasoned veterans.  Some have a legal background –  as law students or paralegals. Many have personal or professional experience in relevant areas – e.g. as a disabled disability rights activist, a Safeguarding Adults Practitioner, a family member and litigant-in-person of a different P in another case, a trainer for court witnesses, and a psychologist.  What is gathered here is a kaleidoscope of different responses, from a range of perspectives, from members of the public who watched this hearing and reflected on it.

For me, the ten accounts gathered here demonstrate unequivocally the value of transparency in the Court of Protection. They demonstrate, in particular, why transparency should not be limited to journalists and “accredited lawyers” (as is the case under the Family Transparency Pilot at the moment).  These are accounts by members of the public about their experience of seeing justice being done, at first hand, and their reflections on that.

Bear in mind that these reflections were written after the first four days of a projected nine day hearing (added note: which has in fact continued, so far, for 14 days, with at least two more days to come, for final submissions) They cover only some of the witness evidence relied on by the ICB and nobody had – at the point this pieces were written – heard any witness evidence from the family. This is a hearing in progress – and it’s possible that we may all change our minds about some matters, or develop different (perhaps more nuanced) perspectives as the hearing progresses. These are simply snapshots of the hearing-so-far on the particular dates and times when the observers were watching it. We will be publishing a second blog post like this one with diverse views from people who have watched the second half of the hearing – and probably some more sustained reflections from observers commenting on the hearing as a whole.

1. From abstract legal principles to emotion in the courtroom

By Tom McBride 

This was my first time observing a Court of Protection hearing. Having just finished my second year studying law at University, I’d had a few brief encounters with the concept of the court: I knew it was set up by the Mental Capacity Act 2005, and that it makes decisions on behalf of those who lack the mental capacity to do so for themselves. Overall, however, my understanding was entirely abstract, and lacking in depth; my university course had so far favoured a rigorous education in the more traditional legal disciplines like tort and contract over an exploration of more contemporary (though no less important) topics like the Court of Protection.  

As a result, I’m not sure what to expect as I wait at my desk to be admitted to the Microsoft Teams meeting on the morning of Friday 21st July 2023 (day 4 of the hearing). After a few minutes, I’m let in, and I watch through my laptop as the courtroom slowly fills up. This was a hybrid hearing, taking place in a physical courtroom whilst simultaneously being viewed by online observers (and one party, plus some witnesses) via Teams. The screen, split up into three different video feeds (showing the witness box, the judge’s chair, and the remainder of the courtroom), gradually becomes busier as barristers, witnesses, observers and staff enter through a door in the corner of my screen. I hear bits and pieces of hushed audio through microphones set up in the courtroom, though nothing is clearly audible. Initially, I assume this is because the remainder of the microphones are yet to be turned on; later, I learn that it is in fact only this microphone which works, which becomes apparent to me when a barrister asks a witness to speak more loudly so that her audio can be picked up.  

It’s not long until Mr Justice Hayden crosses my screen, disappearing from the edge of one video only to reappear in another as he sits down, and the hearing commences. We’re launched straight into the action as a barrister begins to cross-examine the witness, a healthcare worker previously involved in an encounter with the protected party (G)’s father, in order to determine the sequence of events that had taken place during the interaction. At times, the cross examination is tense: the witness has difficulty recollecting certain events; the barrister disputes whether certain statements are true; and questions often revolve around small yet significant details, like G’s oxygen saturation levels or the likelihood of administering certain treatments to a patient. Factoring in occasionally choppy audio, piecing together the interaction becomes a daunting task, and I’m left with a sense of uncertainty which lingers long after I stop observing the hearing. 

And yet, in the midst of the confusion, one thing does remain perfectly clear: the proceedings in this court are deeply personal, and deal with matters touching upon core elements of the human experience. 

Occasionally during the cross-examination, Mr Justice Hayden redirects questioning towards how the witness felt in the presence of G’s father: the emphasis should not be on what he did, but how he made her feel. His motivation for doing so is to maintain the focus of the hearing on what might be best for P. The question at the heart of this case, we are reminded, is to determine what is in the best interests of a young woman who is unable to make this decision for herself. 

At one point, we listen to a recording of the interaction. Amid several panicked voices and frantic hospital alarms, we hear a father’s soothing voice as he tries to calm his daughter during what is an undeniably stressful medical situation. The judge acknowledges that G is not yet at the end of the process of neuro-degeneration, and might be able to recognise her father. The witness admits that G occasionally responds to her father’s attempts to placate her. On this occasion, she says, she became visibly less anxious in his presence. Once again, we are reminded of the humanity of those involved in the hearing (not least the young woman at its very centre) and the significance of the matters at stake. 

My experience of observing was a moving one, and this wasn’t something that I’d expected. Maybe I was naïve. Or maybe I’ve just spent too long studying law in the abstract, blissfully ignorant of the highly emotive matters raised in courts like these on a daily basis. 

After observing the hearing for a few hours, I’m left with no sense of certainty as to what course of action would be in G’s best interests. What I am left with, however, is an urgent sense of hope that the judge is able to get it right. 

2. A disability rights perspective: When ‘service user voice’ is like walking a tightrope

By Gill Loomes-Quinn (@GillLoomesQuinn)

I have lots of experience of observing Court of Protection hearings, having previously spent time in the Court of Protection (CoP), at First Avenue House in London, as part of my PhD research; and then observing in my role as co-director of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project (including observations before this judge). This means that I have prior experience of observing how the court engages with the lives of disabled people deemed to lack mental capacity to make specific, often significant, personal decisions. I am aware of the (sometimes draconian) outcomes of Court of Protection proceedings, and the ways in which these can constrain and circumscribe the fundamental rights and freedoms of those at the centre of such proceedings. I have also observed Court of Protection judges go to considerable lengths to ensure that the ‘protected party’ (as the person at the centre of a CoP case is typically called) is given opportunities to participate in proceedings, and that decisions they make reflect that person’s values, wishes, feelings, and beliefs.. And, as a disabled person and user of social care myself, I inevitably interpret my observations through the ‘lens’ of my own experiences of health and social care services, and the treatment of disabled people by wider society. 

The part of the hearing I observed (on the afternoon of Friday 21st July 2023) examined the evidence of a nurse working as part of G’s care team. Unsurprisingly, it was difficult to join the proceedings at this point – after three and a half days of witness evidence had already been presented – and make sense of the details, and this was exacerbated by the fact that (to me, at least) the sound quality via the remote link was suboptimal.  But what quickly became apparent to me was the complexity of G’s care needs and the gravity of the events around which the parties were in dispute. 

I was especially concerned by an exchange between the witness and G’s grandmother concerning the management of G’s ventilation, when the oxygen supply had apparently been found by G’s grandmother to be off, and the witness was being questioned as to assertions that G’s grandmother may have been responsible for this – seemingly with the alleged aim of casting aspersions on the abilities of the staff to care for G. It is hard to think of a need more profound than that of ventilation, and the potential catastrophic consequences of failure in this regard highlight G’s vulnerability. 

I was therefore surprised by the demeanour of the witness when answering questions – particularly those of G’s grandmother. I say ‘particularly’ firstly because a prolonged exchange between the witness and G’s grandmother took up most of the afternoon’s proceedings, and secondly because I would perhaps have expected a demonstration of more emotion – and ‘care’ – when discussing such potentially serious events with a member of G’s family. Giving evidence in court is likely to be a daunting and stressful experience, and witnesses may not perform in the witness box according to their everyday character or demonstrate the ways in which they may typically interact with G while caring for her. However, the witness came across to me as glib and often defensive in her manner; as well as having a poor, under-prepared, recollection of the events in dispute. For example, when asked if G had particularly ‘complex’ care needs, representing challenges that may lie outside of the witness’s prior experience, she answered in the negative – indicating (in tone and body language as well as word choice) that G’s care was quite routine and within her skillset. It was only on further and more specific examination by G’s grandmother that she acknowledged a novel aspect of G’s care routine – i.e., moving between the ventilation circuits in bed and in her wheelchair. It worried me that she seemed to show such a casual attitude towards complex care needs. I found the witness’s seemingly unfounded certainty and lack of reflexivity profoundly troubling and it reflected on the social context underpinning the incidents being discussed.  

It is hard to put into words the everyday ‘tightrope’ reality of relying on paid strangers to meet one’s basic needs. My own situation is in many ways far removed from that of G and her family – G has clinical needs, and (from what I could ascertain during the hearing) intellectual and communication impairments that I do not; and much of the time I am able to advocate for myself, so my family is fairly minimally involved in my social care. However, elements of what I observed touched some rather sensitive nerves. 

My reflections on the hearing centred mostly on what it revealed about the power relations between ‘service users’ and our families, and the paid staff and service providers on whom we rely for our treatment and care. Hearing the witness talk about the incident with G’s oxygen, I was struck by how easy it appeared for her to maintain the belief that a grandmother might deprive her disabled granddaughter of oxygen purely to make a point. I observed how certain she appeared in her assertion that she had undertaken routine checks when coming on shift – as she put it: “I can’t understand because I always check the oxygens, always, especially G…” and later  “…and if someone else is in the room I always get them to check it”. I recognise that stress can encourage defensiveness, but in someone with such a degree of responsibility for a profoundly vulnerable disabled person, I would hope for a more rigorous, robust, and reflexive approach to practice, and an ability to consider that a mistake may have been made. 

I also put myself in the position of G’s family. I was reminded of times when I have been anxious or unhappy about aspects of my care. I have had carers who have made me uncomfortable and scared in my own home; and while service providers advertise “person-centredness” and “choice and control”, I know from experience that it is possible for ‘professionals’ to pathologize discomfort, distress, anger, and fear; and to locate any ‘blame’ for the breakdown of care packages in the people who use services, rather than those who work within them. And I am painfully aware that I need them exponentially more than they need me – that is not a comfortable position from which to be seen to be ‘making a fuss’. I felt these power dynamics underpinning the proceedings on Friday, and while I am obviously aware of how little I know of the facts of this case, and how abstracted that knowledge is, I imagined the incidents discussed in court in the context of this fundamental power imbalance and saw things stacked against G and her family.

I find the opportunity to observe CoP hearings such as that of Friday afternoon invaluable in helping me to incorporate into my own disability rights politics and activism the experiences of disabled people and families – in very different circumstances to my own but experiencing intersecting, overlapping oppressions, walking the same ‘tightrope’ as me, though wearing very different shoes. I know that such insights make my activism more inclusive and socially just than it would otherwise be, and I consider that a moral imperative. 

3. A safeguarding perspective

By Nikki Bowsley

I am a Safeguarding Adult Practitioner and I have been attempting to observe a hearing in my area of interest, safeguarding, for several months and have until today, been unsuccessful for a number of reasons including not getting a response to my request to observe, hearings being vacated, and my own work commitments not allowing me the time.

After a speedy response to my request (sent to the Open Justice Court of Protection Project rather than the RCJ) to observe the case being heard at 10am on Wednesday 19th July 2023 (the second day of the hearing) I received an MS Teams link and joined the proceedings. 

Having never observed a Court of Protection case before, I was fascinated by the questioning of the witnesses by the barristers and the judge’s role of ensuring that witnesses understood what was being asked, keeping barristers on track and to time, and taking on board all the information being presented in order to help him with his own decision-making.

The hearing itself was complex with allegations of family members tampering with G’s medical equipment and being aggressive to staff caring for their daughter (or granddaughter) and although I only managed to observe a snapshot (3 hours) of the case as a whole, which was running over a number of days and which is not yet complete, I feel I gained a valuable insight. 

In my role as a safeguarding adult practitioner, I provide safeguarding advice and support for health practitioners working across a variety of health services including community nursing, general practice, and rehabilitation units. We have had a number of cases where clients have been under the Court of Protection, and I have recently supported a practitioner in completing healthcare plans requested by the court. Observing the court proceedings for this case gave me a clearer understanding of how those individuals deemed to be incapacitated are supported via best interest decision making.

4. A Bar course student perspective

By Deborah Airey (@airey_deborah)

On Tuesday 18th July and Wednesday 19th July 2023, I unexpectedly found myself with an empty calendar. As I was keen to use the time productively, I decided to observe a Court of Protection hearing. I scanned the Open Justice Court of Protection Project twitter feed (@OpenJusticeCoP) and came across this case due to be heard by Hayden J. 

I was drawn to this hearing in particular as it was starting that morning (Tuesday 18th was Day 1 of the hearing) which meant I would understand the context. 

Moreover, as the case features four King’s Counsel (KC) I considered it an excellent opportunity to observe expert cross-examination. 

As it was the eleventh hour, I contacted Celia Kitzinger directly and was provided with the Microsoft Teams link. Subsequently, I observed the first two days of the hearing and found the case insightful. There are four comments I wish to make.

First, counsel for the applicant provided an introductory summary. This was not for the benefit of counsel or the Judge as they were familiar with the matter. Rather, Hayden J emphasised that it is important for observers to understand the case. As a first-time observer in the Court of Protection, this provided useful context to the hearing and allowed me to follow the examination and cross-examination of witnesses.

Second, I was impressed with the video and audio quality of the hearing. As the hearing was hybrid, some parties and witnesses attended court in person and some attended via Microsoft Teams. From my perspective as an observer, this worked effectively as the parties could see and hear the witnesses and vice versa. Where the audio was unclear, questions and answers were clarified by counsel or Hayden J. This meant that no one was disadvantaged by the hybrid nature of the proceedings. Although those observing online initially could not see the witnesses giving evidence in person, this was remedied by the second day of the hearing. As a result, online observers were able to see Hayden J, most of the advocates and all witnesses giving evidence. This brought the case to life and made it easy to follow. Moreover, there is only one Teams link for the entire proceedings, allowing ease of access over all the days of the hearing.

Third, the cross-examination by counsel, notably Parishil Patel KC, did not disappoint. As a Bar Course student, I have recently completed the cross-examination module. Although this was in the context of a criminal trial, cross-examination was used in the Court of Protection to the same effect, namely, to challenge the reliability of witness evidence. This is precisely what I observed.. Parishil Patel KC asked concise questions, followed up when witnesses did not answer the question asked, and challenged inconsistencies in the evidence. As a result, this was an invaluable learning experience for any aspiring barrister.

 Finally, and most importantly, I was struck by the humanness of the case. During my LLB degree, I studied medical law, so I had some awareness of the subject matter. However, as this was an academic study, I had limited experience of the emotional aspect. In opening the proceedings, Hayden J acknowledged that this case is ‘incredibly sad’. This comment demonstrated from the outset that although Judges make legal decisions, they are also human. Furthermore, the emotions of some witnesses ran high during cross-examination when much of their evidence was undermined. Importantly, Hayden J reassured the witnesses that it is the role of counsel to ‘test the evidence’ and ask difficult questions. Once again this demonstrates the humanity and sensitivity of Hayden J. It is important for the public to see this side of Judges as it aids understanding and adds credibility to judicial decisions.

Overall, I would encourage anyone, but particularly Bar Course students, to observe a Court of Protection hearing. Not only is it an excellent learning opportunity, but it is vital that the public have the opportunity to see how these important decisions are made.

5. An opportunity to watch cross-examination in practice

By Febienne Green (febiennea1999@gmail.com)

I had the opportunity to remotely attend a Court of Protection hearing in front of Mr Justice Hayden, sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice on 20th and 21st July 2023 (the third and fourth day of the hearing).  I witnessed four healthcare professionals giving evidence and being cross-examined in a fact-finding hearing.

It was especially interesting to see the cross-examination skills utilised throughout the hearing both by counsel and by a Litigant in Person. 

From one barrister, I witnessed the methodical breaking down of a witness’s evidence to both guide the witness towards the barristers’ intended point whilst simultaneously making the witness’ evidence seem unreliable. During a line of questioning regarding intimidation from the father towards healthcare staff, the barrister established what the father was doing in the room with his daughter, the answer being – holding her hand. His questions included ‘is holding his daughter’s hand, intimidating?’ and ‘is comforting, intimidating?’ thereby establishing his intended point that the father was not intimidating and that the witnesses evidence was unreliable.

This made an interesting comparison with another barrister’s use of limited and succinct questions to quickly establish the existence of a positive professional relationship between a family member and healthcare staff therefore completing his line of questioning. 

Finally, I was impressed by the cross-examination conducted by a Litigant in Person (P’s grandmother), who displayed a thorough analysis of the electronic and paper bundles. She utilised nurses’ notes to guide the witnesses through questions regarding multiple accounts of tampering with medical equipment. She established who was in the room at certain times and therefore whether it would have been possible to tamper with medical equipment unnoticed. 

As I aspire to practice as a barrister, I found observing this hearing especially interesting, due to its demonstration of cross-examination skills by five parties, four of which were legally represented. 

6. A view from the Royal Courts of Justice: Attending in person

By John Harper (@JohnLHarper_)

I observed this hearing on Thursday 20 July 2023, in person, in the Royal Courts of Justice, Court 45. (It was Day 3 of the hearing.)

It was very easy to observe in person. I arrived at the RCJ in plenty of time, I checked with the desk in the main hall whether I am okay to observe this hearing and asked for directions to the courtroom.  I knew from the RCJ Daily Cause List which is linked to from the Open Justice Court of Protection Project home page that the hearing is in Court 45. I then waited outside until all parties were let in by the court usher just before 10.30am.

I am a Healthcare Litigation Paralegal and aspiring barrister. Court of Protection is an area of law in which I would hope to build a practice when at the Bar. I therefore wanted to observe this hearing because it involves eminent KCs and fascinating issues. In particular, I was interested in seeing how the advocacy differed from other areas I have seen during mini-pupillages such as personal injury.

This day of the hearing involved evidence from nurses and healthcare staff involved in P’s care. While watching the proceedings, I focused on the following: (1) How explicitly will importance be given to P’s welfare and best interests? (2) How will the fact that “the processes of the Court of Protection are essentially inquisitorial rather than adversarial” (Cheshire West and Cheshire Council v P [2011] EWCOP 1330 [52]) impact the barristers’ examination of witnesses? (3) In a hearing which is dealing with such sensitive and serious issues, what will the atmosphere be like in court?

Here are my thoughts on each point in turn.

1. The protected party is at the centre: As this is a fact-finding hearing which relates to conduct between G’s parents and healthcare staff, I expected the importance of putting the protected party at the core of matters to be merely implied.  This was not the case. Rather, it was constantly clear that G’s best interests were at the heart of this hearing. This was most noticeable during Ms Sophia Roper KC’s examination of each witness. As she appeared on behalf of G (by her litigation friend, the Official Solicitor), the thrust of Ms Roper’s questions addressed whether and how the alleged “tampering” and intimidatory conduct of the parents have impacted the ICB staff’s ability to care for G. Ms Roper’s examinations, which came after all the other parties’, always served as a potent reminder that at the centre of the issues before the court lies an individual for whom it is crucial to ensure the best quality care is upheld. The importance of putting focus on G was further highlighted by Hayden J. One example which struck me was when a witness admitted that it was hard to tell how G responds to care when her parents are present compared to when they are not. Hayden J brought the witness back to her previous comment about being able to “bond” with G and suggested to the witness that that surely is a two-way thing which implies involvement from G. The witness agreed and was then able to expand on her answer about building a relationship with G – how it is easier on days the parents do not visit. Hayden J’s comment reassured me that the court is adamant to put G at the focus of matters, painting the most complete picture of her in order to come to the most informed decision on the issues in hand. 

2. Cross examination in an ‘inquisitorial’ court: I do not think the form of the barristers’ examinations differed greatly from other (adversarial) jurisdictions I have observed. This, I thought, may be because the hearing is dealing with alleged breaches of an injunction. As such, this possibly means that counsel for the parties against whom the accusations are made must adopt a more adversarial approach than would otherwise be needed.  I thought Mr Parishil Patel KC (who is acting on behalf of G’s father and undertook the majority of the cross-examination) treated each witness with respect and courtesy, but also with forensic rigour. For example, when he had to push for an answer from a witness who addressed a question other than that which was asked, Mr Patel would bluntly say “you’ve not answered the question I asked” and “that’s a different question. Can I ask you to answer to the question I’ve asked?”.  He also explicitly challenged some accounts given in the witness statements (e.g., “that’s not right, is it” or “that’s not correct, is it”). Even though these remarks put the witness under pressure, in my opinion this robust examination was appropriate for Mr Patel to represent his client to the highest standard as it allowed him to accurately and effectively pinpoint inconsistences in the witnesses’ statements. 

3.  Atmosphere in court: The demeanour of counsel and Hayden J surprised me. They were all dealing with serious issues concerning an extremely vulnerable patient, but the mood in court did not always match that same seriousness. For example, when Ms Roper asked the remote witness whether she could see her on the video-link, she replied “yes, I can see you there in the corner” to which Ms Roper quipped “that’s where they keep me.”  I thought such instances of humour were a really positive aspect of the hearing because they relaxed the witnesses and provided everyone a brief respite before sensitive details of the witnesses’ accounts were once again explored. I understand that others may hold different views on occasional banter in court. For example, in one hearing P’s daughter felt it undermined the impartiality of the court’s process by displaying how ‘pally’ some professionals are with one another, leaving others (and her) feeling like outsiders (“Remote Justice: A Family Perspective”).  On the contrary, I believe that familiarity benefits the court’s process. In the small world of the Bar, practitioners will be against each other time and time again and will undoubtedly develop firm friendships with opposing counsel. Rather than seeming “pally” and therefore risk ostracising others, intermittent informality can actually help them feel more welcome, calming a witness’s nerves and preventing observers feeling like they are intruding on a strictly private matter. I can attest to the latter. Also noteworthy are the exchanges Hayden J had with each witness after they gave evidence. Two examples I noted were,

  1. He told one witness that, although he must listen to many people in this hearing, her voice has been heard as loudly and as clearly as anybody else’s.  
  2. He commented to a witness nurse how lovely it is to hear her speak so eloquently and warmly about G’s care, and that it is no doubt a good thing that G has been able to experience that with her.

These remarks were sincere, personable and reassuring. Moreover, Hayden J rotated his whole body each time towards them on screen (and away from the lawyers in the courtroom) – giving them his full personal attention. This undoubtedly made a visual impression to all that each witness was valued.

I took away a great deal just from the one day I have observed of this hearing thus far. In sum, I learnt that (1) should the type of hearing require it, the advocacy from counsel can put witnesses through their paces and firmly challenge their evidence; (2) not every second of the hearing must be of utmost seriousness and that occasional informality can make the process seem more human; and (3) above all is the constant effort from all parties to place P at the centre of discussion.

7. A different voice – cross-examination by a family member

By Anna (@AnnaJonesBrown)

I didn’t quite know what to expect when I asked to observe one afternoon, Friday 21st July 2023, Day 4 of a 10-day hearing before Mr Justice Hayden. I’ve observed COP hearings before but not one like this, with cross-examination of witnesses.

The case is a very sad one, with family and care workers accusing each other of not caring for P properly. The afternoon I observed, there was just one witness, a nurse involved in the care of P. I watched with interest as three barristers representing different parties, all in the same physical court room as the witness was, taking turns to question the witness. But what really took me by surprise was the representative of the fourth party questioning the witness, appearing remotely – it was G’s grandmother (N), representing herself as a Litigant in Person (LIP). 

I was an LIP in my mother’s hearing. I’ve described the experience in a blog post here: ‘Deprived of her liberty’: My experience of the court procedure for my mum – and I am writing under the same pseudonym I used when I wrote that post, because I am bound by the court’s Transparency Order in relation to anything I say publicly about my mother’s case. 

 My role involved having an opportunity to speak in the hearing and make sure my family had a formal voice in proceedings. But I didn’t have to cross examine witnesses, so I was really interested to see what would happen.  

What a cross examination! N had clearly prepared diligently and thoroughly for this case.  I don’t know what career N had before, but to my lay person’s eyes she could have been a qualified barrister. 

Despite the fact that she must have had a lot of emotions whirling around inside her, she stayed calm and focused. She used the witness’s name frequently, a touch which made the relationship between the two of them personal: they had come across each other many times before. She forensically went through the evidence, gently but effectively challenging the witness as to a number of events and how they had been recorded. The fact that she had been present at those events herself no doubt added to her knowledge, although the same could not be said of the witness, who frequently seemed unable to recall the events herself. N had expert knowledge of the complex medical interventions which G needed. She never once seemed angry or upset, despite the fact that she herself had been accused of tampering with her granddaughter’s medical equipment. When she was pushed by the judge, for example to be clear about what her question was, she remained polite and courteous, always calling him “My Lord”. At one point when the witness was having difficulty finding the evidence, N asked “Do you need a bit of time (Name)? ” and then “You seem to want to accuse me”, very matter-of-factly. I find it hard to believe that I would have stayed so reasonable in those circumstances. It was very impressive!

From reading the judgment from an earlier hearing in this case, I knew that G’s family now have very restricted contact with her as a result of a previous court order due to problems with their behaviour, including N’s behaviour. It’s easy to develop an opinion of what the family is like from reading a judgment like that. 

All I can say is that I saw a woman who seemed to care deeply about her granddaughter, who came across as completely credible and who wanted to see her granddaughter looked after as best as possible.

Hearing somebody from the family cross-examine one of her granddaughter’s carers, as opposed to a cross-examination through the filter of a legal professional, brought home the fact that the case is about real people and real people’s lives, with profound consequences for them.  

My opinion is only based on one afternoon observing an extremely complex case and it has made me appreciate (yet again) the difficult job a judge in the Court of Protection has to do. 

8. A Litigant in Person attempts cross-examination: Telling your story and access to justice

By Jordan Briggs (@JordBriggs)

I observed cross-examination in this hearing during the afternoon of Thursday 20 July 2023 (Day 3 of the hearing).  I saw the cross-examination of two nurses – witness one (“N1”) and witness two (“N2”) – both by professional barristers, and by a litigant in person (G’s grandmother).

I am a paralegal working in the Court of Protection department of a London law firm, and will undertake a specialist Court of Protection pupillage with Doughty Street Chambers in October 2024. I have previously observed COP hearings and blogged for the OJCOP Project, including on cross-examination.  Here, I will limit my reflections to the nature and purpose of cross-examination, to supplement my remarks in the blog I wrote arising from the William Verden hearing.

As background to allow analysis of what follows, I remind (or inform) the reader that, conventionally, cross-examination has three purposes. First, to elicit evidence in support of your own case. Second, to undermine the witness’ credibility or evidence. Third, to challenge disputed evidence. 

Sometimes multiple purposes are discharged simultaneously. For example, a question might cast doubt on a witness’ evidence (i.e. purpose two) and, in so doing, create conceptual space for us to prefer the evidence offered in support of our own case (i.e. purpose one). Nevertheless, these purposes are advanced in professional cross-examination.

With this in mind, I will briefly analyse a few examples of the cross-examination conducted by the barristers and by the litigant-in-person. In summary, whilst the barristers discharged two of cross-examination’s conventional purposes, the litigant-in-person did not. This risks an inequality of arms and unequal access to justice, albeit a minor risk in this case.

First, the barristers. The barristers deployed commonplace tactics to undermine witness’ credibility – eliciting that the witness had not directly perceived an event, meaning their account of that event should be given less weight. For example, on behalf of the father, Parishil Patel KC addressed N1 on the re-hoisting of G. N1 said re-hoisting would have been done safely. Mr. Patel KC asked “You weren’t in the room for re-hoisting, were you?”. The witness answered “No”. This was done to suggest that, because N1 did not directly witness re-hoisting , we might doubt her account that it was done safely. This opens the door to our believing the father’s account; that re-hoisting was unsafe.

Similarly, on behalf of the mother, Joseph O’Brien KC addressed N2 on the checking of G’s oxygen. Mr. O’Brien said  “In your witness statement, it says the oxygen was checked. Did you check it?”. The witness said “No, no, I wasn’t in the room, but I was under the impression it was checked”. Mr. O’Brien said “Let’s be more precise. ‘Being under the impression’ either means it was always done [that way] or you were told it was done [in this instance]. Which was it?”. The witness said “It may well be that I presumed”. This was done to suggest that, because N2 did not witness oxygen being checked, checking might not have occurred at all. This supports the mother’s allegations of mismanagement. 

We turn to the litigant-in-person, namely G’s grandmother.  She was polite, calm, focused and clearly knew her way around the bundle. But her cross-examination was very different from those conducted by the barristers. For example,  G’s grandmother addressed N1 on G’s oxygen circuit. The grandmother said “Can you remember who set that up, [witness one]”?. N1 said “No”. The grandmother said “I remember you saying ‘That was me’. Do you remember that?”. N1 said “No”. The grandmother said “Well, I remember that”. N1 said “Okay”

What was the purpose of this questioning? I think it crystallised when the grandmother asked “Can you understand that I might have been concerned about that – that, even though someone experienced had set up [the oxygen circuit] it was still incorrect?”. To me, this implied the grandmother was using cross-examination to tell her story, or to seek its validation. In other words, the grandmother was sincerely worried about what she perceived had happened to G, and sought validation that her response was not irrational. 

The same inference could be drawn when the grandmother draw attention to a photograph in the bundle, displaying a red wound on G’s skin. The grandmother referred to witness one’s evidence, saying “You said that the skin looks slightly discoloured. Would you say it looks slightly discoloured?”. N1 said “it looks excoriated. I might have used the wrong wording.” The grandmother agreed, then took the point no further.

If the grandmother felt the hearing was a podium from which to tell her story, I can sympathise. However, this tactic does not automatically get one’s desired outcome in litigation. There is some evidence suggesting that judges can be persuaded by narrative stories, such as those litigants-in-person can provide (see: “(Dis)passionate law stories” by Blix and Minissale in Journal of Law and Society).  However, there is also evidence that judges can overlook litigants-in-person’s stories because litigants-in-person lack the ‘discursive competence’ of trial lawyers (see: “The importance of being heard” by Tatiana Grieshofer in Language and Law). In this case, I felt the latter was a risk. The grandmother’s cross-examination was less piercing and convincing than the barristers’, which made her case feel rather weak. Sometimes, such inequality of arms creates a risk of unequal access to justice (i.e. if you can’t put your case persuasively, a judge might not give it the weight it deserves). However, in this case, I think the risk is minimal because the grandmother’s concerns were shared by the mother and the father (who were legally represented) and because, wholly characteristically, Mr. Justice Hayden treated all parties in this case with respect and dignity.

Nevertheless, the difference between the barristers’ and the grandmother’s cross-examination was stark. It provides an opportunity to reflect on the three conventional purposes of cross-examination, and on the need for heightened judicial circumspection to minimise inequality when litigants-in-person attempt to perform the art.

9.  Do your homework or shoot your own credibility down in flames

By Daisy Long (@DaisyDosses) 

I am a former social worker – now director of DCC Interactive which is an independent training and development organisation: I’m also a Visiting Fellow at Bournemouth University. Over 25 years of practice and teaching, I have been to courts of various descriptions and trained many professionals in preparing for the experience of providing statements.

There are two key things that I always make sure I do.  First, I do my homework. Preparation for giving evidence should never be optional and I always make sure I revisit my own statements and know what evidence is going to be put to me as far as is possible. Speculation and presumptions never go down well with our colleagues in the justice system.  Second, I always show my ‘working outs’ in any statements I make. I often joke in the training room that it’s a bit like long division at school (pre-calculator days!): the working outs are the important bits, the bits that show you are credible, balanced in your view and which support the credibility of any professional judgement being offered. 

Unfortunately, the witness I observed on this occasion seem to have done none of these things and it was a masterclass in looking defensive and unprofessional, the very things we focus on preventing in the training room! Training is available from us and other quality providers – I would encourage anyone who is going to court for anything as a professional to seek some out!

I observed the hearing before Mr Justice Hayden on 21st July 2023 from 10am until 4pm (Day 4 of the hearing).

The biggest reflection for me from this part of the hearing was the value for health and social care professionals of doing your homework before giving evidence as a witness in the Court of Protection.

I watched a witness being cross-examined – a nurse involved in G’s care. Her evidence was scheduled to last for just an hour but as it turned out lasted all day.

The witness didn’t appear to have done her homework and the barristers were taking no prisoners around that.  A key message I give to trainees is “always be prepared and show your workings out” and this was a master class in how not to do it! 

While the witness was clearly anxious about being sat in the box, she also was unprepared and was unable to answer basic questions which slowly chipped away at any professional credibility that she may have started with that morning.  

The witness described difficulties in practice – saying that family members are ‘difficult’ ‘intimidating’ and ‘aggressive’. She has accused Dad of tampering with vital medical equipment and therefore not acting in P’s best interests, which if true is a serious claim on behalf of the care-provider. However, what became clear, through the course of the multiple hours the witness was examined, was that no one had actually seen anything, and that the conflict between the parties meant that presumptions and inferences had dictated actions rather than a factual account of what had actually taken place. Was the equipment on in the first place? That was a very real question and the witness said first that she had checked, then that someone had assured her it was on. The audio recording in which she was exclaiming that it was off was played, and it seemed that she hadn’t seen what she said she had, and when she stated that her staff had said the equipment was on, the barrister for G’s father (Parishil Patel) rightly queried whether that meant she trusted her staff more than G’s family members – a daunting position to be in when in the witness box.

 As one of the barristers bluntly pointed out when the witness stated that in her opinion the family member had tampered – ‘it is not a matter for your opinion: did you or did you not see him tamper with the equipment?’. 

This cross examination was obviously difficult for the witness. We watched her slouched on the stand, contradicting herself, denying statements which were available in audio-recording evidence, and she seemed to me to become angry several times at the line of questioning, and I think I saw her pointing forcefully at the barrister in one of her responses in the morning examination (though two other observers I’ve checked this with didn’t see that).

Her evidence really didn’t provide reassurance that she was credible or competent in her statements or claims, and although the witness was not on trial (it was a civil case and she is not a respondent or party in her own right), the lack of preparedness and professionalism overshadowed any actual points she may have had. I am curious to hear from other witnesses to balance what is currently a pretty damning view of a nursing team and their ability to work alongside families who take an active role in their relative’s care and support.

A good statement and accurate case records are worth their weight in gold, for making sure the protected party’s best interests are kept at the centre, and also for our own accountability and defensibility as professionals. This hearing was a blueprint for how to shoot your own credibility down in flames.

10. Troubling witness evidence

By Claire Martin (@DocCMartin)

I am a clinical psychologist in the NHS. I work with older people, including people living in care homes. So, I was interested in this hearing as I knew (having read the two previous judgments) that G was very likely now living in a care home and there would be exploration of what exactly was happening in G’s care.

I observed the hearing for most of Thursday 20th and the afternoon of Friday 21st July 2023 (Days 3 and 4 of the hearing). I observed five witnesses (and took detailed notes for the latter four of those witnesses): a Safeguarding Lead, three registered nurses and one senior health care assistant, all of whom were part of G’s care team at the care home. 

In my view, the care home team’s witness evidence was roundly dismantled by counsel for G’s parents, and by G’s grandmother (who is a Litigant in Person). I was astonished at how easily it was shown that the witness statements, for key occasions in contention, did not align with contemporaneous notes at the time. And further, that the witnesses had not properly checked this, either before signing their witness statements or before they appeared in court. The cross-examinations that I observed suggested to me that the ‘system’ around G may have colluded (not necessarily consciously or deliberately but as a result of staff culture) to implicate the parents and the grandmother as disruptive agents. I don’t think they expected their records to come under the level of scrutiny that a court hearing brings to bear – and as I watched the hearing unfold, the credibility that they started with slowly dissolved. 

Here are some examples taken from the cross-examination of witnesses by counsel for G’s father, Parishil Patel KC.

Nurse A witness evidence – Thursday 20th July 2023 

Counsel for father (Parishil Patel – PP) asking Nurse A about an incident transporting G back to the care home from hospital, when there was a crack in G’s equipment that ensured oxygen reached her tracheotomy. The court was shown a photograph of the cracked equipment, so the fact that it happened was established in court: 

PP: He told you there was an issue about transporting G back with a broken port and said ‘I don’t know if I can speak to you or someone else’.

Nurse A: I can’t recall.

PP: You said ‘I will go and see [manager] and come and find you’.

Nurse A: I remember saying ‘I will get a manager to speak to you’.

PP: What he didn’t say was that YOU personally had put G’s life at risk.

Nurse A: That’s how I perceived it. I don’t know who else he would have been accusing – it was me who brought her back with my two colleagues.

PP: Can I suggest to you that was what you perceived rather than what he said to you.

Nurse A: I can’t recall exactly what conversation was used.

PP: What we were told was that [G’s father] then went to G’s room.

Nurse A: Yes.

PP: And you went back into the office.

Nurse A: Yes.

PP: And then [manager] came down to see [father and mother]. 

Nurse A: Yes, I think she did.

PP: And what she told them was that you’d been left upset by the conversation with them and needed a bit of time to compose yourself and couldn’t work on the unit at that point and that you said he’d accused you of putting her life at risk and was hostile and intimidating.

Nurse A: Yes, I felt intimidated by him.

PP: Is that your perception?

Nurse A: Yes.

PP: You were probably upset that they thought you and your team had put her life at risk.

Nurse A: Can you repeat? 

PP: You were upset, weren’t you, because what was being said to you, and what [father] wanted to say to [Manager] was that something serious had happened in relation to the respiratory port.

Nurse A: Yes

PP:  And because you were upset you perceived [father] as being hostile and threatening and intimidatory to you.

Nurse A: He wasn’t aggressive. It was more-  He spoke calmly, but it was the things he was saying to me.  It was the accusation of putting G’s life at risk. I remember being taken aback and I couldn’t speak. I was quite taken aback. I don’t think I said anything much to him. I said ‘I’ll get a manager to speak to you’.

PP: You’ve had a lot of interaction with [father and mother]

Nurse A: Yes.

PP: And your relationship is quite cordial and civil.

Nurse A: Yes, I’ve had quite pleasant interactions with them.

PP: And general chit chat, and what they’d been up to.

Nurse A: Yes. I will always try to keep atmosphere bright for G.

This exchange was interesting to me. In her witness statement, Nurse A had said that the father was ‘intimidating and hostile’, yet on the witness stand she said ‘he wasn’t aggressive – it was more-  He spoke calmly’. She acknowledges that it was simply the raising of the serious concern (about G’s equipment being faulty on a journey from the hospital – a potentially life-threatening situation for G) that she found upsetting. 

It left me wondering exactly how – if it WAS the case that G’s equipment had been faulty – the father could possibly have raised his concern without the nurse’s feelings about the concern taking precedence, as the manager’s response indicated. 

Senior Health Care Assistant (SHCA) witness evidence – Thursday 20th July 2023 

(Cross-examination about the same incident as Nurse A was questioned about above. Parishil Patel referring to the SHCA’s witness statement)

PP:  You are about to receive a plan of the building.

SHCA: Yes, I have it.

PP: Look at the bottom set of rooms. … That’s where they were standing when you were in the dining room.

SHCA: Yes.

PP: It has doors. Were they closed or open?

SHCA: Open

PP: What you say is that you heard [father] talking to [Nurse A]. You say his ‘tone of voice was very hostile and intimidating’.

SCHA: Yes.

PP: When we heard from her today, she said the tone was NOT intimidating, although she felt intimidated. 

SHCA: I can’t speak for her.

PP: Does that change your evidence?

SHCA: No. I can’t comment on how she felt when he was talking to her.

PP: It didn’t change your perception.

SHCA: No.

PP: You wrote this statement in January this year.

SHCA: Yes.

PP: You then wrote a second statement … in April, three months later. 

SHCA: Yes.

PP: When you wrote the second statement, did you check any records or look at any documents?

SHCA: Erm I was looking through my previous statement, yes, and relevant documents.

PP: Right, because when you refer to THIS incident in April your account is different: ‘He was forceful and blunt’.

SHCA: Yes

PP: That’s not the same as intimidating and hostile, is it?

SHCA: I think it can be the same.

PP: Would you say there’s anything wrong with someone making a direct, forceful point?

SHCA: It depends on how it’s delivered. If it makes people feel uncomfortable, then it’s not okay, no.

PP: That’s different – that’s how it’s being received – would you agree?

SHCA: No. The way I heard it, it was intimidating to [Nurse A]. 

Again, what I observed was the focus being on how Nurse A felt (as Parishil Patel said, ‘how it’s being received’) rather than what actually happened – either the original concern about care or the manner in which it was raised. I continue to wonder when, in this care home, a relative can ever raise a concern in a direct way without that being received as ‘intimidating and hostile’? 

Nurse B (20th July 2023) and Nurse C (21st July 2023) witness evidence

Both Nurse B and Nurse C had written in their witness statements that they had seen things that, under cross-examination, it turned out they had not seen and it transpired were assumptions: 

Nurse B 

PP: I am going to ask you to turn to your witness statement at [reference]. When you wrote it, did you look at other contemporaneous records?

Nurse B: I think I had before I wrote it. I didn’t have it with me when I wrote it.

PP: The events of 9th December 2022. You were on shift looking after P.

Nurse B: Yes, with a colleague.

(Parishil Patel described an occasion when P had to be taken to hospital by ambulance, and P’s father arrived soon after. Nurse B had referred to this occasion in her witness statement – in particular to the oxygen provision to G, which was in contention. ) 

PP: You talk about what happened when [father] arrived at the hospital. Is it the same oxygen cylinder as in the ambulance?

Nurse B: I don’t know as I was doing the handover with the doctor on site.

PP: So, you can’t tell us if she was on same oxygen cylinder as at [the care home].

Nurse B: They are connected to paramedics’ oxygen in the ambulance, then reconnected when we arrive, but that will be the hospital oxygen.

PP: I want you to focus on what happened, rather than procedure.

Nurse B: Okay.

PP: P had been struggling with SATs all day.

Nurse B: Yes, that was one of the reasons we were sending her in. 

PP: So, the ambulance is called. At that point is she on the oxygen she has been on?

Nurse B: No. She was on the wall oxygen until paramedics came. We wouldn’t change that until we knew the clinical decision.

PP: At some point the paramedics put her on the stretcher –  or you?

Nurse B: It would have been our staff.  I was with Nan [P’s grandmother] as she requested to speak to staff.

PP: What you say is ‘once she was ready to be transferred, staff completed all usual checks prior to transfer’.

Nurse B: Yes, we check. We have all the equipment needed to take to hospital. It’s not the daily checklist.

[…]

PP:  You say [in your witness statement] that her oxygen was checked at this juncture. Did you check it?

Nurse B: No, I wasn’t in the room.

PP: So, this is what you’ve been told?

Nurse B: Yes, I was under the impression.

PP: Either this is normally what happens or you were TOLD it did happen? 

Nurse B: It may well be that I presumed. That is what we do when we transfer a patient. It would have been the paramedics who would have put the oxygen on.

PP: So even though it is your care staff transferring her to stretcher, are you sure that it was the paramedics responsible for changing her oxygen? 

Nurse B: You’d have to ask the paramedics.

(The judge clarified where Nurse B was at this point (not in the room with G).)

PP: Am I right in saying that the rest of paragraph 11 is what you’d assumed again, rather than direct knowledge?

Nurse B: Well … I would keep an observation as a duty of care

PP: Please be careful – I am talking about being in the room before she goes in the ambulance. You were not monitoring her SATs machine.

Nurse B:  No, not in the room. But I was in the ambulance.

Judge: Can I take you through this very carefully so I know what you are saying precisely. Were you told- did you see … or not … the procedures?

Nurse B: No,  the other checks I was presuming they would have-

PP: So ‘would have’ is not ‘did’. Did you SEE the usual checks prior to transfer?

Nurse B: No.

PP: The oxygen you said was checked at this juncture – did you see it was checked?

Nurse B: No.

Nurse C

PP: You said before lunch that [father’s] modus operandi is that he points out what’s wrong because he’s tampered with the equipment. … You say that there are occasions in which the family pointed out there was less water than there should be [in the cup of the oxygen equipment] and that they tampered with it?

Nurse C: I’m not saying deliberately, but if they checked the cup then… 

PP: What do you think they’ve done, taken a syringe? 

Nurse C: I don’t know. There’s no accounting for it.

PP: So, what have they done? It is your field [of expertise]

Nurse C: I don’t know. I can’t accuse someone can I?


Judge: Well, you are doing. You are accusing them [unclear]

PP: How is it you say they take the water out?

Nurse C:  A syringe. 

PP: Have you seen them do that?

Nurse C: There are syringes about.

PP: P is always on observations, isn’t she? Have your staff members ever said that they suspect they have used a syringe to take the water out?

Nurse C: No.

PP: So, this is speculation.

Nurse C: Yes

All in all, I was astonished that what looked to me like speculation and assumptions, and witness statements that weren’t supported by contemporaneous notes had been put forward as evidence in a court hearing.

For me, the evidence of all four care home staff seemed unreliable and this casts doubt on the claim that family members are tampering with equipment.  

If, in fact, family members ARE tampering with equipment, then the unreliability of the staff evidence is very dangerous to G.

Either way, I found what I observed over these two days very troubling indeed. 

*****

This hearing continues with more evidence from staff at the care home, and from P’s father, mother and grandmother. We hope to publish future blog post covering these developments, as well as the final submissions from the parties and the final judgment.

Celia Kitzinger, who curated and introduced the 10 contributions above, is co-director of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project. She has observed more than 450 hearings since May 2020 and written more than 100 blog posts. She is on LinkedIn (here), and tweets (or X-es) @KitzingerCelia

Footnote: All material purporting to be direct quotation from the hearing derives from contemporaneous notes made by individual contributors to this collective blog post. Everyone has tried to be as accurate as possible, but because we are not permitted to audio-record hearings, they are unlikely to be 100% verbatim. Where possible we have cross-checked quoted material against the notes of one or more other observers.

‘Failed Re X’: Deprivation of liberty and Re X (the streamlined process) – a social work perspective

By Eleanor Tallon, 10th October 2023

The words “Failed Re X” has appeared in Court of Protection lists recently – like the two reproduced below. 

‘Re X’ is the term used to refer to the streamlined process through which the Court of Protection (CoP) can authorise a ‘Deprivation of Liberty’ (DoL), as established in the case of Re X and others (Deprivation of Liberty)[2014] EWCOP 25.

Essentially, the streamlined process is designed for non-contentious cases which allow for judicial review without an oral hearing (or ‘on the papers’). 

Sometimes, though, ‘Re X’ applications are made, and upon reviewing the evidence, the court decides this streamlined process is not appropriate and the case needs to be heard. 

That is what the listings above refer to as a ‘Failed Re-X’.

In this blog post I’m going to explain the ‘Re X’ procedure in context and consider what sorts of cases lead to ‘Failed Re X’ hearings in the Court of Protection. I will cover:

  1. Deprivation of Liberty and ‘Cheshire West’
  2. The difference between ‘DoLS’ and ‘CoP DoL’ 
  3. Re X (streamlined process)
  4. Why the Re X process might ‘fail’

I am a registered Social Worker and Best Interests Assessor, and I work independently as an expert witness (ISW) for the Court of Protection. The aim of this explanatory blog is to provide a basic overview of the above, so it is likely to be most helpful for professionals and members of the public who don’t work in this area. 

‘Deprivation of liberty’ (DoL) 

Most readers will be familiar with the term ‘deprivation of liberty’ (DoL). There is no statutory definition of what constitutes a DoL. This is determined by case law, such as Stork v Germany [2005], which identifies the three elements of a DoL:  

(a) the objective component of confinement in a particular restricted place for a not negligible length of time; 

(b) the subjective component of lack of valid consent; and 

(c) the attribution of responsibility to the state.

In plain language, a DoL could be described as the combination of restrictions placed on a person’s freedom and movement (that in sum amount to a deprivation of liberty) to which the person lacks capacity to consent. 

A whole range of criteria must be considered and applied to the specific facts according to the person’s concrete situation, such as the type, duration, effects and manner of the arrangements in place. The distinction between ‘restriction’ and ‘deprivation’ (of liberty) relates to the degree or intensity, and is not one of nature or substance (Guzzardi v Italy, 1980).

If it is identified that a person is deprived of their liberty, the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)provides that the person ‘shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful (Article  5).

So, where Article 5 (right to liberty) is triggered, the relevant legal framework must be followed to ensure that the person has an independent check on the arrangements, and if a DoL is unavoidable, they must have access to appropriate representation and legal appeal (these are the legal safeguards). 

Cheshire West and the ‘acid test’ 

In 2014, a landmark Supreme Court judgment was given by Lady Hale, which formulated the ‘acid test’ to determine whether a DoL is taking place (P v Cheshire West and Chester Council [2014], or ‘Cheshire West’ as it is more commonly known). The acid test in effect widened the definition of DoL and made clear the factors which are not relevant. 

The acid test is met when:

  • The person is under continuous[i] supervision and control; 
  • The person is not free to leave (in a permanent sense); 
  • The arrangements are ‘imputable to the state’ (i.e., the arrangements are known, or ought to be known by the state); and
  • The person lacks capacity to decide on the arrangements.  

The following factors are not relevant

(a) the person’s compliance or lack of objection; 

(b) the relative normality of the placement (whatever the comparison made); and 

(c) the reason or purpose behind a particular placement. 

A detailed commentary by Dr Lucy Series on the Cheshire West judgment is available here.

The legal safeguards: DoLS and CoP DoL applications (Court of Protection)

The Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS) framework was introduced in 2007 under Schedule A1 of the Mental Capacity Act (2005), and applies in care homes or hospitals to those aged over 18. A request for a DoLS authorisation is made by the care home or hospital to the Local Authority (i.e., the ‘Supervisory Body’)

The Supervisory Body allocates a Best Interest Assessor (BIA) to complete the combined assessments (i.e., ADASS Form 3) which includes the mental capacity and best interests assessment on whether the person should reside in the specific setting, for purposes of the care and treatment (that give rise to a DoL). 

If the person lacks capacity to decide on the arrangements, the BIA reviews whether the arrangements amount to a DoL, whether this is least restrictive, and whether it should be authorised by the ‘Supervisory Body’ in the person’s best interests. A mental health assessor must confirm if the person has a mental disorder, and whether a DoLS authorisation would be incompatible with any applicable legislation under the Mental Health Act 1983.

When a DoLS authorisation is in place, the person is appointed a Relevant Person’s Representative (RPR). This could be a friend/ family member or a trained advocate, whose role (in summary) is to monitor the arrangements and whether the person is objecting to the DoL (this could be verbally or through behaviour). 

If it appears that the relevant person would wish to legally challenge the authorisation, the RPR has a responsibility to make an application to the court on their behalf, and the Local Authority must also take steps to ensure an application is made where an appeal is required (see RD & Ors [2016] for relevant guidance). 

An application to appeal the DoLS authorisation is  brought to the Court of Protection under section 21A of the MCA 2005. Under section 21A, non-means-tested legal aid is provided to cover the legal costs for ‘P’ (the protected party).  

If a deprivation of liberty arises in any setting other than a care home or hospital (e.g. in supported living, or in the person’s own home) or if the person is aged 16-17 years old (and the person lacks capacity to decide on the arrangements) a welfare application to the Court of Protection is required[ii]

Once an application is made to the Court of Protection, the Judge considers the complexity of the matter and directs whether or not ‘P’ should be joined as a party, and whether a Litigation Friend/ Accredited Legal Representative or another form of representation under Rule 1.2 (Court of Protection Rules 2017) is needed to ensure that P’s ‘voice’ is heard. A Rule 1.2 Representative could be a friend/ family member, or trained advocate.

Ultimately, the Judge decides whether the arrangements are least restrictive and in the person’s best interests. If appropriate, the Judge will make an order to authorise the arrangements. Other factors may need to be considered, for example an order for a tenancy agreement to be signed (where there is no Deputy or Power of Attorney over property and affairs). 

However, in all cases other than section 21A (a legal appeal of a DoLS authorisation), any legal aid funding would be means tested, which is a relevant factor when considering whether P should be joined. This continues to be a debated issue in terms of ‘P’ having equal access to legal representation whether the DoL arises in a care home/ hospital or another setting.

Streamlining the Court of Protection Process: ‘Re X’

The broadened definition of DoL resulting from the Cheshire West judgment nearly a decade ago now led to a huge increase in referrals for Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS) authorisations being made to Local Authorities, and to an increase in applications made to the Court of Protection for DoL authorisations. Both Local Authorities and the Court of Protection struggled to bear the weight of the influx.

In August 2014, just a few months after the Cheshire West ruling, the then-President of the Family Division, Sir James Mumby, devised a streamlined process to provide a more speedy and manageable  response for non -contentious community DoL applications (Re X and others (Deprivation of Liberty) [2014]).  It was designed to address “the practical and procedural implications for the Court of Protection of what all informed opinion agrees is the large increase in its caseload which will follow in consequence of the Supreme Court’s decision”.

Essentially the streamlined process distinguishes between DoL cases to be dealt with out of the courtroom (i.e., ‘on the papers’), whilst allowing the court to give proportionate attention to cases where P may be objecting, or where there are other controversial issues which require more in-depth scrutiny by way of an oral hearing.

For non-contentious cases, it was considered in Re NRA & Ors [2015] not necessary for P to be joined as a party where a family member or friend was properly able to act as their Rule 1.2  Representative.

A new legal form was created to support the streamlined process. So, for a Re-X application the commissioning body submits a COPDOL11 form, along with all the supporting documentation.

Requirements for Re X and ‘Failed’ applications

Though the Re X process may be more streamlined (in comparison to when an oral hearing is required), there is still a significant amount of work required for the COPDOL11 application to be reviewed and for an order to be given. 

The evidence includes (but is not limited to) the mental capacity assessment (COP3), evidence of mental impairment (from a medical practitioner), care and support plans, details of the restrictions that amount to the deprivation, statement of best interests, wishes and feelings of P, consultation with other relevant persons, witness statements, and the draft order. 

Commissioning bodies must make proper enquiries and need to be thorough when presenting their evidence to the court, as this is the basis on which the appropriateness of following the Re X process is decided. Where the evidence is insufficient, further information will be requested, such as more comprehensive evidence around the restrictions in place and why these are proportionate, or further views may be sought from those involved with P.

If, from the evidence submitted, there are any suggestions that P might be objecting to the arrangements or other complexities with the case, and the Judge considers that the application is not suitable for the Re X process, then case management directions will be given for an oral hearing. 

Full and frank accounts of such objections must be made explicit within the submission. An example of where a Local Authority was heavily criticised for their failure to provide accurate information to the court is the case of LB Barnet v JDO & Ors [2019], and this demonstrates what not to do. 

An excellent guidance note by 39 Essex Chambers sets out how to make proper use of the COPDOL11 form, and in particular, what might trigger a subsequent “failed Re X” application: 

The [COPDOL11] form and guidance require the applicant to consider certain triggers which may indicate that the application is not suitable for the streamlined process. The triggers are:

(1) any contest by P or by anyone else to certain of the key requirements of the form (age, evidence of unsoundness of mind, lack of capacity, the care or support plan and best interests);

(2) any failure to comply with the requirement to consult with P and all other relevant people in P’s life and to canvas their wishes, feelings and views;

(3) any concerns arising out of information supplied in relation to P’s wishes and feelings/any relevant person, concerns about P’s litigation friend/Rule 1.2 representative, any matters suggesting that the matter needs particular judicial scrutiny;

(4) any objection by P;

(5) any potential conflict with a relevant advance decision by P or any decisions under an LPA or by P’s deputy;

(6) any other reason that should lead the court to that think that an oral hearing is appropriate. 

“Judicial Authorisation of Deprivation of Liberty” (July 2022) 39 Essex Chambers

 Concerns about 16/17 year olds

The guidance note quoted above continues: “In addition, following the Re KL [2022] EWCOP 24, it is prudent for any application in relation to a 16/17 year old to make clear that the applicant is simply using the form as a vehicle to provide the relevant information, and that they do not anticipate that the court will be able to determine the application without an oral hearing.

Applications for DoL authorisations regarding 16–17-year-olds have spotlighted the worrying issues around practices in respect of restraint and transitional arrangements for young people in care settings. Often the arrangements are unstable and significantly restrictive:

One of the most concerning recent developments in social care has been the huge growth in the number of children with highly complex needs made subject to deprivation of liberty (DoL) orders.

For many, these have involved moving into unregistered placements – without Ofsted’s regulatory oversight – with severe restrictions placed on their movement and access to technology, constant supervision, often by multiple staff members and significant use of restraint (Community Care, 2023).

seminar on Deprivation of Liberty and young people was delivered by 39 Essex Chambers in March 2023, where it was discussed that (in respect of 16-17 year olds who lack capacity) the Court of Protection is unlikely to consider the streamlined procedure as appropriate. The judgement of KL: A Minor (deprivation of liberty) [2022] gives a detailed set of reasons which would indicate the process wouldn’t be suitable. It was envisaged that in most cases, the court is going to ‘call in’ applications for an oral hearing, in which case the young person may be joined as a party with appropriate representation sought, adding further layers of judicial scrutiny. 

Delays in Re X: from a Social Work Perspective 

As part of the Re X application, the Rule 1.2 Representative is required to make a statement to the court outlining the representative’s views on whether the arrangements are in the person’s best interests, without which the application cannot proceed. Where there is no friend or relative who is able, appropriate, and willing to act as the Rule 1.2 Representative, a paid representative (such as an Independent Mental Capacity Advocate or another trained advocate) is required and due to resource constraints, this can be difficult to obtain causing a delay in the process.

I spoke with a local authority DoLS Team Manager who said that just before the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, applications were stayed for a considerable number of months. Applications are now proceeding in a much shorter timeframe, though there are ongoing issues around appointing a Rule 1.2 Representative when there are no appropriate friends and family willing to take on this role. She said:

“Some local authorities are commissioning advocacy services, whereas some are selecting not to do this – leaving this responsibility with the CoP and Ministry of Justice, who have recruited Court Appointed Visitors, which does not mirror the parallel role of the RPR in DoLS. When the individual subject to the DoLS is ‘unbefriended’ and would otherwise have no friends or family visiting, the paid representatives are generally expected to visit every 6/8 weeks – whereas a Court Appointed Visitor might only get to see the person once a year. This would leave such individuals with less visits and scrutiny than the current DoLS framework. Rule 1.2 Representatives need be spot-purchased or added into advocacy contracts by the authority to enable representation and support for this judicial process.” 

Additionally, she said it can be very difficult for the staff responsible for the applications to balance this against the demands of other work pressures, which can cause further delays. There is a call to make the Re X process more efficient and ADASS are currently consulting with local authorities to look at how this can be achieved. Any further improvements would be welcomed.

Final thoughts 

The role of the court is not to decide whether a person should be deprived of their liberty: it is to review whether a deprivation of liberty arising from the care arrangements is “a necessary consequence of the least restrictive available option that best promotes P’s best interests” (Re NRA & Ors [2015] EWCOP 59 para 41).

Both the DoLS framework and the Court of Protection are concerned with promoting autonomy and ensuring that people are not deprived of their liberty in an arbitrary manner. The task of ensuring that all people deprived of their liberty have the safeguards (of independent review and access to legal appeal) is an ongoing challenge. 

To give a flavour of the current pressures, the reported number of DoLS cases that were not completed as of April this year was an estimated 126,100 (NHS Digital, 2023) and there were 872 applications to the Court of Protection for judicial authorisation of deprivation of liberty in the first quarter of 2023, though this number is unlikely to be representative of the number of applications that should be made (39 Essex Chambers, 2023).

The Re X process seeks to ensure legal scrutiny in a proportionate measure to the level of complexity, for those who are deprived of their liberty where the DoLS regime is not an option. The Liberty Protection Safeguards were set to replace the current frameworks (covering all settings and applying to 16-year-olds and above) however this scheme has been ‘shelved’ for the foreseeable future (see here for more information).

The Court of Protection is currently reviewing the Re X application procedure. Local Authorities are urged to continue to review their processes to make best use of the resources available within the existing legal frameworks.

The streamlined application was devised to meet the minimum requirements for compliance with Convention and domestic law, by abbreviating the procedural requirements of the standard COP1 application process. The difference between the standard and the streamlined court procedures is the intensity of scrutiny. The COPDOL11 process is very definitely not a ‘rubber-stamping’ procedure but it relies on judicial antennae alone to identify from paperwork if/where further enquiry is required (KL: A Minor (deprivation of liberty) [2022] para 56)

In sum, although “Failed Re X” sounds as though something has gone wrong, in fact this is the Court of Protection working as it should – making proactive use of resources and using ‘judicial antennae’ to identify the cases that should not be decided simply on the papers and bringing them into the courtroom for full investigation.

Eleanor Tallon is an Independent Social Worker and Best Interests Assessor. She can be contacted via her website mcaprofessional.co.uk and found on LinkedIn. She also Tweets @Eleanor_Tallon


[i] The person may be permitted to go out unsupervised but if they didn’t return then steps would be taken to locate them and bring them back, see Stanev v Bulgaria [2012])

[ii] There are some circumstances where another legal route may be needed, particularly relating to 16–17-year-olds (professional legal advice would determine the appropriate pathway).

Time pressures for a decision about haemodialysis

By Daniel Clark, 8 October 2023

This case (COP 14013508) concerns Isaac, a young man with a diagnosis of learning disability and “Autistic Spectrum Disorder”. Isaac enjoys people watching, as well as looking at street scenes on his iPad. He does not like hospitals or medical interventions. He also has end-stage kidney failure.

At a hearing in April 2023, Mr Justice Hayden was asked to rule on Isaac’s best interests to receive haemodialysis, a transplant, or palliative care. At that time, desensitisation work was being carried out with the view that (eventually) haemodialysis would be possible, and after careful probing of the witnesses, Hayden J gave an ex tempore judgement that it was in Isaac’s best interests to proceed with the desensitisation work and be placed on the waiting list for transplantation, in the hope he will eventually be able to tolerate haemodialysis. There have been two previous blog posts about this case: Ruby Reed-Berendt and Bonnie Venter wrote in detail about the evidence at that previous hearing (The most complex of best interests: Organ donation, learning disability, and the options on the table), and I wrote about the way in which Hayden J ensured that Isaac did not ‘go missing’ amidst the medical technicalities of the witness evidence ( “A lively personality” in a complex medical case). Six months later, at this hearing on Friday 6th October 20023, I was keen to discover what had unfolded since then.

Thanks to one of the lawyers in the case, we learnt that the advertised time for the start of this hearing, given as 10.30am in the official Royal Courts of Justice listings, was wrong: it was actually planned to start the hearing at 10.00am. That was helpful to know and meant I did not miss any of the hearing, which I observed remotely. And I didn’t receive a Transparency Order, but do have one from the last time I observed this case.

It was a hybrid hearing. In the courtroom was Mr Justice Hayden and Katie Gollop KC, of Serjeants’ Inn Chambers, representing the Applicant Trust.  Joining on the Teams video link were: Parishil Patel KC, of 39 Essex Chambers, representing Isaac via his litigation friend, the Official Solicitor; Victoria Butler-Cole KC, also of 39 Essex Chambers, representing Isaac’s parents (who had previously represented themselves); Bridget Dolan KC, of Serjeants’ Inn Chambers, representing the ICB; and Isaac’s mother and father, sharing a camera as they did in the hearing in April.

The hearing
Unfortunately, the sound was not ideal at the start of this hearing, and I struggled to hear those in the courtroom. However, I could hear enough to be able to follow the substance of the submissions by Counsel for the Trust.

Counsel stated that “the programme of desensitisation has been embarked upon and most recently that has involved taking [Isaac] to [a unit] and putting a tube next to his skin, getting the dialysis machine, getting him used to the room and the noise“. Although “he has done better than many thought he would”, the multi-disciplinary team (including people from the Community Learning Disability Team) “consider that there are real problems with him doing haemodialysis whilst conscious because there have been some instances which, if they occurred whilst there was a live session, would have put him and possibly other staff at risk”.  I could not hear quite clearly what had happened but it sounded as though Isaac had been, at times, standing up and moving around. I also heard the word “agitation” but not the surrounding context. What I did hear clearly was that “there was a time when he was in considerable distress”. 

If haemodialysis were to proceed, the hospital could begin it as early as next Thursday or Friday, which “would be in time to avoid hospitalisation”. To start it in the last week of October, which it sounded like was when a next hearing on this matter was originally scheduled for, would most probably be too late. 

On this basis, Hayden J seemed inclined to make a decision as to whether haemodialysis was in Isaac’s best interests during this hearing. He explained he was “instinctively drawn to giving it a try but that’s an entirely human reactionI have to hear what the challenges are likely to be.” He therefore rose to allow the barristers time to decide how he should hear the evidence. 

I stayed on the platform during the brief break, whilst the barristers had these discussions. It’s fair to say that it was unanimously agreed that there was not time to consider the evidence; the situation needed a full day hearing, which could not happen then (the judge had already delayed another hearing by an hour). Further, there was an expert witness who Counsel agreed needed to give evidence. However, he was unavailable until the following week. Finally, the doctor clarified that his view was that a decision would need to be made next week but, he thought, haemodialysis could start the week following.

When the judge returned, Counsel for the Trust explained that the parties were in agreement that the hearing should take place the following week, and that they would be happy (if necessary) for it be heard before another judge. Initially, the judge did not seem too inclined to follow this course of action, and he briefly heard evidence from the doctor. It was only then that the position of the Trust became clear – although it’s possible that Counsel had already laid this out and I had just been unable to hear it.  

The doctor explained that Isaac’s blood tests showed he is becoming progressively more ill as a result of his kidney failure. Blood tests show his GFR (Glomerular Filtration Rate) which shows how well the kidneys are filtering waste) had been declining since April, and his potassium is now rising for the first time, which has the potential to cause death. Generally speaking, the doctor explained, this is when a patient would be invited to start haemodialysis. However, “the position of the Trust is that we would not want to start [Isaac] on haemodialysis because we don’t think it’s in his best interests to do so… If we had to start haemodialysis, we can only do it by proactively sedating him three times a week and we don’t think that’s in his best interests”. It could be the case he had to be sedated three times a week for “months, even years potentially”. 

Even trialling haemodialysis was something they did not see as in his best interests because they would be proactively sedating him three times a week. It is possible that even after a transplant, Isaac would require dialysis in the immediate aftermath to encourage the kidney to work. The doctor felt there was a need to hear from the hospital where the transplant would take place so as to ascertain their views on this.  He also identified that, whilst sedation has been used to facilitate haemodialysis for another person in another hospital, the circumstances were not identical. For Isaac, the levels of sedation would be heavier. The doctor stated it would be best to hear from the expert (who the barristers had mentioned earlier) to ascertain the difference in the two cases.

Moving forward
Hayden J re-scheduled the hearing for the following week. Given the fact that there had been some technical difficulties, he decided all Counsel and witnesses (where possible) should be physically in the courtroom. However, there will be a video link for Isaac’s parents (unless they wish to attend in-person) and for public observers. The judge actually said that “members of the public are entitled to join by video conferencing platform”, which I thought was a clear and explicit commitment to open justice.

It is worth pointing out that it was only by chance that the judge could re-schedule the hearing at such short notice: another case he was due to hear had just applied to vacate as they have an agreed order. The judge had also briefly explained problems with finding available judges. I couldn’t hear the exact detail but it seemed indicative of the pressure the judicial system is under (issues I wrote about in another blog post: A court system creaking under its own weight: Transparency challenges). I should also point out that the judge was very clear that the time and diary pressures of the court should not be central to decision making: it is the best interests of Isaac that are of importance.

This case will return to court on Tuesday 10th October 2023, and will be heard over the duration of a day by Mr Justice Hayden.

Daniel Clark is a member of the core team of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project. He is  a PhD student in the Department of Politics & International Relations at the University of Sheffield. His research considers Iris Marion Young’s claim that older people are an oppressed social group. It is funded by WRoCAH. He tweets @DanielClark132.

Mental Capacity, Disability, and ‘Voice’: A Socio-Legal Exploration 

By Gill Loomes-Quinn, 4th October 2023

Editorial Note: Many congratulations to Gill Loomes-Quinn, co-director of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project, who successfully defended her PhD thesis “Mental Capacity, Disability and ‘Voice’: A socio-legal exploration” at her viva (oral examination) on Monday 2nd October 2023. Her PhD research was supervised by Anna Lawson and Celia Kitzinger and examined by Chrissie Rogers and Amanda Keeling.This blog post is the 3-minute introductory summary with which she opened the viva. Congratulations from all of us to Dr Loomes-Quinn!

Summary of PhD by Gill Loomes-Quinn

 My thesis is a socio-legal study of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (“the MCA 2005”) in practice. It develops and employs an analytic framework of “social voice” to explore how socio-legal practices inscribed by mental capacity law impact the lives of disabled people – particularly those deemed to lack the mental capacity to make specific decisions.

Study Outline

I carried out qualitative research comprising two studies of the construction of “social voice” as it relates to the MCA 2005: 

  1. Firstly, I used thematic analysis of a dataset of 15 semi-structured interviews with disabled activists to explore participants’ views on the advance care planning provisions set out in the MCA 2005. 
  2. The second study is an ethnography of the work of the Court of Protection. I observed 14 hearings and interviewed professional stakeholders. From this, I developed case studies of two hearings: the first a challenge under the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS) and the second an application for property and affairs deputyship. 

Key Findings

  • I found that “Social voice” offers an analytic framework through which to examine the intersubjective nature of relationships between the State and minoritised, socially marginalised demographic groups (such as disabled people) in the context of legislative developments.
  • In practices concerned with the MCA 2005, I found that factors such as disability discrimination, accessibility, and public welfare/resource issues function alongside discourses of law and legality in the construction and regulation of relationships between the individual, the State, and wider society.
  • In exploring how disabled activists engage law and legality in their views on advance care planning under the MCA 2005, I found they had several disability-specific concerns, including discrimination and ‘ableist’ social attitudes. A role for Disabled People’s Organisations (DPOs) in facilitating access to advance care planning under the MCA 2005 was indicated. 
  • The ethnographic study of the Court of Protection produced ‘thick description’ accounts of the “social voice” of two classes of social actor – a ‘protected party’ and a Litigant in Person. My findings point firstly to structural and procedural barriers affecting the participation of the ‘protected party’ and describe the role of key people in mitigating their effects. In observing the involvement of the Litigant in Person in a court hearing, a tension was identified between the policy-identified responsibility of the judge to mitigate against procedural disadvantages faced by the litigant, and the court’s overriding concern for the best interests of the ‘protected party’.  

Significance and Implications

This thesis offers an analytic framework for empirical socio-legal study of the impact of law on the relationship between the individual and the State – with particular focus on the intersubjective nature of law in (and as) practice.

It also points to ways for disabled people and our organisations to include in our activism the experiences and concerns of those in our community deemed to lack mental capacity. And, perhaps most fundamentally, contributing to the articulation of what it means to “have a voice” it offers tools for resistance when this “voice” is threatened. 

Gill Loomes-Quinn is a disabled scholar-activist, and co-director (with Celia Kitzinger) of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project. She is also proud to be a convenor of the Participatory Autism Research Collective (PARC). Gill tweets @GillLoomesQuinn

Her day in court: Attorney fights to clear her name in the face of accusations from her brother and the Public Guardian

By Georgina Baidoun, 2nd October 2023

The hearing I observed (COP 13977140, listed for 12 noon on 18 September 2023 before HHJ Spinks sitting in Cambridge County Court) was a “final” hearing to last for two days, with the issue before the court being “Discharge/conduct of deputy or attorney, application by Public Guardian”. 

Committing to a two-day hearing was a first for me. My previous observations have usually been no more than a couple of hours, often much shorter, being mainly “directions” hearings. I’m not sure I would want to do it again! 

When I saw the details, as listed by the Open Justice Court of Protection Project on Twitter/X, I knew immediately it was probably the case I had been waiting for and I felt I had no option.

 There are very few hearings involving the Public Guardian, they are seldom open to observers and, when they are, they are usually in person with no remote access for observers. At the last one I observed, the OPG representative expressed surprise and dismay at my presence because he had thought the hearing was private (I blogged about it here). On this occasion I overheard a conversation – I think between the OPG barrister and the OPG investigator – to the same effect.

With this background, I was agreeably surprised when I asked for a copy of the OPG’s position statement and, after a few days, received it from their very helpful barrister. By that time, I had already drafted this blog post, so it was interesting to see the discrepancies between it and my understanding of the case based only on what I heard in court. Because the respondents were not represented, there was no way that I could ask for their position statements  – so I now have a slightly lop-sided perspective, which was not the case during the hearing. I have made a few revisions as a result but tried to keep more or less to what I actually heard. Interestingly, the position statement shows that this was originally intended to be yet another “attended hearing” (i.e. in person). I don’t know what caused the change, but it was possibly to accommodate the OPG investigator, who attended remotely.

My special interest in the OPG is in relation to property and financial affairs and stems from the very poor treatment to which I was subjected when I was acting as COP deputy for my mother’s affairs. In particular, after my first annual report, they insisted that I pay back a gift that I had made and, when I refused, threatened me with a range of consequences, including taking me to court to remove me as deputy. I was very keen to go to court because I doubt the legal grounds on which the OPG makes its decisions and welcomed the opportunity to obtain some transparency. It didn’t happen because my mother died and, anyway, it appears from a Freedom of Information request I made that such threats are seldom carried through.

This case concerned an attorney rather than a deputy and I imagine that there are more cases involving attorneys (compared with deputies) because – unlike the situation with deputies – the initial process of becoming an attorney involves very few checks. I sensed that the situation was similar to mine, however, in that the attorney believed that her actions were in keeping with her legal responsibilities and also that the OPG’s administration was badly flawed. Furthermore, she felt that she was being defamed by their accusations and that their behaviour towards her lacked understanding and humanity. She had clearly put her heart into preparing for the hearing, as demonstrated by the fact that she had produced over 300 pages of evidence and claimed to have spent £900 on photocopying. (The entire “bundle” of evidence before the court totalled over 1000 pages!) She represented herself, possibly influenced by the cost of employing a lawyer but I think also because she was so sure she was in the right and that the truth would prevail. Like most people in her position, she had no idea how the judge would expect the hearing to be conducted.

Joining the hearing

I received the link from the Cambridge court at 9.15 on the Monday morning (impressive!) with the heading ‘URGENT HEARING 18th September 2023 at 10:30AM’. I duly opened the link at 10.20 and waited… An hour later I rang the Reading hub to see what was happening but they still had the start time as 12 noon (as per the listing). Sometime after noon, the hearing did in fact commence. It was, I think, only my second experience of a hearing where most of the participants were present in the courtroom. 

Present remotely were myself and the OPG investigator. (For information about OPG investigations, check out “How we do investigations at OPG”.)

Present in the physical courtroom were:
His Honour Judge Spinks
Mr Alex Cisneros representing the Public Guardian as applicant 
First respondent, one of P’s two sons and a co-attorney (A)
Second respondent, P’s only daughter and a co-attorney (B)
Third respondent, P’s other son and a co-attorney (C)

None of the respondents was represented.

The camera was managed extremely well so that the witnesses were in view when giving evidence and the judge was in view at least some of the time when he was addressing the court. For some reason the OPG barrister was almost never in view – possibly due to logistics. I only found out his name when I emailed Celia with what turned out to be a poor attempt at a phonetic version!

The case

The way the hearing was listed was a little vague but it was, in fact, to consider the discharge of all three respondents from their roles as attorneys for both property and financial affairs and health and welfare for their mother, P. The three siblings held their attorney roles both jointly and severally and the OPG sought to replace them with a professional Court of Protection deputy for property and financial affairs, leaving the role of attorney for health and welfare unfilled. This was explained to me by Mr Cisneros at the start of the hearing at the Judge’s request. I had to work out the rest for myself!

It transpired as the hearing progressed that Son A had, in the beginning, been in accord with his sister as to the use of their parents’ assets (they were attorneys for both their father and their mother, but their father had died by the time this investigation began). He had agreed that in reality she would be the only one accessing their accounts because she was the only one looking after them on a day-to-day basis, including eventually moving in with them to give 24-hour a day care. He did have access to P’s bank statements, however, and eventually became concerned by some of the transactions. He had failed to get his sister to engage with his concerns and, as a result, had contacted the OPG.

To avoid paying a professional deputy, Son A had volunteered to be appointed sole attorney; this would be a separate decision once the existing arrangements were revoked, which is why at this stage he was a respondent and not an applicant. (Son C took no significant part in the proceedings except to express his support for his sister.)

I presume that what came next is standard procedure. The OPG started an investigation, putting the powers of attorney into abeyance and appointing an interim professional Court of Protection deputy for property and financial affairs. The investigation included asking for records of all expenditure, which B had provided in what appeared to be meticulous detail, going back some ten years. Since the OPG only ask attorneys to provide records of their activities in exceptional cases I would be very surprised if many attorneys have kept such detailed records, although it is clear that they are expected to do so

The OPG investigator acknowledged that B had been very open during the investigation but said that some of her explanations had become “confused and changed slightly”. He had had no contact with the other two attorneys.

The evidence

The judge said that it would be impossible to go through all the evidence in the time allotted and that, although the OPG were not currently considering requesting that costs be awarded against the respondents, their position might change if resolution could not be achieved in two days. He suggested that the court concentrate on some of the major items of expenditure. He pointed out that the OPG were not requesting repayment of the money B was accused of spending inappropriately (a total of over £80,000 was later mentioned in this context) so she did not have to justify every item. (I don’t know why the OPG were not asking for repayment because they did in my case; I suppose that could come at a later stage, but the judge didn’t in any way suggest it as a possibility.)

B was not happy with this arrangement and, although the OPG’s barrister started off as instructed, a considerable amount of time was in fact spent talking about minor as well as major items. B was clearly very angry that the work and the care that she had put into looking after her parents had been, as she saw it, completely disregarded and that questions were being asked about such things as who paid the bill if they went into a café together. So, the discussion ranged from bills of less than £10 through to the cost of purchasing a car. There was also some time spent on a sum of £10,000 that the OPG initially said was unaccounted for, but then admitted was a transfer between accounts.

B was particularly exercised by the terminology “issues of concern” on the OPG spreadsheet and did not seem reassured when the OPG investigator said that this was simply his way of signifying things that needed to be looked at further. 

The issue of capacity

This was an interesting area. Questions were raised as to when decisions were made; whether they were made by B or by her parents; were they before or after P lost capacity; and what capacity had been lost and what retained on each occasion? The power of attorney had been registered with the parents’ bank well before P lost capacity to manage her money, and B claimed that P’s capacity was, in any case, variable. Even after she had been medically assessed as being unable to make “financial decisions of complexity”, she was still capable of making choices as to how she wanted to spend her money. B said that her father had always managed the couple’s finances and they had never had bank or credit cards.

An underlying issue?

Some of the questions put to B concerned very large amounts of cash that she had taken from her parents’ bank accounts and kept at home. The OPG said she had talked about trying to avoid care costs (P was now in a care home) and she strongly refuted this, given that P was the sole owner of a house of considerable value. She said that her father had always kept large sums of cash and felt more secure being able to see it rather than having it in the bank. This made some sense given his declining faculties, including eyesight. However, it isn’t hard to imagine that B might have preferred to safeguard a certain amount of cash so that it would not be taken into account when, before the house was sold, the Local Authority made its initial financial assessment. The position statement shows that the Local Authority were now paying care home fees due to depletion of assets. B knew that she would have to repay the debt later but, in such circumstances, liquidity can be a real problem.

The judgment: A pragmatic decision

Looking at the government website, it seems to me that the duties of an attorney, as opposed to the duties of a deputy, are not closely defined and certainly there was no attempt at this hearing to come to a decision about whether or not B had contravened them on any particular occasion. In the end, just as the court was set to rise on the second day, the judge managed to pluck agreement out of nowhere, as far as I could see, although I might have lost some concentration! All three attorneys agreed that, whatever the rights or wrongs of B’s actions, because the relationship between them was irretrievably broken, they were incapable of continuing. Son A withdrew his request to act as sole deputy for the same reason.  The judge ordered that a professional deputy should be appointed.

All three siblings agreed that they could still continue to act together as P’s attorneys for health and welfare and the OPG accepted that on the grounds that there were no immediate decisions to be made now that P was reliant on the Local Authority for care home provision.

B’s day in court

Despite unhappily agreeing to the decision, B continued to express her disappointment at the way things had turned out. She had wanted to clear her name and felt that that had not been achieved. She asked about making a complaint about the OPG and the judge said he was sure there must be a complaints procedure. I did so want to tell her not to bother; I have been through all that, including trying to take my case to the Ombudsman, and it doesn’t work. 

Afterword

According to the blurb for a forthcoming book, Powers of Attorney for Property and Finance: A user’s guide by Ann Stanyer, more than six million powers of attorney are now registered in England and Wales and it does seem to me that it is an area potentially fraught with difficulty, with far too little general knowledge or detailed guidance. I am hoping the book will fill this important gap.  

Georgina Baidoun was the lay Court of Protection Deputy for her mother’s Property and Financial Affairs until her mother died in 2021. Because of the difficulties she experienced with several applications to the Court, and with the Office of the Public Guardian in connection with her annual report, she has retained an interest in these areas, including attending recent Court of Protection Users Group meetings. She is keen to share her experiences in the hope that she can help others who have to engage with these institutions with very little help or guidance.  Georgina is the author of many previous blog posts including: A property and affairs application: Observations about P’s role and who should pay costsOffice of the Public Guardian steps in when attorneys don’t agree; and Unusually, this applicant had to pay costs in a Property and Financial Affairs case – the penalty for wasted work. She tweets as @GeorgeMKeynes 

Photo by hao wang on Unsplash

‘The horse has already bolted’: Transparency in a case of “brain-stem death”

By Celia Kitzinger, with Brian Farmer, 24 September 2023

On 9th July 2023, Andy Casey – then a healthy young man – was on a night out when he was assaulted in a pub garden.  He was punched on the right side of his head and fell to the ground, with catastrophic injury to his brain. An ambulance took him to St George’s Hospital where, from the point of admission, he was found to be in the deepest form of coma, and four days later his treating clinicians suspected that his brain stem had died.  This was subsequently confirmed by formal brain stem testing.  This meant he met the legal definition for death in England.

Normally, withdrawal of organ support follows within 24-48 hours of the clinical diagnosis of brain stem death. In this case, though, the family did not accept the results of the tests and reported seeing Andy move in ways that they considered indicated that he was not brain stem dead. An attempt at mediation failed, and the Trust made an application to the Family Court for a declaration that Andy Casey was dead, and that therefore organ support could be lawfully withdrawn.  

The judge heard evidence from the family and from clinicians and concluded that “Mr Casey died on 16 July 2023 at 11.51pm” (i.e., when brain stem testing confirmed his death). He further declared that: “in the circumstances, it is lawful for a consultant or other medical professional at the hospital part of the St George’s University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust to (a) cease to mechanically ventilate and/or to support the respiration of Andrew Casey, (b) to extubate Andrew Casey, (c) cease the administration of medication to Andrew Casey and (d) not attempt any cardio or pulmonary resuscitation upon Andrew Casey when respiration and cardiac output ceases” (§79 and §81(ii) St George’s University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v Casey [2023] EWHC 2244 (Fam)).

This sad story has been widely reported in the media as the case has unfolded – and Andy Casey’s name, and those of his family members, as well as the name of the hospital where he was being treated, have been included in these reports from the outset. Here’s an example from Sky News.

The family of a brain-damaged man have called for certainty when doctors decide if he is brain dead.

Andy Casey, from south London, has been in St George’s Hospital in Tooting for a week after being punched in the back of the head.

The 20-year-old’s family say doctors treating him at the hospital want to do a brain stem test to assess whether he is brain dead before removing life support.

The family oppose the test, citing questions over its reliability after two recent cases where the test was used to wrongly declare living people as dead.

Mr Casey’s mother Samantha Johnson told Sky News the test is “not 100% accurate”.

She said: “If they do this test and it comes back zero activity, they can turn off the machine … it’s not a 100% accurate test so there could be a chance that my son could pull through this.

“I believe my son is fighting. He needs this chance and I’m going to fight no matter what.”

Family of 20-year-old man fear he could be wrongly declared brain dead due to ‘unreliable’ test, Sky News, July 2023

The names of the family, and the Trust and the hospital are used throughout reporting of this case and are also used in the final judgment.  

This is unusual – both in the Family Court and in the Court of Protection – and this blog post  describes how this came about.  

It’s an interesting case to consider for families who don’t want reporting restrictions in relation to their own cases in the Family Court or the Court of Protection. 

It’s sometimes claimed that the Family Court and the Court of Protection are operating in secret, imposing “draconian” reporting restrictions which prevent families from speaking out about court cases in which they are involved.

Of course, many – perhaps most – families involved in these court hearings do not want their stories in the Daily Mail.  But some do, especially when they believe that injustice is being done, or that the life of their relative is at stake.  There may be lessons here for families who want to speak out.

Reporting Restrictions Order: 23 August 2023

Initially, there were reporting restrictions in place preventing identification of the Trust, Andy himself and Andy’s mother. Observers were sent the Order approved by Mr Justice Moor on 23rd August 2023. 

3. For the purposes of these proceedings: 

a. The Claimant shall be referred to as “A Hospital Trust”; 

b. The Person the case relates to shall be referred to as “A”; 

c. The Defendant (A’s mother) shall be referred to as “B”. 

Publishing Restrictions 

4. This Order prohibits the publishing or broadcasting in any newspaper, magazine, public computer network, internet site, social network or media including Twitter or Facebook, sound or television broadcast or cable or satellite programme service of any information (including any photograph, name and/or address) that is likely to lead to the identification of any of the following; 

a. A, who is the subject of these proceedings; or 

b. Any member of A’s family, including B; or 

c. The name of the Applicant NHS Trust; 

d. Any of A’s treating clinicians (clinical and non-clinical), including those who have taken a part in or been referred to in these proceedings. 

IF, BUT ONLY IF, such publication is likely to lead to the identification of A as being the person receiving treatment or as a party to these proceedings, whether such identification be to the public at large or to those who know A, or have encountered A as a fellow patient or being a party to these proceedings. 

Reporting Restriction Order, 23 August 2023

The problem with this Order was that by the time it was issued (in August 2023) there had already been media reports (and a fund-raising page) naming Andy, his family members, and the hospital (though not his treating clinicians) in ways that make it easy to connect them with these legal proceedings.  They include the Sky News report quoted above, which was published in July 2023.

Varying the Reporting Restriction Order: 8 September 2023

Both the Official Solicitor (Emma Sutton KC, acting as Advocate to the Court) and Brian Farmer – as the journalist covering the hearing – drew the judge’s attention to the fact that the information prohibited by the reporting restriction order (RRO) was already in the public domain. 

The Official Solicitor said, that “reconsideration of the terms of the RRO is likely to be needed at the outset of the hearing” – comparing it to an earlier case in the Court of Protection concerning William Verden (Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust v William Verden (by his litigation friend, the Official Solicitor) & Ors [2022] EWCOP 4 (see §§9-11 in particular), where there had also been lots of media publicity before the case reached court.

Brian Farmer (journalist with the Press Association) wrote to the judge as follows:

Dear Judge

1: I can see from the Alerts Service explanatory note that this case is a little unusual because Mr Casey’s mother appears to have disengaged.

2: However, the problem from the media’s point of view is a familiar one.

3: There has been publicity about Mr Casey’s case (names have been named) and the publicity has indicated that litigation is likely if not underway.

4: We’d want to be able to report developments and finish the story. Those developments (and probably the end of the story) will be outlined to you in court.

5: This is the jigsaw identification problem with which everyone in the Family Division is so familiar: names have already been named, how do we end the story if we can’t name Mr Casey or the Trust in court reports? 

6: Anonymous reporting won’t work: outlining the facts without names will create the simplest identification jigsaw.

7: There are obvious public interest issues:

i)      We ought to be able to report court hearings, even private hearings.

ii)    We ought to be able tell people about the consequences of violence (and here I’d make the well-known, “what’s in a name… a lot press would say” (1) point).

iii)  We ought to be able to report the issues that arise, and the difficulties doctors, families, and judges face, in these kinds of cases.

8: You’ll obviously have to balance [Articles] 10 and 8 but I’m not sure whose 8 rights you are protecting. Realistically, ending the story isn’t going to undermine Mr Casey’s 8 rights; they’ve already been undermined by reporting. I would make a similar argument in relation to Mr Casey’s mother and family.

9: We’d say you shouldn’t impose a blanket ban on reporting. (We’d then ask if we could report the ban and make “secret justice” arguments.)

10: These problems have been solved many times before in a series of treatment cases (Gard, Evans, Battersbee etc). We’d say you should let us name the names which have been already named – just as judges did in Gard, Evans, Battersbee etc.

Email from Brian Farmer sent to Mr Justice MacDonald

The parties’ positions

The position of the Trust – represented by Abid Mahmood – was that the reporting restrictions should  continue, despite publication of some of the case details.  

It is not necessarily the position that persons will be able to link the previous reports in the media to this case when it appears on Bailii or the like”, he argued.

The Trust’s motive for retaining the reporting restrictions was clearly to protect staff. 

Counsel referred to a message sent by Christine Casey via Facebook on 14 July 2023 inviting the public to attend the hospital to protest: “…if it says 0% then there turning his machines off so now we need as many people as possible to come up after the test to protest to make sure his machine don’t get turned off please share this status”.  And since then (he said), a covert recording device was found in P’s room – designed to look like an air freshener with a device for recording at the back. 

In their skeleton argument, the Trust acknowledged that “the family deny any connection to it [the covert recording device]” but added “it is obvious that the Hospital staff are employees who need to be able to get on with their work.  Hospitals are always stressful and difficult places even without complications with protests and covert recording devices.  The Trust owes duty to its staff.”  

The Trust quoted the judgment in a Court of Appeal case (which also concerned a case of “brain death”): 

The manner in which social media may now be deployed to name and pillory an individual is well established and the experience of the clinicians treating child patients in cases which achieve publicity, such as those of Charlie Gard and Alfie Evans, demonstrate the highly adverse impact becoming the focus of a media storm may have on treating clinicians. The need for openness and transparency in these difficult, important and, often, controversial cases is critical but can, in the judgment of the court, be more than adequately met through the court’s judgments without the need for identifying those who have cared for Midrar…” (§102, Re M (Declaration of Death of Child) [2020] EWCA Civ)

Judge: I’m sorry to interrupt,  but none of those actions would be restricted by a reporting restriction on the name of the Trust. Family already know it. Friends know it. And members of public know it. An Order preventing reporting of the name of the Trust wouldn’t prevent that mischief.

Counsel for Trust: If members of public want to, it would really be only a simple step to put into search engine the name of the Trust and locate the names of the treating clinicians. We propose that the Trust be referred to as “a London Hospital Trust”

Judge: The horse has bolted, Mr Mahmood. The name of the Trust is already out there. […] I really struggle with the idea that in circumstances where the name of Trust is already in the public domain, I should artificially restrict it. Ms Sutton – […] do you have any submission?

Official Solicitor: Yes, it’s straightforward. The family want to speak out. The only issue is that the clinicians are appropriately anonymised….

The judge checked that the family’s legal representatives (James Bogle and Paul Diamond) also supported relaxing the reporting restrictions.  They did.

Decision on reporting restrictions

The judge said he was “entirely satisfied” that the Order should be varied to allow “naming of Andy and identification of the Trust”.  

The Official Solicitor checked that the intention was that the Order would also permit naming Andy’s mother, the first respondent – albeit that she was not in court today – Samantha Johnson; and his siblings, seeking to join as third and fourth respondents, Christine Casey and Joe Casey.  “Yes”, said the judge.

In his judgment, Mr Justice MacDonald names all of these people – and more (Joe Casey’s partner, Macy Jo Phelan, who gave oral evidence in court), as well as naming the Trust and the hospital.  He refers briefly to the reporting restrictions in §5 of his judgment:

“… the court determined that it was appropriate to relax the terms of the Reporting Restriction Order (RRO) to permit the naming of Mr Casey and the identification of members of the family and to permit the naming of the Trust and the hospital.  Both these steps were taken in circumstances where those details were already in the public domain as the result of coverage in the press. I was not prepared to relax the current restrictions on publishing the names of the treating clinicians involved in this case.”

§5 St George’s University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v Casey [2023] EWHC 2244 (Fam)).

Reflections

“Reporting Restriction Orders” (RROs, in the Family Court) and “Transparency Orders” (TOs, in the Court of Protection) raise difficulties for family members who want to speak out about their court case. They’re often made without the family really understanding what they mean, or knowing how to ask for them to be changed.

As I’ve said previously, these reporting restrictions,  “[impact] upon their [families’] freedom of expression more severely than it does observers , because in speaking about (for example) “my son” or “my mother”, under their own name, in connection with a COP hearing, they are “likely to identify” that person as a P in the Court of Protection”.

In a witness statement submitted to Mrs Justice Lieven last year, I described my concerns:

32. Many of the families I’ve supported through serious medical treatment cases find themselves angry about being “silenced” or “gagged”.  They have come to believe that the TO protects clinicians, not P.  Some of the family members who’ve contacted me through the Open Justice Court of Protection Project say similarly that the court is attempting to silence them because of their criticisms of the healthcare or legal systems.  Reporting restrictions are viewed as damaging P, not protecting them. Most have not, in fact, been willing to challenge reporting restrictions – believing it will be another expensive court battle, or that they are bound to lose anyway, or simply because they are too stressed and exhausted by the situation that has led to the court hearing in the first place. Some fear ‘reprisals’ against P if they are seen as ‘difficult’ family members.

33. I am currently supporting two members of the public seeking variations of the TO – neither of whom recalls any discussion at all, at the outset of their relative’s COP case,  about the restrictions it would impose upon their Art.10 rights.  What they remember is being “reassured” by lawyers that their names (and that of their relative) would not be made public, and that the family’s privacy would be protected – but not that they would lose the right to speak out. 

34. It seems that there is no proper explanation or ‘anxious scrutiny’ of reporting restriction orders with family members.  When supporting family members with cases that have not yet reached court, I explain the TO to them, and help them to engage in a balancing exercise, both in relation to their own rights to privacy and freedom of expression, and in relation to P’s.  In a couple of cases, I have recommended publicising as much as possible in advance of the application to the court, such that “the cat is already out of the bag”, in terms of what is publicly available and a TO restrictive of their Art 10 rights is then less likely.  For 

Celia Kitzinger, Anxious scrutiny or boilerplate? Evidence on Transparency Orders

For families like the Caseys, ensuring that “the horse has already bolted,” or “the cat is out of the bag” can be a very effective strategy for preventing the “draconian” reporting restrictions which sometimes earn the courts a reputation for “gagging” families and for conducting proceedings in “secrecy”. Letting a journalist or public observer know about the hearing in advance is also likely to be of assistance in that they, too, might have arguments to present in court for varying or discharging reporting restrictions.

Celia Kitzinger is co-director of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project. She has observed more than 470 hearings since May 2020 and written more than 100 blog posts. She is on LinkedIn (here), and tweets @KitzingerCelia

(1) This is a reference to the well-known observation by Lord Rodger at §63 In re Guardian News and Media Ltd and others [2010] UKSC 1: What’s in a name? ‘A lot’, the press would answer. This is because stories about particular individuals are simply much more attractive to readers than stories about unidentified people. It is just human nature. […] A requirement to report it in some austere, abstract form, devoid of much of its human interest, could well mean that the report would not be read and the information would not be passed on. Ultimately, such an approach could threaten the viability of newspapers and magazines, which can only inform the public if they attract enough readers and make enough money to survive.”