Application to continue an injunction forbidding P’s son from obstructing health and social care staff

By Pippa Arnold,  1 August 2023

I am an aspiring barrister with an interest in the Court of Protection (COP), particularly cases relating to medical treatment. My interest stems from a medical law module I studied at university, which led me to undertaking a Masters at the end of the Bar Course. For this, I chose to analyse the COP’s decision making in cases relating to the administration of the Covid vaccine. I considered 3 cases – E v Hammersmith and Fulham LBCSS v Richmond Upon Thames LBC and NHS Tameside & Glossop CCG v CR – and looked at how much weight was attached to P’s wishes and feelings, as required by the best interests test under s.4 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005[1]

I was keen to observe a case first-hand and so I contacted the Open Justice COP Project. With their help, I watched a case (COP 14107225) listed before Mr Justice Moor sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice (RCJ) at 10.30am on Friday 14th July. I first saw this listed on Open Justice COP Project’s featured hearings page and twitter feed, but it was also listed on the RCJ’s website as follows:

As the hearing was conducted by MS Teams, I emailed the Family Division at the Royal Courts of Justice the evening before to ask for the link to join. At 10am on the day of the hearing, I had not received the link so, I called the court (using the number provided on Open Justice COP Project’s website). Shortly after speaking with a member of the team, I was emailed the link. 

I joined the hearing without issue, and I was surprised that I was not asked to identify myself. I had provided my name and labelled myself as an ‘observer’, but my camera and microphone were both off. It was not until Counsel for the Applicant gave her opening that she drew the court’s attention to members of the public who were attending (I was not the only one) and referred to a Transparency Order that was in place. I had not been sent this prior to the hearing but Counsel stated that observers should request this from the court after the hearing. I was later sent this by Celia Kitzinger. The order prevents anyone from publishing or communicating anything that identifies, or is likely to identify P, referred to as ‘GB’, who is the subject of these proceedings, or her family members.

The parties 

Counsel for the Applicant, Ms Bridget Dolan KC, gave an opening summary (as advised by the former Vice President of the Court of Protection here)  which I found very helpful. 

From this, I understood that the Applicant was an NHS Trust (Hertfordshire Community NHS Trust)  which has tried to provide medical care to GB at her home. 

The first respondent, GB, was a lady in her 80s who has dementia and lives with her son who is her full-time carer. Ms Katie Gollop KC acted for GB via the Official Solicitor.

GB’s son was the second respondent and a litigant in person.

In her opening, Ms Dolan KC stated that she would refer to GB by her name (knowing that observers are prevented from reporting GB’s name by the Transparency Order) in order to not dehumanise her in the proceedings. I thought this demonstrated respect for GB and acknowledged that she was at the heart of the matter. 

Ms Dolan KC stated that there was no question that GB lacks capacity to make decisions about her health, welfare and care and so, she did not go into detail about this. She did note however, the mental and physical impact that GB’s dementia had had on her as she was now non-verbal, bed-bound, and near the end of her life. 

Ms Dolan KC then turned to the issues and the order that was being sought. 

The issues and order sought 

It was explained that health and social care staff, referred to as ‘nurses’ throughout the hearing, had struggled to gain access to P at home as her son often prevents them from entering. On previous occasions, nurses had gained access by attending with the police. 

Ms Dolan KC said that although GB’s son cares for her with “love, care and devotion”, the problem is that “her needs are such that what she needs to keep her safe and comfortable goes beyond what can be provided by a family member”. This had become a particular concern when GB was at risk of sepsis after a pressure sore had become infected. 

Consequently, the Applicant made a short notice application for an injunction requiring GB’s son to allow the health and social care staff access to the house. To facilitate GB’s compliance with this, it was accepted by the Applicant that they should provide GB’s son with as much notice as possible via email. GB’s son also has to allow the staff to provide care and treatment to GB without obstruction, and he is not permitted to film those attending to provide care or take other action designed to intimidate them.

This injunction had first been granted by Mrs Justice Morgan in a hearing on Wednesday 5th July 2022. The court had returned on Friday 14th July 2023 for a full hearing to determine if the injunction should continue and if so, for how long. The Applicant wanted the injunction to continue for 8 weeks, and it was hoped that in that time, GB’s son and the nurses could reach an agreement and rebuild a relationship of trust so that they did not have to resort to relying on the injunction and/or the police to provide care to GB. 

After Ms Dolan KC’s opening, the judge invited GB’s son to address the court. GB’s son said that he did not oppose the injunction, but “sometimes the nurses just turn up willy-nilly and it’s not appropriate”. GB’s son explained that this was an issue as the nurses did not provide him with any notice that they were attending which was inconvenient for him, and also interfered with his mother’s routine which was very important given her dementia. 

The son also did not see the need for the nurses to attend every day. He explained that he was able to provide a good level of care to his mother and so, it would be more appropriate for them to come on a weekly basis. 

The judge then turned to Ms Gollop KC, who stated that it was clear that GB is highly vulnerable but there was no doubt that her son does his best to support her. She said that when GB was able to verbalise her wishes and feelings, it was her wish to stay at home.  

Ms Gollop KC further stated that GB’s son “loves her very much and doesn’t want to be without her, but the best way for her to live as long and as well as possible is if he can accommodate the visitors to his home who can provide the care for her”. 

Judgment 

The judge gave a background to the application, noting that unfortunately, “considerable friction” had emerged between P’s son and the employees of the NHS Trust whose duty it is to oversee her care. 

The judge stated that GB “no doubt receives the best possible care [her son] can give her” and   “there is no doubt that he loves her, and she loves him. He keeps her clean, changes her, moves her and she is lucky to have him to do that,” but there were elements to GB’s care which extended beyond the skills of a layman and so, it was important that the nurses could enter the property to treat GB. 

The judge said that it was undoubtedly in GB’s best interests for medical staff to have easy access to her, without interference, whenever needed. Consequently, he was “absolutely clear” that the injunction should continue. However, the judge noted the importance of the nurses giving GB’s son notice wherever possible before attending. 

Unfortunately, I lost signal for 30 seconds or so, but was quickly reconnected. The judge had moved on to explain that the injunction also forbid the son from intimidating the nurses in any way, including filming them giving care. The judge said that he was not saying this behaviour had already happened, but it must not happen in the future. 

The judge concluded by stating, “a High Court injunction is an extremely serious matter. It is an Order that must be obeyed. If not, it could be brought back to this court and [GB’s son] could be sent to prison for up to two years. That would be exceptionally serious for his mother because he would not then be able to care for her”.

Post-judgment

Once the judge had concluded his judgment, another participant on the call started speaking. She did not have her camera on at first, and her name did not appear, but she introduced herself as GB’s granddaughter. I am unsure whether the court knew that she was in attendance, but I understand that she was not a party to the proceedings which may explain why she had not been spoken to earlier.  

The granddaughter asked if the court had read her witness statement. The judge said that he had not received or read this. The granddaughter went on to try to justify why it was important that they were able to film the nurses when they were treating GB (“for their safety and our safety given the allegations made”).  The judge, however, interrupted her and stated that he had made an injunction forbidding recording as it was for the medical staff to determine what care GB required and it was highly inappropriate for anyone to film them giving such care. 

GB’s son then stated that he had sent the court a witness statement with some exhibits. I did not have access to the bundle, but I understood that some of the exhibits were videos he had taken of the nurses. GB’s son asked the judge to confirm that he had read / viewed these. 

At this point, the judge’s tone changed and sounded very stern.  He said, “it is not for you to require a judge of the High Court to confirm anything one way or the other”. The judge then confirmed that he had read sufficient information to enable him to make his decision. GB’s son apologised for asking this question but rephrased it in an effort to understand what evidence the judge had considered. The judge said, “I have not been able to read or view everything that has been sent to me because there are only so many hours in the day”.

The judge then concluded the hearing by saying “thank you very much indeed. That is the order of the court”, before leaving the call. As the parties were leaving, both Counsel thanked the judge, however GB’s son said, “he’s not getting a thank you from me!”.

Reflections

Despite having to chase the court for the Teams link, I thought that it was straightforward to attend the hearing and the court were happy to accommodate me. 

Throughout the hearing, it seemed as though the court took a more collaborative approach which tried to accommodate each parties’ concerns, rather than the typical adversarial style of litigation. For example, the judge asked the nurses to provide notice wherever possible to GB’s son when attending. 

I thought that all parties were focusing on GB’s best interests, but this case was a clear example of how best interests can be assessed differently. For instance, GB’s son thought that it was not in GB’s best interests to have her routine disrupted by daily visits from nurses, but the Applicant deemed it necessary to treat GB as and when required in order to uphold her best interests. Despite this, the son did not oppose the injunction and so, the court did not need to go into a detailed analysis of the issues between the parties. Furthermore, for this reason, it made sense for the judge to continue the injunction. 

Unfortunately, the hearing ended on a less positive note. It seemed as though GB’s son was frustrated that not all of his evidence had been considered, which was understandable given the matter concerned his mother who he loves very much. However, I can also understand the court’s position as the son had raised these issues but not opposed the injunction. Nonetheless, perhaps this could have been handled differently, especially as GB’s son was a litigant in person who was not familiar with the court process and consequently, may have questioned the fairness of the hearing. 

Overall, I enjoyed observing as I was able to see first-hand how the court arrives at their decision, as opposed to simply reading the judgments. I would be keen to observe more hearings, especially those where the parties are not in agreement, as I would see the court analyse what is in P’s best interests in more detail. This experience, however, allowed me to see a different type of advocacy and understand some daily issues being brought before the COP.  

Pippa Arnold is currently working as a County Court Advocate and hopes to become a barrister and develop a practice in the Court of Protection having developed an interest in this area from her studies and work experience to date. 


[1] One of these cases was also covered in a blog post here: Why covid vaccination is NOT in this care home resident’s best interests by Astral Heaven

Note: All quotes purporting to be direct quotations from the hearing are as accurate as possible, based on contemporaneous notes – but are unlikely to be 100% verbatim since we are not allowed to audio-record hearings.

A judicial embargo and our decision to postpone

By Celia Kitzinger, 27 July 2023

More than sixty people have asked for the link to observe Mr Justice Hayden’s ‘fact finding’ hearing (COP 12975950) over the last two weeks, and I’ve published a purely factual report about the issues before the court here: Fact-finding hearing: “Little short of outright war“.

As I said in that post, 10 observers have made short contributions to a collective “group blog” that has been up in the WordPress system and ready to go since 24th July 2023 (three days ago now).

Unlike the blog post I’ve already published, this unpublished multi-authored post isn’t purely “factual’. It includes opinion, analysis, and the authors make links with their personal and professional experience. I haven’t yet pressed the “PUBLISH” button.

Initially I didn’t press “PUBLISH” because I was concerned about two things. First, I’d seen how stressed and anxious many of the care home staff are when giving evidence, and I thought our blog post – which expresses some opinions about the reliability of the witness evidence and the effect of cross-examination on it – might contribute to that. It seemed unkind to (potentially) expose the witnesses who hadn’t yet given evidence to bloggers’ criticisms of those who had already done so. Second, I was concerned about a claim made by another judge, Mr Justice Mostyn, in relation to a different blog post earlier this year – a blog post that was then removed and has not subsequently been reposted. Mr Justice Mostyn said that publishing a blog post containing opinion – as opposed to just fact – before the judgment is published may put us in breach of ss 1 and 2 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981. There is, he said, a not insubstantial (but real) risk that the course of justice in the proceedings would be impeded or prejudiced, in that the mind of the court may be subconsciously influenced on reading the post.

I raised both matters in a letter I sent to Mr Justice Hayden in time for it to be considered at the beginning of the hearing the next day. Here’s the letter (sent on 25 July 2023)

The judge addressed my email in court as I was watching on the remote link. He indicated initially that he did not have any objection to publication but asked for the views of counsel. Counsel for the protected party’s father said he had no views. Counsel for the protected party via the Official Solicitor said she had no instruction and asked for the opportunity to consult and return to the matter after the lunch break.

The morning’s hearing went ahead and I was immediately relieved that we had not published the blog post – since I would have hated to be held accountable in any way for the visible distress and anxiety exhibited by the next witness, who was tearful and hyperventilating as she gave her evidence.

After the lunch break, the Official Solicitor asked for a publication embargo. She quoted from my email, where I said I thought that “views expressed about the reliability of the evidence so far could be a source of anxiety for those who have yet to give evidence” and she expressed concern about the extent of anxiety displayed by the care home witnesses in general, and by the witness that morning in particular.

The judge then made his decision.

The sound quality was not good at the time and I heard the decision (that there should be no publication until after the care home witnesses had finished giving evidence) but only part of the reasons for it. I heard the judge say it was not because of the anxiety of the witnesses since “it is difficult to see how they could be made more anxious than they have revealed themselves to be“.   Rather it was because  “the integrity of the evidence at the moment would be better preserved if it were not commented on in the public domain“.

My own view is that this entirely reasonable under the circumstances.

When I discussed the matter with the Core Team responsible for the Open Justice Court of Protection Project, there was a unanimous view that the fairest way to proceed would actually be to wait until the family members have also given their evidence – the father on Friday 28 July and the mother on Monday 31 July. Whatever protection from our influence or criticism has been accorded to the care home staff should also, we think, be accorded to the family. It’s only another two (working) days – so to us that seems proportionate.1

In fact, by the time the judge made his decision to embargo our blog post, I’d already decided it wouldn’t be ethical to publish it immediately anyway – not after the distress I’d seen from the witness that morning. And now we’ve voluntarily extended the publication delay to avoid any unnecessary upset to the family while the case is still being heard.

So, the multi-authored blog post is on hold until the witnesses have finished giving evidence – and meanwhile I’m collecting contributions for a subsequent blog post covering the second week of the hearing. If you have observed any parts of the hearing, please think about contributing. We’re interested in something that explains who you are, and the personal or professional perspective you bring to bear on the issues in the hearing, what you expected the hearing to be like, and how you actually experienced it, the issues it raised for you and what you took away from it.

This whole experience leaves me reflecting on how current ‘media law’ and policy around court observation has not really been developed to cover the kinds of things public observers like us (not journalists, not lawyers) want to write about.

When we watch hearings we don’t usually just want to report the facts – indeed, we’re often not the people best placed to establish the facts, since we have less access to documentation than journalists do, and less skill in legal analysis than the lawyers.

What we often want to do is ‘connect’ in some way – personal or professional – with the stories we are hearing. We say to each other things like: “Gosh, I couldn’t imagine, when I was a litigant in person actually standing up in court and having the confidence to do that!“; or “I didn’t expect the courtroom in such a serious legal matter to include human relationships with humour or compassion“; or “As someone working in the NHS myself, here’s how I have felt about and reacted to ‘difficult’ families” or – in my case – “I’ve been a ‘difficult’ family member with ‘unreasonable’ demands – how painful to see it played out here in court‘”. And that’s what our blogs are about – and that’s not the sort of thing that journalists or lawyers usually write about – although of course they have their own experiences of the health and social care system too.

As far as I know there’s nothing quite like this happening in any other courts – and the Court of Protection rules and procedures weren’t developed with us in mind. Although the Court of Protection Transparency Pilot, right from the beginning, envisaged members of the public (not just journalists) observing court hearings, our Project wasn’t invented back then and our nearly-400 blog posts about court hearings could not then have been imagined – much less provided for in court guidance.

I think we’re creating an important space for public engagement with the justice system, but we’re having to make up some of the rules as we go along – and by “we” I mean everyone who observes and blogs about court hearings, and everyone who advocates for the parties in court, and everyone who hears cases and hands down judgments. I’m grateful to the lawyers and to Mr Justice Hayden in this case – and of course to the many other lawyers and judges whose hearings we’ve blogged about in the past – for engaging with this Project and for their commitment to open justice and transparency in the Court of Protection.

Celia Kitzinger is co-director of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project. She has observed more than 450 hearings since May 2020 and written more than 100 blog posts. She is on LinkedIn (here), and tweets @KitzingerCelia

Note 1: As it turned out, the hearing was adjourned on Monday 31st July due to illness of Lead Counsel for the applicant ICB, and re-listed for the next available dates, 6th and 9th October 2023. The father will finish giving his evidence (he was part way through) and the mother and grandmother will give their evidence, in October. And we’ll publish our blog posts after they have done so.

Fact-finding hearing: “Little short of outright war”

By Celia Kitzinger, 24th July 2023

Fact-finding hearings are rare in the Court of Protection. We’ve previously published only two blog posts about fact-finding hearings: one before HHJ Tindal (“Abuse and coercive control? A fact-finding hearing and exoneration“) and another hearing that was adjourned part way before HHJ Lopez (Fact-finding, ‘magnetic importance’, and the consternation of colleagues: A final hearing adjourned).

Fact-finding hearings arise when one party makes allegations against another that are of significance and will impact upon decisions that need to be made – like where the vulnerable person at the centre of the case will live, or the contact they will have with family members. 

In this case (COP 12975950), the ICB (Integrated Care Board) – with the Care Home – is making serious accusations against the family. And the family has made very serious accusations against the Care Home. When one of the witnesses referred to “a breakdown in communication“, the judge – Mr Justice Hayden – intervened to say it was “something rather more serious than that“, describing it as “little short of outright war between carers and the family“.

The carers say the parents have been intimidating, threatening and challenging to staff and used rude or abusive words to them (thereby breaching injunctive orders from a previous hearing).  

They say both parents and the grandmother have tampered with their daughter’s medical equipment, including the equipment used to deliver oxygen, suction and feeding, and that they’ve placed her at risk of harm by interfering during her medical care.

There are counter accusations from the father, supported by the mother and grandmother.  He says that staff at the care home have placed his daughter at risk of harm by failing to provided proper care.  He says they’ve not properly maintained her airway and lungs, her oxygen supply, her tracheostomy, or feeding tubes.  He says they’ve failed to ensure she has adequate equipment which is properly set up, and that they’ve failed to maintain her personal hygiene, have used unsafe secondary ventilator settings, and failed to administer essential medications.  

These are all very serious allegations – both those by the Care Home and ICB against the family, and those by the family against the Care Home.

The outcome of this hearing will be that the judge, Mr Justice Hayden, will decide the facts of the matter – and those “facts”, as determined by the judge in accordance with the civil standard of “balance of probability”, will have a profound impact on future decisions made for P: on where she lives, who cares for her, and the time she spends with the three closest members of her family.

The young woman at the centre of the case (referred to as “G” in earlier judgments, so that is the initial we’ll use in our blog posts) is 28 years old with a progressive neurological condition. She is in a low awareness state, has a tracheostomy and ventilator, and requires skilled 24/7 care.  She moved from Hospital (where she’d been for the previous 14 years) to a Care Home in mid-August 2022.  Clearly, things have not gone well in the last 11 months.

Her family wanted her to come home rather than move to a care home, but in a previous judgment (in December 2021)  Hayden J ordered she should move to the Care Home because an immediate move home was “fretted with risk” and “might set G up to fail” so that then “she would have no further chance to return to her parents’ care“.  The move to the Care Home was intended, initially, as a step-down from hospital care “to smooth out the transition to any return home” (from the December 2021 judgment, Re G [2021} EWCOP 69).

An unusual feature of this case is that G’s father has made audio-recordings on his telephone when he has visited his daughter in the Care Home.  Some of these have been played in court.  They provide powerful contemporaneous evidence of what was said on particular occasions  – listening to them helps to determine who said what and whether or not (for example) a family member was screaming or shouting at staff, whether they were “rude”, how long it was before someone reported a fault with equipment, and so on.  Memories and records of these events provide one source of evidence. The recordings provide another.  There are also contemporaneous – usually handwritten and initialled – care records maintained by the Care Home, which provide another source of evidence about what happened.  Some of these care records have been displayed on screen in the course of the hearing.

The hearing is taking place in a courtroom in the Royal Courts of Justice.  There is also a video-link and some people are participating remotely.  This includes G’s grandmother (for the first part of the hearing) and some of the witnesses.

The lawyers are all in the courtroom and the barristers are easily recognisable as such because they are wearing wigs. If you join a few minutes before the hearing starts, you’ll often see them putting them on (sometimes their jabots, too) – and complaining about them being “itchy”.  Their instructing solicitors sit behind them, usually alongside their clients. Both parents are in the physical courtroom.  So are some observers (right at the back) – and sometimes the PA journalist, Brian Farmer, appears for parts of the hearing.  He wrote an article about the case after the first day of the hearing which was published in The Independent: “Parents and grandmother accused of ‘tampering’ with woman’s medical equipment”.

The barristers addressing the judge (so-called “Leading Counsel” in this case) are:

If you click on the links, you’ll see photos of them – though they look a bit different dressed up in court (“robed”). 

The grandmother does not have a legal team. She appears as a litigant in person, which is why she is able to cross-question the witnesses (whereas the lawyers do the cross-questioning for the parents).

Other people visible in court if you join by video-link might include: 

  • Olivia Kirkbride, Junior Counsel for the ICB and the Care Home
  • Benjamin Harrison, Junior Counsel for G via her litigation friend the Official Solicitor – He’s sometimes visible in court when he’s helping witnesses find the right page in the bundle of court documents.
  • Francesca Gardner, Junior Counsel for G’s father
  • Nicola Kohn, Junior Counsel for G’s mother.

They are “junior” only in the sense that they are not (yet) KCs – “Kings Counsel” – i.e. those barristers (or solicitor advocates) and who’ve been recognised for excellence in advocacy, who are seen as leaders in their area of law, who generally take on more complex cases requiring a higher level of expertise.  Junior counsel have a very important but less visible role to play in this hearing, and they support senior counsel (the KCs) in court – for example by finding the correct material or references as witnesses are examined, allowing senior counsel to focus more on formulating their questions.

The witnesses – so far including the Safeguarding Lead, some health care assistants, the clinical lead from the care home and some nurses –  are sometimes in the physical courtroom, and sometimes on the remote link. There are more witnesses from the care home still to come. Both parents and the grandmother will also give evidence.

Each witness is ‘sworn in’ or asked to make the (non-religious) ‘affirmation’ that they will tell the truth.  Each has submitted one or more written statements and is asked to confirm they are true, and to make any corrections.  Then they are questioned about what they’ve said to “test their evidence” – and sometimes their statements are compared with what they or others wrote at the time in the care home records,  or with an audio-recording. It’s clear from watching that this is a very stressful experience for them. The judge is trying hard to reduce their stress and explain to them how the process works.

The evidence and questions are focussed around a few specific events.  For example, there have been some occasions when G’s oxygen was not reaching her and there are different views about how that came about. There was an occasion when G was transported from hospital back to the care home with a cracked piece of ventilation equipment: the nurse says it was a “hairline crack”; the father has a photograph (which was displayed on screen) showing a piece of equipment completely broken through.  On another occasion, the parents returned late from a day out with G and the night nurse asked them to hand over G at the front door rather than admitting them into the Care Home: she alleges that G’s mother shouted at her and (deliberately?) injured her foot with the wheelchair by continuing to push G’s wheelchair into the building.

Transparency matters

The judiciary, lawyers and staff of the Court of Protection are deeply committed to transparency.  

But the Court of Protection doesn’t always deliver on the aspiration to transparency, and our blog posts continue to chart the multiple problems of access experienced by would-be observers over the last three years – both in relation to access to the physical courtroom for in-person hearings (where staff have told us that the hearing is not taking place or have stopped us from entering the courtroom, or there have been “PRIVATE” signs on the door) and in relation to remote access (quite often because nobody responds to our email requests for the link – or they don’t respond in time).

Unusually – this has never happened before! – Mr Justice Hayden has given permission for me to share the MS Teams link for this hearing with anyone who wants to observe – just email via openjustice@yahoo.com.  So far, I’ve personally sent out the link to nearly 30 people.  You can also ask the Royal Courts of Justice staff to send it out (which is the normal route to gain remote access):  Email: rcj.familyhighcourt@justice.gov.uk  

But I have run into a transparency problem in relation to this hearing. Ten of the observers have written short contributions for a collective group blog about their experience of the hearing so far. This is ready to publish, and I had intended to post it today. It’s all ready to go.

On the verge of pressing the “Publish” button, I had a crisis of confidence because of an incident that occurred earlier this year in relation to another blog post we published about a different, but also (at the time) ongoing, case before Mostyn J. That blog post contained some strong opinions, and after it was published Mostyn J informed me that we may have been in breach of ss 1 and 2 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 – because (he said) there was a not insubstantial (but real) risk that the course of justice in the proceedings would be impeded or prejudiced, in that the mind of the court may have been subconsciously influenced on reading the post. I removed the blog post immediately – but the episode caused a lot of anxiety and distress. And it has left its legacy.

The ten bloggers who’ve written about this hearing before Hayden J have some strong opinions – about the efficacy of the cross-examination, the reliability of the witness evidence, the approach of the judge. The hearing is ongoing. I dare not risk publishing without being sure that I’m not in contempt of court, And I cannot risk exposing the ten bloggers to being in contempt of court either. So I’ll press the ‘PUBLISH” button only when I get some reassurance from lawyers that I can go ahead.

This transparency business comes with risks – both for the courts and, obviously, for us as observers.

But don’t let that stop you from observing this ongoing hearing – and drafting a commentary on it which we can publish after the hearing is finished, if not before.

For more background to the case, see these two previous judgments: Re G [2021] EWCOP 69 and Re G [2022] EWCOP 25.)

Celia Kitzinger is co-director of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project. She has observed more than 460 hearings since May 2020 and written more than 100 blog posts. She is on LinkedIn (here), and tweets @KitzingerCelia

Giving P “one more roll of the dice”

By Claire Martin, 20 July 2023

This case (COP 1381929T, 17th July 2023) is about whether Mr B can move back to his own home, with or without his wife, Mrs B. They live together in a care home at the moment. 

I received the link for this hearing – as well as the Transparency Order! – in the morning for a 1.30pm start. It’s so helpful to have the link in plenty of time. 

The judge, His Honour Judge Whybrow, sitting in Hull was also extremely facilitative. The hearing started a little late and while I was waiting in the virtual lobby, the judge came on the link and spoke to me. He said that there was a short delay and the hearing would be starting soon. 

Then, when the hearing started, he asked me to put my camera on and to confirm that I had received the Transparency Order (yes) and whether I knew anything about the case (no) and whether a ‘short exposition’ would be helpful (yes). 

A Faltering Start

There had to be a break almost immediately because when HHJ Whybrow turned to Mr B (the applicant in this case, via his Litigation Friend, his Relevant Person’s Representative), who was on a link from his care home, he couldn’t hear him. Mr B was talking animatedly, but his audio was off. And then when the audio was on, the connectivity was poor in the room where Mr B was. 

The judge said he would leave the hearing for a time whilst the care home sorted out the link. 

Mr B was still on screen and we could hear a person (I think a care home member of staff) speaking to Mr B explaining that the connection wasn’t good in the room he was in and they would need to move to another room. I heard Mr B say ‘Forget it’: he looked irritated and then he started to stand up. His link then cut off. 

When we started again not long afterwards, Kelly Hutchinson (representing Mr B) said that he had become ‘agitated’ and ‘fed up with the process’. Their paralegal had called Mr B but ‘now he doesn’t wish to engage, saying that if anyone wants to speak to him they can visit him’.  

Counsel for Mr B then considered various options: 

  • to proceed without Mr B’s presence
  • to proceed later the same afternoon after Mr B had had the opportunity to ‘calm down and see if he will join later on’ 
  • or an in-person hearing to be arranged. 

HHJ Whybrow said that it was ‘unfair to proceed with [Mr B’s] absence’. And that ‘in-person is not an option. He hasn’t left the care home for 3 years.’ 

The second option was chosen and it was agreed to reconvene about an hour and a half later, at 3.30pm. The judge advised that a ‘dummy run at 3.15’ with Mr B should be done, to ensure that he was properly connected. HHJ Whybrow asked me if I would like to observe later so I turned my camera on and said that I would be there. 

Just before leaving the judge asked: “What are the issues today though?

Kelly Hutchinson explained that today’s issues were about best interests for where Mr B should live and receive care. He has ‘strong wishes and feelings – but he can’t consent. We need a court decision’. She also said that there is a question of ‘whether there should be a recording in the order [that] Mr B is not to drink alcohol and not to access places to purchase alcohol’. 

The Court Reconvenes

Mr B was not on the link. That didn’t surprise me. He had seemed mightily fed up when he left the link earlier. 

Kelly Hutchinson said that Mr B had returned to his room with his wife and this has ‘exacerbated his agitation’. She said the options were ‘to adjourn and see if he can join, or to proceed today. [Mr B] has wished for the matter to be drawn to an end. There have been difficulties engaging Mr B – it may be that his participation can’t be facilitated’.

But Mr B’s participation had been on offer at the start of the hearing! He was sitting waiting to speak and did so when the judge addressed him – quite animatedly. What a shame it was that the sound hadn’t been turned on for him and that he had been set up in a room that was apparently not good for connectivity to the internet. 

Why is the case in court? 

Since I was on the link, HHJ Whybrow gave a very helpful summary of the case,: 

Dr Martin is here – she’s observing and brief summary would be helpful. The application was made on behalf of [Mr B]. … The main issue is whether or not Mr B should be able to return home – he has a strong wish – or whether he should be retained in the current care home. One complication is that his wife, Mrs B, is also in the same home and they share the same accommodation. There is already approval for Mrs B to remain there even though she herself would rather move home. She sees matters the same as her husband. Her own needs, her agitation is much greater than her husband’s. Her best interests are to remain where she is. The court has previously approved this. There is no likelihood that, even if he were able to go home, he would want to go home without Mrs B. This is the most touching part [of the case] – they are very close. There is something of a dynamic. Mrs B is more forceful and dominating, Mr B steps into line with her requests. Even if he was tempted to go home, she would prevail upon him not to go. They have been in the care home for three years and retain their home in [place] to return to. They haven’t left the care home and don’t want to go out, even into the garden. It’s very unusual …. It’s a stark situation. They want to go home and are not willing to countenance any middle ground – they are convinced they are going home. Dr Martin that is a brief summary.

I quickly formed the impression that the judge felt compassion for Mr and Mrs B, as well as some bewilderment at the absolute position that they take in relation to their situation. 

Mr B was not in court though and a decision about how to proceed was needed: to continue without Mr B or not. 

Both counsel (Kelly Hutchinson for Mr B and Holly Littlewood for East Riding of Yorkshire Council) were of the view to continue. 

The judge had a different view:

I can understand the strong argument for saying the case should finish today. The evidence is all in. Mr B hasn’t hitherto taken part to any meaningful extent despite saying he wanted to. Today unusually he tried to take part. He was talking but no one could hear due to the tech [I thought that was a generous interpretation of the issues!]. I know they [Mr and Mrs B] want the case to finish – they believe it is a conspiracy by the NHS and they want to go home and they are excited there will be a decision. Against that I am concerned that the professional evidence is all very much against them going home, that the risks are too great and, given that Mrs B is staying there, I can’t see that Mr B would want to go. I can’t see it is right for Mr B to see the outcome like this without the chance to take part in proceedings. I think [counsel] has been blindsided by proceedings. If [the paralegal] had been with Mr B it might have been different. He has been hampered because of tech and then lost patience and given up hope. I am very conscious that today should be centred around Mr B being able to take part and listen. I am very uneasy about finishing proceedings today Ms Hutchinson. There are two options – one to adjourn and come back next week, the other to go ahead and make a decision and give Mr B the opportunity to rehear it if he wishes to take part. On balance the former is the best option – the second is too subtle.”

In any event, it was decided that Kelly Hutchinson’s paralegal colleague would be with Mr B next week and they would try to have a hearing that includes him then. 

The Local Authority, said Holly Littlewood, was ‘concerned about adjournment … that said, if you think one more opportunity, then the Local Authority would not stand in the way’

HHJ Whybrow emphasised: “I am decided it’s right to adjourn. The sole ground is that we need to hear the wishes and feelings of Mr B. We need to give him one more roll of the dice. Mr [paralegal] needs to be there, rather than relying on the staff“.

Hooray for HHJ Whybrow, I thought.  

The next hearing for Mr B will be Monday 24th July 2023 at 3pm. 

Claire Martin is a Consultant Clinical Psychologist, Cumbria, Northumberland, Tyne and Wear NHS Foundation Trust, Older People’s Clinical Psychology Department, Gateshead. She is a member of the core group of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project and has published several blog posts for the Project about hearings she’s observed (e.g. here and here). She tweets @DocCMartin

Note: Quotations are taken from contemporaneous notes and are as accurate as they can be given that we are not allowed to record hearings. For the avoidance of doubt, the image accompanying this blog post is a stock image and is not a photograph of the couple at the centre of this case.

Very like London buses – several ‘property and affairs’ hearings all at once

By Georgina Baidoun, 16 July 2023

I have become lazy about looking for hearings in my area of interest, which is property and affairs and particularly Court of Protection deputy issues, because there are so few listed and those few tend increasingly to be held in person or to be vacated/cancelled. The advent of good weather and the demands of the garden also played a part! This week it rained and I decided to try – with a little extra prodding/help from Celia – to re-engage.

On Monday I asked to observe a hearing in Walsall that was taking place at 3.00pm. I got a message back at 11.00am saying it had been vacated.

On Wednesday, Celia had found two hearings for me, one at First Avenue House at 10.00am and another in Sheffield at 12 noon. I got an email from First Avenue House at 8.55am (very impressive) to tell me that that hearing had been put back to 12 noon. Given the chances of the Sheffield hearing being vacated, I was tempted to hold both options open but decided that would be too nerve wracking. The First Avenue case did at least sound as though it would happen but good manners told me I should go with Sheffield. Virtue had its reward and the Sheffield connection worked like a dream; I got a link at 10.37. There was a bit of a false start, but more of that later.

On Friday, I asked to observe two consecutive cases in Bradford, one at 11.00am and one at 12 noon. The point of contact for both Bradford and Sheffield is Leeds (because both are part of the North East-East Regional Hub – for more information about Regional Hubs check out this page) and the Leeds contact had worked so well on Wednesday that, when I had heard nothing by 10.15, I imagined the delay was with Bradford and therefore emailed them directly. When that produced nothing, I rang Leeds. As I thought, they had forwarded my request but were also able to tell me that the 11.00am was likely to be vacated. They said if I rang them closer to the start of the 12 noon hearing they would try to help but didn’t discourage me from ringing Bradford. So, towards 12 noon, I rang Bradford. I made such good choices out of the telephone options that I was immediately talking to someone who was able to tell me that they were waiting for the judge’s approval and he was in a hearing – the one I was told was likely vacated? More of that one later too.

So, two out of five, of which a little more below.

1. Validity of a Lasting Power of Attorney: COP 13977278 before DJ Roebuck

Having been given the link so early, it was up to me when to join. I believe it is courteous to join early so I was in the court well before noon. Almost immediately there was someone else on the screen who was clearly not part of the court staff and was extremely surprised to see me. He said he thought he must be in the wrong place and that he would log off and come back later. I did my best to reassure him that I was an observer and that he should stay where he was. Luckily others (family members it turned out) then appeared and they started talking among themselves. After a few minutes the clerk and judge joined us. I have not had that experience before.

It turned out that my presence was also a surprise, and not a welcome one it seemed, to the barrister, Mr Alex Lawsonof 33 Bedford Row, who was representing the Public Guardian. When the Judge introduced me, she asked if there were any objections. He immediately replied that he had not been expecting an observer. The judge replied that she had only heard about my existence a little while earlier while she was in another hearing. Mr Lawson did not look very happy but did not pursue an objection. I’m afraid this tended to confirm a suspicion I have that the Office of the Public Guardian does not like observers.   

I never did find out who any of the parties were. I was not served with a Transparency Order, which would have given me this information and it didn’t become clear to me in the hearing, which was very brief. (I have since asked the court and Mr Lawson to provide me with a TO but have had no response.)

The hearing turned out to be an emergency hearing for the judge to make an order about medical records. For this reason, I wasn’t surprised that no summary of what had gone before was provided, although Celia says I should have been and referred me to the (former) Vice President’s memo saying so (here). Not having an introductory summary meant that I had to engage  as so often, in a bit of a guessing game. It seemed that there was a dispute between members of the family about the validity of an LPA and that P’s wife and some children were on one side of that dispute and one child on the other. None of them had legal representation. The validity of the LPA hinged on whether P had had capacity to make the LPA at the point when he made it. The OPG had seen medical records from his GP (which might or might not have included records from a dementia clinic also involved in P’s care) and had presumably been happy to accept at that stage that P did have capacity, since they had then, as required by Data Protection law, destroyed them. Now one of the children was questioning this acceptance and was requesting access to the records. This required the judge to make a ‘third party order’ for the GP to again release the records prior to the full two-day hearing, which had been scheduled for next week.

Clearly the records were not going to be obtained immediately and the judge and Mr Lawson were both of the opinion that a delay of 6 weeks would now be necessary. This delay was opposed by at least one family member because P, who was now terminally ill, would probably not be alive by the time the case was resolved. The judge asked Mr Lawson for confirmation that P’s death would result in the case being closed; he agreed, I thought a little uncertainly, that it would be. It left me wondering what would happen next, if there had been, for instance, a misapplication of assets. I guess an expensive civil suit would be the only possibility, which makes you realize how relatively cheap the Court of Protection can be.

An interesting issue was to whom the GP should send the records, especially as it seemed they would probably need to be redacted. Mr Lawson agreed that the OPG would be the appropriate recipient as they had had the records before. Another issue was that the judge mentioned that she was applying to the Courts and Tribunals Service for an interpreter for one family member whose views had previously been interpreted by another family member. I wonder why this was thought to be necessary as the whole family spoke the same language and any disagreement about translation was hardly likely to be avoided even if the interpreter was an impartial outsider. 

2. Appointing a Court of Protection Professional Deputy: COP 14036507 before DJ Foster

This was another typical case of wondering whether or not to give up. As I have learned from my experience and that of others, it’s almost never too late to find yourself thrown into a hearing having waited well beyond the start time. If you hang on, you need to be prepared to be surprised. I was sitting at my desk with my laptop in front of me doing some work and occasionally glancing at my phone to see if a link had at last been sent when, 40 minutes after the noon starting time, I heard my landline ring. It was the first invitation I had ever had to join a telephone conference and I was so tempted to simply put the phone down. Instead, I pressed the buttons as instructed and was almost immediately being addressed by the judge. It seemed that the hearing had already started and the judge was interrupting it to welcome me and also to ask if I had received a Transparency Order, which he believed should have been the case. I answered that I had not had a TO but that I understood the generality of its contents. He asked me what my understanding was and was clearly relieved by my response, allowing him to proceed without my further involvement. 

The recorded message at the beginning of the session instructed me which buttons to press to mute myself but I was too worried I’d press the wrong ones to use them; I just kept very quiet! I think one of the other participants did make that mistake because the judge noted that he had left the conference and another participant then reported that he was trying desperately to return, which is apparently impossible. The judge had explained that the telephone was being used because of ‘significant technical problems’, which also meant he didn’t have access to on-line files. Fortunately, he had access to the ‘consent order’ which he said was sufficient.

The hearing itself was very straightforward, although I think there had been bumps along the way to get to the agreement that was reached. This was that several members of a family would support the appointment of a Court of Protection professional deputy for the property and financial affairs of P, another family member. It seemed that they had come to the conclusion that this was in the only way to avoid conflict with other family member(s), although it would not otherwise have been their choice, not least because of the costs involved in employing a professional. 

The judge’s role seemed only to be to check that they all understood the consequences of their decision. He also checked with the proposed appointee that his firm had sufficient indemnity to cover any losses and talked about the insurance bond that would need to be purchased after P’s assets were known. Finally, he reassured them that the professional deputy would have to report on all expenditure to the Office of the Public Guardian.

Reflections

Both of these cases involved several close family members and it stands to reason that the bigger the family the more likely they are to disagree. In the second case, the problems could only be resolved by appointing a professional to take over. In the first case it seems likely that the problems would not be resolved at all during the father’s lifetime. My way of trying to resolve these problems would be to name a professional (solicitor or possibly accountant) in the LPA, along with one or more family members. It would be interesting to hear what others think.

Looked at as a whole, I can only say that the experience of engaging with the Court of Protection is anything but predictable. It is also clear that the people working in the system often do a remarkable job in the face of considerable adversity. And timing is a real problem. Ideally you want to decide what to observe once the lists are completed at the end of a working day. That means your request reaches the court offices at the start of the day when staff are at their most busy. But when it works well it is impressive.

Georgina Baidoun was the lay Court of Protection Deputy for her mother’s Property and Financial Affairs until her mother died in 2021. Because of the difficulties she experienced with several applications to the Court, and with the Office of the Public Guardian in connection with her annual report, she has retained an interest in these areas, including attending recent Court of Protection Users Group meetings. She is keen to share her experiences in the hope that she can help others who have to engage with these institutions with very little help or guidance.  Georgina is the author of many previous blog posts including: A property and affairs application: Observations about P’s role and who should pay costsOffice of the Public Guardian steps in when attorneys don’t agree; and Unusually, this applicant had to pay costs in a Property and Financial Affairs case – the penalty for wasted work. She tweets as @GeorgeMKeynes. 

Cancer investigations – with restraint authorised if required

By Celia Kitzinger, 16 July 2023

Mr D is in his fifties, and he’s currently in a psychiatric hospital, with a longstanding diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and a suspected mild learning disability.  

He’s lost a lot of weight recently, and blood tests show a range of inflammatory markers indicative of potential cancer. Doctors say he needs a full-body CT scan and further blood tests to investigate this.

The problem – up until shortly before the hearing – was that he was “flatly refusing” to have a CT scan, and also refusing to engage in discussion about the issue. 

By the time of the hearing, however, Mr D seems to have changed his mind.  

The  applicant Trusts wanted the court to make  declarations that Mr D lacks capacity to make decisions about investigations and treatment, and that it’s in his best interests to undergo investigations for what might be an “aggressive cancer” (with sedation and restraint if necessary).

This is not an unusual scenario in the Court of Protection. 

There are many cases where people deemed to lack the capacity to make their own decisions about investigations and/or treatment say that they do not want medical interventions or treatment[1].

The parties

This case (COP 14099629) was an urgent application before Mrs Justice Theis, Vice President of the Court of Protection, in the Royal Courts of Justice, via MS Teams on Friday 23rd June 2023.

The applicant Acute Trust and Mental Health Trusts were represented by Rhys Hadden of Serjeants’ Inn. The Devon Partnership Mental Health Trust is responsible for Mr D’s examination and potential treatment, and the Mental Health Trust is responsible for his care while he’s a detained patient.

Mr D, as first respondent,  was represented (via his litigation friend the Official Solicitor)  by Elizabeth Fox – also of Serjeants’ Inn. Mr D was also present in (virtual) court, accompanied by a solicitor.

Mrs D, Mr D’s mother, was present at the hearing but did not wish to be joined as a party.  She didn’t speak at the hearing.

Transparency Matters: Position statements and Transparency Order

I requested Position Statements from both the Trusts and from the Official Solicitor.  I am grateful to the Official Solicitor for sending her Position Statement.  

I did not receive a copy of the Transparency Order and am assuming that it is the ‘standard’ order as summarised (orally) by Mrs Justice Theis in the course of the hearing. She said it prohibited anything that might “directly or indirectly identify [P] or his family”.  She said (as this judge – only! – usually does): “If anyone requires to see a copy of the order, then they should immediately communicate with the court[2]. I’ve not been sent a copy, but the OS’s Position Statement refers to the draft order and says it “provides that no person shall publish any information that might lead to the identification of [Mr N], his family or the clinicians providing him with care”.   So, it seems that, in fact, there is more in the Transparency Order than simply the prohibition on identifying P and his family – the identity of clinicians is included in the information we are prohibited from publishing. There is a danger in oral summaries from judges (or counsel) that they do not always adequately capture the scope of the Transparency Order, and so it is good practice for judges to ensure that the injunction is served on all observers (whether we believe ourselves to “require” it, or not – since we may not be best placed to make that assessment).  

One additional sentence of the OS’s Position Statement struck me: “The order currently lasts ‘until further order’ but this will likely need to be altered to a firm date in light of the recent decision in Abbasi v Newcastle upon Tyne [2023] EWCA Civ 331”.   This is a reference to a case heard by the Court of Appeal this year.  It concerned the principles to be applied when a court considers an application to vary or discharge a Reporting Restriction Order (“RRO”) made long before in end-of-life proceedings in the High Court”.  The current practice is to grant indefinite anonymity orders (‘until further orders’) and this was not seen as acceptable by the judges in the Court of Appeal.  In his Mental Capacity Law and Policyblog, Alex Ruck Keene comments:

it is clear on the basis of this judgment that in any case going forward – whether in relation to children or adults with impaired decision-making – that:

(1) as ‘refined’ a focus as possible is required by both the relevant parties and the court upon those individuals most clearly requiring protection;

(2) that the protection may be required to ensure the continued anonymity of the subject of the proceedings / their family; to maintain the integrity of the proceedings; or to secure against a risk of harm to a professional;

(3) that the focus may need to be refined as matters continue to unfold (and, in particular, in light of any relevant social media activity of concern);

(4) any application to continue the RRO after the end of the proceedings on the basis of continuing risk must be based upon clear evidence as to the nature of that risk; and

(5) indefinite RROs (at least in respect of securing the anonymity of professionals, rather than the person or their family) will very much be the exception rather than the norm.

“Reporting restrictions and serious medical treatment cases – a difficult (evidenced) balance” by Alex Ruck Keene, Mental Capacity Law and Policy, 31 March 2023 (my bold emphasis)

This means that if we are sent Transparency Orders – at least those relating to serious medical treatment – which grant anonymity for an indefinite period of time, we would do well to query them with the court and request that they are varied in line with the Court of Appeal decision in Abbasi.

The hearing

The first thing that happened after joining the video-platform was that we were all asked to log off again because Mr D had said he’d like to meet with the judge privately, and she wanted to use the same link.

When we logged on again, the judge provided a summary of their conversation.

The technology worked really well. We were able to hear each other. He clearly understood what the issues were that I was being asked to consider.  He wanted a CT scan to his head.  I said what was wanted was to scan other parts of his body, and he indicated he agreed with that as well.” (Judge)

Mr D nodded, apparently showing his agreement at this point.

The judge continued:

He understood it is on the same site.” (Judge)

At the time, I wasn’t sure what this meant, but the Position Statement from the OS made it clear.  The radiology department, where it is proposed that the CT scan and blood tests will be done, is in the same hospital grounds as the ward where Mr D is currently detained under s.3 of the Mental Health Act 1983. 

He requested a vehicle to take him He also agrees and understands about the blood test and agrees to that being done.  I initially thought he was asking me to deal with the blood test, but he realised the blood test would be done by someone at the hospital.  Ideally, he would like for this to be done today.  But he accepted it might need to be on MondayI can see that Mr D is doing a thumbs-up so I hope that means I’ve accurately summarised what he said.” (Judge)

Mr D did another thumbs up. It seemed he agreed!

Counsel for the Trusts introduced everyone in court and then provided a very helpful brief introductory summary of the case (as recommended by the former Vice President of the Court of Protection – click here).

He explained that prior to being detained in hospital under s. 3 Mental Health Act about six months ago, Mr D had been living in supported accommodation in the community for more than twenty years, and was stable. His medications have been changed and it is possible that he may regain capacity to make his own decisions about investigations and treatment.  For now, however, the applicants are seeking a declaration that he lacks the requisite capacity and that it’s in his best interest to undergo investigation and treatment.  However, the next available appointment was two weeks away.  

Trusts:  There is the potential for Mr D to be scanned on an emergency basis, and we can explore that further in the light of what he Mr D has said today.  Radiography, the anaesthetist and the relevant nursing staff are all available on 30 June.  But in light of what Mr D has said today, I’m trying to take instructions on whether that can be expedited.

Judge: I know that any delay would cause him anxiety and concern.

The ward doctor was in court and put up her hand at this point. She explained that the problem with an earlier appointment was that the anaesthetic department couldn’t guarantee their support at an earlier date, “because if there was an emergency that would take precedence”.

The judge addressed Mr D, saying: “Well it sounds like next Friday. What next Friday would do is it would give you certainty of who is going to b there and the arrangement would be fixed, rather than an uncertain appointment”. 

But Mr D was shaking his head, saying he wanted Monday not Friday and asking to address the judge again, privately, on the matter of the date.

We were asked to leave the hearing again (but this time to rejoin immediately and wait to be admitted in the virtual ‘waiting room’). When we were readmitted 15 minutes later the judge gave a short oral extempore judgment.

Judgment

“This is an urgent application made by Devon Partnership NHS Trust in relation to Mr D.  the court is being asked to make orders to the effect that it is in Mr D’s, who it is said lacks capacity, best interests, to have a CT scan and a blood test.  Mr D has joined this hearing, and I’ve had the very great benefit of being able to speak to Mr D across the court screen, and he’s set out his position and indicated very clearly to me today that he would agree to those procedures taking place.  He would like them to take place sooner, rather than later – today, or on Monday. But the position at the moment is that Dr X, the relevant doctor on the ward, gave the information in the hearing that the first fixed appointment is next Friday, 30th June 2023.  The court had the opportunity to discuss that with Mr D as well.  He repeated his wish for the scan to take place sooner, but recognised in the worst-case scenarios that next Friday would be it.  I urge the hospital to keep looking at the possibility of doing it earlier.  It will ease his understandable anxiety.  Up until today, Mr D was resistant to those procedures taking place.  Just dealing with the position of Mr D. He is currently on the hospital ward, subject of a provision under s.3 Mental Health Act since the beginning of this year, prior to which he lived for many years in the community.  He has psychosis and learning difficulties.  He recently deteriorated in his accommodation in the community. He was not looking after himself. He had angry outbursts. He was losing weight.  He was admitted to hospital and blood tests indicated that further investigations were necessary.  The court has the benefit of Mr A and Mr B – Mr A is the responsible clinician.  He sets out his capacity assessment and it is clear to me that Mr D is unable at the moment to weigh in the balance the relevant factors in making an informed decision.  His medication has been changed and by the middle of July he may have regained that capacity.  But he lacks now decision-making capacity for medical issues and for litigation. This is accepted by the Official Solicitor.  Turning now to the relevant legal framework.  I am satisfied that Mr D lacks capacity. There has been a discussion in the Position Statements as to whether there should be an interim s.48 declaration, or s.15 as sought by the applicants. The court accepts s.15 at this stage on the basis it’s clear in the order that this is on the basis of the evidence the court has at the moment.  Both parties will keep this under active review.   So, the court needs to consider whether the scan and the blood tests are treatments that meet Mr D’s best interests.  Whilst I recognise there has been a history of Mr D not wishing to consent to such treatment, that changed this morning.  I am alive to the fact that the position may change again.  This case will come back to court again in late July.  The care plan I am asked to authorise sets out a very careful, considerate and staged approach in relation to this treatment – starting out with Mr D agreeing, to having support systems in place and stepping up medications needed to calm Mr D’s anxieties, and the possibility of any restraint […]. Beating in mind the nature of the investigations, and concerns about what they may reveal, and the imperative need for Mr D to have these investigations, I am of the view that the care plan as set out should be authorised by the court.  But I hope that Mr D having been able to hear what the court has said, and having been able to express his view to the court, will mean that not all elements of the care order will need to be implemented.  The case will return in the middle to end of July to consider what the next stage is.  (To Mr D) That concludes the case, and I’m sorry it’s taken as long as it has, but we now have a plan going forward.” (Judge)

And with that, the judge left the hearing.

Celia Kitzinger is co-director of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project. She has observed more than 450 hearings since May 2020 and written more than 100 blog posts. She is on LinkedIn (here), and tweets @KitzingerCelia


[1] For some other cases we’ve blogged about involving application to conduct investigations/administer treatment contrary to P’s wishes see these blog posts.

[2] We are not allowed to audio-record hearings. Material presented as direct quotation from the hearing is based on my contemporaneous touch-typed notes and is as accurate as I could make it – but it’s unlikely to be 100% verbatim.

Covert medication, the ‘causative nexus’ and (yet again) issues with the Transparency Order

By Daniel Clark, 14 July 2023

A man in his 60s, living with an acquired brain injury is refusing medication for the management of his diabetes. 

The applicant local authority has applied to the court for the approval of a covert medication plan.

In the previous hearing (which I blogged about here), Theis J had requested further evidence as to P’s capacity to consent to or refuse medication. 

Unless the presumption of capacity is rebutted, it is not lawful to medicate someone who is refusing the medication. 

 It turned out there was an issue with rebutting that presumption because the “causative nexus” was not proved.  I’ll explain that below.

This case (COP 14023716) was heard before Mr Justice Peel via MS Teams on Friday 2nd June 2023, at 10:30am.  Representing the parties were Avril Rushe (counsel for the applicant  Local Authority) and Varsha Jagadesham (counsel for P via his litigation friend, the Official Solicitor), both of No5 Chambers.  

Opening the hearing

Unfortunately, there was no opening summary as advised by the former Vice President

This stands in stark contrast to the last hearing of this case on Friday 26th May 2023 by the current Vice President, who suspended the in-progress hearing when I joined the video-platform (late, through no fault of my own), to ensure that I received a summary introduction of the case. 

In this hearing, counsel for the Local Authority simply reported that “we had extensive pre-hearing discussions and happily we can report that we have an agreed order subject to confirmation by the Official Solicitor. It’s hoped that it won’t be controversial”. 

Following review of the witness statement of P’s GP, both Counsel had converted it into a format that “was more accessible” for the staff supporting P. This plan includes both details of the covert medication plan itself, and a plan should P enter into a medical emergency – for example, what staff should do if his blood sugars become dangerously high. Worked into the plans was what to do should P refuse “his breakfast with the crushed medication. His GP says retreat and approach him again with a snack later on”. The plan is that, if P discovers he is being covertly medicated, the staff will be honest with him, and that the GP and social worker will explain that they were trying to act in his best interests. Furthermore, he will have a blood test in a certain amount of time, to ensure the medication is working. 

At the previous hearing, the Official Solicitor was not satisfied that P lacked capacity to make his own decisions about medication. Now, counsel for the Local Authority explained that both parties are satisfied P lacks capacity to make this decision – the position statements both detail the expert witnesses’ evidence, where it is quite clear that P does not believe he has diabetes, that he perceives the symptoms of his diabetes to be side-effects of medication, and that he does not want to take medication because it can be addictive. 

The position statement of the Official Solicitor acknowledges that it seems P’s wishes and feelings are that he does not want to have medication, and has expressed hostility to medication generally. P’s social worker notes that, although this has consistently been the case, P has never expressed a preference for dying over receiving medical treatment. In the social worker’s view, P has a quality of, and interest in, life, which justifies covert medication as being in his best interests. 

However, the Official Solicitor’s position statement identifies that there is no exit strategy from the covert medication, and there was no mention of such a strategy being formulated. This is, of course, concerning. 

As I wrote in my blog about the previous hearing, the administration of covert medication can affect the relationship between the carer and the cared-for person because a level of deception is introduced into it. In my opinion, not drawing up an exit plan, however sketchy, implicitly suggests that P has entered a realm wherein he will have to be deceived for the rest of his life. 

The ‘causative nexus’

Despite this agreement between the parties, the Official Solicitor was asking the neuropsychologist for clarification on the causative nexus. The causative nexus is established in s2(1) of the Mental Capacity Act, states ‘a person lacks capacity in relation to a matter if at the material time he [sic] is unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain’ (my emphasis). This means that, for somebody to lack capacity to make a certain decision, there must be a link between somebody’s ‘impairment or disturbance’ and their inability make a specific decision. 

Interestingly, the actual term ‘causative nexus’ is not found anywhere in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 but was established in the case of PC & NC v City of York Council [2013]. In this case, the judge in the Court of Protection thought that there was a link between ‘PC’s impairment and the inability’, and therefore ruled PC lacked capacity with regards to choosing to live with her husband. However, the judges in the Court of Appeal were not satisfied of this link, and found that she did have capacity to make this decision. The causative nexus is a very important factor in deciding whether somebody lacks capacity to make a certain decision or is, rather, making an unwise decision. 

If, in the case I observed, the causative nexus was not established, the Court could not make a declaration that P lacked capacity, and therefore could not make a declaration that covert medication was in his best interests because P’s decision-making would not be within the jurisdiction of the Court. In other words, P would be making an unwise but capacitous decision not to take his medication. 

However, counsel for the Local Authority explained that both parties “agree that the causative nexus is there”, with the judge commenting that “I’d be surprised if the report doesn’t confirm that but I can see why one would need to be cautious”. This therefore meant that the judge could still make an order to begin covert medication but that this order would first need to be made under section 48 of the Mental Capacity Act, which makes provision that the Court may give an Order where there is ‘reason to believe that P lacks capacity in relation to the matter’ and the Order is in P’s best interests. Then, when the clarification from the neuropsychologist comes back, it can then become a section 15 order. This is the section of the Mental Capacity Act that means ‘the court may make declarations whether a person has or lacks capacity’ and ‘the lawfulness or otherwise of any act done, or yet to be done, in relation to that person’

After a break, while he finished reading the documents, the judge said he was quite satisfied that P lacks capacity to make the decision about the management of his diabetes and that it is also in P’s best interests to have a covert medication plan in place. This plan was to be put in place from the day after the hearing. 

The Transparency Order

It was just prior to this break when something happened that surprised me. The judge directed that he wanted counsel to consider the Transparency Order, expressing “a concern that P may discover the fact of covert medication being administered. I wonder how that fits into the transparency order….Observers may want to report or publish matters after this hearing but I think we need a balance. There is a right for the public to know how covert medication is done but, on the other hand, there is a need to ensure that if such matters are published in any way, that does not generate a risk of it coming to the attention of P. I don’t know whether he reads the newspapers or goes on the internet….I want you to think about that“.

When the hearing resumed 15 minutes later, counsel for the Local Authority explained that “the chances are somewhat low that he may have sight of a report on this but there are certain features of this case that are specific.” 

After some discussion between counsel and the judge, the Transparency Order was amended to include that I cannot publish anything that will identify, or is likely to identify P and that this includes: P’s actual initials, the identity of the local authority, P’s GP, and the expert witness instructed in this case, (counsel for the Official Solicitor explained this was because P had recently met the expert). There is also another salient fact about P that I cannot publish. 

It was during the course of the discussion between counsel and the judge that it became clear that there are other Court of Protection proceedings taking place that P (apparently) knows about. This complicated things even further, and the judge proposed that “any publication be delayed for a period of time…This is an abundance of caution that if P learns there was a hearing about covert medication and finds out that hearing was today, he may identify himself…maybe waiting a couple of weeks might sever the immediacy”. 

The judge then asked for opinions of observers. This was, again, quite nerve-wracking: not only on account of the fact that I was addressing the judge but that I was essentially needing to immediately respond to a round of quick-fire information.

I explained that I was quite happy with the terms of the Transparency Order but, with relation to the two-week delay, informed that judge that I had already written a blog about this case – as it happens, although I was aware of some of the information now restricted in the new Transparency Order, but not in the old one, I’d not reported it in that blog post (on this previous blog, the judge said “that’s out there, that’s done). I said that I could follow the reasoning of the court, and therefore had no objections, and the judge confirmed that “I’m minded to order that nothing be published for 2 weeks, after which time you’re free to publish as you like Mr Clark”. (It is now well past the 2-week mark.)

Having subsequently had a discussion with Celia Kitzinger, I do now have an objection to not being able to identify the Local Authority. After all, how likely is that it that ‘diabetes + brain injury + Local Authority’ would result in P identifying himself, especially given all of the other information that has been covered by the Transparency Order? It was not until after the hearing that I was alive to this line of reasoning, and would (in future) challenge a Transparency Order that restricts identification of a public body.

It’s my view that it is in the public interest to know that a public body has made an application to medicate someone against their will. Some people will be glad that their Local Authority is ensuring people receive the medication they need; others will be disappointed that their Local Authority is medicating people against their wishes. However, without knowing the identity of the Local Authority, this cannot be discussed at a local level. In this recent blog, Celia Kitzinger discusses the issues that arise when the Transparency Order restricts publication of the public body, and details how she successfully asked for the Order to be varied.

As Celia Kitzinger has pointed out, there is also a potential problem with the logic of the restriction. It’s within the realms of possibility that any male with diabetes and a brain injury who is currently refusing medication and resides in England and Wales, may now read this blog and suspect their local authority of covertly medicating them. Every single of those men could become suspicious of the carers or, indeed, stop eating. 

Despite the fact that the Transparency Order had been updated quite considerably during the hearing, it took over a week for me to receive it, after I had asked for it. There was a further delay when, out of an abundance of caution, I asked permission to share the Transparency Order with Celia Kitzinger (given that she is also bound by the Injunction). And, to top it all off, I never actually received anything in writing that told me I could not publish anything for at least two weeks.

All of this I found rather strange: nowhere have I seen it in print that there had to be a delay in publication. For all I know, there’s an Injunction floating somewhere that I haven’t been sent, perhaps because the person who was going to do so is off work due to illness, or perhaps because everybody thought somebody else had done it. Alternatively, the judge may have assumed that an oral direction would suffice.

Furthermore, I know there were at least two other observers in this hearing. Neither, to the best of my knowledge, received a copy of the Transparency Order – I had to ask for it. In the end, both counsel for the Local Authority and counsel for the Official Solicitor sent me the Transparency Order, for which I am grateful. 

However, the situation is not helped by judges saying things like ‘the Transparency Order should be sent’ (as in this case) or ‘ask for the Transparency Order if you want it’ (as happened in another case, a blog which I’m working on at the moment). This creates confusion about who has what responsibilities for the Transparency Order and, in the past, I’ve not received any replies to my request for a copy of the Transparency Order (or position statements) from the parties.

Finally… 

The order approved by the judge at the end of this hearing was unsurprising: during the previous hearing I got the impression that both parties were, so to speak, on a one-way train in the sense that both agreed that covert medication should be used as detailed in the order they wanted the judge to approve. However, the amendments to the Transparency Order did take me by surprise, and I think the way it was executed demonstrates that there’s still work to be done on ensuring reporting restrictions are accessible, timely, and cover all of the relevant information.

Daniel Clark is a PhD student in the Department of Politics & International Relations at the University of Sheffield. His research takes seriously Iris Marion Young’s claim that older people are an oppressed social group, and is funded by WRoCAH. He tweets @DanielClark132.

The logic, law and language of Lasting Power of Attorney: A case before Hayden J

By Clare Fuller, 12 July 2023

Advance Care Planning is something I care passionately about.  

As a nurse specialising in Palliative and End of Life Care I have seen first-hand and too often what can happen if appropriate plans are not in place. 

Advance Care Planning means thinking ahead, not waiting for a crisis and much of my work as an Advance Care Planning Consultant and Advocate is ensuring this message is heard.  

One key element of Advance Care Planning that everyone should consider is making a Lasting Power of Attorney. 

I attended an in-person hearing at the Royal Courts of Justice which addressed some of the challenges encountered by people making Lasting Powers of Attorney.  

I’ll begin by explaining what a Lasting Power of Attorney is and the process every Lasting Power of Attorney will go through to become a registered document. 

Then I’ll set out the background before moving on to describe the hearing. 

I’ll end with an account of the judgment and close with how it might influence my practice. 

1. What is Lasting Power of Attorney?

A  Lasting Power of Attorney  is a legal document that enables a someone (the donor) to nominate a person or persons (the attorneys) to act for them if they ever lose capacity to make decisions for themselves. Loss of capacity is often associated with a degenerative disease such as dementia, but can also occur as a result of a sudden accident or an acute ill health event.  If more than one attorney is nominated, the donor must choose whether they will act jointly, jointly and severally or jointly for some decisions and severally for others. 

There are two different types of Lasting Power of Attorney, one for Health and Welfare and one for Property and Finance.  A Lasting Power of Attorney for Health and Welfare will enable decisions about things relating to care (see https://www.gov.uk/power-of-attorney)

A Lasting Power of Attorney for Property and Finance will enable decisions relating to money and property. (see https://www.gov.uk/power-of-attorney)

A Lasting Power of Attorney can be created in three ways; a document can be created independently, with a Lasting Power of Attorney Consultant or with a solicitor, something I blog about in more detail here. A Lasting Power of Attorney can be created using paper forms or the  on-line service from the Office of the Public Guardian.  The on-line service means that the documents are created on-line but must be printed and signed as hard copies.

Whether a Lasting Power of Attorney is made on-line or by paper it has to be sent to the Office of the Public Guardian for checking and registration.

The checking process of a Lasting Power of Attorney 

A Lasting Power of Attorney must follow correct process to become a legal document. This includes ensuring the details contained within it are accurate and lawful. The legal framework which applies to Lasting Power of Attorney is in section 9 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005.

A Lasting Power of Attorney application may be rejected by the Court of Protection, or the Court may rule that a part of the document is not valid.

The term “severance” is applied when a Lasting Power of Attorney is found to have invalid instructions. The Court removes or “severs” the invalid instructions so the Lasting Power of Attorney can be registered. (Click here for more information.)

The process of checking the lawfulness of and validating a Lasting Power of Attorney is completed by the Office of the public Guardian and takes approximately twenty weeks. Each application will progress through four distinct steps from waiting to processed.

This is an example of what can be seen when checking the progress of an application (applicable to on-line applications only).

 An example of what a registered Lasting Power of Attorney looks like is provided by the  Office of the Public Guardian and shown below.

Before writing in detail about the hearing I attended and the central theme of this blog, I will take a moment to highlight the process and the time it takes because many people believe a Lasting Power of Attorney can be created when it is needed. This issue was highlighted by Which? and something I raised awareness of in the blog Changing Fears to Facts

As you need to have capacity to complete a Lasting Power of Attorney, it would be too late to complete when needed, or in other words when you had lost capacity. In the case of sudden accident there is simply no warning or time to begin a Lasting Power of Attorney. For some people, any delays can mean the window of opportunity to make a Lasting Power of Attorney could be lost.

The hearing I attended concerned nine Lasting Power of Attorney applications and the delays they are experiencing. The delays are happening because the Office of the Public Guardian and Court of Protection are wrestling with challenges in what I will describe as the logic, law and language in making a Lasting Power of Attorney.

2. The background to the hearing I observed

I was alerted to the hearing by Celia Kitzinger, co-director of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project.  Celia had previously attended a previous on-line hearing in January 2023 to address challenges made to Lasting Power of Attorney applications, specifically whether what has been drafted by applicants is: “compliant with the law, i.e. does the Mental Capacity Act 2005 permit it.”  You can read the  blog ‘Test case’ on Lasting Powers of Attorney – with troubling delay which describes what happened and imagines what could constitute a concern .

Whilst the specific detail of the challenges was not set out in the hearing Celia attended, it appeared that questions had been raised by the Office of the Public Guardian. 

Counsel for the Public Guardian, Neil Allen, said: “These LPAs have been carefully chosen by the Public Guardian as test cases to illustrate the legal issues requiring the court’s determination and guidance”.  

In his opening summary he said that the people whose applications have been consolidated for this case “have either tried to create a lead attorney or provide for a majority rule or organise for the replacement of replacement attorneys. This raises validity issues, and whether any provisions need to be severed.  There are over 100 similar cases which the Public Guardian is considering and will be affected by judgment in this case”.

‘Test case’ on Lasting Powers of Attorney – with troubling delay

In her blog, Celia states:

I don’t know the details of what the people whose forms are now before the Court of Protection were trying to do in their applications – but whatever it is, their forms have raised questions for the Public Guardian about whether what they want is compliant with the law, i.e. does the Mental Capacity Act 2005 permit it.  

‘Test case’ on Lasting Powers of Attorney – with troubling delay

Celia continues to suggest what some of the concerns could be and writes: 

I’m trying to imagine what people have done to cause the Public Guardian these concerns, and what that would look on the completed forms (which of course I haven’t seen).  Maybe people have tried to complete the forms to achieve effects like these (examples invented by me!). 

  • “I appoint my three daughters, A, B and C as my attorneys to act jointly and severally but in any situation where they are acting jointly and they can’t agree, I want my daughter A’s decision to be final”
  • “I appoint my three daughters A, B and C as my attorneys to act jointly and severally but in any situation where they are acting jointly and they can’t agree, I want the majority decision that any two of them agree on to be final”
  • “I appoint my three daughters A, B and C as my attorneys to act jointly and severally, and my son D as a replacement attorney if any one of them becomes unable to act. If D is also unable to act, then I authorise A to choose another replacement attorney.”
  • “I appoint my three daughters A, B and C to make decisions jointly and severally. Any decisions about life-sustaining treatment must be made jointly, and other decisions can be made severally. Decisions about where I live and am cared for must be made only by A, and decisions about my religious worship and diet must be made only by B.  

These are entirely invented examples and I’ve no idea whether they accurately reflect the problems before the court.  I will learn more (I hope) at the next hearing.

‘Test case’ on Lasting Powers of Attorney – with troubling delay

It is relevant to note that the applications in question were not “mistakes”, but that they were drafted in such as way that the lawyers could not confirm as would have legal effect in the way the donors seemed to intend.

The hearing I attended in April 2023 had been set as a directions hearing to explore the causes for concern and issues at the heart of the delays. 

3. The hearing

I have attended previous hearings[i] as an observer however this was my first experience of attending in person. I arrived at the Royal Court of Justice in plenty of time to navigate the security checks and identify where the hearing was to be held. Other than the information available to me in the earlier blog I had no background to the hearing, this can make it difficult to pick up and quickly follow what is being discussed in Court. I was most grateful for Position Statements from Counsel for the Public Guardian Neil Allen, sent to me via email with the Transparency Order prior to the hearing, and the Official Solicitor Ruth Hughs for providing me with a Position Statement later in the day (both documents required anonymity to protect people at the centre of the hearing). A point of learning for me was to ensure connectivity to the Court of Protection Wi Fi before proceedings began as I found I was unable to connect and access the relevant email from Neil Allen until later in the day. 

From the Position Statements I was able to gain a better understanding of the issues for consideration at the hearing which were:

A) Lead attorneys
(1) Whether it is lawful to give primary power to one attorney ahead of other attorneys
when appointed on a joint and several basis;

(2) Whether it is lawful to have joint and several appointments with instructions for
attorneys to deal with separately defined areas of the donor’s affairs or include
restrictions which have this effect;


B) Majority rule

(3) Whether it is lawful to instruct multiple (original or replacement) attorneys to act on
a majority basis;
(4) Whether ‘should’ or similar words constitute a binding instruction or a non-binding
preference on the part of the donor;


C) Replacement attorneys
(5) Whether it is lawful for the donor to replace a replacement attorney;
(6) If not, whether it is lawful for a jointly acting replacement attorney to be reappointed
to act solely.

The hearing began with Counsel for the Public Guardian Neil Allen setting out some background information. A summary of the key issues for discussion was provided which I found extremely valuable as at this point I did not have access to the Position Statements. For further context, Mr Allen informed the Court that there are “six million LPAs [Lasting Power of Attorneys] registered” and “five thousand applications are received per day. The vast bulk of which are entirely non-contentious.”

Discussion followed around the use of language and terminology which included:

  • Donor (a person making a Lasting Power of Attorney)
  • Donee (a person to whom authority is given to act on behalf of another)
  • Attorney (a person to whom authority is given to act on behalf of another. This appeared to be considered more with Enduring Power of Attorney, which was replaced by Lasting Power of Attorney).

Mr Justice Hayden commented on the “archaic language” and reflected that it was not immediately accessible to members of the public. Some time and debate followed concerning the “obscurity of the language” and an agreement to use the word “donee” rather than “attorney”, however I noticed that the terms were used interchangeably during the hearing. 

There appeared to be agreement between Counsel for the Public Guardian and the Official Solicitor on whether or not it is lawful for one attorney to be a “lead” when multiple attorneys are nominated to act jointly and severally. Common ground was agreed in stating that this was not possible to give “primary power” or lead to one attorney.

Regarding the second question, the Counsel for the Public Guardian and the Official Solicitor also agreed that answer is no, it is not lawful to have joint and several appointments with instructions for attorneys to deal with separately defined areas of the donor’s affairs.

Continuing his background information, Counsel for the Public Guardian stated, “as for majority rule, we are both of the view it ought to continue”. 

Moving on to whether ‘should’ or similar words constitute a binding instruction or a non-binding preference on the part of the donor generated detailed discussion. The issue at heart here is section 7 of the Lasting Power of Attorney form which allows a donor to state any preferences or instructions. Section 7 includes the wording, “most people leave this page blank – you can just talk to your attorneys so they understand how you want them to make decisions for you.” 

 The example is from an existing Lasting Power of Attorney and one where nothing specific has been documented.

Instructions for completing section 7 can be found on LP 12, the guide to making a Lasting Power of Attorney: 

Here’s the link to view this information online:

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/make-a-lasting-power-of-attorney/lp12-make-and-register-your-lasting-power-of-attorney-a-guide-web-version#a7

Interpretation of language then followed, specifically the words “should and “must” and the implications of using these words in the preferences and instructions section. Later in the hearing, the Official Solicitor commented on the “mismatch between language and the forms.” I understood, from later discussion, that “conditions and restrictions” have previously been used in Lasting Power of Attorney instruments, and that the “forms were re-designed after user testing which called for simpler language” – but this simpler language has led to some tension between the forms and the statute. 

I was struck by more potential confusion of language on a point that Mr Justice Haydon requested clarity on later in the hearing; namely the use of the letter “P”. The Mental Capacity Act states:

“A lasting power of attorney is a power of attorney under which the donor (“P”) confers on the donee (or donees) authority to make decisions about all or any of the following—

(a)P’s personal welfare or specified matters concerning P’s personal welfare, and

(b)P’s property and affairs or specified matters concerning P’s property and affairs,”

The interchangeability between the word donor and letter P was reflected on with Lord Justice Haydon stating: “It doesn’t help if we have a web of inaccessible nomenclature.”

Replacement Attorneys

Regarding replacement attorneys, this was described as the “meat” of the hearing.  The decision being sought concerned whether a person making a Lasting Power of Attorney can make a successional replacement attorney. At present there is no space on the form to do so, a donor can choose to appoint an attorney(s) or replacement attorney(s); it would appear that donors have tried to use the existing form to express this wish.

Discussion followed regarding specific cases brought to the court and of previous hearings including Re Boff . Without background knowledge I found this part of the proceedings a little hard to follow, but what I have learned since from the archive records is Judge Lush “held that the meaning of s.10(8) MCA 2005 was clear and prevented the appointment of a further replacement attorney. A replacement attorney can only replace an original attorney.”

The judgment in Re Boff highlights the tension between guidance produced by the Office of the Public Guardian and legislation.

Leaving the hearing in April I felt mindful that, for some people, any delays could mean losing a window of opportunity to create a Lasting Power of Attorney. I found the discussion of great interest and had not before appreciated the tensions between logic, law and language in creating a Lasting Power of Attorney. A judgment was initially expected in July. As it turned out, however, judgment was handed down on 9th June 2023. 

4. The judgment

A judgment for the hearing was released on 9th June 2023.

You can read it here: In the Matter of Public Guardian’s Severance Applications [2023] EWCOP 24  

I will summarise my understanding of the key points and outcome below.

The judgment acknowledges the number of Lasting Power of Attorney applications that the OPG receive every day (between 5,00 and 6,000). When the Mental Capacity Act came into law in 2005 there were fewer than 10,500 applications for an entire year.

Acknowledgement is made of the situation each case presented, and that the nine cases were representative of enough similar cases for the OPG to request clarity.

The points the OPG requested clarity on were situations relating to lead donees, majority rule and replacement donees. 

The mismatch between the language and the LPA has previously triggered judicial comment to the effect that ‘it may be that those responsible for drafting forms will wish to reconsider these changes’. (Re Public Guardians Severance Applications (2017 EWCOP 10. Hayden J repeated this concern, saying that, “The donor who constructs their instructions around the language of the forms, rather than the language of the statute, risks invalidating the LPA altogether” and  “The words of the form may become a siren voice dragging the donor’s preferences onto rocks which prevent the instrument from operating as a valid, lasting power of attorney” (#42).

  • With regard to lead donees, Justice Hayden held that primary power cannot be given to one donee ahead of others (when donees are appointed jointly and severally). He held that primary power cannot be given to one donee ahead of others when appointed on a joint and several basis. He noted that if a donor appoints more than one attorney on a joint and several basis, then equality prevails
  • Whether it is lawful to have instructions for jointly and severally appointed donees to deal separately with different remits of responsibility (e.g. requiring a jointly and severally appointed attorney to make decisions only relating to, for example, ‘my business affairs’ or ‘my personal affairs’) was declared more challenging. Mr Justice Hayden held that the current wording of the statutory provision does not support such interpretation and acknowledged the “dangerous” divergence between language of the statute and wording on the forms. That said, Mr Justice Hayden recognised that there is nothing to prevent the donor from creating two LPAs, each appointing an attorney to deal with certain powers.
  • Regarding the issue of majority rule, Justice Hayden declared that this is inconsistent with statutory provision. There was consideration whether a purposive approach to interpretation of the statute could be legitimate; however, he stated:

“Ultimately, however, I cannot conclude that it is, without compromising the logical

integrity of my earlier analysis. The provisions of Section 10(4) are drafted so tightly

that they leave very little, if any, scope for a purposive approach.”

  • Interpretation of the word “should”, Justice Hayden declared was case specific. For the case of Ms B, (one of the cases brought for consideration), Justice Hayden could not see grounds for severance.

“The word ‘should’ is defined as ‘suggesting that something is the proper, reasonable, or best thing to do’. I recognise that this does not sit comfortably within the wording of Section 10 because it is potentially ambiguous. Unfortunately, the form poses a number of alternatives, the first of which is expressed as “decisions attorneys should make jointly” (my emphasis).”

He continued:

“I am not intending to signal any wider guidance as to how the word ‘should’ is to be interpreted. It is highly fact specific and its significance and force will be dependent on context. I am, however, signalling that its use will not automatically give rise to severance. It is the wording on the forms that generates the ambiguity.”

  • On replacement attorneys, Mr Justice Hayden ruled that a donor is entitled to choose an attorney to replace a replacement attorney.  He accepted that section 10(8)(b) MCA 2015 was slightly ambiguous but also added that this section states a secondary replacement attorney is allowed and “a scheme which prohibited the appointment of a secondary replacement might, equally logically, conflict with the objectives of the legislation.” He decided he was “satisfied that an interpretation which permits the appointment of a secondary replacement attorney, is to be preferred.”, explaining that the MCA 2015 requires that the choice of donee is always to be that of the donor in line with promotion of autonomy. 

Mr Justice Hayden closes his judgment recognising the potential for “legislative amendment,” and an awareness that this will not be possible in the “near future”.  But “the clarifications required to the LPA forms do not, as far as I can see, provide quite the same difficulties. The amendments that they require are limited in scope and ought easily to be manageable.”

5. Making sense of the judgment

In section 2 of this blog post, I wrote about the background to the hearing and I quoted Celia Kitzinger’s imagined examples of the kinds of dilemmas the OPG was facing from would-be donees.

Drafting this blog, with the benefit of the judgment has provided an opportunity to revisit the imagined examples,  and time for both Celia and me to articulate how we have interpreted the judgment. I am going to return to the examples now and offer our views alongside an invitation to lawyers for commentary. 

I’ll reproduce the examples again, followed by our view in light of the judgment. 

1.   “I appoint my three daughters, A, B and C as my attorneys to act jointly and severally but in any situation where they are acting jointly and they can’t agree, I want my daughter A’s decision to be final”

Our understanding, in the light of the judgment, is this would not be permitted and would be severed. It’s Qi (‘Primary power”) addressed in the judgment: “It is clear that if a donor appoints more than one attorney on a joint and several basis, it must be understood that equality prevails. Thus, a provision such as “in the event of disagreement, A is to defer to B” or “B’s decision will be final” is irreconcilable with the phrase “jointly and severally” (§39). This appears clear, no one donee has greater power than another.

2.   I appoint my three daughters A, B and C as my attorneys to act jointly and severally but in any situation where they are acting jointly and they can’t agree, I want the majority decision that any two of them agree on to be final”

Once again, we understand that thiswould not be permitted and would be severed.  It’s (“Majority rule”) Qiii addressed in the judgment. Hayden reluctantly says this isn’t allowed at §45:  “Before me, both Mr Allen and Miss Hughes agree, that a ‘majority rule’ provision, as they have termed it, must be severed as they contend that it is inconsistent with the statutory provision. Though they are agreed on the point, I have, as with the previous issue, considered whether a purposive approach to the interpretation of the statute might be legitimate. Ultimately, however, I cannot conclude that it is, without compromising the logical integrity of my earlier analysis. The provisions of Section 10(4) are drafted so tightly that they leave very little, if any, scope for a purposive approach. This said, I find myself sympathetic to the frustration effervescing in DJ Eldergill’s judgment.” (§45). We understand that a majority rule approach will be severed.

3.   “I appoint my three daughters A, B and C as my attorneys to act jointly and severally, and my son D as a replacement attorney if any one of them becomes unable to act. If D is also unable to act, then I authorise A to choose another replacement attorney.”

Our interpretation of the judgment, in this too is not permitted. It is permitted to appoint a replacement attorney (D in the example above) – but not for the donor to attempt to authorise a donee (A in the example above) to choose a successor replacement donee if the replacement donee nominated by the donor is unable to act.  This would be severed as inconsistent with statute.  Section 10(8) prohibits the donee from appointing a substitute or successor: “The MCA requires that the selection of the donee is always to be that of the donor. That is consistent with the promotion of autonomy. Any selection of a donee by an existing donee is expressly prohibited because that is not consistent with promoting the autonomy of the incapacitated person. It takes decision making entirely out of the donor’s hands(§52). However, the donor could say:If D is also unable to act, then I want E to be my replacement attorney instead – because E would be a “replacement replacement attorneys” and our understanding is that it is permitted for a donor to have “replacement replacement attorneys” in a Lasting Power of Attorney. 

4.         “I appoint my three daughters A, B and C to make decisions jointly and severally. Any decisions about life-sustaining treatment must be made jointly, and other decisions can be made severally. Decisions about where I live and am cared for must be made only by A, and decisions about my religious worship and diet must be made only by B.

In Celia’s final example the question of whether attorneys can make some decisions jointly and others jointly and severally is posed. We both found this one more challenging to interpret and welcome commentary, here are our thoughts. This relates to Q (ii) in the judgment: “Whether it is lawful to have joint and several appointments with instructions for attorneys to deal with separately defined areas of the donor’s affairs or include restrictions to this effect“. We believe the answer in §41 is that this can’t be done – but that maybe (maybe?) the donor can achieve this using two separate LPAs. Adding complexity, we note from LP12 Make and register your lasting power of attorney: a guide that the following information is given.  

Health and care LPA examples:
If you choose ‘jointly for some decisions, jointly and severally for other decisions’, you should make a statement like one of these on Continuation sheet 2:
My attorneys must act jointly for decisions about where I live and may act jointly and severally for everything else.
My attorneys must act jointly for decisions I have authorised them to make about life-sustaining treatment and may act jointly and severally for everything else.

We think, therefore, that the first part would be permitted (“I appoint my three daughters A, B and C to make decisions jointly and severally. Any decisions about life-sustaining treatment must be made jointly, and other decisions can be made severally”) but that the second would not be permitted (“Decisions about where I live and am cared for must be made only by A, and decisions about my religious worship and diet must be made only by B”. )  

I am happy to admit that following some of the logic, law and language of the judgment has been hard at times and I still am not sure if I completely understand all elements of the judgment.  I am looking forward to reflections and commentary from lawyers to check my understanding.

How this will influence my practice

I am grateful for the opportunity to attend the hearing and see first-hand the challenges of law and language that are wrestled by the Office of the Public Guardian and the Court of Protection.  I have gained greater confidence in answering clients’ questions as a result, e.g. since attending the hearing a number of clients have asked about appointing “lead attorneys”, for example, and I can tell them with certainty that this is not possible. 

I have observed in my recent discussion with clients an assumption that some attorneys carry more weight than others, typically a spouse for example, above children. I note from the language people use such as “the main” or “the first,” that there can be a tendency for people to think, erroneously, that the order in which they document attorneys carries meaning. Attending the hearing gave me an opportunity to learn about some of the tensions that can occur in the wording of a Lasting Power of Attorney; I also have greater understanding of dilemmas that people can wrestle with in creating these important forms.

Reflecting honestly on how comfortable I feel drafting documents with replacement of replacement attorneys, I can see how that would be drafted in the LPA however would still feel anxious about submitting to the OPG. I feel I understand the principle but am mindful of the caution on the form “the more specific the instructions, the greater the chance that they will not be able to be followed.” 

Regarding separate LPAs to address separate issues, this is something I would like to have greater understanding of. The divide between Health and Welfare and Property and Finance is easily comprehended and to draft a Business LPA to deal with business rather than domestic assets also makes sense; I am less clear how multiple or sequential Health and Welfare LPAs would work.  Overall, attending the hearing has been an interesting and highly informative experience. Seeing the challenges of applying existing law to current forms highlighted pitfalls I hadn’t previously been aware of and gave me a greater understanding of the logic, law and language associated with making a Lasting Power of Attorney.  There remain, however, some elements of uncertainty for me.  

Clare Fuller RGN MSc is a registered nurse with a career dedicated to Palliative and End of Life Care. She is an advocate for proactive Advance Care Planning and provides EoLC Service Improvement and bespoke EoLC Education. Clare hosts the weekly podcast Conversations About Advance Care Planning. She is also a  Lasting Power of Attorney Consultant and director of Speak for Me . Connect with Clare on Twitter @ClareFuller17


[i] Previous hearings I’ve blogged about are:

Bearing Witness: Anorexia Nervosa and NG Feeding

Lasting Power of Attorney: Across Borders

Capacity to make a Lasting Power of Attorney

Reflecting on Re MW and Advance Planning: Legal frameworks and why they matter  

What happens when Lasting Power of Attorney goes wrong?

Decision-making with clarity and compassion: Validity of LPAs and appointment of Deputy

Just another failure of open justice: DJ Bland in Lancaster County Court

By Celia Kitzinger, 11 July 2023

I’m so weary of this sort of thing.  

I can’t summon up the energy, three years on, for outrage about the routine, mundane, banal failure of the Court of Protection, despite its best intentions, to implement transparency for its hearings.

In theory, yes, the doors of the courtroom are open.  

In practice, the barriers placed in the way of even experienced public observers like me can be insurmountable.

Here’s what happened – in 5 dismal steps.

1. Yesterday, I found a hearing I wanted to observe in Lancaster in person: it should have been, but was not, in the COP list

Yesterday evening, I was browsing the Court of Protection list in Courtel/CourtServe and there was nothing that particularly caught my eye as something I wanted to observe.

I know that – despite efforts to fix this over several years – Court of Protection hearings are often not included in the Court of Protection list, so I opened the “Daily Cause” lists for some courts near me.  It’s always interesting to see what’s going on in my own geographical area – especially if it enables me to attend an in-person hearing.

Lo and behold – a Court of Protection hearing in Lancaster at 2pm the next day.  In person!

That’s not too far.  A half hour drive to Penrith train station.  A half-hour-plus train journey.  A 15-minute walk to the court house.  Allowing time for delayed trains and the challenges of getting through airport-style security, I’d be fine if I left home mid-morning and caught the 11.48 (arrives 12.26) or 12.23 (arrives 12.57).  Hurrah!

I emailed the court to check that the wording (“Restricted”) didn’t mean I wasn’t allowed to attend – and also asked what the hearing was about (there should have been ‘descriptors’ in the listing) and for a confirmation that it was going ahead.  So many hearings are vacated (i.e. they don’t happen) – and I didn’t want to travel to Lancaster only to find that this hearing wasn’t going to take place.  

I pointed out, too, that I’d found the listing in the Daily Cause List, when it should actually have been in the Court of Protection list (which didn’t include Lancaster at all).

2. On enquiry, I was sent “the correct list”, which stated the hearing was “IN PRIVATE – NOT OPEN TO THE PUBLIC

I received a prompt and courteous response (at 09.37) from a member of the Lancaster court staff, apologising that the “COP list was missed when the others were sent to Courtel” and attaching “the correct list”.  Here’s what “the correct list” said.

Okay, so “IN PRIVATE – NOT OPEN THE PUBLIC”.

A normal member of the public would have given up at this point.  But then, a normal member of the public wouldn’t have been poking about looking for COP hearings ‘off-piste’ in the Daily Cause list, and wouldn’t have ever seen this Lancaster hearing in the first place.

Also, I know that ‘IN PRIVATE – NOT OPEN TO THE PUBLIC’ doesn’t mean the public can’t be admitted.  I know that’s counter-intuitive.  I know that takes a leap of faith – but trust me on this. I’ve seen it many times before.

So, I wrote back to the nice member of staff who’d sent me the list, to check:  “It says “IN PRIVATE – NOT OPEN TO THE PUBLIC”. It is unusual for COP hearings to be in private and for the public not to be able to attend.  Is this correct?”

He replied, reasonably enough: “This is the information we had from District Judge Bland. Unfortunately we are only a hearing venue and have no information about COP cases or hearings, we can only go off the information provided by the Judge“.

So, I asked the same question again (plus, what’s the hearing about) and sent it back to Lancaster County Court and to Manchester COP (the regional hub), marked “Attnt: DJ Bland COP 14094090”.  It was now 10.21am.  I would need a reply within the hour to ensure I had time to get the train to Lancaster.

3. On asking the judge whether the hearing is really “private”, I’m told I can attend as ‘an accredited blogger’ (which I then explain I’m not)

At 12.04 I received a response from the Lancaster Court staff:  “I have forwarded your email to District Judge Bland who has replied that the court has no objection to an accredited blogger observing the hearing”.

But I’m not an “accredited blogger”.

I don’t think there is such a thing as an “accredited blogger” in the Court of Protection rules.

When hearings are otherwise “private”, in the sense of not being open to the “public”, the Family Court rules permit people to attend if they are “duly accredited representatives of news gathering and reporting organisations” (i.e. journalists) or “a duly authorised lawyer attending for journalistic, research or public legal educational purposes” (sometimes referred to as “legal bloggers” for shorthand). 

The role of “legal bloggers” in the Family Courts has become more prominent since the introduction of the Pilot Scheme (in Leeds, Carlisle and Cardiff) which allows lawyers and journalists to observe Family Court cases and write about them, without having to make an application to do so – as long as it is anonymised (see “Legal blogging and the transparency pilot”).  This is a positive step for the Family Court – to which members of the public do not have any right of access.  But since the Pilot Scheme started in the Family Court, it has sometimes backfired on members of the public wanting to attend Court of Protection hearings, as judges (seemingly unaware of the differences between COP and Family Court transparency rules) have required assurance that we are “legal bloggers” before granting admission to “public” Court of Protection hearings. 

But the confusion in relation to DJ Bland’s hearing was that it seemed to be listed (on “the correct list”) as a private hearing. There was no objection, the judge said said, to my attending as an “accredited blogger” – but I don’t know who would “accredit” me, or what that term means in the Court of Protection. I’m not a lawyer, so I don’t meet the requirements to be a “legal blogger” (i.e. “a duly authorised lawyer attending for journalistic, research or public legal educational purposes” ) for the Family Court.  

I wrote back (at 12.07):

Thank you – but could you let DJ Bland know that I do not qualify as an accredited blogger under the Family Court rules (I’m not a lawyer).  I was really asking whether this hearing was open to members of the public, not accredited bloggers!”

4. Court staff sent (without my asking) the Transparency Order – which said the hearing was “PUBLIC”

At 12.17, the administration officer from the Manchester COP Regional Hub sent an email attaching the Transparency Order for DJ Bland’s hearing “just in case you decide to attend”.  This was enormously helpful.

The Transparency Order had been made (and sealed) by DJ Bland on 7 June 2023.

The usual warnings appear on the front page (about being sent to prison and the like) and then the usual statement that it appears to the court that “Practice Direction 4C to the Court of Protection Rules 2017 should tact apply” (I don’t know what “tact” is doing there – I think it’s a typo). Practice Direction 4C is headed “Transparency” and it says that the court will ordinarily make an order that attended hearings “shall be in public” (§2.1.(a)).  

The second page of DJ Bland’s Transparency Order begins like this:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

The direction that hearings are to be in public 

(1)  This application be set down for an attended hearing at the Family Court at Lancaster on 11th July 2023 at 2pm with a time estimate of 2 hours at which the Court will consider the following issues:  (a) P’s capacity to make decisions as to contact and care,  (b)  P’s best interests in relation to contact and care 

(2)  Subject to further order of the Court that attended hearing and all further attended hearings of this application are to be in public PROVIDED ALWAYS THAT the Court may exclude from an attended hearing any person (other than a party) on the grounds that it is in the interests of justice to do so (for example if that person refuses a request to sign a document recording their attendance and that they are aware of the terms of this order). 

Wow!  It looked as though this hearing is supposed to be in public – so it should have said so, and I should have been entitled to attend as a member of the public1

And yet it was listed as “IN PRIVATE – NOT OPEN TO THE PUBLIC” and a direct approach to the judge yielded only the information that I could attend if I was an “accredited blogger”.  

I supposed it was possible that DJ Bland had subsequently revoked that Transparency Order, made just over a month ago, and made a new one – and I’d been sent the old one by mistake.  

Or perhaps it was supposed to be in public and the listing was wrong, and the judge had been mistaken in implying that I could attend only in the role of an  “accredited blogger”.

5. Less than an hour before the start of the hearing, I’m told the judge says I can attend – but it’s now too late to get to Lancaster in time

At 13.02, a different member of the court staff from Lancaster sent an email: “Further to previous email correspondence, District Judge Bland says you may attend the hearing at 2pm today”.  

That still doesn’t answer my question as to whether the hearing is “public” (as stated in the Transparency Order I was sent) or whether it is indeed “private” but I was being given some kind of special permission to attend a private hearing (as has happened previously).  

In any case, it was now too late for me to get to Lancaster in time for this hearing.  

I’d already said so in an email I’d sent to everyone involved in this correspondence, and to my contact at His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunal Service (HMCTS) with whom I’ve been raising problems with listings for ages, and which she’s been trying (with mixed success) to address.

My letter to Lancaster County Court staff, Manchester COP Regional Hub staff, and DJ Bland (plus HMCTS)


Thank you for sending me the Transparency Order.

I’m now completely baffled!  The TO seems to have been made by DJ Bland earlier this month [note added for blog: my error – it was last month!] and it has a direction saying that the hearing is to be “in public“. (It also says what the issues before the court are which was another question I was asking and not getting an answer to, and which information should have been included in the listing).

The TO I’ve just received says:

…. the hearings are to be in public
(1) This application be set down for an attended hearing at the Family Court
at Lancaster on 11th July 2023 at 2pm with a time estimate of 2 hours at which the Court will consider the following issues:
(a) P’s capacity to make decisions as to contact and care,
(b) P’s best interests in relation to contact and care

Given this Order, I have the following questions:

(a) Why was a hearing that the judge ordered to be heard in public listed to be heard in private?

(b) Why did DJ Bland say I could attend as an “accredited blogger” (which isn’t a term in use for COP hearings as I understand it, and which in any case is a term that doesn’t apply to me). Surely his order means that I should be able to attend as a member of the public, even though I’m NOT an accredited blogger in Family Court terms.

(c) Why didn’t the listing include the issues before the court?

(d) How can this sort of listing problem (and subsequent confusion) be prevented from happening in future?

Sadly it is now too late for me to get to Penrith for a train that would get me to Lancaster in time to attend this hearing, so this listing error will likely mean that the case is heard effectively “in private” (unless any other members of the public turn up).  This does not support the judicial commitment to transparency.

I’m also personally sad about this since there are relatively few COP hearings I can easily observe in person from rural Cumbria, and this is one I would have liked to have attended.

I hope the concerns I have raised can be addressed.

Reflections

There is some good practice in amongst this chaotic experience.  

The court staff – both at Lancaster and at Manchester – responded promptly and courteously, with as much information as they had access to.  I’m particularly grateful to Manchester court staff for supplying me with the Transparency Order (which I hadn’t thought to ask for, and was very helpful).  

I believe that my contact at HMCTS will take what happened seriously and investigate, and do what she can to prevent it from happening again. She always does.

But the problem, ultimately, is that this will be treated as just another “one-off” experience of the failings of transparency, attributable to particular local contingencies.  

I don’t write a letter to HMCTS, much less a blog post, about each of the transparency failings I experience in trying to get access to COP hearings. It’s tedious to document them, and boring to read.  It takes time I’d far rather spend doing something else.  But, believe me, they are multitudes.

And similar problems are also faced by many other public observers – some of whom come to believe it’s somehow their fault that they can’t get admittance to court, or even that it’s “personal” and someone is trying to prevent their access (especially likely when would-be observers are caught up in their own COP hearings), or that there’s a widespread conspiracy to prevent open justice. This sort of thing is very bad public relations for a court with aspirations for transparency.

Each time I do write a letter expressing concerns about one of the multitude of “one-off” failings like this, I get a courteous and concerned response, expressing regret about the failure and an aspiration for improvements in future. I’m often given some reasons why something went wrong on each occasion: someone who was on leave so their job was done by someone else who needs training; sickness and understaffing in the office; an technology upgrade causing temporary disruption; or once in a while just someone who made a mistake (we’re all human!). And then it happens again. And again. And again.

The cumulative effect of these routine, mundane “one-off” experiences is to erect a virtually impenetrable barrier to transparency in the Court of Protection.  

If the judiciary is serious about transparency, the whole system needs a thorough overhaul. (Yes, I know – where is the money for that going to come from?)

I’m pretty confident it wasn’t a conspiracy to exclude me from the hearing in Lancaster today.  

But the effect is just the same as if it was.

Celia Kitzinger is co-director of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project. She has observed more than 450 hearings since May 2020 and written more than 100 blog posts. She is on LinkedIn (here), and tweets @KitzingerCelia

1 I take the reference to the “Family Court” in the TO at §1 to be a short-hand way of referring to the physical building in Lancaster where the hearing is to take place: it’s formally called ‘Lancaster Civil and Family Court’. This is clearly a COP case, not a Family case.

Restricting family contact, and family ‘abuse’ of staff: An adversarial Court of Protection hearing

By Claire Martin, 11th July 2023

One of the most draconian decisions the Court of Protection can make is to restrict contact between people who love each other and want to be together.  That was the issue in this hearing.  

The Health Board was seeking urgent court authorisation for an extension to an order restricting contact between the protected party at the centre of this case (Laura Wareham[1]) and her parents. In fact, they wished to stop all contact (face-to-face, telephone, FaceTime) for a period of twelve weeks, to ‘aid Laura’s mental health recovery and allow her to be discharged from hospital as soon as possible’ (from Position Statement kindly shared by Emma Sutton, counsel for the Health Board). They also proposed to vet all letters between Laura and her parents.  

As Laura and her parents made clear, they saw this as violation of their human rights – most especially Article 8, respect for their private and family life.  

On the basis of this, and similar, cases it’s clear that, in some future scenario if one of my daughters were to lose capacity to make her own decisions about contact with me, that the Court of Protection could, in theory, declare that I am harmful to her and prevent me from seeing her. That possibility fills me with dread. It’s important for us all to understand how this can happen.

Contact restrictions

The court can restrict contact between the protected party (P) and someone else when P lacks capacity to make their own decisions about that contact and the court decides that having contact with them is not in P’s best interests – even if they desperately want it.

When someone is admitted to a care home, the effect may often be to restrict that person’s contact with family members. This was an issue for many people during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic when people could not travel to see loved ones, and visiting was either banned altogether or severely restricted to video-calls,  ‘window contact’, or short meetings in gardens. The ‘right to family life’ (Article 8 of the Human Rights Act) was one of the most painful casualties of the public health emergency and was contested in court (e.g. “Right to family life in a care home during a pandemic”). The care home a person moves to is sometimes some distance away from the family home, and this too can make visiting difficult (see, for example, “What God has put together, let no man put asunder”).

But sometimes reduced contact is not a ‘side-effect’ but a deliberate court-ordered strategy because contact is declared not in the person’s best interests.  

For example, in one case the court made a final order that there would be no contact at all between P and a man whose companionship she craved – on the grounds that he was exercising coercion and control over her and manipulating her with the intention of securing financial benefits (specifically a ‘predatory marriage’).  

More often, contact is restricted, rather than banned altogether, in the vulnerable person’s best interests. For example, the judge ordered that a wife who was said to be abusive, coercive and controlling of her husband (who has dementia and Parkinson’s) was to have contact with him only by letter or by phone, and that face-to-face contact would be possible only with the prior agreement of the local authority (“Abusive” wife agrees to move out of “the matrimonial home” with continuing (albeit restricted) contact with P: An agreed order).  Similarly, contact between Mrs M (who has dementia) and her son was restricted to supervised contact only, i.e. they can only see each other if a member of staff is present to observe them.  This was ruled to be in Mrs M’s best interests because the judge found that the son was opposed to Mrs M taking her prescribed medication and was persuading her not to do so, and was also “exhibiting challenging behaviours with professionals” which “upset his mum” (see “Conditions on contact between mother and son”).

Applications for restrictions on contact often relate to family members alleged to have been abusive to care staff and professionals, and to have challenged the treatments or care plans in place for their relative.  As one blogger, who found when she read her own sister’s medical records that she had been characterised as “difficult”, “vociferous” and “obsessed with the Mental Capacity Act” (!) wrote: “”family members who have views about a person’s treatment which strongly differ from those of healthcare professionals may sometimes be framed as unreasonable, aggressive or not having their relative’s best interests at heart”.  Sometimes, as in the case she observed and blogged, the outcome of the hearing is that the judge entirely exonerates them and declines to restrict contact.

But contact restrictions are a more common outcome – and of course it can feel to families as though they are being punished for seeking better treatment for their loved one, and that fundamental human rights to family life are being violated.

We’ve blogged several such cases, e.g. a case where a judge ordered that a man could continue to visit his son but that the visit would be ended immediately if he were abusive to staff (here) and a case where a man who was coercive and controlling was prohibited from having direct face-to-face contact with his wife (here).

In another case (one I watched and blogged about myself), a mother was banned from seeing her daughter, who desperately wanted to come home,  because she was a bad influence on her daughter and (the court said) was encouraging her to refuse her medication. (See Medical treatment, undue influence and delayed puberty: A baffling case).

It’s clear from these court decisions that Article 8, which protects your right to respect for your private life, your family life, your home and your correspondence is “qualified” – i.e. the state can interfere with these rights to protect the rights of another person, or the wider public interest. And that’s what happened in this case. 

The hearing

It was an urgent application made by the Health Board, heard (via MS Teams) on Monday 12th June 2023, before Mr Justice Francis (COP 1397774T).  When I joined, there were thirteen people on the link waiting for the hearing to begin. 

The court clerk, at just gone 2 o’clock, said ‘Is everyone here?’ Laura (the protected party) replied ‘I’m here despite best efforts to the contrary’[2]. Her voice was strong and confident. I had read all of the earlier blogs and newspaper articles about Laura’s case[3], and seen her television interview, so I knew that she was very able to speak up for herself.  Her mother called out ‘Love you Laura’.  Laura replied: ‘Love you mum’. 

I knew that it was entirely possible that Laura hadn’t had in-person contact (or had had minimal contact) with her parents prior to this hearing, because Celia Kitzinger’s blog, in February this year, reported that an outstanding issue was ‘whether and how face-to-face contact between Laura and her parents can happen, given that in-person visiting arrangements have been suspended at the request of the Health Board due to her mother’s behaviour towards health care staff’

So, I was aware that the rest of us on the link might have been witnessing the first time that Laura and her parents had seen or spoken to each other for some time. That felt uncomfortable. 

I imagine most of us, the general public, would think that it would never happen that we would be prevented by the state from freely seeing the people we love, who sustain us and who we want to see. I was very interested to observe how the court would deal with this.

Background

Laura Wareham has been in hospital since April 2022. An earlier blog provides this summary: 

“A woman in her 30s [who] has “a hugely complicated medical background”, including a rare inherited disease, and a diagnosis of “autistic spectrum disorder”.  According to Emma Sutton, who represents the applicant Health Board (Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board), she has “at least 19 different physical conditions”.  The mother said there were far more. In addition to intubation and ventilation, she is receiving treatment for an acute kidney injury and sepsis.”

There have been several hearings for Laura in this contentious case. There is significant dispute between Laura and her parents on the one hand, and the Health Board and social care services on the other. Both the Health Board responsible for Laura’s care and Laura’s father, Conrad Wareham, have been the subject of judicial criticism (by different judges at different times) as reported in September 2022:

“Mr Justice Francis [the judge at the hearing I observed] made no criticism of specialists or the board, but said Dr and Mrs Wareham had been “interfering” with Miss Wareham’s treatment in a way that was “detrimental”.

He said the medical team treating Miss Wareham, who comes from Sheffield and is being cared for at a specialist unit run by the board, was entitled to treat her in the way it thought she should be treated.

Another judge had earlier criticised the board [Betsi Cadwaladr Health Board] after considering a different case, involving a man in his 40s, at another Court of Protection hearing.

Mr Justice Hayden said the man’s needs had been “substantially unaddressed”, “unacknowledged”, “unidentified” and “neglected”.

He said “so much” had gone wrong” and spoke of “substantial and alarming failures”.

P’s voice: ‘I am not being heard’

Judge: Can you hear us?
Laura: I can hear.  I am not being heard, that’s the difference.
Judge: Good, that’s a good start.
Laura: Well, that remains to be seen.

This hearing was peppered with exchanges like this between Laura and the judge. Laura was not happy to have been found to lack capacity to speak for herself and did not accept that she needed a litigation friend (in the form of the legal team provided by the Official Solicitor). ‘It would be much simpler if I could just speak for myself’ she said. 

Because Laura has been found to lack capacity to litigate this case, she is represented by the Official Solicitor, which means her ‘best interests’ (as the Official Solicitor sees them) are represented – but Laura herself is not represented in the way that legal teams usually represent their clients (see “Litigation friends or foes: Representation of P before the Court of Protection”).   Any of us could be in this situation – if a judge deems us not to have capacity to conduct litigation. Then it is down to someone else to argue what they see as our best interests – which might or might not align with our own views. That’s quite a scary prospect to me. 

And it presents the court with a tricky situation when P is in court, and when they can and do speak up for themselves and when their own view is different from that of “their” lawyer.  It was clear that Laura very much wanted to be heard in her own right. 

I have observed several hearings when P was in court. At this hearing I observed, with a woman who had ‘cognitive impairment’, the judge made a lot of time for her voice to be heard, even thought she had legal representation. That was not the case at this hearing. 

Several times, Francis J said ‘We need to do it in turn, you will be heard I promise you.’ Adding at times, ‘I can mute the sound but I don’t want to do that’. However, Laura didn’t really get ‘a turn’

On a couple of occasions, when the judge let her speak, the focus quickly diverted to someone else, like in this exchange: 

Laura: I have had my hand up [Laura’s ‘digital’ hand was up throughout the hearing] …. Nothing about me without me.
Judge: I will give you your turn in a moment. …. 

[Judge finished talking to counsel]

Judge: [to Laura] I can see you want to speak – don’t forget you are represented…
Laura: No, I am not. So far, it’s a breach of my human rights.

Judge: Which?

Laura: Freedom of expression, and religious belief, psychological torture. 
Judge: Which religious right? 
Laura: Freedom to pray with chosen people. 
Judge: Let me go back to Mr Fernando

The ‘turn’ did not return to Laura. 

I had wondered whether it might have been helpful, at the start, for Laura to know when she would be invited to speak in proceedings. I kept wondering when it would be her ‘turn’, and feeling anxious that her turn seemed to be like jam tomorrow. 

Laura is autistic and it might have been reasonable to operate on the basis that some predictability could be helpful for her.  At the same time, I could see that Laura wanted to speak at all times (with her virtual hand up throughout the hearing) – though this could have been because she didn’t know when she would be allowed to speak. 

Why is contact between Laura and her parents being restricted? 

The reason for this application, says the Health Board (represented by Emma Sutton), is because contact with her parents causes Laura to become very distressed and violent (for example, damaging property at the hospital, such as punching holes in walls, or staff ending up with their glasses broken). Following telephone contact with her mother recently, Laura had been detained under the Mental Health Act, and moved to a psychiatric ward for a period of time. 

The Health Board also reports that Erica Wareham (Laura’s mother) has been ‘verbally abusive to a treating nurse’, though I don’t know the details of that allegation. 

Laura (represented, via the Official Solicitor, by Grainne Mellon) and her parents (represented by Pravin Fernando) vociferously oppose this application, and, as I will report, contend that the Health Board and hospital staff’s allegations are ‘factually inaccurate’ and that ‘correlation is not causation’

There are likely to be many issues of which I am unaware in this complex case, on all sides. I have had the benefit of being able to read the Health Board’s and Laura’s parents’ Position Statements prior to writing this blog, and would have liked to have read the Position Statement for Laura. I requested it from Laura’s counsel, but have not received it. This might mean that this blog is biased or misses important information, and I will do my best to reflect the hearing accurately, as well as reflect upon my own responses to that hearing, from my perspective as an observer, parent and NHS worker. 

The Health Board’s position was supported by an independent expert psychiatrist (Dr Camden Smith), who assessed that Laura’s parents ‘contribute to her help-seeking behaviour’ and that, ‘on a balance of probabilities, Laura’s parents’ behaviour has a negative impact on her’. 

Laura’s parents’ position statement states that Dr Camden-Smith only met Laura on one occasion. They challenge the conclusions reached as ‘reductive’ and note that Dr Camden-Smith was not going to be present at the hearing to have her conclusions scrutinised by the court. Moreover, they have not seen Laura in-person since November 2022, and have had no contact at all since 7th May 2023. 

However, the Health Board was, Emma Sutton said: “… asking for a pause in terms of face-to-face contact. The Health Board is aware that there needs to be a careful approach. There needs to be some outside help – Dr Camden-Smith is an expert in autism and mental health and can give us a toolbox. We need to instruct an expert to help move this forward”.

My understanding, from that piece of information, is that the Health Board was suggesting that (after Laura has already spent 14 months as an inpatient) there is a need for an independent expert in autism and mental health to assist the hospital with how they care for Laura. And that this assessment needs to be conducted in the absence of any contact or involvement from Laura’s parents. I wasn’t sure what was proposed to happen with Laura’s care during the no-contact period that would ‘move this forward’ as the details weren’t discussed. 

I don’t know all of the contentions made about Laura’s parents’ behaviour (or the details of the ones mentioned in the hearing) and cannot know whether what the Health Board says, or what Laura’s parents say, is accurate. 

However, what I could see in the hearing is that Laura herself wants contact with her parents, and appears very distressed that she does not have this contact. Given that distressing Laura is what the Health Board says it is trying to avoid, I felt dubious about the likely success of an expert engaging Laura under these conditions. 

Laura’s counsel, Grainne Mellon said ‘we want to agree a less restrictive form of contact – no more than four to five weeks.’ She mentioned needing to see a ‘clinical plan’, and Pravin Fernando said:

The application is for 12 weeks [and] was said to be required for a period of reablement. The Health Board provides no rationale or plan as to what that would look like. You are being invited to restrict contact entirely without a plan – we don’t know anything.”

It wasn’t clear, at all, what the treatment plan was from the Health Board that necessitated the total absence of Laura’s parents from her life in order to be successful (i.e. to end up with discharge). It seemed as though there might be two reasons for the Health Board’s request: the parents’ behaviour towards staff at the hospital (described as, at times, ‘abusive’) and, more directly, potential ‘harm’ to Laura, as suggested by the expert witness in the form of ‘contributing to [Laura’s] help-seeking behaviour’ and the judge as ‘… to put it bluntly, her mother is winding her up’. 

As I said, I don’t know the details of incidents presented as evidence of harm, either to the health care staff or to Laura. The Health Board, expert witness and judge were all observing a link between contact with her parents and Laura’s distress being exacerbated. I assume evidence was provided in the bundle (which I could not see). 

Reflections on ‘abuse’ of NHS staff

This is a situation where balancing of the costs and benefits of contact is required. This is the first hearing I have observed for this case. I am new to the situation, and know a lot less than the Warehams and the services involved.

I have worked in the NHS for 30 years though. The NHS Staff Survey in 2021 reported:

14.3% of NHS staff have experienced at least one incident of physical violence from patients, service users, relatives or other members of the public in the last 12 months”.

Collins English Dictionary definition of abuse is “extremely rude and insulting things that people say when they are angry” and “cruel and violent treatment”. In relation to workplace abuse, the Royal College of Nursing says:

The RCN supports the Health and Safety Executive’s definition of work-related violence as any incident in which a person is abused, threatened or assaulted in circumstances relating to their work.  This can include verbal abuse or threats as well as physical attacks (Health and Safety Executive 2021). The RCN acknowledges that in health and social care, the approach to tackling work-related violence is nuanced and that ways of reducing the risk of harm to staff may vary in different clinical environments and with different client groups.”

NHS organisations often have a ‘zero-tolerance’ policy in relation to abuse and violence. And of course, it is completely unacceptable to be subject to ‘abuse’ in your place of work. 

I sometimes think that the definition of ‘abuse’ can be quite wide, however. If, for example, a patient or family member raises their voice or shouts because they are frustrated or upset with the service or member of staff, is this always ‘abuse’? Discounting physical assault and discriminatory verbal attack, the interpretation of a person’s behaviour as ‘abusive’ can, I think, be in the eye of the beholder, as well as (or instead of) an objectively observable fact. 

I am not expressing a view one way or another about Laura’s mother’s behaviour. I do not know what she did. I don’t know how people responded to her. I am expressing a view as a person first, and as a long-serving NHS clinician second. 

What I am suggesting is that responses to others’ behaviour can vastly differ. I have seen this myself, time and again, working in mental health services in the NHS. My own (sometimes inner) responses vary, depending upon what is going on for me that day or at that time in my life. 

Sometimes people are upset. Sometimes that is because they are receiving a terrible service. Sometimes the service is fine but they are frantic with worry about someone that they love and the usual social niceties go out of the window. Sometimes, it is because they might anyway lack the emotional, social and communication skills to address what is upsetting them. Sometimes, health care staff bring their own ways of responding to challenging situations, which might or might not be helpful. It’s complex. 

I have witnessed occasions where patients’ and relatives’ behaviour has tipped into verbal or physical threat – and witnessed times when the NHS ‘system’ or individual staff response to people could have been significantly better. Some NHS staff (especially ambulance staff) are at regular, high risk of assault, just because of the area that they work in. This report details the rise in violence towards NHS staff, especially during and since the pandemic. 

Both things can be true – that abuse does happen to NHS staff, and that others’ behaviour is sometimes framed as ‘abuse’ when it is not, really. 

The RCN’s acknowledgement of ‘nuance’ is helpful. Sometimes things are in that grey area. Sometimes I think staff can adopt what they think is ‘zero tolerance’ when more ‘nuance’ is called for. For example, I have seen entries in patients’ notes which have caused me some concern. One entry stating that X ‘raised their voice’and the health worker recorded that they told the patient ‘I am not here to be abused’. Context is important. What was the person raising their voice about? Could their distress/anger/raised voice be understood differently, other than as ‘abuse’? That particular example was the wife of a man living with dementia who (reading through all of her notes) seemed simply at the end of her tether. 

I have been on the receiving end of people’s anger, frustration and distress. It’s never pleasant, but it is not always ‘abuse’. I am not talking about anything physical here – nor minimising the impact of verbal attack. I am saying that how we all communicate with one another is complex and nuanced. Often, just by virtue of being in receipt of healthcare, patients and relatives are subject to a power dynamic that already places them in a vulnerable position. Sometimes, it could be helpful to try to understand this relational complexity, and to see ourselves as part of the dialogical pattern that might contribute to their ‘behaviour’. It’s a difficult area, and I am in no way suggesting that discriminatory verbal or physical abuse should be tolerated or ignored. 

I had a quick look at policies to protect staff from abuse in the NHS. This one, referencing zero-tolerance, says:  “Staff should not be left upset and distressed following an interaction with a patient”. That feels like an impossible target to achieve. The same interaction could upset some people and not others. This aspiration also places the emphasis on how staff should have a right to feel, rather than an objective measure of acceptable and unacceptable actions from others. I think this target runs the risk of all staff thinking that they are entitled not to be upset! How can that be helpful for those areas of ‘nuance’?

Final Submissions and Judgment

There had been an adjournment in the hearing for counsel to confer to see if they could reach a compromise position. The judge also had two other hearings waiting and had been frank that this hearing had not been listed for long enough, and he had not been given sufficient reading time. 

When I rejoined the link, I could see that Erica Wareham was crying and Laura was also crying and wiping her eyes. They were mouthing and gesturing to each other. It was quite difficult to witness and I was fully aware that they knew everyone could see them when they might be feeling very vulnerable, yet this was their only means of contact at the moment. Erica Wareham was also talking to her husband animatedly. Conrad Wareham was sitting back in his chair (and had been throughout the hearing) looking thoroughly fed up, whereas Erica Wareham was often leaning into the screen, and sometimes seemed to be shouting (though on mute). 

The plan that the advocates had agreed, and asked the judge to order, was for half an hour contact per week between Laura and her parents, via MS Teams, on the basis that it would be recorded and transcribed. This was to ensure that communication remained, in the view of the Health Service, ‘appropriate’ – again a position firmly challenged by Laura’s parents. 

“The court will recall that Dr and Mrs Wareham have not had any contact with Laura since 7 May 2023 so how does the Health Board attribute Laura’s ongoing fluctuating negative presentation to Dr and Mrs Wareham? The Health Board attributes too much responsibility to Dr and Mrs Wareham for Laura’s presentation, rather than consider that her personality and behaviour is a manifestation of her.” Laura’s parents’ Position Statement (kindly shared)

Certain topics were not to be discussed between family members.  Emma Sutton proposed that ‘if Erica Wareham and Conrad Wareham start talking about the proceedings or if they do not redirect when medical issues or controversial issues are raised, the Teams call will be terminated’

Contact would be increased to one hour per week, if all went as agreed. 

Then counsel for the parents raised what must have been a difficult topic:

Counsel for Parents: There is one last issue to raise. I am instructed to request – to find an alternative Tier 3 judge to preside over this matter. I am in an invidious position. Some orders you have made and recitals you have made reflecting your opinion – they are of the view that you have taken a specific stance on their conduct and way of engaging that is likely to impact the way future decisions are made, particularly in the context of specific things from today like neurodiversity and Mrs Wareham’s autism. Their preference would be for another Tier 3 judge to look at this with fresh eyes.

Judge: Thank you for the tactful way you have done this. What is the timescale? Have we got a final hearing set down yet?  [after discussion about court and judge availability] What I will say – effectively this is an invitation to recuse myself – I will do the next hearing and if you are going to make an application for me to recuse myself, set it out with the reasons. If the judge has lost the respect of parties, that’s one thing. On the other hand parties can’t just request a different judge when they want. I will hear it at the next hearing. A whole day, certainly half a day at least – effectively today your one hour has become half a day.

Laura: It may be a day for you but it’s over a year of my life that’s been stolen.

Pravin Fernando submitted that the Health Board’s treatment of Mrs Wareham was ‘indirect disability discrimination’ due to her autism. The judge noted:  

I am aware that Mrs Wareham … it has been said has her own things that need to be protected. I have talked about the Local Authority owing her a duty – the Wellbeing Wales Act – I have to pay extra attention to make sure that if Mrs Wareham is suffering from any condition that she is protected by [the court].”

In his judgment, Francis J said that he would ‘adopt the Trust’s position for the next few weeks’, i.e. no face-to-face contact between Laura and her parents.  His reasoning was that, if in-person contact were to be allowed then the parents “inadvertently or intentionally, will wind Laura up and create a situation akin to the one before”.  He authorised the MS Teams contact (to be recorded).

Francis J acknowledged that Laura’s own position was not that taken by the Official Solicitor, and that the reason the court was sitting was because Laura ‘lacked capacity to make her own decisions”.  Laura and her mother were visibly upset and Laura continued to speak out: “I do not lack capacity.  I will not be silenced – nothing about me without me – please stop telling people to mute me.

The judge left the link.

Laura: ‘I love you mum and dad. (Crying) You don’t respect my human rights.

Laura was still shouting out as the line was disconnected. 

Draconian Decisions 

Clearly, preventing family members from having contact with one another is a very serious decision to make and it’s hard to watch the distress it causes protected parties and their families in court.  This hearing for Laura was an acute example of such an awful situation. That does not necessarily mean the decision is not justified. 

I don’t have access to more detailed views of Laura. The phrase ‘correlation is not causation’ was said several times, both by Laura and by her mother. I took that to mean that they acknowledged that Laura might be upset after contact with her mother (at one point Laura said she’d had a ‘meltdown’) but that it wasn’t the case that the contact caused the distress, or that stopping contact would lead to improvements for Laura. 

Pravin Fernando, counsel for the parents, cast doubt on even the correlation, describing what he thought was a ‘troubling’ lack of evidence from the Health Board that Laura’s behaviour had improved following no contact with her parents. Emma Sutton firmly disputed this and evidenced several citations in the bundle from the medical director of the hospital. 

I was left with a sense of niggling anxiety after this hearing. I think that was about what seemed like a lack of an exit plan (perhaps that will come) and a family and system at absolute loggerheads. Observing Laura, I could see that she is very unlikely to join in with a care plan recommended by an expert in autism to ‘move things forward’, knowing full well that this care plan is predicated on the absence of contact with her parents. Especially, perhaps, a care plan based on that expert’s advice to remove Laura’s parents from the picture entirely (albeit for a period of time). There seems to be an impasse, that I wasn’t convinced would be resolved by adopting the Trust’s position for a few weeks. Maybe the interim judgment wasn’t designed for that. Pravin Fernando is considering an application to instruct (perhaps jointly) an independent expert, which could offer a way forward. 

The next hearing (also before Francis J) is likely to be mid-July 2023.

Claire Martin is a Consultant Clinical Psychologist, Cumbria, Northumberland, Tyne and Wear NHS Foundation Trust, Older People’s Clinical Psychology Department, Gateshead. She is a member of the core group of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project and has published several blog posts for the Project about hearings she’s observed (e.g. here and here). She tweets @DocCMartin


[1] The Transparency Order permits us to name Laura Wareham (and her parents, Conrad Wareham and Erica Wareham) but not the hospital where she is being treated, or any of the professionals involved in her care.  

[2] All quotations are based on contemporaneous notes and are as accurate as I can make them, given that we are not allowed to audio-record court hearings. They are unlikely to be 100% verbatim.

[3] ‘I am fearful for my daughter’s life: serious medical treatment in a contentious case’‘Stand-off about the appropriate expert: a pragmatic judicial solution’‘Judge criticises consultant concerned about how doctors are treating his daughter at Welsh Health Board’‘Retired nurse tells judge her daughter is not safe in Betsi Cadwaladr Health Board hospital’‘Rotherham woman with rare condition steps up life-changing surgery campaign’