Rebuilding “trust” after abuse is revealed on CCTV and there are no available options for alternative care provision

By Amanda Hill, 5th December 2025

“It’s his own home”. That’s what the mum of the protected party (I’ll call him “JC”) told the court. JC has been living in his current home for about 10 years, but listening to what was said in this hearing, it didn’t seem much like a “home” to me.

JC has been diagnosed with severe learning difficulties, autism and PTSD, and has significant care needs. He is currently being cared for by a care provider that I can’t name, with care commissioned by a Local Authority (LA) and an Integrated Care Board (ICB) that I can’t name either, due to the reporting restrictions in this case.

And after this hearing he will continue to be cared for by the same provider, because there is no other option. The judge, District Judge Matharu, made it clear to the family that she has no authority to order the LA and ICB to commission a different care provider for JC. And the LA and ICB position is that there is no other available option.

What is particularly shocking about this case is that there is CCTV from August to November 2024 that (according to the LA and ICB) “raised concerns”[1] about JC’s care. These include employment of staff without the relevant expertise, who failed to offer JC appropriate occupation and stimulation, and “the timeliness of interventions when JC soiled himself/the floor, staff sleeping, or inappropriate use of their phones and other matters”. The public bodies say that this has now been investigated, safeguarding referrals completed and changes have been made.  The Position Statement for the LA and ICB states “Some staff have been removed from his care package. Others have received final warnings and further training”.  These “others” are still caring for JC.

The family, who first raised the concerns on viewing the CCTV, are appalled by what happened and there is a “near breakdown of relations between the care provider and family members”. Both JC’s brother and his mum referred to what they had seen as “abuse”: they wanted a change of care provider.

JC’s brother and his mum wanted the judge to view some of the footage. In trying to persuade the judge to look at it, JC’s brother said, “A picture paints a thousand words and there are thousands of words in the bundle.” His mum added that the “CCTV makes JC human, not just words on a page”. But Adam Fullwood, of 39 Essex Chambers, representing the ICB and LA, argued that the judge didn’t need to look at the footage, because Mark Caulfield, the court appointed Independent Social Worker (ISW), had. He’d had “unfettered access.” The judge initially said that she would look at “a couple of incidents …. with nobody else in the courtroom” because the family had asked her to. In the event, the way the hearing panned out, I don’t think she did. She did, however, acknowledge the gravity of what the CCTV contained.

In an unusual move that I haven’t seen before, the judge, DJ Matharu, arranged for the sealed order to be drawn up immediately, at the end of the hearing, and it was printed out (by the judge herself) for the family. Afterwards, the judge made what she called “final observations”. She said (as best I could capture it):

“That concludes the hearing except for the following …I don’t want comments or responses.  ..For the benefit of everyone, this isn’t a win or lose for anyone…. The position the court was in was that there was no alternative option (to staying with the current providers)…. To the credit of those involved in (JC’s) care, after video footage … steps have been established to provide a better environment .. .. As much as (mum and brother) look to the future ..I want the carers to collaborate and make them feel heard (the judge stressed these words). (Mum and brother) have demonstrated throughout …..and Mr Caulfield confirmed ….what loving people they are …(JC) has had a lot of trauma and, it may not be appropriate for me to say, but so have (mum and brother) …. Hopefully the Working Together Agreement and CCTV protocol, by doing what it says on the tin, may restore hopes for (mum and brother)… There can be no doubt that (Mum and brother) are not going away  (the judge said loudly and firmly, looking at the public body staff sitting at the back of the courtroom) …. Mediation is a fresh platform …. I’m grateful to you both.” (looking at mum and brother).

But the care provider that I can’t name will remain responsible for JC’s care for the foreseeable future.  There is no other current option. Many people would find this shocking, I imagine. Nobody has been held accountable for the abuse, apart from the carers who are no longer caring for JC because they have been suspended or dismissed. And JC’s mum and brother haven’t received an apology for what happened, either from the public bodies or the care providers, as many fair-minded people might think would be the decent thing to do given the circumstances. I saw a family fighting to ensure the best care and environment for their son and brother going forward and a family making compromises to ensure that “trust” – a word used, according to my notes, at least 22 times in this hearing – can be re-established.

I observed this hearing, COP 12683557, in person in Manchester. It was listed to last for three days, from 10th – 12th November 2025, but in the event, for reasons that will become clear, and to the family’s dismay, the hearing was over by 1pm on the second day. On the first day, I sat at the back of the courtroom with a journalist who is interested in this case. She has got to know JC’s mum and brother very well. I learnt that she had observed an earlier hearing that I tried to observe remotely but couldn’t, because the court didn’t provide a link.

It was at that previous hearing, in July 2025, that the Transparency Order (TO) was amended to include restrictions on naming the LA and ICB. This new restriction also means that I can’t cross-reference two previous published judgments in the case or make any explicit connection between those previous judgments and the way the case has evolved over the years.  The Position Statement from JC’s Litigation Friend, the Official Solicitor, refers to “…a long and complex history; there are historic and seminal judgments…about JC’s mistreatment and unlawful behaviour of statutory bodies……To a degree, and by way of an observation, the severity of those historic concerns may have caused the family members to continue to mistrust the statutory bodies and care providers”. To provide context to the issues of trust, the LA now is the same LA as in those historic court proceedings (proceedings which are already in the public domain).

The court’s decision to ban me from referring to the previously published judgments poses a very significant obstacle to transparency: it’s a serious infringement on my Article 10 rights to report, and the public’s right to understand, this case in the context of what has previously been reported about this family in Court of Protection proceedings.  The effect of the TO is to sever this hearing from the previous proceedings.

I was going to write a fairly short blog post, briefly outlining the hearing. But as I started to write it, I realised that in order to do justice to the hearing, the process and the outcome, I need to describe in detail what happened. This has therefore turned into a very long blog post. I’ve tried to report what people said, typing as quickly as I could. But my notes won’t be entirely accurate as I don’t touch type or use shorthand. I believe the value of approaching the blog in this forensic way is that it shows not only how a Court of Protection judge tried to deal with a situation where her hands are tied, legally, by the absence of  options, but also to try to give a flavour of what it was like for the family involved, who had no legal representation and took part as litigants in person. I don’t know whether the journalist will find a way to report on the hearing; the press often want to use names in their reporting and the reporting restrictions in this case are extensive.  I think it’s important that there is a record of what happened, and the issues it highlights – that’s why this blog is so long.

I asked Gill Loomes-Quinn[2] to read a draft copy of this blog, to get her perspective. She believes that this hearing is an archetypal case raising two fundamental issues with which the COP is routinely faced: (1) Limitation to “what’s on the table” and the relative impotence of the judge in the formulation of ‘best interests’ decisions where resource implications are engaged (the key authority is N v ACCG & Ors [2017] UKSC 22); and (2) The ‘David and Goliath’ character of the position of litigants in person – especially when these are family members versus public bodies.

After reporting the hearing, I’ll reflect on six aspects: what makes where we live a “home”; establishing a standard of care; the value of an experienced Independent Social Worker; the courtroom environment; judicial review and finally, power.

The Hearing 10th – 11th November 2025

Day 1 – Monday 10th November

The start of the hearing

This was a final hearing, originally listed for three days, so that the judge could hear evidence and make a decision as to what residence and care would be in JC’s best interests.  Very early on, though, it became clear that there was going to be a change to that plan.

The listing for the first day, 10th November 2025, appeared like this:

You’ll notice that I’ve had to redact the public listing. That’s because the publicly available listing included the name of the LA, which I’m not allowed to name. It states that the hearing was about where JC should live and authorising his deprivation of liberty. But any possibility of JC moving from his home was only very briefly touched on. The hearing ended up being about a final order authorising JC’s Deprivation of Liberty, a CCTV protocol and a Working Together Agreement. A primary focus for the judge became the issue of re-establishing trust between the family, the public bodies and the care provider.

Those of us who were waiting in the waiting room, including JC’s mum and brother, were shown into the courtroom at 10.40, some 40 minutes after the scheduled start. The judge was already sitting at her bench. But there was a problem as some of the legal team weren’t there, due to a massive queue to enter the building and go through security, because of enhanced security checks (I’d had to wait 30 minutes myself and even had to open my laptop at security). As we waited, the preliminary discussion was whether the judge was going to view the CCTV footage. She eventually agreed to view two incidents during her lunchbreak and the hearing then turned to the substantive issues. By this time, everyone who was due to be in court had arrived. I noticed four females enter and sit on the backrow of the courtroom, alongside the journalist and me. I realised later that these women were from the ICB and LA. Somebody else pulled up a chair from the benches and sat on the far right – this was Mark Caulfield, the ISW. The courtroom was small; apart from the judge’s bench and a clerk’s bench in front of her (which was unoccupied) there were two wooden benches where the legal teams sat and a row of chairs at the back.

There was no opening summary or introductions so I had to figure out quickly who was who and what was going on, as best I could. Adam Fullwood was representing the ICB and LA (so he was wearing two hats) and behind him were two instructing solicitors. Sam Karim KC, of Kings Chambers, was representing JC via his Litigation Friend, the Official Solicitor. (For simplicity, I will refer to him as Counsel for JC). A representative from his instructing solicitor was seated behind him. JC’s mum and brother were on the right of the front bench. The judge, as is common for District Judges, had no court staff to support her in the courtroom. She rang staff outside the courtroom during the hearing, when she needed something, such as asking for water for JC’s brother.

No available options

Attention immediately turned to available options for JC’s care. The only option for commissioning by the LA and ICB was from the care providers already providing JC’s care. Counsel for the applicants put it this way: “You’ve got to grasp the nettle of what you’ve got”. JC’s mum and brother struggled to understand this. They’d thought that, after hearing evidence, the judge would make a decision about whether JC’s care should be transferred to another provider, but as the judge said: “I can only work within those confines”.  The judge can’t order public bodies to commission an alternative provider if it isn’t an option on the table. The question arose as to whether the hearing needed to last for three days, and whether all the witnesses should be called, if there was only one outcome possible.

 Mum stated that the family wanted the current care provider removed and an Individual Service Fund (ISF)[3] arrangement put in place, with new care providers, rather than being commissioned by the LA, who she said she had “battled with” for 20 years. The LA was committing only to a review of whether an ISF was possible, with a decision by February 2026. The judge said she was “sorry to butt in” and that she was “clear of your position but it is a matter of law and I can’t change….. do you both understand it’s not an option?..…I can only as a matter of law deal with what’s available”. I thought her tone was like the firm tone I used to use as a teacher, when a class discussion needed to move on.

A very short while later, her tone changed dramatically. The judge said to JC’s brother “I’m going to take my judge hat off and ask you personally –  are you ok?” The courtroom was exceedingly hot and it became apparent that JC’s brother was feeling ill. The hearing was clearly taking its toll on both JC’s mum and brother. Mum became tearful. She mentioned “abuse” and JC’s brother said, “We know what decent care is and we know what abuse is …sorry judge”. The judge then said “I can see how you are looking and it is a useful reminder for me how this is affecting the family, but my focus is solely on JC.”  Mum replied: “We see a paucity of care; it’s not care, it’s provision”. The judge referred to her case management powers and said she was deviating from the court timetable. She said she was worried about a three-day probing process on the family, and the impact on them of this, if the outcome was effectively pre-determined and nothing was going to change. She did say that “people have been suspended and people have been dismissed” but also that “this is only option and is in JC’s best interests that everybody works together.”

She continued, speaking to JC’s mum: “You are a fierce advocate …. I cannot change (the care provider)…I can only change where we go from here ….if I can help today (she stressed) I’m going to be very straight with you; I can’t change mindsets. But the trauma it’s causing you….…three days of court time…..I’ve probed and I’ve considered …that’s what’s going to happen.” She then reflected on whether she should “rise” for a few minutes, to see what could be done with the judge’s “input” – she said she was exercising creative case management. Mediation was mentioned.[4] The judge did add that there was no pressure on the family to agree to the suggestion of a shortened hearing, as there were three days of court time allocated. It was clear to me, though, that the judge really didn’t envisage a three-day hearing anymore.

At that point Counsel for the applicants stood up. He suggested “one further go” at a way forward to see “if any good can come out of this for JC”. He proposed a ‘Working Together Agreement”, later referred to simply as a WTA. The family being “encouraged” (some might say, including me, “pressured”) to move forward from the past was a key feature of this hearing, for the public bodies and the judge.

As there were not going to be decisions about care, remaining issues for the court were the proposed CCTV protocol, the Working Together Agreement and mediation.

The CCTV Protocol: involvement of family

The judge left the courtroom at 11.25, so about 45 minutes after the hearing had started. I noticed Counsel for JC going up to the family and letting them know that they could leave their belongings in the courtroom. We were called back in at 12pm and the judge was already sitting at her bench. I saw her smile at the family as they came in.

Counsel for the applicants addressed the court first. He referred to the working together agreement and raised the “utility” of a fact-finding hearing[5] to establish what had happened in the past – but he argued that wouldn’t be in JC’s best interests: “there is no utility in doing that” and suggested setting out a framework going forward. 

Counsel representing JC then made his submissions. He said that he had had a conversation with the ISW and their view was that it would be good to have a conversation with JC’s mum and brother to discuss the benefits of mediation …”regarding care and residence, it is in JC’s best interests to remain there, there is no other option ….even if we have three days of hearings.” He stated that a working together agreement “seems to be agreed” (as a way forward) which would outline the roles and responsibilities of family, carers and the LA. There would also be a CCTV protocol which would cover who was going to be the data controller, who would have the key to the cupboard (where the CCTV is stored, I gathered) and who should be present when the CCTV is viewed every quarter. It was the suggestion of the ISW that there should be confirmation of who has logged on to view the CCTV due to the family’s concerns. 

The judge stated that the current proposal with regards to the CCTV footage going forwards was that the family would be excluded from viewing it and they would only get an outline of its contents from the people who viewed it (so from the LA I think). Those people would bring concerns to the family’s attention.  This became a point of contention, however.  The judge continued: the family “may say that ‘if we hadn’t seen what we have seen …’. I’m saying this for the Official Solicitor ….these are JC’s safeguards. ” The judge seemed to be suggesting that the family would not trust what they were told about the CCTV footage if they hadn’t seen it themselves.

Counsel for JC replied that “The LA have heard what you have said.”

The judge then stated “There is some force in what they (the family) say, that’s why we’ve got here. We are trying to move forward without upset and heartache. I’m trying to deal with what I think they are going to say.” Counsel for JC proposed that “the family can be there when it is viewed” subject to a protocol and the judge replied “That’s what I’m suggesting, to move forward…”

Counsel for the applicants stood up and submitted that a report would be sent to the family unless there were concerns about the standard of care, in which case the family would be told and then brought in to view the footage, so they would not be excluded. He said that mum was visiting regularly (the court had earlier been told that JC’s brother was not visiting regularly due to the distress it caused him).  Counsel for the applicants argued that it was not a case of the family being excluded. He then suggested that things “…cannot proceed on the basis that (it is suggested) the care provider and public bodies are going to tamper (with the CCTV footage).”  He used the word “micromanage” in terms of the court’s role. He also stated that the ISW was in court, so the court could hear directly from him.

I saw the judge rub her forehead.  Addressing the family, she said “I’m trying to find a managed way here …I adjourned for 30 minutes so you could get some fresh air and understand what is happening. You’ve heard about ISF, that’s now going to be looked at, for a realistic update by February so that’s …”. JC’s brother said “progress” and the judge agreed. She then said “We have to have something in place for the CCTV protocol”.

A Working Together Agreement

Mum then spoke. She said it was “a step forward. With regards to the Working Together Agreement, she said “We’ve always tried to work together. We have viewed horrendous, despicable footage” and some staff are still there (caring for JC).

The judge then asked mum how she thought a working together agreement would work. Mum said that she would try and work together. But she was worried. She told the court she has taken “an audio recording in to try and protect myself.” She explained: “I’m an older woman…..there are three six-foot-tall guys…it shouldn’t be like that …it’s JC’s home ….it shouldn’t be like that ….”. She indicated she felt intimidated. Mum is in her late sixties.

JC’s mum continued, saying that there is a female carer (whom I will give the pseudonym Mary) that she trusts and who was due to give evidence. She is a “whistle-blower” and should be protected, according to JC’s mum. Mum was concerned Mary would be laid off by the care providers for being a “whistle-blower”.  About the proposal to exclude family from viewing future CCTV footage, she said “Our concern is that they will determine what is abuse ….I don’t trust the social worker to identify what is abuse.”

The judge summarised: “So, to break it down, you are going to work with…” (the carers) and mum replied: “I’ve always been polite.”

The judge then gave her views on the CCTV protocol, taking into account the two reports written by the ISW. She thought it was important the family were involved. She said, “I can’t build trust on your behalf” and “I can’t give you the gift of trust.”

She continued: “I’m trying to be neutral but ……….the CCTV is going to remain in place, it is part of JC’s life to protect him …and if things happen, you are going to be told and will see it …and for your worries and concerns that it will be tampered with or removed, I will speak further to (counsel for the applicants) and I’m satisfied that there is a safe mechanism. That’s the best I can do, isn’t it?”

Mum replied that it was about safeguarding JC.

At this point, Counsel for the applicant made a new proposal. He suggested that an independent IMCA[6] be appointed by the LA, who would be present at the CCTV viewing, and who would be “really independent.” The judge found that “helpful” and added that “the IMCA will be there on behalf of JC on a long-term basis.” JC’s brother said that it was a way forward.

The judge then moved to the subject of “Mary”. She addressed Counsel for the applicants:

“….Mr Fullwood, it may be out with my jurisdiction …I was (told about Mary) …I’m treading carefully but being open ….she (Mary) has a great attachment to JC, because she was going to come to court …she might feel some sort of employment risk or intimidation…I’m choosing my words carefully …out with my jurisdiction …..”.

Counsel for the applicants replied that “She is an employee of (care provider)… I have no evidence she’s been threatened in any way …judge can check …she would have come to court …but we don’t understand there is any impediment to her coming to court …it is a serious allegation to make ..she is not an employee of the LA.”

Dogs

The judge then brought up the subject of dogs. “I know I shouldn’t micro manage, but I may have to be practical in my role today…mum has two dogs and I have read in the witness statements that JC likes dogs …I’ve read that some staff don’t feel comfortable with dogs ….I’m not interested in their comfort ….If JC likes dogs …..”

Counsel for the applicants stated that these were “large dogs potentially running amok in a property” and making a mess.  “We are hearing from the care provider that this is a problem, and the dogs are not being controlled as they should be” and that wasn’t to the benefit of JC. The judge replied, “I am not making findings….the dogs are retrievers (mum confirms they are two labradors, so hardly XL Bullies, I think to myself) and if JC wants to see those dogs he should be allowed to.”

Counsel for the applicant responded, “I take the court’s point ..as much as can be done, should be.” And the judge replied, “That’s all I’m asking for.”

There is case law about dogs and people who lack capacity.  According to Ian Brownhill, the most famous dog in the Court of Protection is “Bobby the Dog”: (Mrs P v Rochdale Borough Council & Others, [2016] EWCOP B1).  Ian says in a webinar[7] that the judge in that case was “clearly an animal lover” and she recognised the importance of pets to people who lack capacity. Paragraph 29 from the judgment reads as follows: “It may seem to those not well rehearsed in the needs of a person who owns a pet, in this case a person who no longer has capacity to make decisions about various matters, what the importance of a pet is in their life. The deputy only has to read any single reference in reports, assessments or statements of Mrs P of how important Bobby is to her. Her Social Worker says in her witness statement to the court that:- “I would recommend that of single most importance in her life is her dog and having some form of contact with her dog in the future if possible.” The judge in that case? It was DJ Matharu!

Mediation[8]

The judge continued.  She said “The IMCA is a useful tool” which she was sure the Official Solicitor would support. “Mr Karim, there has been progress on the Working Together report, the CCTV protocol will be refined….have I overlooked anything on behalf of JC?”

Counsel for JC outlined some issues to be clarified and then moved to mediation: “It seems on behalf of the Official Solicitor that the recommendation made by the ISW is a good one ..JC has complex needs ….and (has been) looked at by the court for 15 years ….perhaps (we can) find a way in which the public bodies and family can work together on behalf of JC’s best interests.”

The judge asked more about mediation, whether it would be now or in the future and Counsel for JC replied something about depending on a “change of commission and provider…. ..mediation ..if there have been mistakes…” at which the judge cut in and said:

“You are being polite – there have been mistakes.” (Judge’s emphasis).

The judge then summarised the position, addressing the family:

“I don’t want you to think that I don’t want the three days (for the hearing)…I don’t have the jurisdiction to (give you what you want ) ….I’m not removing responsibility for either of you but somebody independent (the IMCA would become involved) …you heard what I said about Mary, and the dogs …..I can ask you, but I can’t compel you,…. but mediation would be something …I think it can be a very good thing …looking again at the notes I took…this is not a criticism or berating you, but when you’ve been through everything….. when you are saying what you feel…”

My reading was that the judge didn’t want to put the family through what she saw as a demanding process for them if there would be no change of care provider, and she was trying to work through what could be achieved.

Mum replied. She said that friendships are so important for JC, the care is rigid…it does not allow for flexibility and friendship: “He’s living in his own home, it’s got to be a home …(they, the care provider) are trying to treat JC’s home like another supported living place ..it’s his own home …he has human rights, to develop a friendship ..there is no creativity (re care)”. 

The judge had her hand resting on her jaw as she looked at JC’s mum and brother, listening intently. 

JC’s brother said the carers were systematically removing…..and encroaching….removing things he loves …the care providers had goalposts but (they) have moved back, to restrict his life. 

Hearing the views of the Independent Social Worker

The judge then made a proposal. She suggested asking the ISW to give his views, to comment and “tell me what this judge should do.” About the CCTV protocol, for example.

Counsel for the applicants said he agreed with the judge’s proposal to hear from the ISW but that family wanting to view the CCTV footage “……has come back to a lack of trust.”

I heard mum sigh loudly.  

The judge said to the family “I need to hear from somebody independent, to you, to (the LA)…. I want to try to future-proof JC’s care. That applies to everybody, the two of you, the two of me (by which I think she means the OS and her) and the LA” (raising her voice).

The ISW went to the witness box and was sworn in by the judge, as she had no clerk.

The judge stated that it had been “a curious route” for him to be in the witness box. She continued:  “You have heard heartfelt views (from the family about JC’s care) ….the hurt they feel on JC’s behalf …you’ve viewed the footage, met the family …the reason I have put you in the witness box is to understand why a new approach from everybody is required and how that can be workable ….I’ve been involved with the family for a number of years …”. 

The ISW said he will do his best to assist the court. The judge asked him about the appointment of an IMCA and he thought that was an excellent idea which will enable a “greater degree of accountability and transparency.” The judge stated that it takes “transparency to build trust” and asked “How does one build trust in this sort of situation?”

The ISW said that the family hadn’t been invited to meetings and that “happens with the Court of Protection….I have no vested interest.. the family are the most dedicated I’ve ever come across …I have met professionals who want the same …I worry ..not worry …I’m trying to choose my words carefully …the difference between professionals and the family …they have different views about how to achieve goals but all want the same goal …I didn’t get a sense that nobody didn’t want that”. That’s why he suggested mediation and talked about “some slack in the system”. He thought the situation was more rigid but “solutions have been found …sorry judge, I don’t want to ramble…but I think they had a degree of faith in my independence and, I might be wrong, but in your independence.”

The judge then said that she may be “putting a label on it but – are we at make or break?”

The ISW replied “Regardless of what happens today, things are going to change in JC’s care, but when people (are in the same room) and can compromise, things can change.”

It was then Counsel for the applicants’ turn to ask the ISW questions.  He started by saying that he was going to ask about what can be done to improve trust. He asked if it is the ISW’s professional view that a Working Together Agreement can improve relationships and the ISW replied yes, if it’s adhered to. Counsel then turned to the issue of the CCTV protocol and the appointment of an IMCA. The ISW replied yes (to the suggestion of the IMCA) because of their independence, and that the suggestion has been put forward by the public body to increase accountability and transparency.

Counsel for the applicants then turned to mediation: “Can you say why, and be clear to the court, why it would be a benefit for (mum and brother)?”

The ISW replied that the family “have a long history of not being listened to” and that he understood their position. “But you never know what is going to happen until you get in that room…impartial person in the room…and mum and brother would say they want a social worker they can have trust in, that would be their ultimate goal..”

Counsel for the applicants then stated that the LA is “inviting the court to make an order that JC will receive care provided by (current care provider)” and what the ISW’s view was on whether they can meet JC’s needs. The ISW replied that there is a “disparity in terms of evidence and degree of certainty” but he “is satisfied the care plans will meet JC’s needs for the next 12 months.”

Counsel for JC via the OS asked the ISW about the CCTV protocol, and the advantages and disadvantages of the family being present when the CCTV footage is viewed. The ISW replied that there was the advantage of the family not being there in that there would be no “interference”. But there would be a disadvantage too. The family know JC particularly well, including his “…idiosyncrasies”. JC shows distress that the family can identify that the professionals wouldn’t spot (even if there was lack of agreement about what is abuse or not). Counsel for JC then stated that a disadvantage of them being present would be exacerbating a lack of trust. The ISW responded by saying that there was a possibility of increasing conflict when viewing (together) but it may be a way of developing relationships. “I did not specifically explore that with the LA (viewing with family present) ..but I support family being present…if It’s a regular review I don’t anticipate it being a challenge”. Counsel for JC asked if a quarterly review would be ok and the ISW replied “yes, if concerns are dealt with judiciously”. He mentioned “activities”, “faeces” and “urine”.

Counsel for JC then asked the ISW: “Are JC’s needs being met in current placement?” and the reply from the ISW was “yes”.  “And in the future, if there were to be a change of provider, what would you recommend regarding better relationships between family and professionals?” The ISW mentioned co-working and involvement of the family, hence the suggestion of ISF. “Mum and brother don’t feel listened to……there are polarised views on care and I see that continuing (without a change of provider)”. But he said that he has seen some improvements. He said “Concerns were raised in 2023, 2024…difficult to make argument that care needs are being met ..but to provide balance, I am satisfied…. finely balanced on the basis of probabilities, that JC’s needs are being met …..the family have greater control and the ICB and LA can ensure that JC’s needs are being met.”

There was a brief exchange about how contact between JC and his brother could be facilitated and the discussion turned back to mediation as a way of improving relationships. The ISW said “When people have concerns about care …especially as a social worker, I have seen improvements even with the same providers.”

The judge then asked mum if she had anything to say.

Mum asked the judge if she could stay sitting down. The ISW and mum smiled at each other and she called him Mark. She started talking; talking about trauma and how she feels the need for a new start ..that’s why talk of ISF gave her hope……..

The judge asked her to ask the ISW a question. 

Mum asked him, “How do you justify his needs are being met when he can’t go out in his car?” The ISW asked for guidance from the judge, as he was being challenged to answer something anecdotal in court. The judge replied, saying that both Counsel had asked him if the “package was meeting JC’s care needs, and mum is saying that they don’t; she doesn’t understand how you could say that, in the round, if he doesn’t have access to a car.”

The ISW replied by saying that there are always occasions when there are absences (of a driver)…mum and brother are saying that it is endemic and if that is the case, then that is a significant part of his care …”and when I spoke to the care provider, they said a car was a part of his routine and P used (going out in the car) for self-regulating …P can’t access the community any other way, so a driver is a significant part of his care plan…but the absence (of a driver) would need to be systematic.”

Mum mentioned about looking at the car through the “lens of P’s care” and the judge said she would deal with it.

Mum carried on. She said that ISF would be a fresh start. But I could see that she was finding it hard to speak. “..I want to clarify ..sorry judge, I had so many questions …trying to put a question .. Catalyst provider ..I want it clarified who Skills for Care really is … I’m sorry judge, I’m not phrasing properly “. The judge asked mum to pause and addressed the ISW: “The LA have said they are going to look into it. So, if they have “got the wrong end of the stick”, if I can put it like that … that would come out in the wash, wouldn’t it?

The ISW replied “Yes.”

The judge continued, saying that the LA say they will come back by Feb…as an interim stage, they will do their homework (about the possibility of ISF).

Mum then said: “I’m not a lawyer, I’m just a mum …care isn’t about being perfect, it’s about being good.”

The judge summarised her position. “What I’m trying to do is provide some progress with the only tools I am given …I asked the ISW to provide evidence about building trust up …Mr Fullwood, you are going to have to take instructions on this…I am minded to direct, so far as I am able, mediation …it is not an arbitrary, nebulous concept …I’m going to be prescriptive ….about who should be there, otherwise it is not going to work, and perhaps an agenda of sorts , using what Mr Caulfield has had to say …to next mediation meetings and achievable targets ….first item is P’s car…difficulties with agency workers … I’m not asking the ISW to deal with (all the issues in his report …(my aim) is to try and see how we can work together going forward.”

A leap of faith

The judge accepted that the morning had not proceeded in the way the plan for the hearing had been put together but she said she was trying to work towards “a new start and provide the engagement of everybody”.

She then addressed the family. She said I have to (express myself) myself in legal language even though you aren’t represented …..”mediation requires a leap of faith …the  LA are going to provide (the means) but it also requires the two of you …what does “leap of faith” mean? It means going in with an open mind … I can only direct it, if you two will give it a go.”

The judge was asking the family to agree to mediation and to consider it over lunch. The judge reiterated the view of the ISW, after a comment by mum about hearing more evidence (I think): “He has said this is not the best (care provider) but it’s all we have … at this moment in time, these are the only care staff available …so I can probe, but it is the only care team available.”(judge’s emphasis)

The judge also wanted mum to understand that, by offering the appointment of an IMCA, the LA were also making a compromise, after mum stated that the family have compromised, and are willing to compromise in the future. 

At that point, at 1.30pm, the court rose for an hour.

Discussions between the parties took place before everyone came back into court. The Local Authority proposed one organisation to act as mediators and the judge wanted to find out what the family thought. She said again: “I can’t compel mediation …are you prepared …to explore (mediation) …to take a “leap of faith?” JC ‘s brother replied yes, although “it’s going to be hard for us, (this) has taken its toll on us.”

The judge replied, “We aren’t going to leapfrog into …(there are) certain tweaks I want to make …but the fact that you are prepared to give it a go is a great thing for me.”

Making a decision about who views future CCTV footage

The judge then suggested to Counsel for the applicants that there was something he might want to seek instruction on; the ISW has said that he doesn’t see why the family can’t be at the CCTV footage reviews.

Counsel for the applicants said that he didn’t have a chance to question the ISW on that, but the purpose was safeguarding and that’s the LA’s responsibility and not the family; “Mum says she just wants to be a mum ….there are practicalities …..it could make relationships worse …but can I say this? If you decide this is what should happen or give an indication…..”

The judge replied: “I have to tread carefully …if I give indications….”. Counsel for the applicants suggested that she could ask the OS what her view was. The judge replied “I’m trying to do this collaboratively …do you want to ask the ISW?”

To this suggestion, Counsel for the applicant said that the ISW (looking at him) “would say the responsibility is the public body and he is nodding …..but if the OS has a clear recommendation, I will take that into account.”

As Counsel for the OS doesn’t have instructions on that particular point, his solicitor leaves the court to find out what the instructions would be.

The Judge then made a decision. “I haven’t made findings because of the possibility of making a rift bigger” and she doesn’t want to set things up to fail … “when I look at the expectations… it might it be advisable not to have the manager (who was named[9]), but a client manager trying to manage the new relationship…”.

Counsel for the applicants said: “We can make enquiries …(the named manager) would be the obvious choice.” He said the concern was that the LA could come up with somebody else who would be opposed (by the family).

The judge said, “If we could do that today, that would be very helpful”. She then talked to the family and asked them if they could suggest anybody ….the family suggested a compliance officer who they have some faith in.

The judge recognised that she was micromanaging, “which people say isn’t the role of the court, but some cases demand it, and this is one of them”.

Counsel for the applicants referred to the “WTA” and the judge stated that she was trying to find somebody the family could trust to be a client manager. Counsel for the applicant asserted that the “key is communication …the mediation process starts with building blocks, so the focus could be how to improve communication with everybody …to avoid “misunderstandings” and the judge responded by saying she agreed with “incremental improvement.”

The judge said, “ I hate this expression but a “meet and greet of the IMCA”, part of WTA, Working Together Agreement, such as a rota of activities, because that is such a big thing. And part of that is JC and his car” so there would be  …”achievable markers”.

Counsel for the applicants stated that the “…background needs to be disclosed (to the IMCA) but not enough to colour the chances of success.” The judge agreed that everyone needed to be concerned about JC’s privacy.” She asked the family if they understood what was happening at the moment. Mum started speaking ….. “I think an apology is in order ..but enough is enough, I want to move forward, it is sad where it has got to, but we are ready to move on.”

The judge thanked the ISW: “Your input has been very useful; you have seen the fruits (of your work).”

The ISW replied: “For me, what would assist, as an addition to the formal mediation, are friends and family in the community being part of JC’s life, managers coming together with family ….greater (care provider) presence …having a JC day, training days, using expertise about the best ways to work with JC – that seems to have been lost in this conflict …a training day, with an independent facilitator to input into a PBS[10] process, an undertaking from mum and brother….part of mediation.. if I’m allowed to say this, the local authority won’t fund mediation indefinitely and there are meetings that mum and brother should be a central part of …I realise this is disputed but with (previous carers), there was a relationship, and the best care packages (have good relationships) as long as they are within boundaries and professional guidance.”

Counsel for the applicant responded, “I don’t think anybody would disagree with what you’ve said.”  He asked the ISW to confirm that mediation would give greater reassurance that the package of care was in JC’s best interests. The ISW confirmed his view that it would.

Counsel for the applicants continued, asking about the family sitting in on future CCTV viewings: “Would you agree that (viewing CCTV) is to review the quality of care and that is the responsibility of the LA …and there are consequences if the family sit in?”

The ISW responded that it was a challenge “…and I don’t think I said this as a disadvantage …but there has to be a framework …for example, if mum raises a concern and it is not reviewed…it would need to be triangulated (evidence) …(it’s about) building trust and transparency, as long as it does not interfere……”

Counsel for the applicants responded by saying that one of the difficulties was about building trust, and is it an indication that the family don’t trust (the process) if they are there …what if an independent IMCA is there?

The ISW replied that it “is a compromise ….and subject to review”. I notice that the judge isn’t writing notes at this point but is looking at the ISW as he’s speaking.

Counsel for the applicants stated that the court was still awaiting instructions from the OS, but was it his view that an IMCA would satisfy regarding the fairness of the system? The ISW replied “Yes”.

Counsel for JC then questioned the ISW. He asked the ISW “Is it still your view that the gold standard is family involvement and, in their absence, an IMCA is an acceptable option”, which the ISW confirmed was his view.

Counsel for JC then asked the ISW about mediation and the family viewing CCTV. He took his time to answer. His reply was “I don’t think it is a prerequisite to mediation, but it would be helpful (to provide trust) – I think – CCTV being available.”

The judge then asked the ISW: “I think there is a risk of a degree of separation if the family aren’t involved (in viewing CCTV)?”

The ISW replied yes, but it depended on the challenges of family being present …”.it is difficult to say, judge …everyone on an equal footing ..steps should be made to allow family input”

The judge continued. And the independent IMCA, it is going to take some time for that trust to be established between the family and the IMCA? The ISW agreed.

The judge went further:  If they never get to see what their son and brother (is doing) ….“How do you think that fits in with this degree of trust we are trying to build?”. The ISW replied, stating that a different contact for them within the care provider, somebody they had more trust in, would help negate them not being there to view the CCTV footage.

The judge observed: “So some creative thinking…….but that would still be your preferred option?”

The ISW replied “Mum goes in every single day; no professional has that degree of contact …and sometimes what she observes doesn’t tally with what she hears, so it is difficult to square the circle,  and I would be the same ….so for example, concerns have arisen because mum has seen faeces and urine, and she doesn’t trust the staff, because they haven’t always been accurate …..and that’s why my preferred option is 1) family and 2) IMCA.”

The judge turned to the family and asked if there was anything that arose from the questions she’d asked the ISW, or that they thought she hadn’t asked.  JC’s brother replied no and said that the questions had been “poignant.” Mum added that there was a duty of candour, that she wanted openness and transparency and that she wanted to move forward.

Counsel for the applicants then spoke, saying “In the spirit of being candid, and on behalf of my client, people being there is not to find fault”, and he raises “practical arrangements”. (He refers to practical difficulties which arose to do with the ISW viewing the previous CCTV footage). He suggested that the data controller gave everybody 4 weeks’ notice of the review of the CCTV footage.

The judge asked “And you are proposing that this meeting is everybody?”

Counsel for the applicants replied: “I’ve made my submissions on behalf of my two clients …I’m trying to anticipate difficulties …it’s a small point but can be an important point”. He mentioned …”4 weeks’ notice” and that it doesn’t have to be both family members, for example JC’s brother has work commitments.

At this point, Counsel for JC informed the court that the OS supported, for transparency and good working relationships, that either JC’s brother or mum should be there (to review the CCTV) in JC’s best interests. 

The judge then turned to the family, and said: “You’ve heard, one or other of you must be able to attend and if perhaps if one or other of you couldn’t make it”….(the IMCA could be there). The family agreed. Counsel for the applicants then stated that perhaps the IMCA should be there for every meeting and there was a discussion as to who should be there for the care provider, and the judge stated that the detail needed to be pulled together and used the term “least worst option”. She brought the discussion to a close, saying “that deals with the CCTV protocol and the WTA client manager”.

Agreeing the Court Order

The judge’s attention moved to the court order. She suggested a 6 month for a review of the Deprivation of Liberty authorisation “and to see how it’s going. You’re going to say the court doesn’t have the authority……but a review earlier than 12 months might be better.” The judge was giving a clear indication that she wanted a review after 6 months. After the instructing solicitor looked at the people from the public bodies, Counsel for the applicants agreed on 6 months.  The judge explained to the family that judges can’t “hang onto cases” if a final order is issued and she suggested a 6-month review was possible and if all is going well, she thought that they could have a hearing “on the papers”, that is, without anybody attending.

The judge then goes through the detail of the order, the family are asked to look at the website of the organisation the LA will fund for mediation, to make sure they don’t have any objections. After the judge went through the detail of the order, at a little before 4pm, the judge rose. Counsel for the applicant had to draft the agreed order. The plan was that the order would be approved the same day.

But mum was still thinking about the process. After about half an hour, we went back into the courtroom. Mum had spoken to Counsel for JC during the break. She still wants Mary to give evidence. Mum asked the judge: “What’s your advice?  I’m not a lawyer.”

The judge replied: “I can’t give advice ….a 3 day final hearing was listed, so that I could explore and probe what care JC was receiving …and to explore that, you were going to call witnesses and I was going to spend 3 days exploring …and Mr Fullwood said, to help people who weren’t represented, he said that you can explore but there is no other option …the evidence is in the bundle ….but there won’t be cross examination ….there are things that need improvement …I aired worries about Mary in open court …but as to what happens to her evidence, I don’t hear from them, but I have read their evidence …3 days of challenges to you and the care company, when the outcome is going to be exactly the same. We are trying to have a different way ahead …would that have been the same after 3 days of acrimony and resentment on both sides? …I have no jurisdiction to change the care team …I could have said that I’ve looked at the video and Mr Caulfield has looked at the videos …..and they accept that there does need to be a different approach, a different programme of care, and of you not being made to feel welcome and treading on egg shells …what is that going to achieve when I can’t change anything? …What I’m hoping for, with this collaborative approach …I’ve never seen JC’s brother look so ill….I’m weighing up,  and that’s not my role, what is the best outcome for JC, because I can’t remove the care company …..we move two steps forward and fifteen steps backwards ..We have a document that works for everything …I just want what’s best for JC …..what would (witnesses) have achieved? I’m looking for a period of time when, in 6 months’ time ….so for people who aren’t represented, does that provide any clarity?”

JC’s brother confirmed that it had. JC’s mum said that they needed to read the order. The judge said that she would print the order when it was ready so they could read it. We left the courtroom again. My impression is that the court’s preference was for the family to agree to the order and accompanying documents (the CCTV Protocol and the WTA) before the end of the day, so nobody would have to return the next day.

The lawyers spent time drafting the order in a consultation room as the rest of us, including JC’s mum and brother, waited in the waiting area. We were called back in at 5pm. Counsel for the applicants had emailed the order to the judge, and she left the courtroom to print it out.

My notes at this point record: I wonder why the barristers can’t explain it to the family as we are waiting ….we are all sitting in silence now. It feels like a very long day.

The judge came back with the printed papers, and we all left the courtroom again. JC’s mum and brother went into a consultation room to read them. Counsel for JC joined them.  At 5.30pm we headed back into the courtroom. JC’s mum and brother look very tired.

JC’s brother told the judge that  “Sam (Karim) has politely talked us through the order”. But the family were not happy with the wording of the Working Together Agreement. They felt that the wording was slanted against the family, and the judge said she also had some concerns. She added “It’s been a long day and I’m sorry”. JC’s brother said that if they are moving forward and building trust, the way the document is phrased (raises issues). The judge said that it was “not based on any findings….but there are a couple of tweaks I want to make (too).” It was agreed that the parties would arrive for further discussions at 9.30am the next day, with the second day of the hearing due to start at 10.30am.

The judge thanked the family, and the hearing was finished for the day. It was approaching 6pm and Manchester Civil Justice Centre was virtually empty as we all left.

Day 2 Tuesday 11th November

Initial discussions

The next day, we were called into the courtroom at 10.45 and the judge was already sitting at her bench. Counsel for the applicants had his two instructing solicitors again and today there are three rather than four ladies from the public bodies sitting in the back row. Counsel for JC is accompanied by his instructing solicitor. JC’s mum and brother are on the front row. I sit on the back row behind them. Today neither the ISW nor the journalist are there. The journalist had told me the previous day that she couldn’t be there as she had other commitments.

Counsel for the applicants told the judge that the parties “have been busy”. The draft order was agreed but there were issues with the Working Together Agreement. He thought, being optimistic, that they needed 20 minutes more. The judge asked the family if they wanted her to deal with the CCTV protocol then, but JC’s brother says they wanted everything to be dealt with in one go.

Counsel for JC told the court that the Official Solicitor was neutral on the WTA and that it was not drafted in a way that was implying that a party had “done something”. The judge wanted “everyone treated the same way.” She suggested that in the preamble to the WTA, it was written that the recorded provisions “are not based on findings or culpability on any findings” because I haven’t made any comments …I don’t want to use word appease…”. JC’s brother suggested the word “alleviate” and the judge thanked him. Counsel for the applicants then suggested a form of words but was speaking so quickly I couldn’t note them. The judge liked the wording and said it was “clearer and more precise”.

The judge then stated “for openness, the journalist approached me yesterday to ask for the approved order…….she’s not here today”

Counsel for the applicants then said something about “yesterday’s news” and smiling, he looked at the public bodies staff sitting behind him on the back row. The judge smiled too.  

JC’s mum asked if some evidence from JC’s two GPs could be considered (they had sent her an email overnight). Counsel for the applicants said he thought they had looked at all the evidence and were “looking forward to the future.” Mum replied that it was looking forward. The GPs wanted to put forward to the court how important it is for JC to have the family as advocates in his life. The GPs have known JC since he was 4. The judge asked whether the GPs are supporting family involvement and mum replied that it’s about the best model of care that JC should be receiving from a clinical, emotional and social level, and she is confused about why they (the GPs) have not been brought in and their advice not sought. The judge asked if it is a medical issue and mum replies that it is a holistic issue…they are writing it in the best interests of JC. They sent it in an email to her as “he doesn’t know how to submit (it), I just got it last night, it is not supporting the family, it’s to give a view of the medics of what’s best for JC.”

Counsel for JC stated that it “might be best to see it” and the judge agreed.  Counsel for the applicants said that he couldn’t say anything until he has seen it. The judge commented that she didn’t know what impact it would have on the Working Together Agreement.

We left the courtroom again at 10.55, so that the parties could have further discussions. We are called back in at 11.45.

Working Together Agreement – Back to the dogs, and “items”

Counsel for the applicants told the court that there is “good news and bad news.” The parties had agreed the order and the CCTV protocol. They had agreed everything in the WTA except one substantive issue (the dogs having access to the paddling pool in the garden) and one clarification (about bringing items into the property).

Counsel for JC stated that the paddling pool issue was a difficult one. The family say JC enjoys seeing the dogs and “My learned friend says he doesn’t enjoy it”: the Official Solicitor had “no strong view”. 

The nub of the issue was that the care provider say the dogs shouldn’t go in the paddling pool because it isn’t hygenic.  JC’s brother explained what happens. The dogs go into the kitchen as their main area, and they are let off their leads. They then play in the garden and will inevitably go in the paddling pool, not in the spa which is in the house. JC sometimes gets in the pool after running around without shoes on, and has played in the pool with the dogs.  Mum adds that since he was a small child, his dad created a pool and he has always gone in a pool with the dogs. He has always had dogs in his life, he has been brought up with them. The family don’t want restrictions on the dogs. If the dogs aren’t allowed into the garden, they will only be allowed in the kitchen.

The judge asked about the type of pool, and JC’s mum explained that they are blow up paddling pools, he stands in them, and only his feet are in them.  Counsel for the applicants said that he has heard the evidence, it is JC’s paddling pool, it is not the dogs’ paddling pool, it is not the family’s paddling pool…the staff have to make it clean and hygienic for JC…this is all focussed around JC’s needs, JC won’t go into the pool if he sees the dogs have gone in there ….we don’t understand why the emphasis is being put on the dogs when its JC’s to use; it is in the care plan.

The judge asked how burdensome it is to clean a plastic paddling pool for the care staff and Counsel for the applicants replied that it “is another job that can be avoided”.  The judge added “And when you said that the evidence is that JC doesn’t enjoy the dogs as his mum and brother say …where is the evidence? Counsel for the applicants replied that it is “what I’m told. I can call the social worker …?” The judge says, “And mum will say….”. Counsel for the Applicants said that he was reporting back what the carers on the ground say. After a discussion about the nature of the pool, and a suggestion from Counsel for JC that maybe the family could clean the pool, the judge asked mum “May I ask one more question….is it onerous for you to pick up a hose pipe and clean the paddling pool?” and mum replied “Not at all.”

The judge made a decision. She was not supporting the position of the care provider:  “Much of yesterday has been about working collaboratively …mum and brother need to be involved …that’s what yesterday’s hearing was about …JC will indicate if he isn’t happy ….mum and brother have been involved in JC’s life  …I am not endorsing an unmanageable provision …mum needs to feel relaxed when she goes to see JC with the dogs …could make her feel tense or unhappy …and JC could sense that …..and when I’m told that it is another job can be avoided …Mr Karim suggested a compromise …mum is happy to clean it”. They all agree on the wording for the WTA about the dogs.  

Counsel for the applicants then raised the issue of notice being given to replace items. He said it is “forwards looking” and is in JC’s best interests. Counsel for JC supported the amendment and agreed that not everything needed to go through a formal best interests decision. The judge asked the family what their issue was with the wording. JC’s brother explained that the wording doesn’t say furnishing and fittings, it says “’items’ ….that could be a KitKat. What if the trampoline busts or breaks, we would expect to replace that, not go through a best interests process.” The judge clarified: “You are talking about a like for like; that goes without saying.”  JC’s brother replied: “I don’t think it does, judge.” The judge asked Counsel for the Applicants about the “like for like” wording and that was agreed. The judge also suggested that if new people come in, like for like applies to equipment such as sofas, bird tables or similar. The family thanked her for the clarification. The judge added that where there is disagreement, there will be a best interests decision involving the IMCA, and the family are happy about working collaboratively with the IMCA.

There is then a discussion about tidying up the agreed version of the Working Together Agreement. JC’s brother asked for a punctuation change relating to potential future carers, if an ISF model of funding is agreed after review from the Local Authority. He apologised to the judge: “Sorry, it’s a small point” to which the judge replied: “it’s not a small point.” The family confirmed that they are happy with the organisation proposed by the Local Authority for mediation.

Counsel for the Applicants then stated that proceedings were concluded even if it is a 6-month order and a COP9 would be completed if a hearing was needed. The judge said that she wanted to pick up on that: “I had my own note…I need to explain the meaning of that to brother and mum…all that I think needs to go in, Mr Fullwood, and I will explain what concluding means.”

The judge addressed the family: “Brother and mum, what that means is that as a consequence of how things have panned out yesterday and today….looking forward,  for all the reasons I gave yesterday, the issues have been resolved by the court order, the WTA and the CCTV protocol …I’m trying to use words that won’t upset you…. so ‘wrapped up’; but you are concerned with ISF …that’s the only bit that is really live at the moment – home and the care provider is finished. If the ISF model is not commissioned, that is something you will have to follow up …by judicial review ..that’s an admin court.”

Ending the hearing

Counsel for the Applicants proposed that the family had approved court documents printed that they could take away with them. The judge had to arrange this herself, phoning the Court of Protection office to let them know they would be receiving some documents that they had to seal immediately, because she had unrepresented parties.  She told them she would deal with printing them in her “retiring room”. The judge explained to the family that she wanted them to have the documents when they left.

As the court was waiting, Counsel for JC brought up the issue of the email from the GP. Counsel for the applicants said that he hadn’t had a chance to read it and he didn’t know what the purpose of the email was. The judge said that she would read it so that she could say she’d read “everything”. She read it. Then she addressed JC’s mum and brother: “You can relay to the GPs that I’ve read their medical overview …there is nothing new to what is in the ISW’s report …stability…family relationships are a fundamental aspect …(of JC’s) social and emotional needs …the email has been provided to the LA and it can also be provided to the care provider as part of the WTA. There is nothing there that criticises anyone.” Mum mentioned an addendum, and the use of agency staff, and “that is the concern of the GPs.”

The judge replied (after dealing with a confidentiality schedule for the order, as the order is being sent to the press):  “You are putting me in a difficult position in this way – I cannot dictate or compel the care team to use certain staff or do certain tasks …however JC needs consistency …so anybody with an ounce of common sense can see that he needs stable staff …but if there are shifts, or staff are not available….would you rather nobody was there?”  Mum replied “no”.

The judge continued: “Mr Caufield, his work is a very important piece of work …the GP reports don’t contradict (that) ….. it reaffirms (what’s in the ISW report)”. JC’s brother used the word “ratify”. The judge then indicated that she would be making some observations once the order had been printed.  

The judge then left the courtroom to do her administration tasks and print the order. The rest of us stayed in the courtroom, waiting. At first there was silence, except for the noise of computer keyboards. It was very hot. JC’s brother drank some water and Counsel for JC suggested he step out of the room to get some fresh air. JC’s brother asked if he iwas allowed to. Counsel for JC said yes, and JC’s brother left.

At 12.40, Counsel for the applicants said to the public body staff that they could step outside to stretch their legs as he had just sent something to the judge, but they stayed in the courtroom. Counsel for the applicant started talking to his legal team, discussing hotels I think ……he said something about coming back in 6 months. At 12.43 JC’s brother came back in, and he wasn’t wearing his tie. Counsel for the applicants started talking to his solicitor about high taxpayers moving to Malta and reasons why …and talking about his children. I’m not sure he realised, but his voice carried in the small, otherwise silent courtroom. I remember thinking of the family, sitting and listening.  

At 12.50 the judge came back in, gave the printed, sealed order to JC’s mum and brother (Counsel having confirmed they didn’t need hard copies) and made her closing observations, which I have already included at the start of this blog. And with those final words from the judge, the hearing ended.

Reflections

I will focus on a few key points: the meaning of “home”; establishing a standard of care; the ISW; the courtroom; the idea of judicial review; and the concept of power.

Home as a place to do as you please

For many of us “home’[11] is a space where we make personal choices about what we do and how we live. A place to be free to express our identity. To decide for ourselves about all the small and important details of our lives. This includes pets.

To anyone who doesn’t like dogs or who has never been brought up with dogs, it can be hard to understand the focus on dogs in this case. But anyone who has been brought up with dogs will understand how important they are to family life – and to providing a home rather than just a house. I’ve got two labradors myself, so I perfectly understand why JC’s mum and brother were not prepared to concede to the demands of the LA. I was pleased that the judge recognised how important allowing the dogs to access the garden was for this family. Having later learned about the Bobby the dog case, her decision is not surprising to me.

Establishing a standard of care

Highlighted in bold in §5 of the LA and ICB Position Statement are the following words, about case law they have used: “Here, the court’s task was to select the best practical outcome that was realistically available, even though all the options were, to say the least, imperfect. It was beyond the powers to eliminate risk or make A’s many problems go away.”

Mum isn’t looking for gold-plated, perfect care. She said during the hearing “Care isn’t about being perfect, it’s about being good.”

Observing this hearing does make me wonder what counts as “good care”.

The Independent Social Worker

It was clear that both the family and the public bodies recognised Mark Caulfield as an independent voice in this case. And the judge certainly valued his input, both his reports and his contribution during the hearing. It is an excellent example of what an important role Independent Social Workers can have in Court of Protection proceedings. He came up with what seemed to me to be important suggestions and ideas for the future, such as having a JC day and training days. I hope his ideas are taken forward.

The Courtroom

The courtroom is a space that is very familiar to legal teams. I’m sure they feel at home in that space. But I think it’s important to recognise that it can be an alien space for families and especially Litigants in Person. Apart from me (and the journalist and ISW on the first day), everybody in the courtroom was associated with the parties to the case, other than JC’s mum and brother. There were seven people associated with the public bodies and two associated with the legal team for JC. Plus the judge. I imagine it can feel lonely for a family representing themselves in that sort of situation.

 The oppressive nature was added to in this hearing by the very hot temperature inside the courtroom. At one point JC’s brother asked if he could take his tie off and the judge replied that he could even take his jacket off (he didn’t) and that “the courtroom has no temperature regulator, it is either freezing cold or boiling hot”. I was pleased that the judge noticed how JC’s brother was not on tip top form and reacted to that. Legal teams need to be conscious that families don’t know what they can and can’t do, even asking for water. And in a small courtroom like this was, being conscious of how sound carries is important too. Even small things can help alleviate the trauma of going through a Court of Protection process.

Judicial Review

The judge told the family that if they weren’t happy with a future LA commissioning decision about care, their only recourse was “judicial review”, which she described as an “admin court”. I haven’t been able to find anything that simply explains to Litigants in Person what a judicial review is, and how to go about asking for one. And I don’t know how much they cost. I’ve found an Introduction to Judicial Review by the Public Law Project, and the relevant forms for the court are here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/form-n461-judicial-review-claim-form-administrative-court.

Judicial appeal came up in the recent Assisted Dying debate, with ex-judge Nicolas Mostyn suggesting that it is an easy process for Litigants in Person to do (speaking to Illora Finlay). I wonder how true this is, an opinion reflected by a reaction on X:

Gill Loomes -Quinn explained to me that there are practical barriers in going to judicial review for lay  people, that legal professionals may not be aware of, or give due consideration. Not least that there’s usually a requirement to exhaust other options such as internal complaints procedures, which require that a) You are able to access the complaints procedure (this isn’t typically covered by the scope of Care Act advocacy, even if you qualify for one of those.) b) The Local Authority responds to a complaint. The problem is that if they don’t, the next step would be complaining to the Ombudsman – but they require a copy of the outcome of the internal complaint. Which if the LA hasn’t done anything with your complaint, you don’t have. A catch 22 situation.

Power

According to  Gill Loomes-Quinn, power imbalances abound in this case. She writes: “Most constrained seem to be the family members/LiPs, who are at a disadvantage in the unfamiliar, formal legal setting of the court room and who rely on the public bodies and care providers to meet the needs of their loved one (and who risk being characterised as ‘difficult’ if they fail to ‘toe the line’). The judge is constrained by the limits of her jurisdiction and is required to accept the scope of the options presented to her. It seems like (in this sort of case) things are weighted in favour of the public body – access to funding for legal teams, power to decide what options are ‘on the table’, as well as the bottom line that P needs care, and alternatives available are limited (Direct Payments / ISFs present an illusion of ‘choice’ based on market principles, but this relies on there being options to choose from and in lots of areas this isn’t the case).”

Gill believes that this case highlights well the limited scope of the MCA 2005: “The Act provides a statutory framework for decision-making on behalf of those deemed to lack capacity but to talk of it ‘protecting’ P seems erroneous. To ‘protect’ someone in this P’s position would be to take steps to keep him safe and provide him with care that meets his needs – and it would be to ensure that he and his family are not expected to engage with care providers they don’t trust who have failed him in the past. Likewise, these things would be in his ‘best interests’. What the Act seems to protect and reinforce are existing power imbalances and social (dis)orders – all the ‘sweeping under the carpet’ of “moving forwards” and “looking to the future” in this case. Along with the failure of ‘professionals’ to realise that no matter how it is worded, the very enforcement of a WTA is suggestive of a finding of fault on the part of the family – otherwise why create one? They’re not enforced ‘as standard’. And it’s not much of an ‘agreement’ when it’s compelled?[12] But what other options does P’s family have? What happens if they refuse to agree? Or to participate in mediation?”

Gill continues: “It also strikes me that there is typically a failure on the part of ‘professionals’ to recognise the cumulative nature of the trauma experienced by disabled people or family members – or anyone who is a ‘service user’. So often, suggestions are made glibly – “Go to Judicial Review” – and (notwithstanding the inaccessibility and impenetrability of such mechanisms) these are made to sound so simple. There may be some recognition of the difficulties of inaccessibility for those unfamiliar with ‘the system’, but what I don’t really see is acknowledgement of the ‘burn out’ that occurs with years of such ‘battles’. Each failure of ‘the system’ to deliver results in a kind of fatigue (“Here we go again”) – along with an erosion of trust and a loss of hope – making even the genuinely simplest of administrative tasks feel insurmountable. I don’t think ‘professionals’ like to acknowledge how intensely adversarial and damaging the systems of which they are a part can seem to those they profess to help.

This case alludes to one of the phenomena that I think contributes to such ‘burn out’ – the ‘Tightrope’ that ‘service users’ (or family members etc) are required to negotiate: The need to advocate robustly for oneself (or loved one) while at the same time keeping the ‘professionals’ onside and avoiding being characterised as ‘difficult’ in a way that can impact the treatment received. The egos of service providers and public bodies can be very fragile.”

Moving Forwards

All in all, I left this hearing reflecting on many things.  About the power imbalance between the carers, the care provider, the public bodies, the court and the family. About the focus on moving forwards, as if what had happened in the past could be swept away. About the onus on JC’s mum and brother to have “trust” in the organisation responsible for the care of their son and brother, an organisation that everyone agreed had made mistakes in the past. Mistakes that the family uncovered. About the fact that there was no accountability from the public bodies responsible for commissioning such poor care, public bodies that the court has decided can’t even be named. I left this hearing thinking about how much the court was really protecting P, despite all the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards in place. I really hope that JC’s house can become a proper home for him, and that he does receive good care moving forwards. It’s what he deserves and what his mother and brother dearly want.    

Amanda Hill is a PhD student at the School of Journalism, Media and Culture at Cardiff University. Her research focuses on the Court of Protection, exploring family experiences, media representations and social media activism. She is a core team member of OJCOP. She is also a daughter of a P in a Court of Protection case and has been a Litigant in Person. She is on LinkedIn (here), and also on X as (@AmandaAPHill) and on Bluesky (@AmandaAPHill.bsky.social).


[1] I have received two anonymised position statements, from the LA and ICB jointly, and the OS, as well as the approved court order. I have used information in those to write this blog post, as well as my own observations.

[2] Gill is a disabled scholar-activist and ‘service user’. Her PhD focused on the ‘Voice’ of disabled people in practices relating to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (particularly in the Court of Protection). Gill co-directs the Open Justice Court of Protection Project.   

[3] From here: An Individual Service Fund (ISF) is an arrangement where the budget for a person’s care and support arrangements is transferred from a Local Authority, directly to a support provider of the person’s choice. This enables the person to be in control of how their support is designed and delivered.

[4] The OS PS states that mum and brother were being asked to “ reconsider their rejection to engage in mediation; independent mediation between the family, the public bodies and the care provider can only be considered to be in JC’s best interests.  

[5] This recent judgment from October 2025 provides useful information about fact finding hearings: [2025] EWCOP 37 (T3)

[6] An IMCA is an Independent Mental Capacity Advocate

[7] Ian Brownhill presented a webinar entitled “Pet Owners, Protected Parties and Patients” on 2nd May 2024. With thanks to Celia Kitzinger, blog editor, for bringing this to my attention

[8] Gill Loomes-Quinn and Jaime Lindsey wrote a report on mediation in the COP: Evaluation of mediation in the Court of Protection

[9] The person the LA named who would be responsible for reviewing the CCTV footage was not somebody the family trust

[10] PBS is Positive Behaviour Support

[11] Daniel Clark has published a blog reflecting on the nature of “home”:  The well-recognised wish to go home  25th November 2025

[12] This blog from Daniel Clarke writes about a hearing where a WTA was central but  Counsel argued was part of an unfair process for a family member:  “It is a process that isn’t fair”: Structural injustice in the Court of Protection

Writing support plans, an appropriate 1.2 rep, and educational provision 

By Daniel Clark, 3rd December 2025

On 13th November 2025, District Judge Davies (sitting remotely at Derby Family Court) authorised the deprivation of liberty of P, a young man who lives at home, for a period of six months. This authorisation came three years after the initial application in this case (COP 13670825). 

I’ve observed two thirds of the hearings in this case: one on 10th April 2025 (“the April hearing”), and one on 13th November 2025 (“the November hearing”). As far as I can tell, there has only been one other hearing (in December 2024). 

Derby City Council, the applicant local authority, is represented by Alison Bush, a solicitor employed by the Council itself. P is represented by his mother, acting as his litigation friend[i]. She was joined by P’s father at the April hearing but he was not present at the November hearing. 

Here’s how this blog is organised:

  • In the first section of this blog, I’ll set out the background to the case. 
  • In the second section, I discuss the support plans, and some disagreement about whether or not it should be written in the first person.
  • In the third section, I explain the hunt for an appropriate 1.2 representative. 
  • Finally,  I’ll explain the educational provision for P, and why the uncertainty around this has caused delays in the judge authorising a deprivation of liberty. 
  1. Background

Counsel for the local authority explained in a very helpful opening summary at the November 2025 hearing that this case “has a long but not overly complicated history”.

In October 2021, a judge sitting in the Court of Protection authorised P’s deprivation of liberty under the Re X streamlined procedure. As Eleanor Tallon has explained in her blog, the Re X procedure was established following the Supreme Court’s judgment in Cheshire West. It was intended “to provide a more speedy and manageable response for non -contentious community DoL application

At that stage, P’s mother was appointed to act as P’s Rule 1.2 representative. As Eleanor explained in her blog, the role of a Rule 1.2 representative is “to make a statement to the court outlining the representative’s views on whether the arrangements are in the person’s best interests, without which the application cannot proceed..

A further application to authorise a deprivation of liberty was made in September 2022. At the November 2025 hearing, Counsel for the local authority explained (in a very detailed opening summary) that “in the intervening time [i.e. between October 2021 and September 2022], the courts generally had a change of heart [about] appointing family members providing care who are also 1.2 rep.”.

As a result, the judge considering the renewed application (Tribunal Judge Hornes) directed that a Court of Protection Special Visitor visit P and produce a report of his wishes and feelings. The proceedings were stayed until that report was filed, which happened in October 2024. 

At that stage, P was out of school, and that was causing “issues” (I don’t know what but it sounded like the change in circumstances was causing distress to P). As a result, the judge removed the case from the streamlined procedure. At the April 2025 hearing, DJ Davies explained that this was “because the judge – Tribunal Judge Hornes – wasn’t happy to rubberstamp it, [and] that’s why it has come to the local court for further investigation”. 

The case therefore was listed before DJ Davies in December 2024. Since then, he has also heard the case in April 2025 and November 2025. 

Before getting into the substance of the hearings I observed, I’d like to pay testament to DJ Davies’s handling of this case. At various points he asked P’s mother if she had any questions, and answered them in a way that was crystal clear but not condescending. He repeatedly recognised the knowledge of P’s parents – including acknowledging the fact they have represented P at a SEN Tribunal

In addition, at the start of the April hearing, at the request of P’s parents, he explained the role of observers in Court of Protection proceedings. He also asked if they had any objections to the presence of an observer[ii] (which they did not).

I’m glad that the judge dealt with that request for explanation in a fair and concise way but it is a shame that nobody had thought to explain the role of observers beforehand. I imagine that could be because P’s parents were not represented (indeed, P’s mother was representing P). For the lawyers reading this, may I suggest that you do make every effort to explain to family members that observers could be present at a hearing and direct them to our website for further information.

2. The support plan

At the December 2024 hearing (which I did not observe), the judge had directed that an up-to-date Care Act assessment and support plan be filed with the court in time for the next hearing. That hadn’t happened by the time of the April hearing, and he wanted to know why not. 

According to Counsel for the local authority, the support plan hadn’t been prepared, “because that has taken a little longer – a lot longer – to discuss [the contents] with [parents], and the toing and froining about what is to be included …The social worker visited on Monday and I understand that, on Monday, [P’s mother] has finally agreed the contents of the review assessment and also the new support plan”. 

The judge wasn’t satisfied with that – 

Judge: When was it actually agreed?

Counsel for LA: Monday, as far as I can understand. 

Judge: So why haven’t I got it for today?

Counsel for LA: Because I don’t – I do apologise but I don’t have it yet. I was notified on either Tuesday evening or on Wednesday that [P’s parents] had agreed it. I don’t work on Wednesdays so I’m not in a position to have sent it to you before today.

Judge: But we would have made more progress if I’d had it today. I’m not sitting tomorrow so I can only review it on Monday.

It struck me that there was an under-current of blame-shifting. In particular, the blame for the delay was being laid squarely at the doors of P’s parents. However, P’s mother later told the court that both of them were unwell in February, and so had limited time to discuss the support plan – not quite the parental procrastination that counsel had made it sound like. 

In her submissions to the court, P’s mother raised the issue that his support plan has been written in the first person. His previous support plans had not been written in the first person, but with a new social worker came a new approach. 

The problem, P’s mother told the court, was a fairly simple one: “it indicates by putting it in first person that he’s written it. And I’ve said it shouldn’t be written like that….it would indicate he has fully written it and that he has capacity to join in the meeting, to be able to advocate himself…If you say ‘I’, it means I have taken part – P can’t take part”.

This wasn’t the first time that P’s mother was raising concerns about the use of the first person; she told the court that she had told the social worker about her misgivings. However, “it [third person] was removed because, in her [Social Worker’s] words, ‘I don’t like it so I’m changing it to the first personFor [Social Worker] her life moves on but they [support plans] stay with [P] for the rest of his life.”

In a similar way, P’s mother was also concerned that this new support plan made no reference to P’s diagnosis. Again, I want to quote directly from my notes of what she told the court: “[P]’s diagnosis has been removed from the support plan and I asked for it to be put back in. I was told it’s not necessary and irrelevant. To me, to remove it is to take away from all the importance of what we’re fighting for”.

I agree. The simple fact is that P would not be a subject of Court of Protection proceedings, and his parents would not have to fight for him to access education, if not for his diagnosis of an impairment of mind or brain (and the effect of that on his decision-making ability). To remove reference to it is to remove part of him from the support plan – somewhat ironic given that it’s written in first person.  

The judge told P’s mother that he had seen many support plans written in the first person, including in his capacity as a Family Court judge. However, this wasn’t the most important part of the support plan: “I am more interested in substance over form” – that is to say, the court was more interested in what the plan said rather than how it said it. Nevertheless, he recognised the concerns, and said to the local authority counsel: “I want to hear why it’s in those terms and why – given [the] objections….why can’t it be re-written?”

Counsel responded that she will discuss this with the social worker, and take instructions on the point. She pointed out that this “might affect whether I can get the support plan to you for tomorrow”, to which the judge gently reminded her that he would not be at work until Monday. In fact, as the hearing came to a close, he directed (without asking if it was a workable timeframe) that the draft order and support plan be filed with him by Monday.  

This issue was not raised again at the November hearing, which I assume means that the issue was satisfactorily resolved. 

3. An appropriate 1.2 rep

As explained in the background section of this blog, the issue of identifying an appropriate 1.2 representative had caused considerable delay in this case.

During the April 2025 hearing, the judge had explained to P’s family why there may be a problem with those providing care also acting as a 1.2 rep: “The role of a litigation friend is to make decisions in proceedings. But a rule 1.2 rep is to be the voice of [P], advocating for what he wants. Sometimes, it doesn’t always happen, there can be a conflict of the roles – I’ve said it’s nuanced – and sometimes it’s better to have the 1.2 rep as somebody entirely independent. There are cases where someone can, and does, wear both hats. In my experience, in a Re X where we have deprivation of liberty in the community, even if there are no safeguarding concerns it’s sometimes better to have somebody else….[there is a] hypothetical potential for conflict of interest. Is there anybody else who can adopt that role or is it your case that you feel you can?”

P’s mother seemed understanding of the position. She told the court that she’d already asked another family member if she would take up the role but, as she also provided P with some support, she had come to realise (I think as the judge was speaking) that she couldn’t do it either. That left “the only other person who doesn’t have a caring role [which] is his eldest brother, and I didn’t realise it was an issue [meaning he hadn’t yet been asked] so therefore the only person I could ask is his brother”. 

At this stage, the judge gave directions that the order would make provision for another Special Visitor’s report “but if somebody is prepared to come forward then we can simply vary the order and not do the report”. 

By the time of the November 2025 hearing, P’s brother had indeed agreed to take up the role. Counsel for the local authority told the court that there had been some difficulty in acquiring a witness statement, detailing the brother’s views on P’s support plan and his care arrangements. It sounded as though P’s brother had filed the witness statement in April 2025 (so shortly after the last hearing) but this hadn’t made its way to the hands of the local authority until the Tuesday before this hearing (so two days before). 

Counsel explained that, “the local authority’s position before we had received that was for the court to consider removing [P’s brother] as 1.2 rep”. At this point, the judge said what sounded like “not an option,” but counsel hadn’t realised the judge was speaking and had continued speaking herself. She told the judge that, as they had now seen the witness statement, the Council’s position was that the brother should remain as 1.2 rep.

The overlap between the judge and Counsel meant I can’t be sure that’s what the judge did say. However, I’m fairly confident that’s what the judge did say because, later in the hearing, he described the brother’s statement as setting out his views in a way “perhaps only a family member could – that’s been helpful”. 

The final order, authorising P’s deprivation of liberty, was to be sent to P’s brother in his capacity as 1.2 rep. 

4. Educational provision

At the April hearing, P’s parents wanted P to attend his College for a further year, funded by an EHCP[iii]. At that stage, it had not been agreed by the SEN team in the Council. The decision should have been communicated by the end of March but, come April, they were still waiting.

The question of whether P would receive educational provision has been relevant not only to the support P will receive but what the deprivation of liberty that the judge was authorising would look like. If P was not to receive education for a further year, there would need to be a “Plan B”. 

At the November hearing, it was confirmed that P has been approved for further time at College. Unfortunately, there were more problems. 

As it stood, the Council’s SEN team had said that P can stay at the College for another academic year (and indeed had already started). However, the College hadn’t confirmed that they were prepared to offer a place to P beyond December. 

The judge asked P’s mother whether she had “any straws in the wind” as to whether P could remain past December. She told the court that it seemed the delay was purely administrative, and that the College would be offering another year to P. She told the court that the delay in confirmation came down to the fact that, at an in-person review at the College, Derby City Council had been invited to (but ultimately didn’t) attend. The College then didn’t know the funding had been confirmed for the full academic year, meaning they couldn’t confirm that P could stay beyond December.

The judge seemed content with this. He asked P’s mother to explain what the plan was after the end of the academic year, when P would no longer be attending education. P’s mother gave the court a great deal of detail about the service provision she had been looking into. It would be unnecessarily intrusive for me to describe what that was but, in the words of P’s mother, they all converged on the aim that “[P] will have a fulfilled life which is what he needs and deserves”. 

The judge therefore identified that the support plan will need to change around the middle of 2026, meaning the care arrangements (that amount to a deprivation of liberty and therefore require court authorisation) will change then. After canvassing the views of P’s mother and Counsel for the local authority, he confirmed that he’ll authorise the deprivation of liberty for six months. At that point, the council will need to re-apply to the court for a further authorisation – though this might not need a hearing, and may well be approved by the streamlined procedure. In the meantime, if the College say P cannot stay beyond December, “the matter needs to be brought back, and my door is always open”.

The judge concluded the hearing by addressing P’s mother: “We might meet again [P’s mother] but, if not, I wish you, [P], and the rest of the family well”.

Daniel Clark is a member of the core team of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project. He is a PhD student in the Department of Politics & International Relations at the University of Sheffield. His research considers Iris Marion Young’s claim that older people are an oppressed social group. It is funded by WRoCAH. He is on LinkedIn, X @DanielClark132  and Bluesky @clarkdaniel.bsky.social.


[i] As far as I am aware, this is the only blog published by the Open Justice Court of Protection Project where a family member has acted as P’s litigation friend. 

[ii] Any party or interested person is entitled to object to the presence of observers. In such an event, it’s for the judge to decide whether observers will be permitted to attend or whether the case should be heard in private (see Court of Protection Rules 4.1-4.4). For a report of a hearing where the protected party objected to the presence of an observer, and the judge ruled that the case should therefore be heard in private, see: Balancing open justice and P’s right to privacy: A protected party says NO to a public observer “and her voice shall be heard” by Eleanor Tallon. These decisions are case-specific: P (or their family) cannot veto public observers or insist on private hearings.

[iii] The UK government website explains what an EHCP is: “An education, health and care (EHC) plan is for children and young people aged up to 25 who need more support than is available through special educational needs support. EHC plans identify educational, health and social needs and set out the additional support to meet those needs.” BBC’s Panorama have produced a documentary that explores the difficulties that families face when trying to acquire an EHCP and specialist educational provision: Kellie Bright – Autism, School and Families on the Edge


Renal Failure Case Returns: Dialysis problems and Barnet’s non-compliance with a court order

By Claire Martin, 30th November 2025

This case (COP 20000635) has been before Mr Justice McKendrick for a while, and we have blogged about it twice before: “An urgent case: Renal failure and an application for forced ‘extraction and conveyance’ to hospital”; and “A protracted hospital stay: A next hearing in the ‘renal failure’ case”.

The protected party is a man in his 40s, with Down Syndrome and learning disabilities. In 2022, he was diagnosed with ‘significant renal problems’. They’ve been difficult to monitor because P’s father, with whom he lives, is said to believe that doctors intend to harm his son.

At the hearings we observed in 2024, the applicant Trust (the Royal Free NHS Trust in London) said that Ps life might be in danger.  The Trust was seeking authorisation to remove P from his home (by force if necessary) to hospital so that further tests could be carried out and decisions made about treatment in his best interests. 

After P was assessed in hospital in October 2024, he was discharged home. A final court order of 24th November 2024 allowed P to be discharged home on the condition that his father would take him for out-patient dialysis three times a week. Proceedings concluded at that point. There is no published judgment.

This blog reports on a hybrid (in person and remote) hearing before Mr Justice McKendrick at the Royal Courts of Justice on Wednesday 8th October 2025, which re-opened the proceedings.  A new application had made on 1st October 2025 by the same NHS Trust (Royal Free London Hospital Trust) concerning the same patient. I attended the hearing in person.

In the blog I will detail the new application before the court, report on the hearing and in particular the judge’s frustration with Barnet’s non-compliance with previous court orders to commission and file a psychologist’s report, and end with some reflections on non-compliance in the Court of Protection.

New Application

The Trust says that, over the past year P has increasingly been missing his dialysis sessions at hospital. In June 2025, P was admitted to hospital for dialysis for three days, following some missed sessions. Since then (up to mid-September 2025) the Trust says that P has missed 11 out of 40 dialysis sessions and has not stayed for the full 4 hours on more than half of the sessions, and that they could not persuade P’s father to allow P to stay for the full treatment period. Further concerns have been raised by the Trust that P is not taking his medication as prescribed or eating the right diet (resulting in high phosphate levels). The position of the Trust (represented by Victoria Butler-Cole KC) is: “P is at risk of very serious complications as a result of under-dialysis including sudden death from an electrolyte abnormality, fluid accumulation leading to difficulty breathing and pressure on the heart, chronic damage of blood vessels, and the development of calciphylaxis, a painful and sometimes fatal ulcerating skin condition.”

This application also asks the court to ‘fully investigate’ the option of removing P from his father’s care. He has lived with his father all his life, so this would be a draconian step for the court to authorise.

The parties are:

  • the applicant – Royal Free London Hospital Trust with counsel Victoria Butler-Cole KC (who was on a remote link)
  • P –  via his Litigation Friend the Official Solicitor with counsel Sophia Roper KC (also on a remote link)
  • P’s father – who is unrepresented at present (also on a remote link, accompanied by P, from his hospital where he was having dialysis)
  • the Local Authority (London Borough of Barnet) with counsel Kate Round (who was in court in person)

The Trust was asking the court to order (again) the appointment of an expert psychologist to consider the following (reproduced from the Position Statement of the applicant Trust):

  • What further steps, if any, might be effective in persuading [his father] to take P to dialysis for every session, and to stay there for the full 4 hours.
  • What further steps, if any, could be taken to ensure that P receives his prescribed medication while living with [his father].
  • What options the expert psychologist considers are in P’s best interests.
  • The impact on P of moving to live apart from his father;
  • The feasibility and impact of the imposition of any restrictions on contact between P and his father;
  • What steps, if any, could be taken to mitigate the negative impact of such arrangements;

The Trust also asked the court to ‘remind’ P’s father of ‘the importance of full compliance with P’s dialysis schedule’ and also to gather information (via witness evidence) from the Local Authority regarding compliance with allowing carers to see and work with P, giving him his medication and the care he is said to need. And additional residence options from the LA ‘in the event he did not live with [his father]

The Hearing

The hearing was in Court 35 at the Royal Courts of Justice. The courtroom is large, and I was able to sit at the side of the court, in the press bench, rather than at the back where observers usually sit. This is because I (and my co-observer and OJCOP team member, Amanda Hill) asked the court usher if we could sit in the press bench to make the hearing more accessible: sitting at the side means that you can see everyone’s faces (the judge and counsel and people attending for parties, who face the judge). I have a hearing impairment and even with hearing aids, sitting behind people talking makes it tricky to understand what they are saying. So, this was a welcome permission from the court. I was also very pleased to be attending in person, since hybrid hearings are often hard to hear (much more so than fully remote ones).

It was evident at the start of the hearing that P and his father were behind a cubicle curtain on a hospital ward, and although P’s father was wearing headphones (so the court was not audible to anyone else), anything P’s father said would be heard by other people on the ward. The judge asked whether a private room in the hospital could be provided, and counsel for the Trust said “we did ask but there was not enough notice of the hearing date to arrange this: it could be possible in future”. So, the hearing went ahead on that basis, with P and his father taking part from his hospital cubicle.

After introducing the new application and current situation, counsel for the Trust raised the further issue regarding a psychologist report which the judge had ordered (on 26th November 2024) that the Local Authority (London Borough of Barnet) must  submit in the previous proceedings . The Local Authority had never submitted it.

The approved Order from this hearing (8th October 2025) states that the Local Authority had been: ‘… directed to file a report by a psychologist by 7 February 2025 which was not complied with, and no application was made to vary or discharge that order before the proceedings stood dismissed on 20 February 2025’.

It transpired that the psychologist’s report was intended to inform the court (amongst other things) about the potential impact on P of being removed from living with his father. But the court did not have the advantage of this previously-ordered report at these new proceedings. The judge was not happy:

Counsel for the Trust: Given the risks this really needs to be looked at with the most careful scrutiny to decide what to do.

Judge: I am very much in agreement. That’s why the Local Authority was ORDERED to produce a report from a clinical psychologist so that what has come to pass [i.e. P’s father not taking him for treatment] would not come to pass [in future]. Notwithstanding the careful orders made, we are in October 2025 with no identified expert until February 2026 and I am told he’s at risk of sudden death. I am struggling to understand why the Local Authority are not first of all apologising for ignoring an order of the court and, secondly, why a clinical psychologist [hasn’t been instructed]. I am struggling with why it’s necessary to make directions to follow an order already made – here we are almost a year down the line – to sanction a single joint expert.

And later:

Judge: Despite the father’s promises – which he made to me in court – none of that has come to pass. It was ordered that there would already be a clinical psychology report to assist me. I am not in that position and now we face significant delay which might put P at risk.

It did sound (from what counsel for the Trust said) as though a psychologist had tried, earlier this year, to meet with P, but “wasn’t able to engage his father or P in a meeting” (counsel for the Trust). That psychologist had apparently been connected to the Local Authority and the parties were now proposing an independent psychologist in the hope that someone clearly independent might be more successful.

Counsel for the London Borough of Barnet (Kate Round) said: “My Lord, technically it would have been better if we had notified the court that we couldn’t get that report and why. It is with regret that we don’t have it. We had identified someone – at the moment it’s a perennial problem. Either we can’t identify anyone or it’s not good enough and then we have to go to an independent expert. We do apologise.

The judge responded like this: “It’s no good apologising to me …. you’re putting P at risk. I’ve got a bee in my bonnet this week. I have had cases with public bodies and the court makes orders and the public bodies don’t comply. If I did have that clinical psychology report I COULD have listed the hearing for a short hearing.”[judge’s emphasis]

The judge, understandably, was concerned about the urgency, given that he was being told that P’s life was at risk. Counsel for the Trust said: “It’s not urgent, not the next fortnight. After the last hearing in November 2024 there was a period of full compliance for a number of months. We want an order to say that he [P’s father] must take P every Monday, Wednesday and Friday and must stay for the four hours. We are hopeful that the court reminding [P’s father] of that might help, while we are gathering evidence. Previously, he said he hadn’t agreed that it was in P’s best interests to receive dialysis. Certainly, if a psychology expert can be found to report in a shorter time-scale I don’t think I am instructed to ask the court to make provision more urgently than that.”

Then there was an interesting, brief exchange between the judge and counsel for the Trust, about penal notices:

Judge: The draft order doesn’t include any penal notices. Is that deliberate?

Counsel for the Trust: It is. The Trust recognises that P’s father IS bringing him and he is attending to a degree. They are keen to encourage that to continue, and I have no instructions to attach a penal notice. [Counsel’s emphasis]

So, despite the fact that P’s father was in breach of court orders in relation to facilitating and not impeding P’s care and medical treatment, the Trust had decided not to seek to penalise him for this.  The judge then spoke to P’s father and P:

Judge: I hope you have been able to follow. What I am going to do is list this matter for a hearing between now and December and I am going to have a clinical psychologist instructed to assess the impact on [P] of living apart from you and that’s because, for a large part of this year, he’s not received the dialysis to keep him healthy. And that’s ONE option to live apart from you to be assisted by support workers. I am also being asked again to make an order on you to facilitate his dialysis: you take him, don’t interfere and call 999 if there are any significant difficulties and you follow advice from the dietician. We went through this in 2024 and you PROMISED me …. [judge’s emphasis]

Father: [interrupting] … which I did … 4 hours he is ill, all this has been happening …. [difficult to understand via video link] complicated …. So that’s the reason …. I am looking after my son for 44 years, I know what he’s able …. 4 hours is [missed] 3 hours is much better, he says he’s better.  (I think P’s father was saying that 4 hours of dialysis makes P feel more ill and that he prefers 3 hours, but we didn’t hear from him what P says about his treatment, or why his father believes this might be the case).

Judge: What I am going to do [name of P’s father] is to direct the public bodies to explain the reasons for P to have dialysis [in the way they advise] and to find out what you think the impact on P would be of living apart from you, and to explain [why you have been doing what you have been doing]. I’m going to direct you to file a detailed witness statement, saying if you believe in dialysis, what you think the impact on P would be if he lived in supported living. You may need to give evidence at the hearing in December. In the meantime, I am going to make an order like the one in November….are you going to comply with it?

Father: Yes, I … accept anything …. [difficult to understand] the entire case …. I …

Judge: Yes well [name of P’s father] it’s very important that when you take P to hospital you stay for 4 hours, and 3 hours is not enough.

Father: OK and if anything happens to my son after 3 hours, who is responsible?

Judge: I’m sure that he’s in the hands of experienced clinicians at the hospital.

Father: [talking loudly – but I can’t understand what he’s saying at this point]

Judge: Have you seen the Position Statements and the evidence for today’s hearing?

Father: [unclear answer] I call the 99 …

Judge: [addressing P’s father by name] It’s very important you read the documents please. The evidence before me is that P is at risk of serious complications and at risk of dying from electrolyte abnormalities. You’re his father and I am asking you to please comply.

Father: Can P speak?

Judge: I will speak to P.  Good morning [P], this is the judge. Do you remember speaking to me at the end of last year?

P: I do

Judge: You were smartly dressed at that time. It’s important [P] that you come to hospital for appointments.

P: Which I do.

Judge: Sometimes it’s difficult and boring?

P: It is

Judge: But you must keep coming to hospital

P: [inaudible]  

Judge: Okay, just keep coming to hospital with your father. Are you still going to football matches. Which team is yours?

P: Yes …Arsenal.

Judge: I hope they are playing well.

P: They are actually!

Sophia Roper KC, acting for P on behalf of the Official Solicitor, addressed the question of who should be instructed to complete the psychological assessment and report to the court. She informed the judge that the proposed independent expert psychologist had been contacted the day before and “what we have NOW been told is that he will not be able to report until February 2026. Five other independent psychologists and psychiatrists have been contacted. It’s up to the LA to decide if they can provide an in-house psychologist. They would likely be more amenable to be directed to provide a report [earlier] than an independent expert.” [counsel’s emphasis]

The judge expressed his frustration again, at the predictable situation:

I am going to adjourn for 30 minutes this morning to allow for discussion and phone calls to be made. Given what I have been told about the medical situation, it’s essential to have a report by the end of the day. The previous order entirely envisaged the situation in front of you.”

There was then a break of half an hour to allow counsel to establish the timescales within which a psychologist could report back to court.

Despite the earlier suggestion that a psychologist independent from the Local Authority would be preferable, in terms of P and his father’s likely engagement, counsel for the LA said:

If there were an independent expert available we would prefer that. However, we have got the lead clinical psychologist – [name] – she has confirmed she can do a report by the end of November 2025. […] We have flagged with her about working from [P’s] home… she has said if clinically appropriate or she could see him at the hospital. We hope she would be able to see P and his father at their home for the assessment. […]  It’s important for the court to understand the potential damage to P from taking him away from his father. The best way of getting to that is by way of this report, so we really hope the father will allow this work.”

The Local Authority also agreed to pay for the clinical psychology report, whether it ended up being an independent expert or not.

When the judge spoke to P’s father to inform him of the plan for the psychologist assessment, his father said “I am happy to do so, for my son” and that he “is a human being with human rights”. P’s father also said “it is very important to protect my son’s life from everyone, I lost my wife”. I wondered at this point whether P’s father was fearful of healthcare professionals and of medical interventions, because he linked the conversation to  the loss of his wife. When we first reported this case it was said that P’s father believed doctors were harming his son. It made me wonder about any experiences with doctors in his wife’s care.

The judge strongly encouraged P’s father to seek representation in time for the next hearing, warning, “I will not look favourably on an application to adjourn a final hearing on the basis that you can’t find a solicitor”.  He replied, “Okay,  yes”.

My co-observer’s notes say (but I didn’t record this) that Sophia Roper KC then made a point about non-compliance with orders, to which the judge replied: “I’ve vented my spleen on non-compliance with orders and I won’t be reading any other correspondence (about that)”.

The next hearings are currently listed as Pre-trial review at 2pm on Thursday 4th December 2025 and a final hearing on Wednesday 17th and Thursday 18th December 2025 in person at the Royal Courts of Justice.

P’s father has been ordered by the court to attend in person and to arrange for someone else to accompany P to hospital if it is one of his dialysis days.

Reflections on non-compliance

I have observed many hearings where parties have not complied with orders of the court: sometimes public bodies and sometimes family members.

Two cases I’ve followed closely that involve family members’ non-compliance – Luba Macpherson and Caroline Grady – have had penalties attached to the court orders (in Luba’s case a prison sentence and in Caroline’s a fine) and we’ve blogged about them here:   Serving a prison sentence for contempt of court: Luba Macpherson and  Safeguarding Mum: The “vile” judgment and the daughter’s story.

In this case, there’s non-compliance with court orders from both a family member (the protected party’s father) and from a public body (the London Borough of Barnet).

Non-compliance from the family member is currently being dealt with by education (the public bodies are to explain to him why dialysis is so important for his son, and the judge asks him to read the documentation about this) and “encouragement” (with an order, and with something that might be experienced by him as a threat that the possible alternative to compliance might be removal of his son from the home).  There is no penal notice attached to the order.

I have never observed a penalty of any kind, other than judicial reprimand, being directed at a public body for non-compliance (otherwise known as contempt of court). It’s made me wonder whether penalties for non-compliance are ever given to public bodies, and if so, what kinds of penalties are possible.

The case of JS (by his litigation friend) v Cardiff City Council [2022] EWHC 707 (Admin) (There’s a helpful summary of the case here: “Local Authority found to be in contempt of Court”) concerned an application by a young man with diagnoses including autistic spectrum disorder and ‘learning difficulties’ against Cardiff City Council for contempt of court on two grounds:

  1. “A failure to comply with the mandatory injunction set out at paragraph 5 of the order of his Honour Judge Keyser QC, on the basis that the Defendant did not as of 7 January 2022 and still has not completed future placement planning for the Claimant.”
  2. “The Defendant has also failed to comply with paragraph 6(a) of that order in that no sworn affidavit has been filed by the relevant director of the Defendant explaining the breach of the injunction.”

 The judge was clear:

“Contempt proceedings may be brought against a public body for a failure to act in accordance with an order of the court. In proceedings in the Administrative Court, it is not the usual practice to include a penal notice on an order against a defendant public body. In R (JM) v Croydon London Borough Council [2009] EWHC 2474 (Admin), Collins J held that a penal notice is not necessary to enable the court to deal with public bodies by means of proceedings for contempt as public bodies would seldom find themselves in the position where committal would be contemplated. Collins J observed at [12]: “Accordingly, I do not think that a penal notice is necessary in orders made against a public body. A failure to comply with an order can be dealt with by an application to the court for a finding of contempt and, if necessary, a further mandatory order which may contain an indication of what might happen should there be any further failure to comply. Adverse findings coupled with what would probably be an order to pay indemnity costs should suffice since it is to be expected that a public body would not deliberately flout an order of the court. Were that to happen, the contemnor could be brought before the court and, were he to threaten to persist in his refusal, an order could be made which made it clear that if he did he would be liable to imprisonment or a fine.” ((§56, JS (by his litigation friend) v Cardiff City Council [2022] EWHC 707 (Admin))

This judgment states clearly that, should a public body ‘deliberately flout’ a court order, imprisonment (though ‘seldom’ used) or a fine are options for the court. But, I wonder, who would be imprisoned? And a fine would disadvantage further the citizens who rely on that public body (as Munby J says below).

The case against Cardiff City Council found the council to be in contempt of court but does not detail the penalty imposed. Instead, the judgment states:

‘I bear in mind that in R (Bempoa) v London Borough of Southwark [2002] EWHC 153 (Admin), Munby J concluded that the gravity of that local authority’s contempt could be adequately marked by the delivery of the court’s judgment in public. The “public humiliation” of a judgment the contents of which publicly shamed the local authority was a greater penalty than the exaction of a financial penalty which could only be to the financial disadvantage of the inhabitants of the local authority area, and those who rely upon the authority for the services it provides, without providing any corresponding financial benefit for the claimant.The contents of this judgment shame Cardiff City Council. Whether any further penalty is appropriate in this case is likely to depend, amongst other matters, on whether an apology is forthcoming and on the strenuousness of the efforts the Council now makes to comply with the mandatory order which remains in effect.’ (§94-95 JS (by his litigation friend) v Cardiff City Council [2022] EWHC 707 (Admin))

The case was reported in the national press (e.g. “Cardiff council committed ‘appalling’ breach of care of disabled man”): I hope the Council felt appropriately “shamed”.

I would be interested to know whether the penalty of ‘public humiliation’ is ever considered sufficient for family members who do not comply with court orders in the Court of Protection, as opposed to fines or prison sentences (or other sanctions).  Although this is not (as far as I know) stated by the judge as an intended penalty in his decision to name Philip Esper (who was found to have committed contempt of court but given no penalty), it’s clear from the fact that Mr Esper appealed the decision to name him that he experienced simply being publicly named as a penalty in and of itself (Esper v NHS NW London ICB (Appeal: Anonymity in committal proceedings) [2023] EWCOP 29).  

In the case I’m reporting on here, non-compliance from the public body was dealt with by judicial expressions of incomprehension (“I’m struggling to understand…”) about the Local Authority’s failure to act and about their failure to apologise for not doing so. 

This led to an acknowledgement of (some) fault by Barnet (they admitted that “technically” they should have let the court know about the difficulties they were having), and to an expression of regret and an apology – which was not really accepted by the judge (“It’s no good apologising to me…”).

It was notable that, given a half hour break in proceedings to focus on dealing with the issue, it seems they were able to solve the problem and work out how to commission a psychologist’s report (albeit not an independent one) by the end of November.  Court proceedings do seem to focus minds and galvanise action.  A court hearing is, however,  rather an expensive and unwieldy method for prompting actions that should properly have taken place in any event.  It’s very common though – due here to what counsel described as the “perennial problem” of getting adequate reports on time. 

As described in an earlier blog post (Non-compliance:  What happens when public bodies don’t obey court orders?): ‘There’s a lot of non-compliance from public bodies evident in Court of Protection hearings every day.  It’s routine to hear apologies tendered to the judge for not having submitted reports in time or complied with other directions and orders – pleading staff sickness, failures to respond to an enquiry further down the line, and administrative errors.  Mostly judges seem resigned to it.  It’s no secret that health and social services (like HMCTS) is underfunded, under-resourced and struggling to deliver basic services.’

Senior Judge Hilder sets aside one day each month for hearings to deal with non-compliant public bodies  – but if they then comply not less than seven days before the date of the listed non-compliance hearing, it’s vacated. Celia Kitzinger reflects that, in five years of observing Court of Protection hearings, she has never before observed a ‘non-compliance’ hearing and, as the blog notes: ‘Apparently this is because the effect of listing them is rapid compliance, meaning that case never appears in the public listings’.

I find this quite astonishing – either something can be done or it can’t. Public bodies shouldn’t need to wait for the equivalent of a ticking off by the headteacher to do what they should (and can) be doing. Hearings in court cost (a lot) of money and, I would argue, shouldn’t be used for this purpose.

UPDATE: Following the hearing on 17/18 December 2025, there is now a published judgment, authorising P’s residence in a supported living placement as being in his best interests: see Royal Free NHS Foundation Trust v EF & Ors [2025] EWCOP 52 (T3) (19 December 2025)

Claire Martin is a Consultant Clinical Psychologist, Cumbria, Northumberland, Tyne and Wear NHS Foundation Trust, Older People’s Clinical Psychology Department, Gateshead. She is a member of the core team of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project and has published dozens of blog posts for the Project about hearings she’s observed (e.g. here and here). She is on X as @DocCMartin, on LinkedIn and on BlueSky as @doccmartin.bsky.social

Contact Restrictions between P and their Family in the Court of Protection: How Decisions Are Made 

By Hanna Whitehead, 27th November 2025

Contact is a recurring issue in Court of Protection proceedings. I have been working in this area for eight years and my rough estimate would be that a dispute around contact (justified or otherwise) has arisen in around 30-40% of the cases I work on.

Where an adult lacks capacity to make their own decisions about who they see and how often, disagreements can arise between families and professionals about what contact is appropriate, safe, or sustainable. For families, restrictions on contact (e.g. limited hours of contact, contact only via phone or video-link, supervised contact only) can feel abrupt and disproportionate. It can also be interpreted as a ‘punishment’ for querying or complaining about their relative’s care.

This post explains how the Court approaches these cases, what the legal framework actually requires, and how evidence is scrutinised.

Where I have referred to ‘public bodies,’ this means the Local Authority, Integrated Care Board (ICB) or Health Board; whoever is the Supervising Authority that makes decisions about (and sometimes funds) a vulnerable person’s residence and care arrangements.

Capacity to make decisions about contact 

Before the Court can make any decision about contact, it must determine whether the person (“P”) has capacity to make such decisions themselves. This cannot be assumed on the basis of assessments regarding capacity in other areas e.g. residence. 

Capacity must be assessed for the specific decision, and sometimes the specific person, in question. I have seen cases where P is deemed to have capacity to determine contact generally, but lacks capacity regarding one individual. This may be where P has been particularly reliant on that person for a prolonged period of time and is unable to weigh up the impact of seeing that person on their wellbeing.

If P has capacity, P makes the decision, even if professionals disagree or would make a different choice. If P lacks capacity, the Court can then consider what contact is in P’s best interests. This is, of course, subject to the agreement of the person with whom contact is being considered – the Court cannot force a person to have contact with P if they do not consent, nor will they insist that P have contact if that is not what they want.

Best interests decisions are P-focused 

If P lacks capacity to decide on contact, the Mental Capacity Act (s4) requires that decisions are made in P’s best interests. This means the decision must be centred on what is best for P – not what family members want, and not what is easiest for care providers. 

Under s4(6) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, the Court is required to consider, so far as is reasonably ascertainable:

(a) the person’s past and present wishes and feelings (and, in particular, any relevant written statement made by him when he had capacity),

(b) the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision if he had capacity, and

(c) the other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to do so.

S4(7) of the Mental Capacity Act requires the views of of family, carers and professionals to be taken into account, if it is appropriate and practical to consult them. This does not necessarily mean considering what that person (e.g. a relative) wants to happen, but rather utilising their knowledge of P to help inform what P would decide.

The final decision must always be based only on what is best for P. 

Care home rules vs Court-ordered restrictions 

Restrictions on contact can occur in one of three ways: 

  1. The placement can impose their own rules; 
  2. The Local Authority/Health Board/ICB can apply to Court to restrict contact; or 
  3. The Court can order restrictions without such application. 

I will look at each of these in turn, and then consider what evidence is required to authorise such restrictions and how this can be challenged.

Placement-imposed restrictions 

Regulation 9A of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations and the associated CQC guidance (link here) states that ‘Unless there are exceptional circumstances, service users whose care or treatment involves an overnight stay or the provision of accommodation in a care home, hospital or hospice, must be facilitated to receive visits at those premises.’ 

The starting position is therefore that contact should be facilitated. However, 9A4 states that ‘Nothing in this regulation requires a service user to receive a visit, take a visit out of a care home or be accompanied…  where the service user lacks the capacity to give consent, where it would not be in the service user’s best interests.’ 

    There is no specific definition as to what constitutes ‘exceptional circumstances,’ however it is suggested this may include, ‘to protect the person using the service, other people using the service, staff or people visiting, where there is a significant risk to their health, safety or welfare.’

    Placements are therefore able to restrict contact if it is deemed in P’s best interests. However, the following is contained within the guidance to the Regulations: 

    • ‘Where a risk has been identified we expect providers to implement appropriate precautions to enable a visit to happen safely, rather than prevent visiting altogether.’ 
    • ‘This should always follow the preferences of the person using the service, wherever possible, and their assessed needs. ‘ 
    • ‘Providers must consider that any restriction to a person’s right to receive visitors is lawful, has a legitimate aim and is proportionate. ‘Proportionate’ means that there is the least restriction possible to achieve the aim.’ 
    • ‘If there is a need for additional precautions or a restriction to be put in place, the provider should apply the most proportionate and least restrictive option.’ 
    • ‘Providers should not apply blanket decisions or long-term restrictions. They should review decisions to restrict visiting regularly by working together with the people involved.’ 

    In essence, if there are concerns about contact, then restricting contact should be a last resort and alternative measures should be considered.

    Contact Agreements

    An alternative measure  may be agreeing a Contract of Expectations for both staff and the family, setting out  what  each party understands to be expected of them.

    In Re RK (Capacity: Contact: Inherent Jurisdiction) (2023), the judge declined to authorise a specified contact arrangement as he deemed RK had capacity and did not want contact with her family, but he did recommend that a ‘supportive framework’ be  implemented, as follows:

    ‘I do not feel it right that I should prescribe the precise terms of the supportive framework; it should nonetheless incorporate – so far as possible – the essential points raised by each of the parties.’

    These included, although were not limited to:

    • R to be asked about contact with the family at key events in the calendar – birthdays / Christmas / Easter;
    • R will be supported by the key worker to integrate with her friends outside of the placement;
    • Updates to be provided to the family at intervals (three monthly) about progress with attempts to encourage R to have contact; and
    • A key worker shall be appointed to spend time with R and ensure that her family remain alive in her mind and that she is encouraged to think about her future involving them in her life.

    If contact restrictions are implemented, the public body should be informed and consideration given to seeking Court authorisation.

    Public Body and Court-imposed restrictions 

    The Local Authority/ICB/Health Board is able to restrict contact between P and their family (if P lacks capacity), but they should make an application to the Court of Protection to authorise any restrictions. The Court will be very critical if the public body does not make that application promptly.

    The public body has a duty to consider how meaningful contact can be promoted if in P’s best interests. As above, the starting point will always be that P should be able to see the people important to them in as natural a way as possible.

    When restrictions on contact may be justified 

    Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to respect for private and family life. However, this right can be lawfully restricted if necessary and proportionate to protect the rights and freedoms of others – in this context, P. This means that Article 8 is not breached if limiting contact is necessary to protect P.

    For example, in Re G (Court of Protection: Injunction) [2022] EWCOP 25, an injunction that restricted the family’s contact with P (amongst other things) was held to be lawful on the basis of evidence from numerous witnesses stating that P’s father had been hostile and intimidating to staff, and had tampered with medical equipment.

    See also MB v PB [2022[ EWCOP 14, blogged about here. In this case, face-to-face contact between P and her husband had been prohibited, following allegations (and subsequently ‘findings’ – see below) of controlling and coercive behaviour.

    The Court must consider Article 8 carefully, but a justified and proportionate restriction will not necessarily breach it.  

    Contact restrictions can take different forms: frequency restrictions, supervised contact, limits on location, or suspension of contact entirely. They may be justified in a range of situations, including: 

    1. Where contact causes distress or destabilisation 
      For some people, particularly those with significant cognitive impairment, contact can lead to confusion, agitation, or behavioural deterioration afterwards. In A Local Authority v PB (2011), the Court permitted night-time restrictions because evidence showed P became more confused and unsettled following overnight contact. 
    2. Where contact undermines P’s stability or placement 
      If family members are alleged to make significantly negative comments to P about the placement, this may cause P to demonstrate challenging behaviour, leading to the placement not being able to meet their needs. A move to a new placement, especially if unplanned, is a significant risk in itself. This may also apply where family members are said to be aggressive or hostile to staff, causing P distress and affecting the staff’s ability to meet their needs. See Luba Macpherson and her concerns regarding the care of her daughter.
    3. Where there are concerns about physical risk 
      This could relate to ignoring essential dietary rules, not following medical instructions, or behaviour which puts P or others at physical risk. 

    By contrast, in SR v A Local Authority & Anor (2018) EWCOP 36 , the Court refused restrictions on a husband’s contact where there was no evidence that contact posed a risk. The Local Authority were concerned that the husband had made comments that indicated he was in support of euthanasia and exhibited ‘distorted or grotesque thinking,’ (§18) but did not allege that the husband concretely intended to end P’s life. P had remained safe during extensive previous unsupervised contact. It was held by HHJ Buckingham that: ‘Whilst I accept that JR’s comments have given rise to legitimate anxiety on the part of the professionals, I do not consider that there was adequate investigation into the reasons why JR has made such comments and what he understands by the notion of supporting euthanasia, which from his evidence related to the right to self-determination and dignity… I have reached the conclusion that the restriction sought by A Local Authority is neither justifiable, proportionate or necessary.’ (§44 & §46)

    Occasionally, assertions are made that P’s family are demonstrating ‘coercive or controlling’ behaviour and this can be promoted as a justification for restricting contact. The Family Procedure Rules 2010 in Practice Direction 12J define coercive behaviour as ‘being an act or a pattern of acts of assault, threats, humiliation and intimidation or other abuse that is used to harm, punish, or frighten the victim.’ A recent example is Caroline Grady, who was found to have acted abusively towards her mother – see previous blog here.

    Unfortunately, terms like ‘coercive behaviour’ are sometimes used by public bodies in a vague context when family members believe they are simply being protective. Such  allegations (and all others) should be properly particularised (i.e. details of specific events provided) and their meanings clarified.

    Restrictions must always be in P’s best interests – and the Court will examine their basis 

    Contact limitations can sometimes arise where providers (e.g., a care home) misinterpret a family raising concern as hostility or risk or adopt a defensive or risk-averse position. This frequently feels like a punishment directed towards the relatives for raising concerns about the care that their loved one receives.

    However, when the Court becomes involved, it will examine the actual basis for the restrictions. The Court will not impose or uphold limits as a punitive measure. Any restriction must be justified by reference to preventing harm to P, and must be proportionate to the level of risk. Where the evidence does not support restrictions, the Court will not endorse them and will remove or relax them. 

    Evidence and scrutiny 

    A restriction must be capable of being justified by evidence. Evidence might include: 

    • care home records 
    • incident logs 
    • behavioural charts 
    • phone, message or call logs 
    • CCTV
    • medical records. 

    Sometimes decisions are made rapidly when concerns arise, before full evidence is obtained. The Court may agree to short-term protective measures while records, CCTV, call logs or incident reports are reviewed, but with the understanding that these are short-term only. Permanent or long-term restrictions will require proper evidence. There is no set form that this evidence should take, but it may involve the records set out above, witness statements, expert reports, etc.

    Family members who are parties to proceedings will almost always be able to file their own witness statements and attach evidence to those, if required. The Court order will provide a set date for these to be provided. Family members who are not parties may also be allowed to provide a statement, but this is subject to the Court’s discretion and permission for this must also be contained within an order.

    Evidence that can be filed by family members often includes correspondence with the public bodies that demonstrates reasons for lifting contact e.g. birthday cards showing an ongoing, loving relationship, examples of positive contact, etc.

    Records

    Families (and all other parties) are entitled to ask the Court to order that these records are disclosed in proceedings. They may assist in determining, for example, whether P truly demonstrates challenging behaviour after contact or whether there may be a different trigger. A care home or placement would need an exceptional reason for refusing to release records into proceedings, although it can be agreed for some parts to be redacted if necessary (e.g. if there are references to another resident).

    The Court may determine that some records are not appropriate for involved family members to see, and this will be considered in each case. Sometimes an order is drafted that allows only P’s solicitor to see the records. This is almost always the case (in order, it is said, to promote P’s dignity and privacy) but this can be challenged by family members and reasons requested.

    If concerns arise around the accuracy of the records, this can be challenged by raising the issues within a witness statement (which parties are generally required to provide at set intervals,, requesting additional records from a different organisation or by asking the Court to order that the author of the records provide a witness statement to explain any inconsistencies or errors. This is subject to the Court’s discretion and reasons/evidence must be provided as to why these courses of action are necessary.

    Finding of Fact Hearings

    The Court of Protection is also able to order a ‘Finding of Fact’ hearing. This is a relatively lengthy hearing where the Court will hear from relevant witnesses who will be questioned by the other parties. This allows the Court to decide ‘on the balance of probabilities’ (i.e. whether an event is more likely than not to have happened, often simplified to a likelihood of 51% or higher) whether a certain thing happened or not. This is different to, and much lower than, the criminal burden of proof which is ‘beyond reasonable doubt.’

    For example, they may make a finding that a relative did or did not financially abuse P, or withhold their medication, etc. The allegation is then either accepted by the Court as fact or, if the finding was not made, the allegation cannot be relied upon further (see Abuse and coercive control? A fact-finding hearing and exoneration, where a relative was exonerated from the allegations made against her by public bodies.)

    In essence, the Court may order a Finding of Fact Hearing if the disputed issues of fact are relevant to the decision as to what is in P’s best interests.

    In essence, a Fact Finding hearing may be ordered where the issues in dispute are relevant to the decision regarding what would be in P’s best interests.

    These hearings are quite rare in the Court of Protection when compared to Child Care proceedings and are only implemented when ‘necessary and proportionate.’ In Nottingham City Council v SV & Anor [2025] EWCOP 37, Lieven J stated as follows:

    55. The facts which are sought to be found must have a direct impact on the welfare decisions that need to be made in respect of P. The fact finding must be “necessary” for the determination of those welfare decisions. The fact finding exercise must be proportionate to the issues that need to be determined. In determining proportionality, the likely cost to public funds, the time taken and the impact of delay on P are all relevant considerations.

    In that case, it was deemed that it was not necessary or proportionate for a Finding of Fact hearing to take place, as all parties (including P) were in agreement with a proposed plan involving a Contact Plan and a gradual build-up of contact. It was also noted that (1) P would be fully protected by this plan, (2) a hearing would take two days of ‘the very limited time available for Court of Protection hearings at Tier 2 level,’ and (3) the cost to public funds would be ‘disproportionate’, given all parties were publicly funded.

    P’s Representative

    Where P is a party to the proceedings, P will have their own solicitor. If there is a paid advocate, Relevant Person’s Representative (RPR) or Independent Mental Capacity Advocate (IMCA), usually the solicitor is contacted and instructed by them, after consulting with P if appropriate. Alternatively, if proceedings are started and there is no person fulfilling the role of Litigation Friend, the Official Solicitor (an independent organisation whose role is solely to promote the best interests of vulnerable parties) will instruct a solicitor themselves.

    P’s representative is not instructed by any of the public bodies or the care provider, and is able to raise queries, test assertions, and obtain disclosure. Any evidence is therefore tested and evaluated by a person who has no ties to the public bodies, as well as the Court.

    Dependent on the nature of the proceedings (i.e. under which section of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 they have been issued), P may be entitled to non-means tested Legal Aid, regardless of their financial circumstances. In other situations, their eligibility may be dependent on their income, capital and assets.

    P’s wishes and feelings are also incredibly important. The Court is able to override these wishes, but they will always be considered under s4(6) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. P’s views will be obtained by their own representative who is appointed for this reason and they will file a statement setting out their experience and interactions with P. If relatives disagree that P’s views are truly as set out in the statement, they will be able to explain in witness evidence why they feel this and how the accuracy could be improved e.g. if the visit took place without an interpreter present, which resulted in a language barrier.

    What families can do if they disagree with contact restrictions

    If family members believe a restriction is not justified or is disproportionate, they can: 

    • ask the placement to provide written reasons 
    • ask that relevant records are disclosed 
    • keep a record of visits and their impact 
    • request that concerns are put before the Court for determination 
    • make an application to the Court directly.

    Family members are not entitled to see the records of any P who is an adult, regardless of their relationship to P, unless there is a Deputyship or Lasting Power of Attorney for Health & Welfare in place or P has capacity to consent to this. The person in the role of the Relevant Person’s Representative (RPR) is expected to review the Care Plans, but other records are protected. As above, the Court can order disclosure of these records.

    If the matter is not before the Court of Protection already, then, subject to Court permission, family members who are not fulfilling the role of RPR, Deputy or Attorney can make applications – they’re not wholly dependent on waiting for the LA or others with formal roles  to make an application.

    Legal Aid may be available for family members in Court of Protection proceedings about contact and welfare, although this is subject to means testing and examination of the merits of the case.

    Conclusion 

    Contact decisions are complex because P’s Article 8 rights must be balanced with their safety and often it is not entirely clear at the outset of proceedings what is in their best interests. 

    The Court’s role is to step in when there is disagreement, assess evidence, and determine what arrangements genuinely promote P’s welfare. Restrictions must be necessary, proportionate, and justified. Where they are not, the Court can (and does) refuse or remove them. 

     Hanna Whitehead is an Associate in the Court of Protection: Health & Welfare Team at Ramsdens Solicitors LLP. You can learn more about Hanna’s work from her profile here: Hanna Whitehead – Ramsdens Solicitors.

    The well-recognised wish to go home

    By Daniel Clark, 25th November 2025

    Where is home? 

    For many people, that question evokes an instant answer. The man at this centre of this case, A, is no different. For him, home is Spain, where he lived for approximately 33 years. 

    The problem is that he currently lives in a care home in Wales. Despite the fact that a circuit judge has found that A is habitually resident in Spain, and despite the fact that he clearly wants to return to Spain, that may not be an option for him. 

    Whether that’s an option, and how the legal complexities should be addressed, is an issue for Mrs Justice Morgan. On Tuesday 7 October 2025, I observed a remote directions hearing in this case (COP 20009483). Representing the local authority, Neath Port Talbot County Borough Council, was Victoria Butler-Cole KC. Representing A, via his litigation friend, was Ian Brownhill, who was also joined by Jake Thorold.

    In this blog, I’ll explain the background to this case, and draw heavily on a previously published judgment in this case to explain what habitual residence means and why a judge concluded that A is habitually resident in Spain. 

    Next, I’ll explain some of the legal and practical complexities that Morgan J will need to deal with it at the next hearing.

    Finally, I’ll share some personal reflections on what Morgan J described as “the well- recognised emotional human basic wish to go home”. 

    1. Background and the previous judgment

    On 10 June 2025, HHJ Richard Miller handed down judgment in this case: Neath Port Talbot County Borough Council v A & Ors.

    In this section, the references to other pieces of case law are lifted from the published judgment. 

    In his judgment, the judge explains that A was born in Wales but lived in Spain for approximately 33 years. He achieved residency there, which is due to expire in 2031. His wife, B, remains in Spain. His son, C, lives in South Wales.

    In April 2024, C flew to Spain and A returned to Wales with him. C is unable to care for A at home, who now resides at D Care Home. He is unhappy there and wants to return to Spain. 

    The question for the court at this stage was to determine A’s habitual residence. At §8 of the judgment, the judge explains that “habitual residence is a question of fact to be determined by a wide range of circumstances of the particular case. It is not a legal concept”. 

    Knowles J, in Health Service Executive of Ireland v IM & Anor, set out seven key principles for determining habitual residence at §29 of her judgment. These principles include identifying the appropriate legal test as habitual residence being the “place which reflects some degree of integration by the child [and in this context adult] in a social and family environment”, the importance of the person’s state of mind, and the stability (rather than permanence) of the residence. 

    In Local Authority v SW & Ors[i], Moylan J held that,

    b) The expression “degree of integration” is an overarching summary or question rather than the sole, or even necessarily the primary factor in the determination of habitual residence. The court’s focus should not be narrowed to this issue alone as a question of fact [68] and [72].

    Importantly, “the court must look not only at the terms of the authority conferred upon the person taking the decision [to move someone who lacks capacity] but also at their motives for taking that decision” (§32). In addition, the fact that the person thinks it is in P’s best interests “may not suffice to prevent the move from being wrongful”. 

    Schedule 3 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 only makes provision for the Court of Protection to exercise its power if an adult is habitually resident in England and Wales, if the adult has property there, the matter is urgent, or the protective measures are temporary or limited in effect to England and Wales. An adult will be treated as habitually resident in England and Wales if their habitual residence cannot be ascertained, they are a refugee, or they have been displaced as a result of disturbance in the country of his habitual residence. 

    Taken in the round, HHJ Richard Miller concluded that A’s habitual residence is in Spain (see §13 of the judgment). The judge considered that A did not have any intention to return to live in Wales when he had capacity, was integrated into life in Spain and had chosen to live there, he owned property in Spain, had a business and bank accounts in Spain, received healthcare in Spain, had obtained residency in Spain, and did not choose to leave Spain.

    This meant that B and C “had no lawful authority to move A to Wales. He had refused to sign a lasting power of attorney […] His permanent removal from Spain was likely to be contrary to his wishes” (§14). However, and for the avoidance of doubt, “B and C did not act in bad faith” (§15). 

    In concluding the judgment, the judge commented that “consideration should be given to the appropriate Tier of judiciary to which this case should be allocated in future”. 

    Clearly consideration had been given to this because, when I observed the hearing in October, the case had been allocated to Mrs Justice Morgan (a Tier 3 judge).

    2. The October hearing: Legal complexities and fitness to fly

    Matters had moved on since the judgment. Counsel for the local authority told the court that enquiries have been made as to what options are available to A in Spain: “although he is said to be fit to fly with assistance there are no viable options from in Spain because he wouldn’t be able to afford privately funded care and the process for him to access publicly funded care is expensive …. It seems to us there isn’t any realistic way of him going back to Spain and unfortunately there aren’t any other care homes in the vicinity or close to his son. He is going to have to stay in his present care home even though he objects”.

    This raises tricky technical and legal questions but, at this stage, the judge did not want to be side-tracked by this. She recalled a previous hearing (which I didn’t observe) in which the family had spoken about the situation in a “very affecting way….that is familiar to anyone in a family who found themselves navigating their way through inevitable deteriorating dementia…I would not want to be lost in what you [Counsel for the local authority] correctly identify as the technical and practical complexities.”

    One of those complexities is under what legal mechanism the Court of Protection can authorise A’s deprivation of liberty in the care home. Another is that A has expressed a wish to go home to Spain but has also told his legal representatives that he does not want to return to Spain for an assessment or even to live in a care home. He wants to return to live at his previous home (somewhere that his wife told the court he has not lived for some years). 

    The judge was also keen to get into the issue of whether A is actually fit to fly. Counsel for A told the court that, “[C, A’s son] [says] his father can’t navigate through an airport, can’t navigate onto an aircraft…I think the medics have taken a narrow view on the concept of fitness [to fly] and one concern is the emotional impact of this man going onto an aircraft”. In other words, A may be medically fit to fly, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that the process of flying would be safe or in his best interests. 

    The judge therefore directed that further evidence about this matter be filed in time for a hearing in the first week of December. At this same hearing, the court will consider the legal complexities, and (hopefully) come to a conclusion as to A’s best interests.

    3. The wish to go home

    It seemed to me that this hearing was always intended to be a brief directions hearing. Indeed, given that the parties seemed to be in broad agreement as to the way forward, I got the impression that Morgan J had kept it in the list so she could reassure A’s wife and son that she was ‘keeping an eye on things’. 

    However, I was quite struck by the way that the judge addressed A’s expressed wish to go home. Here’s a brief exchange from my notes (we’re not allowed to record hearings so this is unlikely to be verbatim). 

    Judge: May I just ask you [Counsel for A] this. I don’t think I’m conscious of having seen a note of the visit yesterday. I wanted just to canvas this with you. The situation about wanting to go to Spain as expressed, and very firmly not wanting to go through the process of going to Spain for the purpose of being assessed for something that is not wanted – I put that inelegantly – is not a straightforward linear process for somebody whose thought processes, as I read the evidence, are affected by his illness. Are you able to help me with the link that [A] made in his head with the consequence of not wanting the process, if he still wanted the end result that is only possible by that process?

    Counsel for A: My Lady I can’t and I don’t want to give evidence or offer a clinical opinion…I wonder whether it’s that straightforward desire to return home as we see so often in people with dementia. [A]’s home is Spain and I do wonder whether that’s at the core of what he’s saying…the level of his distress has not been as consistent but he has always been consistent about his wishes and feelings

    Judge: And you’re not inviting me to make any further or other directions. I should safely treat it as the well-recognised emotional human basic wish to go home, in circumstances where home is understood and recognised as Spain? 

    Counsel for A: That’s right.

    This has lingered in my mind far beyond the conclusion of the hearing. 

    What I mean when I say “home” can be contextual. When I was in Amsterdam for a few days in October, and I said at the end of our first day “let’s go home”, I didn’t mean back to the UK. I meant the apartment in which we were staying.

    At the end of our visit, and when we were waiting in the airport, I said something like “I want to go home”. In that context, I did mean that I wanted to go back to the UK. In fact, I meant my own home, where I live. But as anybody who has ever flown into Manchester Airport will know, the process isn’t quite as fast as you’d hope, and getting to my own home was going to take some time. 

    This shifting meaning of home need not be contextual. I still refer to my parents’ house as home even though I haven’t lived there for years. In that instance, home isn’t the place that I live but a place with strong emotional connection (and I’m lucky enough that those emotions are positive ones).

    If, hopefully a long time in the future, I find myself diagnosed with dementia and living in a care home, I rather suspect that any request to go home will have two meanings. In the first instance, it’ll probably mean wherever it is that I’ve made my home. But there’s a strong possibility that it’ll also mean my childhood home, where I lived for eighteen years, and where I first felt both physically and emotionally safe. 

    This strength of emotion has also been picked up on by the travel writer Jan Morris. At the very end of Trieste and the Meaning of Nowhere (my favourite of her prodigious output), she writes movingly about the places that have meant the most to her: “As for me, when my clock moves on for the last time, the angel having returned to Heaven, the angler having packed it in for the night and gone to the pub, I shall happily haunt the two places that have most happily haunted me. Most of the after-time I shall be wandering with my beloved along the banks of the Dwyfor; but now and then you may find me in a boat below the walls of Miramar, watching the nightingales swarm”. 

    Home is a physical place but can also be understood as a physical representation of emotion. In A Room of One’s own[ii], the political theorist Iris Marion Young makes the point explicit. Home, she says, is not just a place where we dwell “among things” but it is also a preservation of those things and those meanings. While it need not be a whole building (and here she was specifically concerned with nursing home) there is a need for “some individuated dwelling space […] a space in which one dwells among personally meaningful things”.

    For many people with dementia, the emotional connection with home remains long after the dwindling of the memory that the physical space is no longer accessible. It can be distressing when care staff do not understand or are perceived of obstructing attempts to return to that place. But none of this changes the desire to be home, and none of this changes the possibility that the care home can become a place that one might see as home.

    I know I’ll be unable to observe this hearing when it returns to court in the week commencing 1st December 2025. It sounds like A will not be able to go to the home he desires. But I do hope something can be done to turn wherever he is living into somewhere he might consider a home. 

    Daniel Clark is a member of the core team of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project. He is a PhD student in the Department of Politics & International Relations at the University of Sheffield. His research considers Iris Marion Young’s claim that older people are an oppressed social group. It is funded by WRoCAH. He is on LinkedIn, X @DanielClark132  and Bluesky @clarkdaniel.bsky.social.


    [i] At §11 of HHJ Richard Miller’s judgment, this case is given the neutral citation number [2014] EWCOP 4. That is incorrect. The actual neutral citation number is [2014] EWCOP 43. 

    [ii] This is my favourite of Young’s essays, and in some ways can be seen as a continuation of House and Home (another essay by Young). Here she agrees with other feminist theorists that home is often constructed at women’s expense because of an expectation that they nurture the home so their children and husbands can develop their own goals and subjectivities. Home can also be a locus for violence. But she nevertheless disagrees that home cannot be a useful and meaningful concept. In both essays she suffuses philosophy with personal experience (in House and Home she discusses being removed from her mother’s care; in A Room of One’s Own she discusses her father-in-law’s move to a nursing home following a stroke).  

    Hoarding: P is removed from his home by court order with no suitable alternative accommodation provided

    By Virginia Gough, 23rd November 2025

    The protected party (P) is a man with autism and a hoarding disorder. The Local Authority has deemed his property in need of urgent clearance and attempts to achieve this previously have not been successful because P has remained at the property and ‘progress was too slow to be meaningful. He resisted the removal of certain items and progress was extremely limited.’  At a hearing last month, the judge was asked to authorise P’s removal from his home – either by agreement or by force – to enable them to clear the property, assess the amount of work that is required to make the place habitable, and complete any necessary remedial works.  At that hearing, the local authority made an application for a two-stage order: the first stage was for P to be “encouraged” to leave the property. Stage 2, contingent on Stage 1 being unsuccessful, was for authorisation of removal with restraint. The judge authorised only Stage 1 at the last hearing. (see Hoarding and best interests challenges for the Court of Protection by Claire Martin).

    There was one feature of the 7th October 2025 hearing which was (intentionally) omitted in Claire Martin’s report of it and which we feel is important to report on now. There were actually two different versions of the judge’s order of 7th October 2025 – one for the public bodies (which referred to Stage 2) and one for P and his brother (which did not mention Stage 2). Both versions were discussed in a public hearing, and there was nothing in the Transparency Order preventing the observer from reporting this. Since the creation of two different versions of the order was clearly an attempt to withhold certain information from P (and his family), Claire (the observer) and Celia Kitzinger (the blog editor) decided together to wait until after P had moved – or been moved – out of his house to report on this.  Celia says: “In effect, the court relied on us being responsible court reporters – but it would be wise to bear in mind in future that with an observer present in a public hearing, and no reporting restrictions to prevent disclosure, there is always a risk that information might be published and discovered by P and his family, contrary to the intentions of the court. I urge the court to amend the Transparency Order in cases like these”.  She also comments: “I am not sure how the ‘two versions’ of the order really works in any event, given that orders from public hearings are themselves public documents (COP Rule 5.9). I would previously have advised family members that (unless they are specifically told otherwise) an order from a public hearing would be complete and accurate – but now I have to contemplate the possibility of redactions, even in orders from public hearings. I’m not sure this was properly thought through”.

    Following the hearing observed by Claire, Stage 1 “persuasion” was attempted, but P refused to leave his home. Subsequently, Stage 2 was approved, on 14th October 2025 (we think without a publicly listed hearing). However, in the event, P left his home on the 20th October 2025 without the use of the authorised restraint plan.

    The next hearing we saw publicly listed was on Monday 17th November 2025 (a bit sooner than had been anticipated, according to Claire Martin’s blog post). It was at 11am before Tribunal Judge Kaufman, and that is the one I observed and report on below.

    Hearing of 17th November 2025

    At the hearing, P was present, in the same room and on the same screen as counsel representing him (via the Official Solicitor), Mary-Rachel McCabe. The Local Authority (London Borough of Brent) was represented by Alexander Campbell. (P’s brother appeared not to be present at this hearing.)

    For the benefit of those observing, the Local Authority provided an updated background since the previous hearing when the order for removal with restraint was approved.

    On 20th October 2025, P moved out of his home without the use of restraint, and into a hotel in the local area (for the purposes of this post, let us call it Hotel A), which he was familiar with from a previous stay. This move had gone well – which, as the Judge clearly expressed toward the end of the hearing, was the result of the consideration and time put into the process in the previous two hearings.

    However, the placement at Hotel A has had to come to an end. The reasons for this were not made entirely clear, the Local Authority referred only to insurmountable logistical difficulties’ regarding payment.

    As a result, P has had to move again, into another local hotel (I will call it Hotel B) at his own expense. The Local Authority has been searching for a suitable property since then and has now found a flat available for P’s use – but it is some distance away in another area of London. They have kitted this out with towels, pillows, a microwave and other items to make it habitable, and it has been available since 6th November 2025.

    The Local Authority wants an order to move P into that flat, with the same transition plan in place as previously authorised. This includes the multi-stage order from verbal encouragement at first, progressing to restraint subsequently.

    The Official Solicitor opposed this application as the flat is not in P’s local area, and he would find such a move destabilising. In addition, the property only has a shower, and P’s particular needs require use of a bath. Additionally, the Official Solicitor opposed the use of restraint for this move as disproportionate.

    The Local Authority offered a number of arguments for why this move, although not ideal, would be in the best interests of P:

    • This accommodation is preferable to that of a hotel as it is more secure, particularly as P is currently self-funding at Hotel B. There is, therefore, a risk of a financial need to end the stay, or a risk that the property will become fully booked requiring P to leave at very short notice. At that stage and urgency, the Local Authority may find it difficult to find any suitable accommodation, or to purchase needed items to make the accommodation acceptable for P. The Local Authority is seeking more reliable accommodation.
    • There are also benefits to the specific property the LA has located. As a private dwelling, it is a more personal setting than that of a hotel. It will allow P to live independently as it has better facilities, such as a food preparation area and microwave.

    If the Court agrees to order the move to the flat, the Local Authority will continue looking for a more suitable property in P’s local area. The Local Authority did recognise that for P it would be preferable to avoid multiple moves but stated that this is unavoidable as there is nothing better currently available.

    The Judge asked Counsel to specifically address the evidence from the Mental Health NHS Trust (although not represented at this hearing, they were involved previously and both the Judge and Counsel for the Official Solicitor referred to and quoted from a written report provided by them) which stated that P’s specific needs meant moving out of the local area would be challenging.

    LA: ‘If we had found somewhere in his local area, that would be what we were asking the Court to authorise today. But there was nothing suitable in the area. The evidence provided by the Trust recognises the benefits of P remaining in his local area, and whilst the Local Authority would not dispute these, the evidence does not suggest that living in a different part of London would be an absolute barrier to receiving the ongoing support and care. It may be more difficult but, in my submissions, those do not outweigh the benefits of more secure accommodation.’ [Counsel for the Local Authority]

    The Local Authority emphasised that  if P had to move out of Hotel B urgently, the accommodation found at that point may be even less convenient: this was a significant risk they wished to avoid.

    Then the Official Solicitor provided the following reasons for why the move is unsuitable for P:

    • The primary reason is location. The property is a signficant distance from P’s local area.  In fact, when looked up by the Official Solicitor, it is over an hour and 15 minutes on public transport – depending on the route – requiring two or three changes. P relies on local individuals, shopkeepers and his GP. He requires the stability brought by consistent routines. He has lived in the local area for most of his life.
    • Multiple moves are not advisable for P. Counsel for P stated: ‘P requires stability as much as is realistically possible. That position also reflects the conclusions of the doctor who diagnosed him, who stated a need for ‘scaffolding and structure.’ In other words, stability is important.’ The move from his home to Hotel A was possible due to his clear involvement in the process, careful planning and the fact the Hotel A was already known to him and in his local area. This is not true of the other property.
    • Additionally, whilst this is a less important factor, P has been unable to tolerate having a shower throughout his life and requires a bath.

    The Official Solicitor recognised that asking the Court to effectively authorise the continued payment of Hotel B out of the pocket of P was an ‘unusual’ one, but pending the identification of more suitable accommodation, this was preferred. The Local Authority would then have to continue to search, and it was requested that the order include a particular responsibility of the Local Authority to update and communicate regularly with the Official Solicitor about available accommodation to ensure P could be involved in this process.

    Additionally, the Official Solicitor was keen to request that restraint be removed from the order as an option for removal. The use of restraint had been discussed at length with regard to removing P from his own property urgently. However, Counsel described it as ‘disproportionate’ outside of that urgent and particularly difficult context. The proposed move from Hotel B is significantly different, and as it is a private hotel, there are some limits to the authority the secure ambulance service has to force entry, which had not been properly considered by the Local Authority.

    Judgment

    The Judge apologised to P for the disjointed and unsettled process of moving him out of his property. She expressed concern that these circumstances would not be putting him in a positive position to move forward from the clearance of his property. However, beyond answering yes or no to a question asked by the Judge regarding his planned attendance at an upcoming important appointment, P did not make any oral contributions expressing his own views at any point in the hearing.

    The Judge also re-emphasised how unfortunate additional or gratuitous moves are for P and recognised that whilst hotel accommodation is deficient in many ways and it is concerning to think P will ‘remain in hotel accommodation for a long time’, the Local Authority plan itself involves possible further moves beyond the flat now under consideration, if a more suitable property is found.

    The judge found, in conclusion, that the risks of residing in a hotel were not particularly weighty and she did not authorise the move to the property proposed by the Local Authority.

    The Judge did order that the Local Authority file evidence about the continuing search for an appropriate property and must keep the Official Solicitor updated as to the efforts and outcomes of the search. This will be discussed at the next hearing.

    Costs application against the Local Authority

    Additionally, the Official Solicitor had made a costs application in the week prior to the hearing, for the costs arising from the additional work resulting from the failure of the placement at Hotel A.

    Timelines for the Local Authority to respond to this cost application were set in the course of the hearing. The Local Authority wanted until the morning of Friday 21st  November to respond to the application (over a week), on the basis that the individual who had received it was out of office at the time and their legal and social work teams were to be focused on finding accommodation for P. The Official Solicitor requested the Local Authority response and evidence at the end of the working day on Thursday 20th November. As stated by the Official Solicitor, these additional few hours would be important to ensuring they could respond fully. The Judge gave the Local Authority the timeline they requested, with the explicit direction that she did so to provide them additional time to make extensive effort’ to find suitable local accommodation for P.

    The application is set to be discussed in full at the next hearing, which was last confirmed to be listed for 11:00am on 25 November 2025.

    Virginia Gough is a student at City Law School, currently studying the Bar Vocational Course following completion of the Graduate Diploma in Law. She is pursuing a practice in Family Law and Court of Protection. Her interest in mental capacity law and the specific challenges of advocacy for vulnerable individuals stems from her volunteer work as a Social Security Tribunal Representative, where she represents clients appealing decisions on disability benefits. She is a new contributor to the Open Justice Court of Protection Project, and this is her first blog post. You can connect with her on LinkedIn.

    If you were a Supreme Court judge, how would you decide Cheshire West Revisited?

    By Sandra and Joe Preston, Lorraine Currie, Alison Golding, Eleanor Tallon, Hilary Paxton, Mary Kadzirange, and Lucy Series (with an introduction by Daniel Clark), 21st November 2025

    On 20-22 October 2025, the Supreme Court heard a case in which they were invited to re-consider the definition of a deprivation of liberty. You can view a recording of the proceedings on the Supreme Court’s website and read our previously published blogs about the case on (collected together here).

    We’ll publish more about the case once the judgment is handed down, but that’s unlikely to be before early 2026 at least. While we wait, we thought it would be interesting to hear what people who had watched the live-stream or the recordings would decide if they were a Supreme Court judge. Shortly after the hearing, we issued an open call for contributions to answer that very question.

    The answers we received to this question have been presented in no particular order, though I have tried to directly juxtapose responses that stand in contrast to one another. This approach brings to the fore how much variety there is. That’s to be expected because of the considerable diversity of people who have contributed. Where there are similarities, that’s entirely coincidental.

    Open justice means that members of the public have access to courts and can watch hearings. That means the observers form opinions about what they see, opinions informed by their own unique expertise and knowledge base (professional and personal).

    The question before the Supreme Court was whether the proposal from the Attorney General for Northern Ireland was compliant with the Strasbourg jurisprudence concerning the proper interpretation of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. For the most part, the contributors to this blog have chosen not to answer this question, and instead tend to focus on the broader issue of what they do (and don’t) want to change about DOLS.

    First, Sandra and Joe Preston explain their view that the current approach to DOLS should change because, contrary to the view expressed by the Charities, repeated DOLS assessments are intrusive.

    Second, Lorraine Currie says that she would “ease” the impact of Cheshire West but that, in her view, this ought to be done by a change to the Code of Practice rather than in the Act itself.

    Third, Alison Golding engages in close interpretation of Article 5, and makes the case that there should be a high bar for assessing a person’s “contentment” with their living arrangements but a low bar for identifying an objection.

    Fourth, Eleanor Tallon considers the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. She thinks that the acid test should remain as-is but nevertheless thinks that the question of what being free (or not) to leave means in the context of the person living in their own private home or with family.

    Fifth, Hilary Paxton considers the role of external scrutiny, with a particular focus on the role of visitors.

    Sixth, Mary Kadzirange discusses the relationship between safeguarding and deprivations of liberty.

    Seventh, Lucy Series reflects on the passage of time since the hearing in Cheshire West (which she observed). Ultimately, she thinks that the robust safeguards needed for valid consent should be provided through legislation.

    1. DOLS and intrusive assessments

    By Sandra and Joe Preston

    Three charities (Mind, Mencap and the National Autistic Society) acted as interveners in the Supreme Court case, represented by Victoria Butler Cole KC.  At one point, in response to the Secretary of State’s observation that families find repeated DOLS assessments intrusive, the advocate said that the charities she represents “had not found this to be an issue”.  This has certainly been an issue for us.  

    Joe’s mother has Alzheimer’s. Until recently, she’s been living in a care home where she’s been safe, cared for and generally content.  Some of her behaviour was treated as “objecting” including saying she wanted to go “home” (she meant to the town where she lived as a small child), and occasionally banging on windows and doors (out of frustration at having to wait for staff to escort her inside and out).  We both believed her objections were to the situation she found herself in – with diminishing cognition, and she was generally happy. The only thing that caused her real distress was the Deprivation of Liberty process itself – when someone from the Supervisory Body took it upon themselves to interrogate her as to where she would like to live.  This could unsettle her for days at a time.

    The first DOLS authorisation was issued in May 2021, valid only for three months “to ascertain whether P’s behaviour constituted an active and consistent objection to her placement”.   This was the beginning of a period of short-term DOLS assessments involving 23 visits from 16 different officials and a s.21A court hearing, before remaining in her placement was determined to be in her best interests. We wrote about this in our previous blog post (A court hearing and 23 visits from 16 officials: Family doubt that ‘Deprivation of liberty’ is working in the public interest).  We hoped that, after this court hearing, and a carefully worded order from the judge, that would be an end to repeated and disruptive short-term DOLS assessments and authorisations for her.  Sadly this was not to be.

    Joe’s mum has recently been admitted to hospital following a series of falls and is still there as her previous care home would not have her back.  The hospital brokerage team has finally identified a nursing home that will take her and provide 1:1 support which she is currently assessed as needing because of her falls risk, dementia and delirium. On the DOLS front, the one that was extended at the CoP in June is now void and the Court Order which refers to her former care home is not quite the document it was in June.  The hospital has put their own DOLS in place to cover her lengthy stay there, and as soon as she is discharged to the new nursing home she will require another DOLS being authorised.  She is being placed there under the D2A process, so possibly only for 4-6 weeks, but it is too soon to second guess whether she will then need another DOLS or not.

    We are leaning towards the AGNI/DHSC view and would question whether those with advanced dementia are actually deprived of their liberty under Article 5 – surely it is their illness that has deprived them of their liberty and if they require 1:1 care to keep them safe from harm and have no alternatives but to live in nursing placements identified for them by an Integrated Care Board do they need as many authorisations as Joe’s mum is now facing?  She finds them distressing and intrusive, and as for us, we certainly don’t  want our last days/weeks/months together taken up with DOLS bureaucracy, but instead to spend what precious time we may have left with her at the end of her life. In our view,  DOLS for Joe’s mum is not just a waste of public money, it also actively causes harm and diminishes the quality of our family life.

    Joe and Sandra Preston are the son and daughter-in-law of a P who was involved in Court of Protection proceedings.  They can be contacted through the project email on openjustice@yahoo.com.

    2. “I do not see how I could reach a decision”

    By Lorraine Currie

    I’ve been asked the question what would I decide to do if I was a Supreme Court judge in the Northern Ireland reference about valid consent.

    From observation of the hearings, and putting myself in their shoes, rather than my own, I simply wouldn’t have enough information on which to decide anything. So many options were presented beyond the original reference e.g. Cheshire West was re-examined but not in any great detail, the question of valid consent inferred by the persons wishes and feelings was discussed, but so many relevant players were not represented. We heard nothing from the Dementia charities, we heard nothing from the likes of Social Care futures or a Gloriously Ordinary life who may have had a different take. We didn’t hear actual case studies of those negatively impacted by the repetition of DoLS and we didn’t hear from local Councils or DoLS Leads who could explain the burden of DoLS not only on systems but on the people at the heart.

    Without a full and complete re-examination of DoLS in 2025 I do not see how I would reach a decision.

    I sense that some of the Judges were definitely inclined to limit the impact of Cheshire West whilst others were totally oblivious to its reach and I would be one of those who would like to limit its reach.

    I would probably allow the interpretation as requested by the Attorney General for Northern Ireland but in doing so, by in fact allowing a policy change in the Code not in the Act, I would be fully aware that this would open the doors to further challenges reaching the Supreme Court in regard to this interpretation.

    I would also be concerned that (as a Judge) I would have no role in ensuring the necessary safeguards were in place. I would however see this as an opportunity to promote rights but I would then want to be fully involved in setting up a system of safeguards (in my normal role). It then might be that the easing of Cheshire West offered by the interpretation actually results in a second parallel and complex process of alternate safeguards.

    Lorraine Currie is now a freelance Mental Capacity Consultant. She has over 30 years Local Authority experience, is a qualified social worker and in 2021 received the LGC Award for Outstanding Individual Contribution. Lorraine provides extensive training and is an Associate for the West Midlands Association of Directors of Adult Social Services (WMADASS) working on DoLS. Lorraine is on Bluesky as @lorrainecurrie.bsky.social.

    3. Interpreting Article 5

    by Alison Golding

    Firstly, Article 5(1)(e) does not apply to a person who is unable to make any expression of wishes through any means, such as a person in a persistent vegetative state, as their situation does not reach the criteria set out in the universal test in Guzzardi for there to be a deprivation of liberty: the tests in Guzzardi depend on the recognition by the subject that they have, even if only at a most minimal level, either bodily autonomy or the right of bodily autonomy. (Only a mental element is relevant here: a person with e.g. locked-in syndrome who is able to communicate has the ability to recognise and consent or object to their living circumstances and so be subject to restraint.)

    Secondly, Article 5(1)(e) only applies if a person is “of unsound mind”: a person who has legal capacity to consent, or not to consent, to their living arrangements is not of unsound mind for the. purposes of Article 5(1)(e). This analysis explains Storck, Stanev and Mihailovs: a valid refusal or lack of consent excludes any lawful power for national authorities to confine in accordance with Article 5(1)(e), confirmed by the use by ECtHR of the legal term “consent”.

    The test for whether a person can validly grant or refusal consent so as to take them outside the scope of Article 5(1)(e) is separate from a general test as to whether a person is “of unsound mind”, and depends on that person’s living arrangements and on whether they are consenting or refusing. A child living at home with caring parents, on reaching adulthood, may be able to relatively easily express by their manner and expressions that they are validly consenting to that arrangement. (In Cheshire West, the manner and expressions of MIG, living contentedly in the closest available arrangement to a caring parental home, might be taken to meet this standard.) The barrier for a person in an institutional arrangement expressing contentment to that arrangement is likely to be subject to a higher barrier for that expression to be treated as consent, and the barrier for their expression of objection to be valid lower.

    Where the above analysis leads to a person not being within the safeguards of Article 5(1)(e):

    (a) they are protected from DOL by the application to them of the safeguards of Article 5 as a whole,

    (b) they still have the benefit of the protections in Articles 2 to 4 and 6 to 12, for which national protections other than DOL procedures may be required.

    Alison Golding qualified as a Solicitor in local government.  She then worked as a legal adviser in various UK Government Departments for 25 years until early retirement.

    4. Valid Consent to Confinement through Wishes and Feelings: What Would You Decide?

    By Eleanor Tallon

    The requirement to provide information to enable a person to make an informed decision is a definitive characteristic of consent. The person’s right to withdraw consent without adverse consequences is another key factor. Therefore, my initial concern would be that changing the meaning of valid consent (in the context of confinement) risks placing health and social care providers in a state of uncertainty about the meaning of consent. 

    This could also erode responsibilities to support decision-making and gain informed consent for care and treatment. Further complexities, against a backdrop of uncertainties and misapplication of the MCA and DoL processes, would not be helpful. 

    The Attorney General claims that accepting positive wishes and feelings as valid consent would support the principle of Article 12, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), the right to enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis. Yet, the person’s wishes and feelings would only be accepted as valid consent if they agree to the arrangements. If the person subsequently objects, they would not be free to withdraw consent; they would remain objectively confined and deprived of their liberty. 

    To truly promote legal capacity, the person’s will and preferences would determine the decision, as far as that is practically achievable. This would apply in all areas of the person’s life so that their home and daily experiences reflect who they are and what they want, regardless of decision-making capacity. It’s not about constructing a fantasy that the person has legal agency to consent to their confinement, while removing that as soon as the person acts in opposition to those who really hold the power. 

    While I absolutely support the aim to embed the CRPD on the domestic level, it seems to me that this can be done in more effective ways than changing the definition of valid consent to confinement, such as through legislative reform, and incorporating human rights into practice cultures (focusing on the Reach StandardsSocial Care Future and Gloriously Ordinary Lives as guiding initiatives is a good starting point).

    Secondly, I would question how valid consent to confinement can be given by wishes and feelings. The person’s happiness in relation to their confinement would be difficult to quantify, and there are real risks of misinterpretation, susceptibility, coercion, and misrepresentation by those responsible for the person’s care. If the safeguards are removed because the person is deemed to be ‘happy’, as it stands, there is no clarity on what alternative safeguards would be available and no guarantee that the individual’s right to liberty would be protected by any other means. 

    It is not uncommon for the presumption of capacity to be used defensively by services and professionals to divert responsibilities. Similarly, the person’s proclaimed ‘happiness’ could be used as a mechanism to avoid the additional administrative and resource burdens for providers and authorities, which are warranted when the person meets the threshold for Deprivation of Liberty (DoL).

    In terms of the acid test for confinement, as defined in the ‘Cheshire West’ judgment (2014), I would advocate that this remains. It provides clarity for care providers when identifying a confinement. If both arms of the acid test are met and there is no valid consent, this would trigger a referral for assessment under DoLS or the judicial authorisation process. A more nuanced evaluation will then be carried out by the Best Interest Assessor or the Court of Protection, while considering the concrete factors outlined in Guzzardi v Italy (1980) to establish whether a person is objectively confined. 

    However, I would urge more consideration around the second arm of the acid test, which is often misinterpreted. Not being free to leave is conflated with restrictions on leaving in the immediate sense (i.e., locked doors). Yet such restrictions would fall within the scope of continuous supervision and control. The relevant question to determine the second arm of the acid test is whether the person is unable to leave permanently, to live elsewhere.  

    Often, care arrangements within institutional-type settings will satisfy the objective test for confinement. Many people in care homes or hospitals are not free to live elsewhere because their care and residence are inextricable. If that is considered the legitimate, least restrictive option to meet their needs, then it can be deduced that they are not free to leave.  Yet there needs to be a comprehensive appraisal of whether a person who lives in their own private home or with family is not free to live elsewhere. This type of scenario is the most disconcerting when considering the acid test for confinement, and I think it’s worth more thought around what being free to leave means in these contexts.

    Eleanor Tallon is an Independent Social Worker, Expert Witness, and Best Interests Assessor. Eleanor is also an ESRC-funded Doctoral Training Pathway (DTP) student at the University of Birmingham. Her research focuses on the application of the Mental Capacity Act (2005) in private brain injury case management. Eleanor can be contacted via email eleanor@mcaprofessional.co.uk or through her website mcaprofessional.co.uk and found on LinkedIn or X(Twitter) @Eleanor_Tallon and Bluesky @eleanor24.bsky.social.

    5. Looking forward to LPS

    By Hilary Paxton

    Where care and support works best, the provider would not be acting unilaterally.  Any arrangements should be part of a care and support plan and be developed in the best interests of the person, based on a needs assessment and their preferred outcomes, and their wishes and feelings on how best to achieve the outcomes.

    Whilst LPS is not yet in place and may be subject to further development, I support its aim to embed consideration of liberty and any arrangements that might affect it within a well-thought through response to needs etc.  We will of course have debates about skill levels and capacity, but that aim should mean that the provider is only one agent in all this.  This is about promoting wellbeing, including the prevention of abuse and neglect.  External scrutiny is crucial to ensure there is then no abuse of power by an organisation or individual staff.  External visitors (family, advocates, other professionals, clergy, visitors with pat dogs, theatre groups, singers, etc) to settings where care and support are provided all have a part to play to speak up if they see anything that appears untoward.  This is not limited to people who may have an authorised deprivation of liberty. It is particularly important for people who do not have any visitors.

    We of course, want to get the DoLS and the Court of Protection authorisation bit right, but this is only part of the story for people affected.

    Hilary Paxton is a senior advisor at the Local Government Association.

    6. Reflections on the post-Cheshire West landscape

    By Mary Kadzirange

    UKSC/2025/0042 has profoundly underscored the difficult and often uncomfortable tension that persists in the post-Cheshire West landscape. Whilst Cheshire West was grounded in the protective intent of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), seeking to safeguard individuals from arbitrary deprivation of liberty, it has simultaneously placed professionals, families, and the state in an enduring ethical and practical dilemma. It sharpened the focus on protecting vulnerable individuals, yet in doing so, it expanded the scope of what constitutes a deprivation of liberty to such an extent that the boundary between necessary protection and unjustified restriction has become increasingly blurred. This tension is not merely theoretical; it is felt daily by practitioners striving to uphold both autonomy and safety, often within complex and emotionally charged situations.

    AGNI highlights the continuing struggle to draw principled and workable boundaries between the state’s duty to protect and the individual’s right to self-determination, privacy, and family life. It raises difficult questions about what true liberty means for people living in care settings, and whether the systems designed to safeguard them have become too rigid or bureaucratic to respond compassionately and proportionately to real-life circumstances.

    In practice, the challenge is striking a balance that neither leaves people unprotected nor subjects them to unnecessary intrusion or control. Safeguarding systems must evolve beyond compliance and formality to reflect nuanced human realities. If deprivations of liberty within homes or community settings are not properly authorised, people remain vulnerable; yet excessively procedural approaches risk alienating families and exhausting professional goodwill. Perhaps the path forward lies in proportionate reform, that ensures flexibility, transparency, and humanity, guided by holistic person-centred safeguarding legislation and processes that are further informed by future judicial clarifications, such as the anticipated 2025 Supreme Court deliberations, to recalibrate the delicate equilibrium between autonomy, protection, and proportionality.

    Mary Kadzirange is a Registered Mental Health Nurse and a practising Best Interests Assessor She is the Mental Capacity Act lead within West Yorkshire Integrated Care Board’s safeguarding team, and is also Chair of the West Yorkshire ICB Race Equality Network.

    7. Being careful what you wish for

    By Lucy Series

    Twelve years ago, on a grey October day in 2013, I listened to the first day of the Cheshire West Supreme Court and hearing (P (by his litigation friend the Official Solicitor) v Cheshire West and Chester Council & Anor). The courtroom was full of familiar faces from the world of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The hearing was, as a barrister later commented, like a seminar with the brightest minds on one of the most challenging questions in mental capacity law: when is a person, who is not confined in a traditional ‘institution’, deprived of their liberty? 

    I enjoyed watching Lady Hale interject to correct barristers when they had misunderstood some aspects of mental capacity law and the underlying issues. I enjoyed conversations in the lunch break about what would convince the court that the current situation was untenable, that it was unacceptable that a man who had broken down the door of his care home to try and escape ita woman who had capacity and was asking to live in her own home, and people like MEG and P in Cheshire West, who were being physically restrained and given sedating medications, were not considered deprived of their liberty when their behaviours indicated they were resisting aspects of their care.

    Five months later I sat in my office with my friend and colleague at Cardiff University, Professor Phil Fennell[i], reading the Supreme Court’s judgment. We read Lady Hale’s ‘acid test’ of deprivation of liberty: a person is deprived of their liberty if they are subject to continuous supervision and control, and they are not free to leave, regardless of whether it is ‘normal’ for a person with their disability, or whether it is in their ‘best interests’. ‘A gilded cage is still a cage’. Deprivation of liberty must have the same meaning for a disabled person as a person without a disability, because this is the essence of universal human rights. To say otherwise would be to discriminate and deny safeguards that others would be entitled to in their situation. Phil turned to me and said ‘it’s a case of be careful what you wish for’. 

    Phil has always been wiser than me. This is what I wished for, more or less. I had worked in the kinds of places that P and MEG were being cared for, and some of what I saw was horrifying. I worked with an autistic man with learning disabilities, whose carers took him for walks with a rope around his waist – yet there seemed to be no ‘alarm bell’ that we could ring. The regulator had brought it up in reports, his social worker must have known, and yet it continued. People were confined to their rooms. Sedation, restraint and violence were routine, and went both ways between staff and residents, and between some of the residents themselves. Many residents seemed unhappy, even if they could not clearly articulate this because they did not use words to communicate. Not everywhere was like this, but when I read about P and MEG, this resonated.

    So, what did I wish for when the Supreme Court revisited Cheshire West in Re Attorney General’s Reference? That the justices would have the level of understanding of mental capacity law, of the realities of social care, and the egalitarian human rights values that Lady Hale and other justices brought to Cheshire West. I would say that what I saw of the hearing – the first day, online – did not fill me confidence that this is the case.  I feel quite worried, if I am honest, about how this will end. I was part of a brilliant WhatsApp group organised by the Court of Protection Open Justice Project – we watched the hearing together and have continued to discuss it. We share an anxiety that this ruling will leave people without the meagre safeguards the law currently entitles them to. Safeguards against inappropriate placements, excessively restrictive practices within settings, measures that restrict the rights and freedoms people could and should be entitled to. And anxiety about the way these populations were being constructed in some comments – not as bearers of rights, but as populations without the capacity for rights

    In the best-case scenario, what would I wish for? I stand by what I wrote (summarised here) that if we take seriously that people have a will, a meaningful subjective experience of the world, then this should be able to make a difference in terms of whether they are categorised as deprived of their liberty or not. The very concept of liberty only makes sense for beings with a ‘will’ – we don’t speak of depriving a rock, or a table or a teapot of their liberty. 

    I do not agree with the submissions from the Department of Health and Social Care that their subjective perspective is part of the ‘objective’ limb of deprivation of liberty. Logically, subjective experience must go to the subjective aspect of deprivation of liberty, because it is subjective. Objective is what is going on around the person, subjective is what is going on for them.

    It is the subjective element that transforms confinement into deprivation of liberty. In everyday life people agree to things that could otherwise objectively amount to a deprivation of liberty, from the mundane (getting on a train, when you can’t get off until the next stop) to the experiences where the point is to be locked in (Escape Rooms). But they are not detained: they have consented.

    I think the law should recognise that in some cases people’s subjective experience is of living in the place where they want to live, and being happy with their care arrangements (including any restrictions or supervision to keep them safe). This seems to have been the case for MIG, and for some others caught up under the ‘deprivation of liberty’ label at the moment. I believe we should create a legal framework that can recognise this as a legally valid consent for the purposes of Article 5 ECHR. If we do not, we risk reinforcing the same ableist stereotypes that allow others to say that ‘these people have no will, and therefore no liberty to lose’. 

    My biggest fear, however, is that ‘valid consent’ will be used as a shortcut, to avoid ‘formal’ assessments and independent checks on the person’s situation. One way this might happen is by treating subjective experience as part of the ‘objective’ limb of article 5. Care providers could treat someone nodding off in an armchair under heavy sedation, or someone cowed and institutionalised, as ‘happy’, and there would be no requirement to submit that judgement for external scrutiny. Nobody would check in on that, and the person and their family may not have the resources afforded by Article 5 to challenge this. That would be worse than where we are now. It would also insert new interpretive chaos into the system, we will be back to the days of councils having different rates of DoLS applications by several orders of magnitude. 

    Because of the weighty issues at stake here – the right to liberty – and because these are populations whose will is sometimes unclear or contested, there needs to be robust safeguards around valid consent in connection with article 5. My preference is that the Supreme Court says that these safeguards could only be provided through legislation (primary or secondary), properly developed and consulted on with stakeholders. That where a person lacks capacity there needs to be a robust regulatory framework for consent to be valid. 

    This reflects the requirements of article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which recognises that everyone – no matter what their ‘mental capacity’ – should be supported and enabled to exercise legal capacity (make legally valid decisions). However, Article 12(4) also says that this must be subject to ‘appropriate and effective safeguards to prevent abuse in accordance with international human rights law… [ensuring]  that measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity respect the rights, will and preferences of the person, are free of conflict of interest and undue influence, are proportional and tailored to the person’s circumstances’. 

    My view is that safeguards for valid consent should – at a minimum – require consultation with the person, and those who know the person well, and there should be a layer of independent oversight and regular review. It will require robust guidance on factors and indicators that preclude valid consent being given (e.g. restraint and sedation as part of care planning, guidance on how to interpret ‘challenging behaviours’). This could (I think) easily be built into the LPS processes and a revised Code of Practice. The system – after all – is supposed to be about protecting liberty, not just authorising taking it away.

    Lucy Series is an Associate Professor in the School for Policy Studies at the University of Bristol. She researches and teaches mental capacity, disability rights and adult social care law and policy. She blogs at The Small Places. You can read her book – Deprivation of Liberty in the Shadows of the Institution – free of charge here (hyperlinked) or on Kindle. She is on Bluesky @thesmallplaces.bsky.social. 


    [i] Professor Phil Fennell is now an Emeritus Professor at Cardiff University. Before retirement he was a Professor of Mental Health Law. We worked together on a Nuffield funded research project on welfare cases in the Court of Protection. He is the author of Treatment Without Consent.


    The Mostyn Objection

    By Sir Nicholas Mostyn, 19th November 2025

    The writer and political salonnière Jeanne Marie “Manon” Roland was guillotined in Paris on 8th November 1793. Legend has it that her last words on the scaffold were, “O Liberté, que de crimes on commet en ton nom!”—“Oh Liberty, what crimes are committed in your name!

    Her warning has proved doggedly durable.

    In our own time, the majority’s ruling in Cheshire West [2014] AC 896 has meant that, purportedly in Liberty’s name, tens of thousands of mentally disabled citizens now fall within the law’s definition of state detention.

    I have long objected to the majority’s definition of liberty and its deprivation as statist, unrealistic and patronising. I remain astounded that Lord Sumption, of all people, should have joined the majority in their definition.

    I have expressed my objection in a number of judgments[1] and in a fiery memorandum submitted to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which was then considering the proposals to reform the deprivation of liberty safeguards. That memorandum  is attached in the Appendix to this blog[2]. I’m delighted to give it another outing here in the light of the recent hearing in the Supreme Court on the reference from the Attorney General of Northern Ireland (AGNI) concerning the proposal  to amend the deprivation of liberty safeguards applicable in the Province.

    I have read the printed cases of the parties and listened to the submissions made by their counsel. I have also read the blogs on the Open Justice Court of Protection Project website.

    Naturally, I was delighted that counsel for the AGNI, as well as counsel for the UK Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, considered that my pronouncements in a sequence of cases concerning the true meaning of the decision of the Supreme Court in Cheshire West were correct.

    I read and listened very carefully to the arguments in support of retention of the unyielding, monolithic, absolutist “acid test” propounded in Cheshire West but I remain completely unconvinced. It is worth reflecting on what the phrase “an acid test” actually means.  Back in the day, there was literally a chemical test for gold that used nitric acid (HNO₃).  Nitric acid would dissolve base metals such as silver, brass and copper, but gold did not react. It was an infallible test. So it is now used rhetorically to describe any proposition that is said really to prove the truth of something. An acid test admits of no nuance. It admits of no discretion. It is entirely black-and-white.

    It was as a result of this absolutist interpretation that I found myself listening to a completely anomalous position adopted by the Charities – namely that that the views of mentally disabled persons count for nothing in determining whether they are under state detention or not.

    I do understand that it is only by shoehorning mentally disabled people into and through the acid test that they get some kind of assurance that the state will recognise their existence and consider their best interests.

    And so, as always, it boils down to money. If the care of the mentally disabled was properly funded in this country, the Charities would not be in the crazy position of having to argue that mentally disabled people being looked after at home are in fact in state detention.

    As to the actual legal question, I do agree with my fellow bloggers that it was quite difficult during the course of the hearing to keep one’s attention firmly focused in circumstances where there was no factual foundation to the case before the court and where the discussions seemed to have more in common with a philosophy seminar at All Souls College rather than a hearing in a courtroom.

    However, I was (unsurprisingly) completely persuaded that the absolutist interpretation of the Supreme Court is not consistent with the Strasbourg jurisprudence and, therefore, given the terms of section 64(5), Cheshire West does not strictly bind courts of first instance.

    I am sure that were the matter to be reconsidered in Strasbourg, the court would insist in each case that (a) an intense fact-specific analysis is undertaken and (b) before someone can be declared to be in state detention, they must be confined in the sense that they are not merely physically prevented from leaving the place in question but stopped from going to a real-life destination of choice. It is only by adopting this interpretation of the first component of Storck v Germany (2005) 43 EHRR 96 (Stork 1) that one can avoid the absurd paradox referred to above. Such an interpretation would also give due respect to the intentions of the framers of the Convention who quite plainly intended Article 5 to apply to state detention in the natural and normal sense of that concept.

    So, the patient in Ferreira, R (On the Application Of) v HM Senior Coroner for Inner South London [2017] EWCA Civ 31 plainly was not confined in the normal sense of that expression. The reason the patient could not leave was because she was insensible. The decision was so obviously correct that the Supreme Court declined permission to appeal. Similarly, Katherine in the Rochdale case [2014] EWCOP 45 was obviously not confined in that normal sense. She was scarcely ambulant. It was not going to be long before she was going to need assistance to move at all. To say that because she could just about make it to the front door meant that she was being confined under Stork 1 whereas in a few months’ time she could not do so and therefore would not be confined, is, with respect, completely ridiculous. And even if she could make it out of the front door, it was not for the purposes of going to a real life chosen destination. So, she wasn’t being confined in that sense either.

    I am absolutely confident that Strasbourg would reach the same decision. I therefore hope that these Supremes will “clarify” the current test to conform with the suggestion I have made in the appendix and which I repeat here:

    An incapacitated adult will be deprived of liberty if, and only if:

    1. she is prevented from removing herself permanently in order to live where and with whom she chooses; and
    2. the dominant reason is the continuous supervision and control to which she is subjected, and not her underlying condition.

    Two afterthoughts

    1.      I do think that Celia Kitzinger was a bit hard on the Supremes in her blog post. I agree that it was a frustrating experience listening to the dialogue between counsel and bench neither of whom had any practical experience of administering the law of mental capacity. The fact is, however, that the Supremes have to work incredibly hard. They are given one reading day each week but that is often consumed by applications for permission to appeal; or in writing their own judgments; or in reading and suggesting amendments to  colleagues’ judgments. It is for this reason that (so I am led to believe) one of their number in each case is normally chosen to be the Judge Rapporteur and who is then expected to make the running in submissions, with the others picking up the details as the case proceeds. The quality of the judgments of the Supremes when they emerge is always of  the highest order, and often stands in stark contrast to the quality of judicial interrogation during the hearing.

    2. At the time that I heard Rochdale I was completely baffled by the stance of the local authority which had applied to the court for a declaration that Katherine was deprived of her liberty. The consequence of this declaration would be, and was, to impose an enormous financial burden on Rochdale on top of the huge sums that they paid for the daily care of Katherine. One would have thought that Rochdale would have wanted to have been spared those additional expenses, thereby freeing up money for its numerous hard-pressed obligations. I had assumed that when I turned down the application Rochdale would have been very happy. But no, Rochdale appealed the decision and when I turned down the application a second time it appealed again. It’s almost as if it was determined to spend its money on the elaborate legal panoply that attends state detention rather than on other necessary things. Rochdale’s stance was not atypical. It is incomprehensible.

    Sir Nicholas Mostyn is a retired High Court judge  and was before that a barrister and QC specialising in big divorce settlements. He was diagnosed with Parkinson’s Disease in 2020 and launched the King’s Parkinson’s Charitable Fund with Professor Ray Chaudhuri in June 2024. Sir Nicholas has launched two highly successful podcasts, Movers & Shakers and Law & Disorder, with Baroness Helena Kennedy KC and Lord Charlie Falconer.

    [1] Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council v KW & Ors [2014] EWCOP 45,  The London Borough of Tower Hamlets v TB & Anor  [2014] EWCOP 53,  Bournemouth Borough Council v PS & Anor [2015] EWCOP 39, Re CD [2015] EWCOP 74.

    [2] In the printed case for the Secretary of State, it was stated that I had provided the memorandum following my retirement. That is not so. I provided it while I was a serving High Court judge. I do not think, however, this means that it carries more weight

    APPENDIX

    ************************************

    1. Thank you for giving me the opportunity of making this submission to the Joint Committee.
    2. I will deal substantively only with the third question. My answer to the first two questions is yes, if (and only if) the law as pronounced by the majority in Cheshire West is affirmed as correct.  
    3. The work of the Law Commission in producing the report Mental Capacity and Deprivation of Liberty (Law Com No 372) was prodigious, but the unanswered question, the elephant in the room if you like, is: was Cheshire West correctly decided? The Law Commission did not grapple with this. Maybe it was too controversial. Maybe they were internally divided.
    4. The Law Commission could have recommended that Parliament should reverse the view of the bare majority in Cheshire West (Lady Hale, and Lords Neuberger, Kerr and Sumption) and that the view of the minority (Lords Carnwath, Hodge and Clarke), and of both constitutions of the Court of Appeal in respectively P & Q and Cheshire West (i.e. Wilson, Smith, Rimer, Munby, Lloyd and Pill LJJ), should be reinstated. The high judicial voices in favour of the nuanced, comparative, fact-specific definition of deprivation of liberty in mental capacity cases are numerous and persuasive. It was adventitious that Lord Wilson did not sit in Cheshire West, as he had been on the Court of Appeal panel in P and Q. If that case had not also been appealed, and only Cheshire West had, we can safely assume that we would not be in the bureaucratic, artificial and resource-consumptive situation that we are now.
    5. Under section 64(5) of the 2005 Act it is provided that “references to deprivation of a person’s liberty have the same meaning as in Article 5(1) of the Human Rights Convention.” Yet, no case from Strasbourg has come close to saying that the case of someone of “unsound mind” (as Article 5 puts it) falls within the terms of that article if they are being looked after in their own home. It might be thought that if the narrower, more nuanced test were restored there would be a risk that the Strasbourg court would disagree with it, with the result that a cohort of incapacitated people would fall into a no-mans-land: outside the statutory definition but covered by Article 5 nonetheless. But it is surely vanishingly unlikely that Strasbourg would disagree with the narrower test: it is after all completely consistent with its jurisprudence, which mandates a fact sensitive approach and which looks at a range of factors such as the intensity of the restrictions in question. It is the majority view which is out of step.  It is worth reflecting on Katherine’s circumstances in the Rochdale case (q.v.). In para 6 I stated: “Physically, Katherine is just ambulant with the use of a wheeled Zimmer frame. Mentally, she is trapped in the past. She believes it is 1996 and that she is living at her old home with her three small children (who are now all adult). Her delusions are very powerful and she has a tendency to try to wander off in order to find her small children. Her present home is held under a tenancy from a Housing Association. The arrangement entails the presence of carers 24/7. They attend to her every need in an effort to make her life as normal as possible. If she tries to wander off she will be brought back.”
    6. I respectfully suggest that it is not only an abuse of language to suggest that she is in state detention, but also that it is impossible to imagine the Strasbourg court deciding that she was. 
    7. I confine my remarks to the case of the incapacitated adult (“P”). Space does not permit me to dilate on the complexities concerning the application of Article 5 to children. I do not dispute that in the case of an incapacitated adult  the test of the Strasbourg court in  Storck v Germany (2005) 43 EHRR 96, paras 74, 89, must be applied. Thus Article 5 is engaged if the well-known three components are present viz (a) confinement in a particular restricted place for a not negligible length of time; (b) a lack of valid consent; and (c) the attribution of responsibility to the state.  
    8. The test for component (a) as promulgated by the majority of the Supreme Court is a binary black-and-white one. It is simply this: is the protected person under continuous supervision and control and not free to leave? But such a one-size-fits-all test has never been enunciated by Strasbourg. As Lord Clarke put it: “The ECtHR has not held that there is only one question (or acid test), namely whether the individual concerned is free to leave. Its approach is more nuanced than that.” To my knowledge no other country has adopted the approach mandated by the majority in Cheshire West.
    9. Since that decision I have attempted in a number of cases, within the bounds of the doctrine of stare decisis, to mitigate the more extreme ramifications of the decision. I have suffered a rebuke from the Court of Appeal, but I remain unrepentant. I am convinced that the decision is legally wrong and socially disastrous. It pits the state against families and costs hard-pressed public authorities vast sums, which ought to be spent on the front line.
    10. The cases are: Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council v KW & Ors [2014] EWCOP 45 (18 November 2014);  The London Borough of Tower Hamlets v TB & Anor  [2014] EWCOP 53 (17 December 2014;  Bournemouth Borough Council v PS & Anor [2015] EWCOP 39 (11 June 2015 Re CD [2015] EWCOP 74 (13 November 2015) 
    11. It is to be noted that in the second and fourth cases I felt my hands were tied and that I had no choice but to declare that the protected person was in a situation of state detention. The fourth case was completely unreal. There the protected person strongly wanted the operation to remove potentially lethal ovarian masses yet because she lacked capacity I had to declare that she was deprived of her liberty during the operation. How much money did that case cost the state? 
    12. The problem with this hard-edged approach is that it begins to show serious signs of strain when it is tested by quite ordinary situations. In Cheshire West, in the Court of Appeal, Munby LJ considered a child placed with foster-parents, who had a child of their own. It would be absurd, he said, if the former were caught by Article 5 but not the latter. Yet, Lord Neuberger thought that the latter was so caught. Lord Kerr thought that foster-children would not be caught by Article 5 when they were “very young”, but not when they were older[1]. There are other conundrums, exemplified by the cases I have heard. Is it true that someone with a mental age of a very young child who wanders off is being detained by the state if she is brought back (the Rochdale case)? Or someone who is looked after in his home and who has never shown the slightest wish to leave (the Bournemouth case)? Or someone who is incapacitated but who fervently wants an operation to restore her health (Re CD)? Or someone intubated and sedated in hospital (to which I turn below)?   
    13. It is highly significant that in the case of Ferreira, R (On the Application Of) v HM Senior Coroner for Inner South London [2017] EWCA Civ 31 (26 January 2017) Arden LJ was not prepared to find that the intubated and sedated patient (“P”) was in “state detention” when she died in the ICU at King’s College Hospital. At [98] – [99] she held that the acid test should be interpreted to read as if the conjunctive adverb “therefore” was inserted viz:  Is the protected person under continuous supervision and control and therefore not free to leave? Thus, she reasoned, a causative analysis has to be undertaken. Is the “real cause” that P is not free to leave the continuous supervision and control, or is it the underlying condition, for which the state is not responsible? If the latter, the acid test is not satisfied. But she stated: “It is quite different in the case of living arrangements for a person of unsound mind. If she is prevented from leaving her placement it is because of steps taken to prevent her because of her mental disorder.” I am not sure I understand the distinction. Even so, a pure application of Lady Hale’s black-and-white acid test should surely have led to the opposite conclusion. This suggests that some retreat from the absolutism of Lady Hale’s test has already begun.
    14. I agree with the causative analysis and suggest that it should be applied across the board in all cases of mental incapacity. 
    15. The next issue is about the meaning of “freedom to leave”. I do not agree that this should mean merely the ability to walk off in a certain direction, which is what most people have interpreted Lady Hale to mean.   However, in Re D (A Child) [2017] EWCA Civ 1695 at [22] Sir James Munby P  stated that he considered that Lady Hale was using  it to mean “leaving in the sense of removing himself permanently in order to live where and with whom he chooses” and not merely “leaving for the purpose of some trip or outing.” If this is adopted, then that too will represent a major inroad into the present very wide reach of the test.
    16. My fundamental contention is that it should be put beyond doubt by Parliament that an incapacitated adult will only be deprived of liberty if, and only if: (a) she is prevented from removing herself permanently in order to live where and with whom she chooses; and (b) the dominant reason is the continuous supervision and control to which she is subjected, and not her underlying condition. This would do no more than put Storck (1) on a statutory footing and specify it in accordance with the recent authorities. 
    17. I would strongly reject any suggestion that were the test to be restored to its previous form that this would represent an erosion of the rights of the mentally impaired. I am a very strong advocate for the promotion of the rights of the mentally impaired.  I would argue that to adopt this test would enhance and not diminish those rights. That is because it would implicitly recognise and promote the obligation of the state to secure the human dignity of the disabled by recognising that their situation is significantly different from that of the able-bodied, and to take measures to ameliorate and compensate for those disabilities. The new test does not do this.  See London Borough of Tower Hamlets v TB at [57] and Bournemouth Borough Council v PS at [25]. I would suggest that this approach is consistent with, and gives effect to, the Public Sector Equality Duty as set out in section 149(1) Equality Act 2010.
    18. It is a bitter irony that the huge volume of DoLs cases arising since the Supreme Court decision has meant that the rights of the mentally impaired are being eroded because only a minority who are deprived of liberty under the new definition will ever get an assessment at all (and even fewer within the statutory time limits). I gather that under the new regime there are around 220,000 DoLS referrals each per year and only about 40% are assessed.   If you are compliant, in end-of-life care, and have a stable placement then you have virtually no hope of ever being assessed. Lord Neuberger once said: “sometimes I think that the only piece of legislation which is totally reliable is the law of unintended consequences”[2], and that is the case here, up to the hilt. A ruling designed to advance the rights of the mentally impaired has resulted in swathes of them being unassessed and this abandoned cohort will inevitably include many who on any view fall within Article 5. 
    19. There can be no doubt that were the definition I have proposed to be adopted there would be far fewer DOLs cases. In the Tower Hamlets case at [60] I stated: “At para 1 of my decision in Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council v KW  I referred to the very serious resource implications to local authorities and the state generally if periodical court reviews are required in such cases. Notwithstanding the arrival of the streamlined procedure recently promulgated by the Court of Protection Practice Direction 10AA there will still be tens if not hundreds of thousands of such cases and hundreds of thousands if not millions of documents to be processed. The streamlined procedure itself requires the deployment of much man and womanpower in order to identify, monitor and process the cases. Plainly all this will cost huge sums, sums which I would respectfully suggest are better spent on the front line rather than on lawyers.”
    20. I maintain that view.  I have heard anecdotally that leading counsel for the appellant in the Supreme Court assured the justices that an increase in DOLs cases was not foreseen were the acid test proposed by him to be adopted. I venture that a different decision would have been reached if the justices could have foreseen the eventuation of the explosion in the numbers of DOLs cases, with its huge cost to the public purse.
    21. I apologise for breaching the 1500-word limit. I would be happy to amplify my views should the committee find this of assistance.

           16 February 2018

    [1] The supposedly “simple” acid text has generated a host of highly complex decisions in its application to children.  See, for example, Re D (A Child) (Deprivation of Liberty) [2015] EWHC 922 (Fam), [2016] 1 FLR 142; In re AB (A Child) (Deprivation of Liberty: Consent) [2015] EWHC 3125 (Fam)[2016] 1 WLR 1160[2016] 2 FLR 601Birmingham City Council v D [2016] EWCOP 8[2016] PTSR 1129 (on appeal Re D (A Child) [2017] EWCA Civ1695); Re D (deprivation of liberty declaration) [2016] EWFC B31A Local Authority v D, E and C [2016] EWHC 3473 (Fam)Re T (A Child: Care Order: Beyond Parental Control: Deprivation of Liberty: Authority to Administer Medication) [2018] EWFC B1; and Re A-F (Children) [2018] EWHC 138 (Fam)

    [2] http://www.kingston.ac.uk/news/article/1599/22-dec-2015-uk-supreme-court-president-lord-neuberger-talks-luck-land-law-and-prince-charles-letters-at/


    Feeding under sedation for anorexia nervosa: The outcome for LV [2025] EWCOP 9

    By Sydney White, 18th November 2025

    The protected party at the centre of this case, LV, is a 20-year-old woman diagnosed with anorexia nervosa, autism spectrum disorder, severe depression, and anxiety.  At the time of the first Court of Protection hearing, in early 2025, she was an inpatient on a ward in a specialist eating disorder unit (SEDU) of a university teaching hospital where she’d been for more than 2 years (and for a year before that on different hospital wards). She was detained under section 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983.

    In February 2025, LV was very unwell. The Hospital Trust and the NHS Mental Health Trust responsible for her care made an urgent application to the Court of Protection.  The case (COP 20011799) was heard in the Royal Courts of Justice by Mrs Justice Morgan. The published judgment reports:

    She is presently being fed twice a day using a Naso Gastric Tube. She has to be restrained for this. The process requires seven staff members. Since December of last year, this process has been largely ineffective in providing her with nutrition since she has developed the ability, at will, to regurgitate feed whilst it is being delivered and to purge by vomiting most, nearly all, of the remainder after delivery. In that time she has lost a further 15% of her body weight.  Her body mass index is slightly over 11. The likelihood is that, absent effective intervention, she will die soon. It is difficult to predict when that may be, but the evidence before me is that a timescale of days or weeks is what is contemplated rather than one of months.” (St George’s University Hospitals Foundation Trust & Anor v LV [2025] EWCOP 9 (T3)).

    The Trusts were applying for (i) a declaration that LV lacks capacity to conduct proceedings and to make decisions about her care and treatment and (ii) a declaration that it is lawful and in LV’s best interests to be admitted to an Intensive Care Unit for a period of feeding under sedation.  This was seen as a “last resort” option – the consensus view being that if she stayed where she was, death would be likely in days or weeks, and that feeding under restraint was not in her best interests either as it would be very high risk because she pulls out tubes and lines.

    Here’s how the option of feeding under sedation was described in the written evidence before the court:

    Go to General Hospital and be admitted to ITU for feeding while intubated under general anaesthesia: She will be under general anaesthesia and fed while asleep. The list of medical risks are as listed below, derived from the best interests meeting from the ITU intensivists, gastroenterologist, and medical nutritionists at St George’s Hospital. The process would involve being put to sleep, then doctors inserting a breathing tube and then using a ventilator machine to take over breathing. She would then be kept asleep using medication and fed while asleep. The first concern is that while she is asleep, she will continue to lose muscle mass while sedated – this may be up to 10% a week. Explained this carries risk of critical illness myopathy, which would leave her profoundly weak, potentially unable to move her limbs, and this could be irreversible. Another risk was requiring a tracheostomy (a breathing tube in the neck), and that there is a chance she would require this in the longer term – this would leave her requiring a permanent placement in a facility able to accommodate this, which may be a neurodisability hospital. Another risk was that she would be at very high risk of infection, both a chest infection related to being on a ventilator, or from a line. This would carry risk of multi-organ failure and death. In the first week, there would be risk from being put to sleep, and also from her heart reacting to us starting to feed her. (§8 of the judgment).

    The judge said it was “sobering against the backdrop of that level of risk, to reflect on the fact that the unanimous view of all of those treating and caring for LV is that it should be taken and is in her best interests to do so”.  And that was the decision she made.

      “I have thought long and hard about all of those risks and detriments as I weigh the balance. The point about the balance however is to look at what it is that falls on the other side. Here when I look at the other side, at what lies in the balance against all that is risky; all that which in other circumstances would be an intolerable affront to her autonomy, what I contemplate is her imminent death. At the moment twice a day, LV is subject to what, in other times and contexts, was called ‘force-feeding’. The means by which it is achieved, for all the empathetic approach and skill of the staff, is not so very far removed from the images which that phrase conjures up. Yet for all the pain distress and indignity of it (during all of which she is emotionally and physically present) it is achieving nothing. LV is starving to death.”(§57, judgment)

    And so, the judge concluded: “I am satisfied that it is, in all the circumstances of this most unusual and troubling case, in LV’s best interests to undergo the proposed course of treatment” (§58).

    Hearings observed

    I observed two subsequent hearings in this case, both remotely and both before Morgan J: the first on 7th April 2025 and the second on 18th June 2025. There have been no further published judgments, so this report is an “update” on what happened with LV after the (only) published judgment in this case,  and after the refeeding in the ICU that it authorised.  As far as I know, there have been no further hearings since June 2025.

    April hearing

    LV had been woken up after nearly 7 weeks in the ICU.  She had gained weight more quickly than expected and now had a BMI of 13.5.

    The views of LV herself had not been canvassed by the Official Solicitor, or by the court, either at the February hearing, or at this one.  The Official Solicitor, represented by Fiona Paterson KC had not been able to speak with LV earlier in the year before she went into the ICU due to how ill she was.  She said now: “In terms of P being involved in her own case, I have invited her to speak with me over a video link. We’ve been guided by her parents because though happily LV came off the ventilator in the second week of March, she’s been receiving varying levels of sedation, and we don’t want to impose upon her until she feels ready, but have made it clear that we are happy to go on a link and wave at her and say no more,  if only to impress upon her that she has her own representation.”[i] 

    The judge, who expressed repeated concerns (in the published judgment as well as at this hearing) that LV should not be treated as a child, and that her (albeit non-capacitous) views about treatment should be properly elicited, said in reply: “There is no reference to LV’s views being expressed in any reports from various clinicians, so I am much reassured by what you’ve told me”.  She also wanted “disclosure of documents and reports about the involvement of this adult patient herself” in treatment decisions going forward.  As Fiona Paterson said, however, “to keep calm and tolerate being fed, she’s needed varying levels of sedation and not been well enough to have a chat with someone new. We don’t want to get off on a bad start”.

    It was agreed by the Official Solicitor and the applicant NHS Trusts (represented by Vikram Sachdeva KC) that LV should be moved to a Specialist Eating Disorder Unit (SEDU). LV, herself, had expressed a wish to move there. But this was complicated by several factors. First, only one SEDU was put forward as potentially being able to accept LV as a patient. Second, LV required two adjacent rooms, not one, to accommodate her needs. Third, LV’s acceptance to the SEDU was conditional upon improvements in her disordered eating and funding by an NHS Trust provider collaborative. Nevertheless, it was anticipated that LV would be in the SEDU by the end of May.

    June hearing

    At the time of the hearing on 18th June 2025, LV was still on the hospital ward, and her health was deteriorating both physically and mentally. She was ‘purging’ more frequently and her BMI was dropping.  On discharge from ICU in early April, her BMI had been 13.5. By 1st May 2025 it had dropped to 12.2 (representing a loss of 3.4kg since her discharge from ICU).  By 16th June, the Trusts (now represented by Victoria Butler-Cole KC) reported that LV’s BMI was 11.7 – very close to where it had been a few months earlier before admission to the ICU. 

    Things were not going well. The SEDU had not yet committed to giving LV a bed, and the provider collaborative had not yet agreed to fund whatever place the SEDU may offer. Morgan J labelled this, in no uncertain terms, ‘a dismal state of affairs’.

    The new counsel for the applicant NHS Trusts, questioned whether the Court of Protection had any further jurisdiction in regard to LV’s care. Morgan J disagreed, emphasising the ‘unattractive’ consequences of ‘drift and delay’ and her unwillingness to “leave this young adult in circumstances where a decision could be made without the best information that can be obtained’“. The judge issued an order directing that the NHS Trust provider collaborative file a statement by 2nd July identifying:

    1. Whether the SEDU had confirmed it would offer LV a place
    2. What the conditions of the offer were, in terms of LV’s physical health and behaviour
    3. The proposed dates of admission, or a fixed date by which that date would be known
    4. Whether the provider collaborative had agreed to fund LV’s placement at the SEDU
    5. If the provider collaborative has not agreed to commission the placement, an explanation for why it had reached that decision
    6. If the SEDU had not made an offer, what the provider collaborative proposed to commission for LV instead.

    This is clearly an attempt to bring some certainty and focus to the “chicken and egg” situation, as Morgan J called it, in which LV had found herself: the offer from a SEDU being conditional upon a change in LV’s behaviour, but a change in LV’s behaviour being very difficult to achieve without access to a SEDU.  It is Morgan J’s attempt to exert enough pressure on the various parties involved in LV’s care so that LV might leave the hospital ward, where her health was likely to continue deteriorating. Indeed, it effectively encapsulates Morgan J’s repeatedly-expressed dismay and disappointment at “the ever-moving and uncertain responses to the core question that LV is asking, which is: when can I go there”‘”.

    The order states that if a place at the SEDU were to be confirmed and a fixed date for LV’s transfer identified, then in that case the hearing—scheduled for 11th July 2025 —would be vacated.

    No hearing was publicly listed for this case for 11th July 2025. I hope that LV did, at last, find certainty and solace in a place at the SEDU.

    Sydney White recently completed her MPhil (Master of Philosophy) in Medical Law at the University of Oxford, having also graduated from Oxford’s undergraduate law program. Her thesis focussed on the Court of Protection’s approach to best interests assessments for patients with anorexia nervosa under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Her fascination with Medical Law brought her to the Open Justice Court of Protection Project.  She has previously published these blog posts: An in-person hearing on anorexia (Re CC): Observer’s rollercoaster and the role of “hope”; Respecting autonomy in treating Anorexia Nervosa, and Cross-jurisdictional challenges and Schedule 3 in a case of anorexia: Health Service Executive of Ireland v SM [2024] EWCOP 60. She can be found on LinkedIn at www.linkedin.com/in/sydney-e-white, on Twitter/X @sydwhiteCOP and on Bluesky@sydneywhite


    [i] From notes made contemporaneously during the hearing, which (since we’re not allowed to audio-record hearings) are unlikely to be 100% verbatim, but are as accurate as I could make them, with the help Celia Kitzinger who shared her notes with me.

    Hoarding and best interests challenges for the Court of Protection

    By Claire Martin, 16th November 2025

    The protected party at the centre of this case (P) is a man who has significant hoarding difficulties. The Local Authority wants him to leave his home – either by agreement or by force – to enable them to clear the property and assess the amount of work that is required to make the place habitable. I think the plan is then for P to go back to live there, as he owns the house himself (it’s a  home that he inherited).

    I observed the 12-noon hearing below, in person, at First Avenue House in London (COP 14270384), before Tribunal Judge Kaufman.

    Background

    P is a man with diagnoses of autism and hoarding disorder. He has a brother who supports him, including with managing his finances, but things are very difficult as his brother is said to have health difficulties of his own. Finances are not part of this application – however, more on this later.

    The issue for P is that the Local Authority (Brent) has deemed his property in need of urgent clearance (the specific risks said to be posed by hoarding at the property were not described at the hearing). Previous attempts (in September 2025) at clearance with an agency were of limited success (according to the clearance agency) because P remained at the property and ‘progress was too slow to be meaningful. He resisted the removal of certain items and progress was extremely limited.’ (PS from MH Trust).

    P has a new CMHN (Community Mental Health Nurse) with whom he is engaging (he didn’t form a good relationship with his previous CMHN).  He also meets with his GP, and he does have a good relationship with the person from the clearance agency (I will call him Doug). The CMHN, GP and Doug are working together with P to try to find a way to help him to allow his house to be cleared, with as little distress as possible. An ‘autism informed communication plan’ is being drawn up. It sounds like it’s all quite difficult and P both wants things to change in theory and is distressed at the prospect of it and resistant to it in reality.

    A referral to specialist tertiary clinic has been made by the Mental Health Trust, for assessment and possible treatment of P’s hoarding – but the ICB has refused funding for this, and the Mental Health Trust is appealing this decision.

    An expert psychologist, Professor Paul Salkovskis, has been approached to see if he’s available to assess P and make a report to the court (I am not entirely sure what he’s being asked to report on).

    The hearing we observed was to decide whether (and the extent to which) to authorise the LA to clear P’s property without him being there, and (if authorised) where P should go in the interim.

    The Hearing

    P wasn’t at the hearing, although he was aware that it was happening, and his counsel (Asma Nizami via the Official Solicitor) said that P “did get in contact with [his solicitor] yesterday, making it clear he had been intending to send an email with points he wishes to make”, but that “he’s not had the time or the mental clarity to put it together, but he wants to put it together and wants it to be conveyed verbatim to the court. He’s not in a position at the moment [to do that] and he would have wanted to come to court today to speak to us, but 10am would be impossible for him at the time”.

    Other parties in this case are the Local Authority (represented by India Flanagan) and P’s Mental Health Trust (Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust, represented by Emily Campbell).

    The Local Authority wanted the judge to authorise a two-stage clearance plan: Stage 1 is that P is told that the court has ordered him to vacate the property, and he (hopefully) agrees to go elsewhere whilst his property is cleared. Failing that agreement being reached, Stage 2 is that P will be removed forcibly, using restraint if necessary (by a company called Secure 24).

    The Mental Health Trust and the LA  were asking the judge to authorise both steps at the hearing. The Official Solicitor, acting for P, expressed disquiet about the lack of a detailed plan from the LA, should Stage 2 be required:

    Counsel for P: We would invite the court to take a staged, a cautious approach. [P] is likely to be very distressed with the prospect of removal – there is evidence already that he was distressed at the end of September when [Doug] attempted to remove things. To put it concisely: Stage 2 is not fully thought out. If Stage 2 is to be considered by the court, a proper restraint plan is needed.

    It’s not clear what staged, incremental approach the court is being asked to approve. At the moment, the clearance plan refers to ‘prone restraint’ being authorised. There is the potential that when [P] would be lying down face down, it would be extremely restrictive [Judge: …. and dangerous]. Exactly, and there is guidance from the Department of Health which rules it out in most cases.

    In brief the terms the OS is not in a position today to approve the restraint plan, or prone restraint. It also refers to mechanical restraint, which includes handcuffs. [P has] no history of violence, security is not an issue, he’s not at risk of harm to anyone else.

    Taking all these points into account, we would say the position [that is] in [P’s] best interests is solely to authorise Stage 1 at this stage, and it to be made clear to [P] that he is being asked by the court to vacate his property so that clearance can take place because the court has determined it’s needed, and it’s hoped that because [P] is a law abiding person who respects the authority of the court, that he will act in line with that. [counsel’s emphasis]

    Counsel for P also expressed some reservations about the proposed interim place for P to live:

    Counsel for P: The Local Authority [LA] is referring to a placement called [XX] as a ‘BnB’. But we have received an email from the LA today that summarises that it is NOT a BnB. It’s not open to the public and does NOT operate as a BnB, it’s not online, it’s just a semi-detached property, it does not operate as a public facing venture.

    Judge: What is it?

    Official Solicitor: It’s an emergency housing provider –  there are 3 flats, A B C. One is privately rented out, the other two it seems are used by different clients for emergency housing. So …. hospitals and LAs referring clients with nowhere else to go. So, it’s misleading to refer to it as a BnB. […] What we would ask court to do is to step back and review whether this is the best place for [P].

    Counsel for the OS went on to say that P had previously (2017-2021) stayed in a hotel, and that same hotel has availability, but the LA says that it doesn’t fund ‘private hotels’. However, she observed, “Whilst the LA says it doesn’t fund private hotels, there’s a contradiction because it’s willing to fund the so-called BnB.”

    The judge adjourned the hearing for lunch whilst the LA sought pictures of the proposed ‘BnB’ accommodation. Counsel for the OS specifically asked to see the floor plan, and photos covering the communal area and bedroom he would occupy”.

    Given the earlier report that P wanted to express his views to the court but had not had the ‘time or mental clarity’ to send an intended email to the court, I did wonder why the OS hadn’t sent a legal representative to meet with P and provide a report on his wishes and feelings, especially since the case was long-running. As a result, the court was grappling with how to allow for some flexibility in where P goes to stay, should he be willing to leave his home, but not want to go the ‘BnB’. Options seemed limited, but the possibility of him paying himself for the previous hotel he stayed in, or (less plausibly) stay with his brother, were mooted:

    Counsel for P: The way you’d phrase it is that it’s in his best interests to vacate and reside elsewhere either at [XX] or another suitable placement chosen by him and agreed by the LA. For example, he may say he wants to go to stay with his brother. That’s unlikely but could be an option he’d want to go with. We wouldn’t want for him to be said to breach the order.

    Judge: I think that would have to come back to court, on the papers. I would not want him to be forced to go somewhere he didn’t want to go, if he felt somewhere else was more palatable.

    It was clear from early on in the hearing that the judge was ‘attracted’ (her word) to authorising Stage 1 only, it being the ‘less restrictive alternative’. That was the order that the judge made.

    Finances

    A side-issue cropped up during the hearing – how P’s finances are to be managed. Although this is not part of this application (which is a Health and Welfare application), it became clear that P’s finances are not being managed properly for him. His brother tries to help. He has a pension that he doesn’t seem to be accessing and, worryingly, the LA had made an application to court for a deputyship order back in November 2024. It turned out that the judge (who has overseen this case throughout) hadn’t received the application.

    The judge said “I am surprised this has been going on for a year, maybe it’s got lost in the system. They need to be sent so I can look at them. … If you can send me them again I can have a look now.”

    Counsel for P said that the previous deputyship application was ‘deficient’ and was ‘paused’.

    P himself does not agree that he lacks capacity to manage his finances. I don’t know whether a capacity assessment for finance management has been done.

    When the judge received the application (during the hearing) she made an interim deputyship order for a panel deputy to be appointed. She said that, although the previous documents were ‘incomplete’, P and those with an interest in the potential appointment (P’s brother, his Social Worker and the Official Solicitor) had been ‘made aware of the application and there are no objections that have been brought to my attention to oppose the appointment of a panel deputy’. The judge directed that the panel deputy should make enquiries about P’s finances to ‘regularise’ the situation, and that it might be the case that P’s brother takes over the role in future.

    Next Steps

    P wants to have his voice heard by the court – this was emphasised by his counsel throughout the hearing.

    When making the interim deputyship order for finances, the judge said “I also note that he did not accept that he lacked capacity. Given he hasn’t attended this or previous hearings I am going to make an INTERIM deputyship order and he can attend at the next substantive directions hearing. I am more than happy to hear from him his position on deputyship.” [judge’s emphasis]

    I was quite surprised, then, when counsel and the judge were setting a date for the next substantive hearing (which will deal with the surveyor’s report on the state of P’s property and the works required, as well as updates regarding P’s finances) P’s own limitations and needs were given little consideration.

    Judge: 25th November at 10am 2hours

    Counsel for P: Is there any way it could be afternoon to encourage P?

    Judge: 11 o’clock ….

    Counsel for P: Unfortunately, 11 is same as 10, the earliest he could attend is 2pm. We will encourage him, but the reality is that …..

    Judge: 11 o’clock on the 25th November.

    I know from attending Court of Protection hearings regularly that judges’ diaries are very stretched and there seems to be little wiggle-room. However,  ‘P’ is meant to be the centre of a case, and the court wants to hear from P, so making reasonable adjustments for P’s identified needs to facilitate attendance would seem fair and equitable.

    I am not sure why P would find it hard to attend court in the morning, and his counsel had earlier alluded to him struggling to engage with the court, despite wishing and intending to do so. For whatever reason, it sounded like an afternoon hearing was likely to accommodate his needs. That wasn’t what was offered, however, and we have seen that the case has been listed at an earlier date, and still for a morning hearing, on Monday 17th November 11am, via remote link. If you’d like the link to observe email: courtofprotectionhearings@justice.gov.uk with the case number COP 14270384.

    The case might have been back in court sooner, depending upon what happens when P is asked to comply with the court’s order to move out whilst his house is cleared. I didn’t spot the case number coming up again in the listings. I hope, whatever happened, that P can be supported through what is likely to be a very difficult period of time for him.

    Transparency Matters

    First Avenue House in London – the home of the Court of Protection – is geared up for public observers. Staff are unfailingly helpful in my experience, they have printed Transparency Orders ready to hand to you when you tell them which hearing you are there to observe, and they seem on top of changes to listed hearings.

    This hearing started a bit late (around 12.30).

    In the waiting area, Asma Nizami (counsel for OS) came to speak to us (I was observing with Amanda Hill my colleague in OJCOP) to explain the  standard OS position on disclosure of Position statements (following the guidance from Poole J in Re AB (Disclosure of Position Statements) [2025] EWCOP 25 (T3) ), and I was very grateful to Asma Nizami for raising it in court.

    Official Solicitor: Another issue – a matter that arose outside of court. The two observers from the Transparency Project have requested PSs. I don’t have instructions from the OS …. I am aware from a recent hearing, the OS position has changed as result of the Poole judgment. The OS has not been agreeing to disclose PS without an order from the court. The reason for that is because we don’t have evidence that [P] would agree that his PS can be disclosed to an observer. That leaves us – you can direct  if observers ask court to direct this.

    Judge: I have got the draft order I don’t know if there are significant changes to the draft or amended draft in process?

    Oddly, the judge didn’t address the issue raised by the OS at this point, and counsel raised it again (thank you!) at the end of the hearing: “Before you rise – can I ask for clarity on the Position Statements?” (Official Solicitor)

    The judge asked us to confirm we had received the Transparency Order (we had been given this as a paper copy by the court staff at First Avenue House when we arrived). She then ordered disclosure of PSs to us as observers. And that was that.

    I received the Position Statement for NHS Trust Central and North West London NHS Trust) the day after the hearing and the PSs for the two other parties two days later.

    Thank you to Asma Nizami for raising the request for the judge to direct that Position Statements should be provided to observers, and to all counsel for providing Position Statements following the hearing. It makes an enormous difference to our understanding of the case.

    Being able to read the PS for the Mental Health Trust has been very helpful. This case has been ongoing since the 20th June 2024 and the PS provides crucial background information that I would otherwise not know. It helps me fully to understand the judicial process, making it accessible to me as a member of the public.

    Claire Martin is a Consultant Clinical Psychologist, Cumbria, Northumberland, Tyne and Wear NHS Foundation Trust, Older People’s Clinical Psychology Department, Gateshead. She is a member of the core team of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project and has published dozens of blog posts for the Project about hearings she’s observed (e.g. here and here). She is on X as @DocCMartin, on LinkedIn and on BlueSky as @doccmartin.bsky.social