“What I need to decide is whether it’s her call or not”: Capacity in the context of anorexia

By Ruby Reed-Berendt, 15 May 2023

Editorial note: This blog post has been temporarily removed. The matter will be back in court on Thursday 18 May 2023 at 10.30am and is open to the public. See our home page for how to observe the hearing.

You can read about this case in detail in the published judgment. Please click here:

North East London NHS Foundation Trust v Beatrice (Rev1) [2023] EWCOP 17 (09 May 2023)

“A lively personality” in a complex medical case: Jordan Tooke and haemodialysis (with postscript)

By Daniel Clark, 13 May 2023 (and Postscript about the Inquest, 28th March 2025)

This case (COP 14013508) concerned serious medical treatment: namely, whether it was the protected party’s best interests to have a kidney transplant. Originally, as is usual in the COP, this person’s name was banned from publication. That was later lifted: his name was Jordan Tooke.

The hearing was replete with complex medical evidence provided by a range of specialists, and the medical evidence has been summarised and discussed in an earlier blog post: The most complex of best interests: Organ donation, learning disability, and the options on the table.

It would be easy for the protected party at the centre of this case to ‘go missing’ amongst a sea of expert opinion. However, I was struck how diligently the judge (Hayden J) worked to ensure this did not happen. Indeed, this hearing was the first time I’ve seen a protected party ‘come alive’ in a hearing despite their absence in court. 

The judge’s commitment to discovering who Jordan is was evident during an exchange with one of the Consultants. Towards the end of his evidence, the judge asked the Consultant for his view of Jordan: his personality, who he gets on with, and how he “enjoys life”. The Consultant’s response was that Jordan enjoys life “in its current form… It will be different if he is coming to hospital for haemodialysis.” This is because Jordan “hates” the hospital environment, and going to hospital regularly (as is required of somebody receiving haemodialysis) “would be very distressing”. This was not, however, what the judge wanted to know, replying that “I’m trying to bring you away from the medical and look at the patient… the man who enjoys life would want to have the best shot at maintaining it”. 

The expert evidence

To me, this speaks to an inherent tension between the medical model and a more holistic social model. This is not to say that this doctor did not want what was in Jordan’s best interests; rather that he saw the situation through the lens of Jordan’s relationship with medical treatment. As a result, Jordan the person was just out of view. The judge, on the other hand, was attempting to transcend the strictly medical, and seek an understanding of how Jordan’s personality could instruct us what his views might be if he were able to express them. 

Jordan’s parents

Both parents had joined the hearing via video link, and throughout the hearing the judge ‘checked in’ with them to ensure that they were able to hear and follow everything. They had one camera and it was the mother who took the lead role, but the judge ensured that both were ‘affirmed’ (i.e. made the statement that they would tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth), so that “if he [Dad] wants to chip in he can”.

The judge started by asking for “a pen portrait” of Jordan. His mother explained that “he’s quite a bubbly young man. He likes to interact and laugh…Not one single carer has said other than that he’s a wonderful young man. He seems to have a light, a personality – even though he can’t talk it just seems to shine through”. He enjoys spending spend time at a day centre and, when he’s home, he relaxes “like most of us”. 

Jordan also likes people watching, both at home and whilst out-and-about, and enjoys looking at street scenes on his iPad. He also enjoys watching videos of Boris Johnson and Piers Morgan, which the judge jokingly referred to in his judgment. 

The judge was particularly keen to understand in what ways Jordan can be affectionate, with his mum explaining that “some people he just really takes to and really loves”. He’s often affectionate to his mum but not so much with his dad, who explained that Jordan’s affection disappeared when he became a teenager (prompting the judge to joke that it sounded like perfectly normal teenager behaviour). However, Jordan does hug his dad when is unwell or in hospital, and his dad feels this shows that he is clearly a safe space for him in those times. 

Jordan’s mum explained that Jordan tolerated a RIG (insertion of a feeding tube) following desensitisation work with a specialist team, and continues to deal well with the site being cleaned. As she put it, “it’s beyond all my expectations of what he would’ve coped with”. Ultimately, this suggested that further work could be done to try and help Jordan tolerate the process of haemodialysis, and his mother would do research to see what could help keep the tube safely in place (as she had done following the RIG). 

Two things were apparent during the course of Jordan’s parents giving evidence. The first was that the judge was clearly eager to ensure that they both felt comfortable and relaxed in what can be an intimidating environment. He made jokes with them, was obviously interested in hearing about their son, and made frequent references to videos of Jordan he had been sent. The whole exchange was an exemplary demonstration of making somebody who was absent feel very present.

The second thing was that Jordan enjoys life. He’s supported by loving parents who help him to live as well as possible, and want to keep that up for as long as possible. His mum said that “if it doesn’t work it doesn’t work. But we have to try our best”. 


In his oral judgment, the judge placed Jordan front-and-centre. As the judge put it, ‘descriptions of Jordan are not simply a backdrop. They are the way in for the professionals, the Official Solicitor,  and the Court to understand something of what Jordan himself would want’.

The judgment

The judge stated that Jordan ‘is able to communicate in a variety of ways, through his behaviour, through his expressions, through his demonstration of love, approbation and indeed disapprobation’. All of this makes it very clear that Jordan ‘is a young man who wants to live. He has created, with the support of his loving and devoted parents, a life that is full and fun‘.

The judge treated Jordan’s personality extremely seriously. To state what Jordan is like was not simply a tick-box exercise but a fundamental step to understanding what is in his best interests. Ultimately, the judge made me feel as though Jordan was present (in spirit) in the courtroom.

At the end of his judgment, in which he ruled that it was in Jordan’s best interests to continue with the desensitisation work to see if he will become able to tolerate haemodialysis, the judge referred to Jordan as “a lively personality” who’s “very fortunate to have parents who are as loving and committed to him as you are”. For an observer, those two things were very clear to see. 

Note: Later, Jordan’s condition deteriorated and in a subsequent judgment, the judge authorised haemodialysis. The judgement is published here: Norfolk and Norwich University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust & Ors v Jordan Tooke & Ors [2023] EWCOP 45

Postscript (28 March 2025)

Jordan Tooke sadly died on 31st August, 2024, aged 30. His inquest was heard at County Hall in Norfolk on Tuesday 18th March 2025. Bonnie Venter, who had observed the earlier Court of Protection proceedings (and blogged about them here: The most complex of best interests: Organ donation, learning disability, and the options on the table), was able to observe the inquest remotely. The link was sent the day before the inquest, and within two hours of her initial request. 

The court heard that, following the Court of Protection proceedings, Jordan was coping well on dialysis. He needed sedation and ventilation only for the first three months, and after that seemed to cope well with the procedure. At the time of his death, he was rather high on the transplant list too. 

His death occurred from unexplainable events. He went for a dialysis session in the morning, and then his mum saw blood on his back – this was indicative that the dialysis had disconnected. It appears as though a line from a dialysis machine became detached, causing an air embolism that triggered a fatal brain injury.

 There is no way to say how the line came to be detached but there is no way that Jordan could  have done  it – he was asleep and, unlike William Verden (another person with learning disabilities whose dialysis was also approved by an order made in the Court of Protection) had no history of ever pulling at his lines. The evidence before the court seemed to suggest that the detachment of dialysis lines does not happen often, and a Nephrologist who gave evidence said he has never seen a line come undone. The nurses who gave evidence also explained how the lines are connected, and said it was unexplainable.

At the start of the hearing, a letter from Jordan’s mum, Camilla Tooke, was read to the court. She expressed her belief that Jordan had experienced discrimination at the hospital because of his disability. She also questioned whether the doctors had done everything they could to prevent his death. The BBC reported on this aspect of the inquest: Mencap urges NHS to improve disabled patient care.

The coroner returned a verdict of accidental but natural death. His causes of death are multiple (hypoxic brain injury, air embolism, complications of Haemodialysis, and comorbidities from his underlying syndrome). It’s not expected that there will  be a Prevention of Future Deaths report issued.

Daniel Clark is a member of the core team of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project. He is a PhD student in the Department of Politics & International Relations at the University of Sheffield. His research considers Iris Marion Young’s claim that older people are an oppressed social group. It is funded by WRoCAH. He is on LinkedIn, X @DanielClark132   and Bluesky @clarkdaniel.bsky.social.

The most complex of best interests: Organ donation, learning disability, and the options on the table

Ruby Reed-Berendt and Bonnie Venter, 12 May 2023

To our knowledge, the Court of Protection has only once before grappled with the issue of capacity and organ donation in the context of learning disability: when it considered the case of William Verden last year. You can read the judgment in that earlier judgment here: Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust v Verden & Anor [2022] EWCOP 4. The Open Justice Court of Protection Project has published a selection of commentaries from observers who watched the William Verden hearings (e.g. here, here and here). 

Following in the footsteps of the William Verden case, the individual at the centre of this case, who we will call Isaac (not his real name), is 28 years old and has a diagnosis of learning disability and “Autistic Spectrum Disorder”. He has end stage kidney failure and the key issues before the court concerned what treatment would be in his best interests.  The usual options would be to provide renal replacement therapy via dialysis (where the role of the kidneys in cleaning blood is taken on externally) or transplant. 

Isaac was receiving treatment at his local trust (Trust W), but the potential transplant would take place at a specialist team at another nearby hospital (Hospital X), which was part of Trust Y. 

This was the third hearing in the case (COP 140113508). Bonnie observed the first two and we both observed the final hearing which was attended by all the barristers in person before Mr Justice Hayden on 21 April 2023, with the video-link for Isaac’s mother and observers.

No party was disputing that Isaac lacks capacity to make decisions about his medical treatment, so the evidence focused on what course of action would be in his best interests. 

In this blog, we focus on the medical evidence before the court and how the various options were explored through the examination process. You can also read Daniel Clark’s blog on the parent’s evidence here. 

Beginning the hearing

At the start of the hearing, we could see a large number of people in the physical courtroom, and were grateful that Ms Katie Gollop KC, counsel for the two NHS Trusts, introduced each in turn. In terms of counsel, also present were Mr Scott Matthewson, counsel for the Integrated Care Board, Ms Nicola Kohn, instructed by Isaac’s mother, and Mr Parishil Patel KC, instructed by the Official Solicitor, who was appointed to act as Isaac’s litigation friend. Each was accompanied by their instructing solicitor. Ms Gollop also introduced four healthcare professionals who were available to give evidence to the Court. These consisted of the consultants who either were involved in Isaac’s care, or would be involved if a transplant went ahead. Two independent experts were also involved in the case, Dr Antonia Cronin, consultant nephrologist, and Dr Steven Carnaby, a Consultant Clinical Psychologist specialising in intellectual disabilities. Isaac’s parents were in attendance virtually via Cloud Video Platform (which we also used to observe the hearing).

Ms Gollop began by explaining that prior to the hearing there had been a “productive meeting” with all parties including Isaac’s parents, and that the clinicians had answered their questions and furthered all parties’ understandings. She confirmed that the details of the issues were as set out in her position statement: however Hayden J requested that she provide an outline for the benefit of the observers, which was greatly appreciated. 

Ms Gollop first confirmed Isaac’s age and diagnoses, including Williams Syndrome, that he is largely non-verbal and sensory-seeking. She explained that discussions had been taking place over the past two years as to what could be offered to treat Isaac’s kidney failure. The usual treatment would be dialysis, provided either peritoneally (via insertion of a catheter tube into the stomach), or through haemodialysis (HD), which requires attendance at hospital three times a week for a 3-4 hour session on a machine. Ms Gollop explained that peritoneal dialysis was not an option in this case, because Isaac already had a tube inserted into his stomach to support his gut (known as a Radiologically Inserted Gastrostomy or RIG), and to introduce a second would create a high risk of infection; this was agreed by all parties. The discussion was focused on HD or a transplant – or palliative care. 

During the first hearing in November, all parties agreed that Isaac would be unable to tolerate HD. As Ms Gollop summarised, “he does not like going to hospital, at the time it was hard to get him to go, he doesn’t like being messed about with, he doesn’t like unpredictable noises, it has taken an enormous amount of work to get him to the state where he would accept a blood test”.[1] Concerning transplantation, the options on this front had been narrowed to organs from a dead donor (known as cadaveric donation). Donation via a family member had already been ruled out, and Ms Gollop reported that Isaac’s blood type made him less matchable for altruistic donation (i.e. receiving an organ a living donor who was not known to him). When it came to a transplant, she explained “the difficulty is not the actual operation itself, it is incredibly safe. The difficulties and risks are everything that happens around that. The work up before and post-operative period, and the post-post operative period.”  

Since the previous hearings, there had been a change. With input from the Learning Disability team, “desensitisation work” had been carried out with Isaac to get him into a position to cope with going to hospital and medical interventions. This had successfully allowed him to undergo the insertion of his RIG, and meant reconsideration of whether Isaac could cope with a transplant operation. A further report had been produced by Dr Cronin, the day before the hearing, however her view (which was shared by the clinicians at Hospital X) was that the obstacles to placing Isaac on the waiting list for a transplant were “prohibitive”. This was because Isaac was not established on HD, it was doubtful that he could tolerate HD. There was a realistic prospect that some form of HD would be required post-operatively, and without this, Isaac would die. Ms Gollop confirmed that on this basis, “having considered this carefully, with regret the team at [Hospital X] is not prepared to put him on the list for a cadaveric transplant unless he is able to do HD”.  

At this point Hayden J interjected, leading to the following exchange: 

Hayden J: Does that mean that anyone with severe autism would axiomatically not get on the transplant list?

Ms Gollop: No, because some people with severe autism – like William Verden –  are able to tolerate haemodialysis and he got on the list. It’s a bespoke thing. 

Hayden J: Is it the case that anyone at this end of the autistic spectrum would not be able to receive a kidney transplant?

Ms Gollop: If autism is the reason why you can’t do haemodialysis, that’s right. But there are other reasons why people can’t do haemodialysis. And some people with severe autism CAN do haemodialsyis.   It’s not “he has severe autism, ergo we can’t do transplant’. I don’t know that I’m in a position to say this. 

Hayden J: It’s an important question. 

Ms Gollop: No-one is saying this at [Hospital X]. 

Hayden: No they wouldn’t, but the result of your argument appears to mean that someone at this end of the spectrum would never be placed on the list.

Ms Gollop: Then that’s right.

Hayden J: And that’s an ethical issue that has to be confronted in this case. 

Ms Gollop: And it is being confronted. It’s precisely because people are treating [Isaac] as an individual that this is being discussed. They have suggested that we reconsider his ability to undergo haemodialysis in relation to this stark fact that if he is unable to do this, then his end stage kidney failure will take over.  His mother has said she sees haemodialysis as a ‘non starter’.  Dr B is prepared to engage with this process against his better judgment. He is very worried about the risks

Hayden: So let me follow. Are you contemplating a further assessment of his capacity to engage in haemodialysis? 

Ms Gollop: Something like that. His mental capacity won’t be there but if more desensitisation could be done then it might be possible

Hayden J: I shouldn’t be asking any doctor to engage in a process against their better judgment, nor am I likely to do so.  In the context of end-stage kidney failure, there are no good options. 

Ms Gollop: There are no good options here. There are questions about the demands and burdens of treatment and the effect on [Isaac]’s quality of life. [Isaac] is someone for whom routine is important. He gets enjoyment from his current routine, his visits to his day centre, going out and about, visiting people.  Dialysis would interfere with that routine.  It’s unpleasant and tiring.  There are risks associated with it. All that needs to be weighed in the balance of choosing the least worst option for him now.  It’s a question of a higher quality of life and a shorter one,  or distress and medical procedures and a lot of time in hospital with the possibility of a  longer life. 

Hayden J:  Ms Gollop, you and I have done some very complicated cases together but I don’t recall any that are more complicated than the best interests decision in this case.

This was a very important discussion and demonstrated clearly the issues that were being grappled with. It was good to see Hayden J noting the potential implications of the stance being taken by the clinicians: Isaac was said to be unable to tolerate HD as a result of his ASD, and because of this, the clinicians would not put him on the list for transplant. It could be said therefore that his autism was the barrier to him receiving treatment, and the reason why it might be decided that he should be placed on end-of-life care instead of being given active treatment. The clincians themselves are also constrained by the policies in place regarding the transplant pathway, and as Bonnie has previously written, there are significant barriers to individuals with learning disabilities accessing transplantation. As such, it was important to confront this head on when considering what the options were for Isaac. A consideration of whether he could tolerate HD seemed crucial to whether transplant could be contemplated. It was noticeable that Hayden J considered this one of the most complicated he had ever dealt with – quite the feat given his considerable experience .  This comment from the judge really hammered home how difficult this case was.

Evidence from the medical witnesses

The judge then heard evidence from each of the four clinicians who would be involved in the transplant or were involved in Isaac’s treatment. They were: 

  • Dr A, Consultant Transplant Surgeon at Hospital X
  • Dr B, Consultant Nephrologist at Trust W (who was currently involved in Isaac’s care)
  • Dr C, Consultant Intensivist at Hospital X
  • Mr D, Consultant Transplant Surgeon at Hospital X

We will discuss the evidence from each in turn.

1. Dr A“It is not safe to embark on desceased donor kidney transplant as things currently stand”

Dr A gave detailed evidence regarding the transplantation procedure and allocation system. Concerning the latter, he explained that the allocation of organs is done by NHS Blood and Transplant (the specialist NHS authority) by means of a complex algorithm on the basis of seven factors, the most important of which are the time the person has been on the list, and a calculation on whether the organ is a match, for example considering blood group, age etc. He confirmed that the waiting time for an organ varies regionally, but in their local area, it is shorter than the national average, because their policy involves using organs which may have been rejected by other centres. He explained for individuals in Isaac’s blood group, the average national waiting time is 729 days, but in their local area it could be as low as 12 months. 

Dr A then described the reasons that the team would not to add Isaac to the organ transplant waiting list. The first was that Isaac would need to be well enough to have a transplant when one became available, and given the timescale there was a risk he would not be. The second was “the practical business of doing it”. Isaac would need a period in intensive care post-operation, and there was the possibility of further treatment including HD. There was some discussion between Dr A and Hayden J about the post-operative environment and complications, however it was not possible to follow this because there were issues with the audio of both the judge and Dr A. The clerks in the courtroom were very responsive when we raised this issue, and with some swapping of microphones, we were able to pick up the conversation after a few minutes. Hayden J was trying to understand at this point when Isaac’s kidney function was likely to deteriorate. Dr B confirmed from the back of the courtroom that he would “fall below the threshold to start dialysis in the next 6-12 months”. Hayden J then put to Dr A: 

“Taking the conservative 6 months estimate and putting it into the time frames you have given us [on transplant waiting times], it seems that there is a realistic prospect that we will know the answer to [Isaac]’s capacity to engage with haemodialysis by the time the kidney is available?”

This appeared to be geared towards exploring the possibility of listing Isaac for a transplant at the same time as the desensitisation work for HD was taking place – what Hayden J referred to as “running options in parallel”.  Dr A confirmed that they would need to be confident Isaac could tolerate HD – not for the purpose of long-term treatment but so that a transplant could be offered safely. He added however that he could not place Isaac on the waiting list unless they were satisfied of his tolerance. The judge pushed him on this: “I don’t get the logic of that. If he’s on the list he doesn’t get matched, but the longer he’s on the list, the shorter the timescale.”

After some discussion, Dr A agreed that it would be possible to place Isaac on the waiting list but have him as a suspended patient, meaning he would still accrue waiting time for the purposes of allocation, but would not be made ‘live’ and able to receive an organ until the clinicians were satisfied he could tolerate HD. Hayden J summarised: “whilst it might be unorthodox, the prospect of getting [Isaac] on a suspended waiting list would be a realistic objective.” Dr A reiterated “that would be straightforward, but does not mean we are prepared to transplant him, we would need to be confident he could be safely dialysed.” 

The judge then stated “in simple terms, last November, I would not have thought there was any prospect at all of [Isaac] being able to comply with haemodialysis. That was Mum’s position. [His mother can be seen nodding at this point]  My thinking, which I’m stating  for Mum in simple honest terms, is that it strikes me as a rather uphill struggle for Isaac to be able to achieve compliance with haemodialysis, but we do sometimes find that people surprise us. If [Isaac] could not tolerate it, the focus would then turn to establishing the best possible package of palliative care for him.”

It seemed that Dr A was also supportive of this course of action; he noted that other benefits could be accrued through the desensitisation work as it would provide reassurance that further interventions, if needed, could be attempted, such as treating Isaac for infection. 

We were both pleased to see the potential for the options to be explored simultaneously, to allow Isaac the benefit of being on the waiting list to accrue time and thus be further up the list for allocation whilst the possibilities around HD were further explored. This seemed to be a reasonable way forward so as not to disadvantage him. Dr A also noted that the approach to transplantation in Hospital X potentially increased the need for post-operative HD to get the kidneys working (as they may have been in storage for longer). He noted that although another unit elsewhere might be willing to accept Isaac as a potential candidate, because waiting times vary dependent on the part of the country that a unit is in, it would be likely that Isaac’s total waiting time could be longer. 

Dr A was also keen to point out that “we have transplanted patients with similar learning and psychological difficulties to Isaac’s, one of two a year he suggested, in every case they have been established on haemodialysis.”  

Dr A was then cross-examined by Ms Kohn for Isaac’s mother, and Mr Patel, for the Official Solicitor. Ms Kohn pushed him on the potential that post-transplantation HD could be needed (which she stated was around 50%) and why establishing Isaac on HD was absolutely necessary: “my understanding is that you consider him theoretically fit for transplant, it is technically possible but the surrounding treatment issues are the impediment”. To this Dr A replied that they could not envisage placing Isaac on the list and then allowing him to die post-operatively because they could not dialyse: “there is a real risk of unpleasant distressing admission leading to his death with us trying, some might say recklessly, to perform a transplant.” It was again emphasised that whilst Dr A would be happy to give him the ‘advantage’ of being on the list, this is “not an acknowledgement that we think he is fit to receive a transplant”.

This line of questioning continued with Mr Patel who noted that in order to make Isaac active (instead of suspended) on the transplant list, the doctors would need to conclude that it would be safe for Isaac to have a transplant, but putting him on the list was a recognition that he might be able to reach that point (to which Dr A replied “conceivably”). It was clear from their discussion that placing Isaac on the list should not be construed as an agreement that he would get a transplant, but rather that it signalled a commitment to assessing him further following the desensitisation work. Dr A suggested 3-6 months would be a reasonable timeframe for re-assessment. Ms Kohn then finally asked “is establishment on dialysis is an essential requirement for transplant to be safe and practical a requirement [for Isaac] or for all patients?” Dr A replied “in our view the ability to perform some form of renal treatment in the peri-transplant period is essential. Otherwise, we would be in a situation where you carried out a kidney transplant and patient would die if it did not work. We could not countenance that.”

2. Dr B: “Haemodialysis is fraught with considerable risk: it is not possible to safely administer it to get him fit enough for transplant”

Dr B’s evidence, from his perspective as Isaac’s nephrologist, focused on HD. Counsel for the NHS Trusts, Ms Gollop,  began the questioning by raising HD as a precondition of transplant and what the risks were. Dr B’s view that HD should not be considered came across strongly in this exchange. He stated: 

“It would involve [Isaac] being stationary for 3-4 hours each time. Initially we would do it once or twice a week, but eventually it would need to be 3 times a week for 4 hours. And this would move up rather soon, it could be in a matter of weeks. If we start on HD with the intention of long-term treatment, it is with the idea of doing it 3x a week for 4 hours. Knowing [Isaac] and reviewing the clinical psychologist’s report, I do not think that’s going to be achievable. It is  fraught with risk.”

Even when pushed by Ms Gollop on whether he would be prepared to offer it, Dr B replied as follows: “There is the dignified palliative route that we adopt when we know that contemplated  medical interventions are going to do more harm than good. It’s an estimate how long [Isaac]’s kidneys will give him time, it’s possible he has a period of stability, if that’s years with a good quality of life, starting him on a treatment which we know might be dangerous and impact on quality of life is not sensible, and that’s a view shared collectively by the renal unit. I don’t think it would be appropriate to embark upon long-term HD.”

We both found this exchange confusing, because it seemed that Dr B was focused on the unsuitability of HD as a long-term treatment, but that was not what was being proposed here, as far as we understood the plan was to try and get Isaac to tolerate HD such that it could be given post-operatively if needed. It seemed odd then that Dr B’s evidence was heavily focused on Isaac’s inability to tolerate it in the long-term, and that he suggested that attempting it was not appropriate, even though his position as far as Ms Gollop understood was it was worth trialling. Hearing his evidence, the judge put to him: 

“What was being canvassed earlier was a possibility, predicated on what he has achieved thus far, that [Isaac] might surprise us, and with the desensitisation work and increasing familiarity with hospital situations, he might manage to find a way to compliance with haemodialysis. The prospect of that is not a good one, but the question is whether it should be discounted. If it is not to be discounted, and he starts on it, what are the risks at that stage? The risks for a compliant 27-year-old on haemodialysis.

To this, Dr B responded that if Isaac did tolerate HD (and there was no physical or chemical restraint) then there are no contraindications.

At this point, the hearing was adjourned for lunch, with Dr B’s evidence to continue in the afternoon.

On our return, Dr Cronin (the independent expert) was now visible in the court room, having arrived to give evidence if needed. Further issues with the microphones again made it difficult to hear the discussion. As far as we could make out, Dr B gave evidence about how he envisaged the desensitisation work would progress to enable what Ms Gollop termed a “trial of limited haemodialysis”. This included work on getting Isaac to be familiar with the machine, having a dummy line placed on his tummy, then moving towards an actual line being put in. The judge asked some questions regarding the experience of dialysis for individuals and what would happen if Isaac was well, versus unwell when receiving it. During his responses, Dr B suggested that although Isaac appeared more cooperative recently, this could be a result of his kidney disease, which could make him fatigued. Hayden J challenged this, noting that in videos he had been sent of Isaac by his mother he did not appear lethargic and had been “full of beans”. His mother confirmed when asked that the clips had been taken recently and that “he had one taken yesterday with his carer at the day service, he was happy and boisterous”.  

A discussion also took place regarding the use of sedation during HD. Dr B stated he was not willing to use chemical restraint (i.e. medication) to achieve compliance. The judge once again challenged this stance, leading to the following exchange: 

Hayden J: A General Anaesthetic seems to be beyond coherent argument. But what about a situation where there had been a pattern of compliance but [Isaac] has a bad day, would you consider an oral sedative? 

Dr B: Oral sedation from time to time is frequently required to bring [Isaac] into hospital, but once someone comes in, there’s a specific timeframe to start dialysis (as we understood, the sessions run at specific times in the hospital). Administering another sedative isn’t practicable.

Hayden J: What I am saying is that [Isaac] may have an inconsistent pattern of compliance. So, whilst there might be strategies for achieving compliance, he might on some occasions need sedating, would you rule that out? 

Dr B: There would have to be a protocol in place in terms of what we are and aren’t prepared to do, and the anaesthetic team would need to be closely involved. Intravenous sedation is out of the question. 

Ms Gollop also raised practical challenges regarding support from the learning disability team, as Isaac’s main contact in that team is only part time, and discussions were ongoing with the ICB to make plans and contingencies for this. Dr B reiterated that HD is not in Isaac’s best interests and that his parents would need to be on page. Hayden J noted to this “The Trust has tacked in a different direction, [Isaac’s mother] has got to hear about it late in the day and is absorbing as it goes along. I wouldn’t assume she’s hostile now, I can see she’s shaking her head that she’s not”. Dr B reiterated that if Isaac was non-compliant in the process, he would not prepared to attach him to a machine three days a week, but up to that he would be willing to try it. The judge asked if Dr B thought Isaac would comply, to which he responded: 

“Knowing him, I don’t think he will comply. One of the things brought up is consistency of environment  for [Isaac]. His environment shouldn’t change, he doesn’t like being messed around with, he doesn’t like loud noises. Even with adjustments, my viewis that he will not comply with treatment. Dialysis would need to be done in same room same time. But there would be change in staff, machine will frequently have alarms, and he may not take kindly to that. We have unexpected occurrences which result in unexpected dialysis on unexpected days, which will be disruptive. Some end up with hospital admissions, which would be in completely different place, times. There is only so much we can simulate and only so much we can aspire to in terms of consistency. It will be distressing for him and us if we cannot safely deliver it. And he is likely to have a death in a medical environment.”

Despite this, however, it seemed that Dr B would be willing to trial dialysis as the “least worst option” as far as active treatment was concerned, while also pointing out that the court could alternatively acknowledge that active treatments are not in his best interests.

Hayden J then moved to a new line of questioning and asked Dr B how well he knew Isaac. Dr B began to reply “first assessed him in late 2019 when admitted for chest infection, he had a long stay in hospital and under my care, that’s when we identified kidney failure…” But the judge interrupted his answer “I’m not asking about how you know him medically, but about Isaac as a person”. Dr B replied that he had met Isaac once a year. This led to the following exchange: 

Hayden J: Have you made an assessment of his personality?

Dr B: I haven’t bonded as much as some of the nurses. He recognises and remembers people. 

Hayden J: And looking at his interactions with others, what kind of personality does he have? 

Dr B: He enjoys being around certain people, people he loves and knows. He loves his iPad, he loves listening to certain things…

Hayden J: Do you know what sort of things he likes to listen to? 

Dr B: [pauses] I’m sorry I can’t remember 

Hayden J: Can he communicate?

Dr B: He is not verbal, he has limited insight into what is happening, he doesn’t know why doctors assess him, but he feels that a doctor is someone that he has to be on his guard around. 

Hayden J: Can he interact with and tease people?

Dr B: I would say so. 

Hayden: So he enjoys life?

Dr B: Yes, in its current form. But if I were to bring him into hospital 3 times a week and connect him to a dialysis  machine I don’t think he would. 

Hayden: What’s proposed here is that we don’t close the door on a potential transplant at this stage, but we keep it open for now. Do you think that’s what [Isaac] would want?

Dr B: I can’t pretend to know what Isaac would want.

Hayden: Well you know he enjoys life. 

Dr B: Knowing [Isaac], bringing him to hospital 3 times a week is going to severely impact his quality of life. He will hate it.

Hayden: I am trying to get you away from the medical and look at the patient. [Isaac] cannot communicate his wishes and feelings in the way some 27-year-old men are able to. That doesn’t relieve me of the obligation to drill down into  what I can find about him and his wishes and feelings. I’m drawing from your evidence that the man who enjoys life  would want the best shot at maintaining it. 

Dr B: If we embarked on this treatment he would cease to enjoy life. 

We both found this interaction difficult to listen to. It seemed that Dr B was entirely focused on Isaac in the context of medical care, referring to his compliance, his insight, his behaviour, and he seemingly struggled to think about Isaac as an individual person outside the context of medical care. Whilst he was agreeing to trial HD, it was clear he had significant reservations and appeared to be even constrained by starting dialysis at certain times of the day. It wasn’t clear why this was so rigid and could not be varied to accommodate Isaac’s needs or any potential sedation. 

3. Dr C – post-operative care issues

Dr C, the Consultant Intensivist at Hospital X, was the next to give evidence. At this stage, we both had to step out of the hearing at times and therefore will only provide a summary here  based on the evidence we were able to observe.

Dr C’s evidence focused on post-operative care for transplant patients in intensive care (ICU), including the potential risks of distress and disorientation, the process of bringing a person out of their induced coma, extubation and regaining of consciousness. He also discussed the physical space of ICU, how many visitors Isaac would be allowed when he woke up, and the potential long-term effects of being cared for in ICU, such as post-intensive care syndrome.  

During her cross-examination, Ms Kohn mentioned having spoken to the paediatric intensive care consultant involved in the William Verden case (who was known as Dr Z). Further information on his evidence during the Verden hearing can be found here.  Ms Kohn explained that in the Verden case, Dr Z found it acceptable to sedate and ventilate William for two weeks, if necessary, post-transplant. Dr C was asked whether he would be confident to carry out the same treatment. 

Dr C: I think confident would be an overstatement.  I work in pediatrics with a different patient population.

Ms Kohn: if you had a 3-year-old who was acting up, you’d contemplate this kind of procedure, so do you have a view why you wouldn’t for adults?

Dr C: These are the first patients of this kind coming through…

Hayden J: Why is that? There’s no demographic reason why that should be the case.

Dr C: Because transplants are now being considered for groups of patients for whom it was not previously considered.

Hayden J: Yes I think that’s the only inference it’s possible to draw.

Hayden J then continued to ask Dr C about the treatment William required after receiving his transplant. During this exchange, some confusion seemed to arise relating to whether sedation and ventilation was considered in William’s case to to administer HD post-transplant. Ms Kohn referred to Hayden J to the useful diagram that was presented by Ms Victoria Butler-Cole KC during William Verden’s case which laid out the various treatment options that were being considered. 

After a bit of back and forth between counsel and Hayden J, there was still uncertainty as to whether one of the options was to sedate and ventilate William to administer HD. Fortunately, Dr Cronin  stepped in and provided a full explanation from her seat at the back of the court. Dr Cronin clarified that in William’s case, sedation and ventilation had been considered, as it would be required to administer plasma exchange therapy. 

Here, it’s worthwhile noting that the cause of William and Isaac’s kidney failure is extremely different. William’s diagnosis of steroid-resistant nephrotic syndrome had a much higher likelihood of leading to graft rejection post-transplant and this would have been treated by providing one or more sessions of plasma exchange. By contrast, plasma exchange was not being considered for Isaac – in this hearing the focus was rather that Isaac might require HD post-transplant and whether he would be able to tolerate it. 

4. Mr D – do no harm

The final clinical expert who presented evidence was Mr D, consultant transplant surgeon. As he later explained, a transplant surgeon’s role is primarily to decide whether a patient is suitable for transplant by looking at their anatomy, as well as, ensuring that that the transplant would be safe for the specific patient. 

In Isaac’s case, Mr D had conducted his physical exam and was also involved in the multi-disciplinary team (MDT) discussions about whether a transplant would be considered safe for Isaac. Regarding the examination, Mr D explained that he first met Isaac at Trust W’s Transplant Assessment Clinic where he spent about 30 minutes conducting an examination to determine whether there was any physical reason that would not allow for Isaac to receive a kidney. Isaac’s mother assisted Mr D by providing details of Isaac’s full clinical history. Mr D told the court that despite experiencing some difficulties he was able to examine Isaac. 

Mr D: [Isaac] was very pleasant when I saw him…we struggled a bit to get him to lie down to examine…it was a quite difficult to examine…but he allowed me to do it…

Hayden J: What happens when you try to get him to lie down?

Mr D: He wasn’t unhappy at all. He just didn’t want to sit down, he wanted to walk around. He just wasn’t co-operating in a way to allow me to do a full examination. 

Hayden J then asked Mr D to explain why the MDT had reached the decision that they would not perform a transplant unless Isaac is able to tolerate HD whilst awake. Once again, it was emphasised that there were no contraindications except safety reasons in relation to HD. As Mr D put it, “it’s not safe to go into the process of transplant without knowing [patients] can be dialysed…it’s the safety of being able to deliver dialysis or any other therapy. It’s not something we’ve entertained previously“.

Soon after this exchange, we returned to comparisons between Isaac’s situation and that of William Verden. Hayden J noted that although there was a difference in the fact that William was established on dialysis, he thought there were similar concerns between the two, taking into consideration that there were concerns about William’s behaviour towards his HD. When making this point, Hayden J was clearly erring on the side of caution and commented on the fact that he only had a document with a few bullet points explaining Verden’s case and continued to state that these points “could hardly be reflective of such a complex case”. 

Hayden J continued to push Mr D on how the MDT had reach their decision that Isaac was not a suitable candidate and put to Mr D: “In this case, you say it simply could not be reconciled with the patient’s interests, because to sedate a patient on a long-term basis throughout dialysis would be pressing your ethical boundaries.

In response to this, Mr D explained:  

Yes, you don’t know the length of time that dialysis will take, and the question is, would we treat adults or children differently? I think if [Isaac]’s scenario had been the same as [William’s] where there was established dialysis and the referring team was saying they are struggling with dialysis, I think that is something we would entertain because dialysis is already established.” 

Continuing to compare William and Isaac, Hayden J took the opportunity to (as he put it) play devil’s advocate. He suggested that if we were comparing patterns, then surely Isaac was in a more favourable position:  William went from compliance to non-compliance, whereas Isaac is moving from non-compliance to compliance. Hayden J did of course emphasise that Isaac’s shift from non-compliance to compliance was primarily due to the desenitisation work that was done.

Listening to Hayden J’s explanation, it was useful to reflect on how much progress Isaac had made with medical interactions since the first hearing in November 2022. During this hearing we had heard that Isaac’s fear was deeply rooted following a procedure he had when he was fourteen, and that even as an adult, his parents sometimes could not get Isaac within a quarter of a mile of the hospital as he knew every route. Yet, the recent desensitisation work had managed to overcome this, offering a glimmer of hope and Hayden J felt strongly that we should not devalue Isaac’s progress.

He returned to the comparison that Mr D had made earlier between how children and adults are provided medical treatment, leading to the following discussion: 

Hayden J: “There might be a progressive revolving understanding of the needs of adults with complex needs which is catching up with our instinctive response to offer children a chance at life. Do you think?”

Mr D: “Things evolve all the time. We’re surely doing transplant and dialysing people we would not have entertained years ago. But what we have to do, is act with the knowledge we have now, with what is the right thing and what is the safest thing. I, as a transplant surgeon did not enter transplant to not transplant people. It would be wonderful if we can transplant Isaac safely and it would be a success, but the principle is ‘do no harm’,  and that is the concern.” 

Mr D confirmed he was satisfied with the plan that was emerging in court, but whether Isaac could be transplanted would still depend on the success of the desensitisation work and whether Isaac could comply with HD. He confirmed that only then would the MDT be able to reconsider its approach to the potential transplant. 

At this point, Ms Gollop interjected and said that she had one point to make while Mr D was providing evidence: 

[Isaac’s mother]’s solicitors had the benefit of acting on behalf of Verden’s parent and they’ve put that question directly to Dr Carnaby. They asked him ‘having provided evidence in the Verden case, do you see any difference between these two cases?‘ [Dr Carnaby’s] response was that the key difference is one of insight and understanding. Isaac’s level of disability is of such that he lacks any measurable awareness of his health condition and the risk it poses to his survival. At the time of my assessment with William he was able to engage in conversations about his kidneys – where they are, their function, and that they weren’t working as they should and the need for both dialysis and transplant. This level of understanding meant that William was able to see, to a limited extent, the need to cooperate…”

Hayden J stopped Ms Gollop and said that Dr Carnaby’s response was indeed compelling. 

Following this exchange, Mr D was cross-examined by Ms Kohn who further pushed him to explain what it was exactly about Isaac’s presentation that led the MDT to make their decision. She posed the following question: 

“…there are two elements arising out of this, the one is the ability to withstand dialysis and the other is the ability to understand the nature of the operation. The reality is that somebody like Isaac will not understand it. Can I take it that part of your reasoning is if a patient doesn’t understand it’s not ethically appropriate to do it?” 

In response to this Mr D explained his approach and understanding of treating patients with limited decision-making capacity: 

“No, the lack of understanding is the ability to cope with scenarios that arise. If there is a need for dialysis, or a need to go for a CT scan or to have another operation, if there is a level of understanding, then they may be able to comply or demonstration of complying with things that they might not understand. For instance, complying with dialysis is complying with a treatment they might not understand. To say that if someone lacks understanding, it’s not ethically right to treat them, I wouldn’t agree. Everybody has a right to medical treatment if that treatment is right and safe and proper for them.” 

After this exchange, the only aspect Mr D was left to discuss was whether there were any other impediments that would exclude Isaac from transplantation. He briefly referred to the fact that there could be other issues concerning Isaac’s bladder and reoccurring infections in the past but that neither would act as a contraindication to transplant. 

Isaac’s parents were the last people to give evidence to the court. This part of the hearing is covered in Daniel Clarke’s (forthcoming) blog post – but it was the first time we got a real sense of who Isaac was a person, rather than hearing medical evidence about risks, and what he might or might not be able to manage. It served of an important reminder for all parties as to whom this decision was for and the person that was at the heart of the discussion. 

Reflections: the options on the table[2]

This was a challenging case and the ultimate decision made by Hayden J was that it was in Isaac’s best interests to proceed with the desensitisation work and be placed on the waiting list for transplantation, albeit in suspended form, in the hope that he will become able to tolerate HD. This plan, he found, was “far more consistent with his best interests than that which had been committed to paper before today”.  The outcome was testament to the careful probing of Mr Justice Hayden to push the doctors on what the options were, and what elements of the process could be adjusted to accommodate Isaac’s needs.

Beyond these positives, however, what was apparent to both of us the ways in which the options that were available to Isaac were shaped by the doctors before the court, with certain possibilities discounted by the medics from the outset and excluded from the court’s consideration. A simple way that this happened was through three doctors simply stating they would not be willing to do certain things; they would not place Isaac on the transplant waiting list – except in a ‘suspended’ form – unless or until he is able to tolderate HD, and they would not sedate him to allow HD to take place. It is well established in case law that the court cannot force a doctor to provide treatment against their clinical judgement (see R (Burke) v GMC [2005] EWCA Civ 1003). In this instance, it meant certain options were simply not contemplated. 

A number of other possibilities were also constrained, with some concerning implications for what was possible for Isaac. 

  1. Only cadaveric donation

An interesting shift occurred from the first to the third hearing in relation to the donor options that were on the table for Isaac. Ordinarily a recipient, based on their circumstances, will be provided a choice between a living or deceased donor.  A living donor can be someone the recipient knows (known as an altruistic directed/specified donor) or it can be a complete stranger (referred to as a non-directed/unspecified donor – although various other terms exist). 

Back in November 2022, at the first hearing observed by Bonnie, we heard that Isaac’s sister was being considered as a potential donor. Hayden J helpfully reminded the court that if this was the case, he would have to understand Isaac’s perception of his sister’s best interests as part of his determination of Isaac’s best interests.

When we returned to court for the second hearing in December 2022, Isaac’s father had also indicated that he would be willing to act as a donor. At this stage, there was no certainty that either of these family members would be considered as a suitable candidate, but there was also no reason to believe that they would not pass the required assessments. As part of this discussion, the legal requirements to donate (as stipulated by the Human Tissue Act 2004) were also brought to the court’s attention.

It bears emphasising that in order for the donor to provide valid consent, they should not be coerced into the donation. All potential donors must initiate their own donation by either calling or sending a mail to their nearest transplant centre. Unfortunately, it was acknowledged in court (at the December 2022 hearing) that there had been somewhat of a ‘communication gap’ and that neither Isaac’s father nor his sister had understood that they had to take the first step and contact a transplant centre to indicate their willingness to donate to Isaac. This sadly meant that neither of them, at the time, had the opportunity to contact the NHS but we were told that Living Donation Information packs had been sent to them a few days before the hearing. Towards the end of the hearing, when Isaac’s father spoke to Hayden J, he profusely apologised that they had not made contact with the centre but explained there were so many emails going back and forth as part of the case that it made it difficult to stay on top of everything. 

Today, however, with rather little explanation, Ms Gollop confirmed that living donation pathways were no longer being considered, either via donation from a member of Isaac’s family or via an unspecified donor. As observers, we are only able to form our views based on the information relayed in Court. It might well be that there were more nuanced discussions as to why a deceased donor was the most appropriate decision, but this information was not provided in court. Despite this, we would make two observations. 

First, it was disheartening to learn in the December hearing that Isaac’s family was not made fully aware of how to approach the living donation process and the various living donation options. During the final hearing, Ms Gollop informed the court that even though his sister had been suggested as a possible donor in November 2022, some miscommunication had occurred that it was of utmost importance that pressure on the donor should be avoided. It’s worth noting that research shows that  individuals often experience difficulties when first coming forward as a living donor, and it is well-documented that barriers including knowledge on donation, patient activation, and perceived social support[3] can create inequity in access to living donor transplants. No individual should feel coerced to donate an organ and if members of Isaac’s family did not feel able to act as a donor, then it is entirely correct that this option was not pursued. However a lesson that can perhaps be learned here, especially given Isaac’s father relayed to Hayden J how overwhelming the legal proceedings can be, is that families who find themselves in a similar position could benefit from additional support and guidance on how to understand and approach the donor options in a timely manner. The living kidney donation process is difficult to navigate under ordinary circumstances, and whilst it is vital that no coercion take place, guidance and support ought to be provided from the outset ensure that a person and their family are placed in the best possible position to make informed decisions regarding living donation. 

Our second observation relates to the unspecified donation pathway. Research shows that unspecified donation is often not discussed as an option with potential recipients,[4] however the evidence suggested that this was explored to some extent. Dr A for example suggested that altruistic (unspecified) donors were a small number of the overall donor pool and that it was further complicated because the sharing scheme had to be taken into consideration. One option that was not mentioned in any of the hearings was the the alternative route of using a public campaign to find an altruistic donor.  This method is not reliant on the sharing scheme or a donation by a family member and was initially advocated for in the William Verden case; a public campaign was launched via traditional media outlets, such as the BBC, but social media platforms like Facebook have also proved to be successful in the past. It is worthwhile to note that pubic campaigns are legally valid

The reason why unspecified donors are often considered is because a living donation can provide for a more controlled environment. We heard in the Verden case that a controlled transplant environment is often more desirable for patients with learning difficulties and ASD – (interestingly though William eventually received a kidney from the deceased donor list). Of course we do not know whether this possibility was discussed between the family and the healthcare professionals and simply not relayed in Court. But when reflecting on how the living donation options discussed above were approached with Isaac, we cannot help but to wonder if there was perhaps a missed opportunity in this case to first exhaust all possible avenues of living donation before moving forward with the deceased donation route, or indeed run the options concurrently to maximise Isaac’s chances, as was done in William Verden’s case.

2. Transplantion only if he can demonstrate tolerance for HD

The second key limitation was the question of Isaac’s best interests in relation to transplant became inexorably linked to his best interests in relation a trial of HD, because the doctors would not list him without first establishing tolerance for HD. This limitation was ultimately accepted by the judge. It was further argued in the medical evidence before the court that no patient who could not tolerate HD would be listed for transplant – it is a standard that all patients would need to meet – perhaps as a means to push back on Hayden J’s question to Ms Gollop at the start. Whilst this might seem to be an equal approach on paper, it bears remembering that in practice, patients without learning disabilities can be listed for transplant without being established on HD beforehand. This is known as a pre-emptive transplant, and is primarily achieved by means of living donation. Due to the waiting time for a deceased donor, a recipient will often have to undergo dialysis in the meantime whilst they wait for a kidney to become available. Living donation provides an opportunity to avoid dialysis altogether, as it can be planned for in advance. In such cases, there is also a lower risk that the kidney will be rejected. 

This example demonstrates that not being established on dialysis can be no impediment to receiving a transplant, most likely to our mind, that it is assumed that such patients would tolerate it if necessary. But for Isaac, because the doctors expressed an unwillingness to list him without this evidence, he is placed in a position where he needs to actively demonstrate his tolerance for HD before transplant can be contemplated. This was further justified through comparisons to William Verden and other patients with learning disabilities and/or ASD, who were all on dialysis before transplantation. When considered in this light, it seems that Isaac, and potentially others with such disabilities, are placed in a different position where they must have dialysis before transplant, and arguably must satisfy a higher threshold (of compliance) to be considered a candidate for receiving an organ. We acknowledge the evidence of Isaac’s fear of hospitals does perhaps justify the heightened level of concern, and agree that careful decision-making is required as a transplantable organ is an incredibly scarce and much needed resources given the ever-growing waiting list. But this should not mean that patients in Isaac’s position should be overlooked or that they should be held to a higher threshold when access to transplant is being considered, and indeed raises questions as to how the process could be adjusted to accommodate Isaac’s needs.   

This also begs the question of what exactly Isaac would need to do to satisfy the doctors that a transplant would be safe – i.e., what level of compliance he would need to show to indicate a tolerance for HD. It seemed, listening to the evidence of Dr B in particular, that assumptions were circulating about what Isaac was or wasn’t capable of, that the plan would not work, and limitations were placed on what sedation could be given to cope with HD because of the challenges this would create in scheduling dialysis. This creates a concern that he might never be compliant to a level that the doctors are willing to make him active on the list. 

The question of what a sufficient level of tolerance would look like wasn’t something that was bottomed out in the court process, or what level of variable compliance would be considered management. However, it seems important to think this through carefully, given the potential different between tolerating HD and establishing Isaac on HD. The latter adheres to the scenario mentioned by Dr B, three times a week for four hours in the long term – which nobody thought would be in Isaac’s best interests. Yet if what is trying to be achieved is getting Isaac to a point where he could manage HD post-operatively, including familiarity with the machine, an understanding of the process, this seems to require a much less intensive regime, and it is not clear why establishment on dialysis as if it was the long-term treatment plan should in fact needed here to allow Isaac to manage it after a transplant operation. 

Whilst it comes as a relief that the door has not been shut to transplantation, there remains a great deal which is constrained by medical opinion and willingness. We can only hope that these questions are further explored as the desensitisation work commences, in conjunction with Isaac’s family, so he is given every chance of active treatment. 

Ruby Reed-Berendt is a PhD Candidate and Research Associate at the Mason Institute for Life Sciences and the Law, Edinburgh Law School. Her PhD research analyses mental capacity law from an intersectional feminist perspective. She tweets @rubyreedberendt

Bonnie Venter is a PhD candidate and Teaching Associate at the Centre for Health, Law and Society situated within the University of Bristol Law School. Her PhD research is based on an empirically informed evaluation of the legal and regulatory framework guiding the living kidney donation pathway in the United Kingdom. She tweets @TheOrganOgress 

[1] All quotations are from contemporaneous notes taken by Ruby and Bonnie, and then cross-checked with Celia Kitzinger’s notes from the hearing. Although we have done our best to ensure their accuracy, the quotations should not be taken as verbatim records.

[2] If you are interested in the question of ‘options on the table’, Beverley Clough has written about it further in her book ‘The Spaces of Mental Capacity Law: Moving Beyond Binaries’ (Routledge 2022)

[3] For more information on barriers to accessing living kidney donation see Living Organ Donation, UK Parliament POSTNOTE Number 641 (April 2021). Also see, Bailey PK and others, Investigating strategies to improve Access to Kidney Transplantation

[4] See Zuchowski M and others, Experiences of completed and withdrawn unspecified kidney donor candidates in the United Kingdom and Bailey PK and others, Better the donor you know? A qualitative study of renal patients’ views on ‘altrusitic’ live-donor kidney transplantation


A family at breaking point

By Celia Kitzinger, 23rd April 2023

This was a distressing hearing to watch because as it unfolded it became increasing clear that the parents were at breaking point in trying to care for their disabled daughter.  The Official Solicitor was clearly pushing for more support for the family from the local authority – who seem to have made some steps in that direction, but clearly not enough to prevent what the judge thought might develop into a “dramatic situation”.  

My understanding is that the court cannot order a local authority to provide additional support, but the judge emphasised his view that it would be in the protected party’s best interests that they should do so, and asked that the order be drafted to reflect that, with the hope and expectation that some additional support would be put in place before the next hearing (which isn’t for another three months).  

I had asked to observe two hearings before HHJ Marin on the afternoon of Wednesday 19th April 2023,   one at 2pm and one at 3pm, both listed as public hearings and both dealing with “Section 16 Health and Welfare”.  This refers to the section of the Mental Capacity Act that says the court has the power to make decisions if a person lacks capacity in relation to either their personal welfare or their property and affairs.

At 10.09am, I sent a request for the links to these two hearings to the email address given in the listing, and I resent my email (with “URGENT” in the subject header) when I hadn’t heard anything from the court by 13.51, just nine minutes before the first of these hearings was supposed to start.  I received the MS Teams link for the first hearing at 13:59 with a message saying “Apologies we were awaiting the Judge’s consent” – which is odd, because I don’t think there was anything for the judge to consent to.  It was a public hearing!  (The link for the second hearing followed at 14:06.) Because I received the link so late, it was all a bit of a scramble to get into court on time, but I made it for the start of the hearing, and was able to request a copy of the transparency order (which arrived at 14:09) and is in the standard terms.  This blog post is just about the 2pm hearing (COP 14062580) 

The hearing

Usually, the judge asks counsel for the applicant to introduce the people in court. In this case that introduction was done by Alex Schymyck of Garden Court Chambers who said he was acting for the applicant local authority, London Borough of Wandsworth.  The barrister for the person at the centre of the case (I’ll call her “Lizzie”) was Zimran Samuel of Doughty Street Chambers, acting via the Official Solicitor. There were also some other people in court including professionals from the local authority (one was a social worker), and (on separate screens) Lizzie’s mother and father.  

Usually the applicant barrister also provides a short background and summary of the case, as recommended by the former Vice President of the Court of Protection, Mr Justice Hayden, who points out: “Whilst the judge and the lawyers will have read the papers and be able to move quickly to engage with the identified issues, those who are present as observers will often find it initially difficult fully to grasp what the case is about’.  Unfortunately for me, this didn’t happen in this case.  (However, I was very pleased that HHJ Marin was responsive to my email – sent via the court administrator –after this hearing and before the 3pm hearing explaining that an opening summary would support transparency: at the invitation of the judge, counsel for the applicant provided an excellent summary for the 3pm case).

In this case, though,  the court moved quickly on to consider the “agreed draft order” – leaving me with no idea what it was all about.  I learnt that the order agreed between the local authority and the Official Solicitor provided for “the ICB to be joined as a party…. for a variety of further evidence to be obtained and put before the court… a s.49 order for an updated capacity report and the usual provisions regarding wishes and feelings”.  I think counsel also said that the plan was for the parents to be asked to join as a party to the proceedings. At this point, I thought the judge would just approve the order and I would be left none the wiser what it was all about. In fact that didn’t happen.

Instead, counsel for the Official Solicitor (offered the opportunity to speak after counsel for the local authority had completed his submission) referred to “a family very much struggling to cope… a vulnerable young lady on a broken bed with mould growing around her”.  He felt the court should act with “a view to helping that sorry situation” by ensuring “the right support from the applicant” so that the family is not “set up to fail”.

The judge responded by saying: “The parents are under immense pressure here and it’s really unfair to expect them to do so much.  It’s a long time before this case is back in court.  What can be done between now and then to alleviate their burden?  I appreciate the broken bed isn’t going to be sorted out in 10 minutes, but in terms of actual human support, what can be done so they can have a breather and spend time with their other children?

It’s within the applicant’s gift to provide support”, said the Official Solicitor, “and I know Lizzie’s mother would jump at extra support”. 

The judge checked that the parents understood the order.  Both had, apparently, attended a pre-hearing meeting at which (they said) it had been explained to them, and they were “fine with it” (father). 

The judge said: “The parties have agreed a whole package of information that will be collected so parties can sit down with all the information they need to decide what to do.  My concern is the pressure you’re both under, and the case is not back before July. What can be done between now and then to provide the family with extra support because – forgive me if I’m wrong – but it looks to me as if this family is coming up to breaking point”.

It was established that there had recently been an increase in direct payments to allow Lizzie to attend a day time respite centre, but that was only available during school holidays – which (as the judge said) meant that between now (April) and the next hearing in July “you’ve got the bulk of the caring haven’t you?”.

I realised at this point that Lizzie’s mother was becoming tearful.  “Ask the social worker”, she said to the judge: “I’m a bit emotional”.

The social worker explained that the current package involves

  • 48 nights per year at a respite centre (with one-to-one overnight care for Lizzie)
  • 20 hours per week term-time care
  • 30 hours per week during school holidays
  • 2 days per week at day respite during holidays

That’s still very little,” said the judge, “given the high level of care that Lizzie needs. I accept the Court of Protection can only go so far, but in terms of best interests I’m wondering if I could make a declaration that the local authority and the Official Solicitor should meet and see what can be done.  If these parents break down because they can’t cope with looking after Lizzie any more, it’s going to be a much more dramatic situation – and on my reading of the papers, we’re on the road to that situation”.  He turned to the parents and told them to get in touch with the Official Solicitor’s representative “and set out what else you need”.

The mother was openly weeping and clearly distressed at this point, wiping her eyes on her sleeve.  “We’ve asked for all these things before”, she said, “but it’s never been done”.  

There was then a discussion about signposting the family to solicitors and offering them assistance in finding legal aid.  “Thank you for your very kind consideration”, said Lizzie’s father.  “We need help with our child, so we can carry on. We are trying our very best”, said Lizzie’s mother.

All the professionals recognise that you and your husband are doing a very good job”, said the judge. “But you are being asked to do something superhuman, and it’s not fair on you.  Before the next hearing there must be a professional’s meeting about what can be done immediately. I want a recital in the order and I will be very concerned if, when we come back, I hear nothing’s been done”.  

Background to the case

After joining the hearing, I googled both lawyers and sent them emails asking for their Position Statements and received one the next day, and the other the day after that. Reading the Position Statements gave me a much better understanding of this case.

I learnt that Lizzie is a teenager who lives at home with her parents and two siblings and has a diagnosis of “spastic quadriplegic cerebral palsy affecting all four limbs, developmental delay, asthma and occasional focal seizures, food allergy, severe speech and language impairment and severe learning difficulty…. [She] has significant mobility difficulties and often falls to the floor. She requires 1:1 at all times.”  

This case started (I think only a few months ago) when the local authority made a court application to authorise Lizzie’s deprivation of liberty in a specially-designed cot bed with doors on all sides that cannot be opened from the inside.  This is to prevent Lizzie from falling out and suffering harm during the night – and Lizzie’s parents support its use.

But when the Official Solicitor’s representative visited Lizzie at home a few days before the hearing, the parents told him that the bed is not safe. It needs servicing.  There is mould in Lizzie’s bedroom and bathroom. It became clear that the parents were struggling. The mother stated that everything looks good on paper, but that’s not the reality. Carers don’t show up, they’ve asked for training on restraint and none has been provided, they haven’t had a carer’s assessment since before the pandemic, and Lizzie is sometimes self-harming.  The Official Solicitor concluded “there is concern for the long-term stability of the care package. It is recorded in the care plan [Lizzie’s mother] seems as though she is burning out…. The applicant is requested to consider a carers assessment on her to consider how she can be supported…. For example, Lizzie loves music, it could be explored if there are any music groups she can attend… Lizzie gets distressed when she is unable to mobilise [and] it may be that the applicant can explore how they can support Lizzie to mobilise…. It is submitted that there needs to be a deeper exploration into the behavioural issues Lizzie has….”.  The Official Solicitor also wanted consideration of adaptations to the garden to support Lizzie in accessing the garden with minimal support (the parents would like to put in a sensory garden for her).  There is a long list of “further evidence” required along these lines (including reports from Lizzie’s occupational therapist, physiotherapist, speech and language therapist, and from her school) to try to work out what support she needs.

It seems as though a case that started as a relatively contained single-issue case concerned with “authorising the deprivation of liberty arising from the arrangements for Lizzies accommodation and care”, i.e. the cot bed (according to the Transparency Order issued on 13th March 2023) has become, just over a month later, a much broader concern about a care package at risk of collapse.  It was good to see that the Official Solicitor and the judge recognised the family’s situation and were doing what they could to address it.

Celia Kitzinger is co-director of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project. She has observed more than 420 hearings since 1st May 2020 and is a prolific blogger.  She is on LinkedIn (here), and tweets @KitzingerCelia

Opaque justice in the Court of Protection: A dispute about the validity of Lasting Power of Attorney

By Daniel Clark, 21st April 2023

At 2pm on Friday 14th April 2023, I observed a directions hearing (COP 13795316) via MS Teams before Deputy District Judge Chahal sitting at First Avenue House in London.

I simply couldn’t follow it.

Wittgenstein’s notion of language-games proposes that language only has meaning when applied in its context. In other words, it is action that establishes meaning. In the context of the Court of Protection, ‘open’ and ‘transparent’ only has meaning when it is connected with actions that make its work open and transparent. Simply admitting observers to a hearing is not enough: the hearing itself must be accessible to observers. One way that this can be done is by way of an introductory summary. The (former) Vice President has advised that an introductory summary is good practice, particularly because, ‘Whilst the judge and the lawyers will have read the papers and be able to move quickly to engage with the identified issues, those who are present as observers will often find it initially difficult fully to grasp what the case is about’.

That was certainly the case in this hearing.  In this blog I will first explain how the lack of an introductory summary resulted in a very confusing experience for me as a public observer;  then I’ll explain the background to this case (only possible because one of the parties kindly sent their position statement); and then describe the substantive content of this brief hearing. I’ll end with some brief reflections.

My experience of the hearing

I knew, from the listing, that this hearing concerned a dispute about Lasting Power of Attorney (LPA).

A Lasting Power of Attorney is a legal document wherein someone (a ‘donor’) appoints attorneys to make decisions on their behalf at a possible future time when they will lack mental capacity to make those decisions. There are two (separate) types. A health and welfare LPA concerns decisions such as those regarding medical care, including life-sustaining treatment, and residence. A property and financial affairs LPA concerns financial decisions, such as the paying of bills or selling a home. The donor must have the mental capacity to make the decision about the LPA when they sign the documents. 

LPAs are a very good way to ensure that, should you be unable to make a certain decision in the future, someone you know and trust will be able to make decisions in your best interests. It is worth pointing out that each LPA has a fee for registering. I mention this because despite knowing quite a lot about the intricacies of LPAs, the fee came as quite a surprise when a family member was registering their LPA. There are exemptions and reductions available, so you can still apply even if you may need financial assistance. 


I was sent the transparency order along with the link to the hearing well in advance, which is unusual and positive. This instilled in me a sense of optimism, and I felt that this signalled a clear commitment to open justice. 

At the beginning of the hearing, DDJ Chahal immediately acknowledged the presence of two public observers. However, this was only to tell us not to record the hearing,  before she dove straight into the substance of the matter. The judge was clearly familiar with the material, and did not ask Counsel for an introductory summary.

This had two negative effects. 

First, I had no idea what the actual substance of the disagreement between the parties was and it took me some time to work out who the barristers were representing, which made the hearing almost completely inaccessible.  

I knew from the transparency order that the applicant was the Public Guardian, and that there were four respondents. I deduced, from the fact that Courtney Step-Marsden was the first of the Counsel to address the judge, that she was the applicant representing the Public Guardian. I later deduced that Joss Knight, the other Counsel present, was representing the first and second respondents. 

However, that’s all I was able to know for definite. 

Due to the lack of introductory summary, I wasn’t able to follow the discussion between the judge and Counsel, and I wasn’t entirely clear what the nature of the disagreement was. I thought that this was a dispute about one LPA though, as I will discuss below, this was wrong. 

When public observers are admitted to a hearing, but no attempt is made to ensure they will be able to follow it, they are essentially being admitted as an act of lip service to the idea of transparency. This is not open and transparent justice; instead, it is closed and opaque justice. 

The second problematic effect of the lack of introductory summary is to do with the role of the protected party. It’s widely accepted that the protected party (P) should be at the centre of decision-making in the Court of Protection. However, it struck me at the end of the hearing that I did not know who P was – he was almost completely absent from the discussion. Counsel and the judge discussed ‘the LPA’ and ‘the Order’ but didn’t once circle back to P. 

Of course, this is probably because this is not the first time the parties have been in Court. Nevertheless, I feel very strongly that introductory summaries not only make hearings accessible to the public but also inevitably have an effect of re-establishing P as the person at the centre of the decision-making. But in this case, I didn’t notice a single mention of P: I didn’t even know he was a man until I was sent a position statement. 

This hearing was listed for one hour but only took half an hour. An introductory summary would have added a couple of minutes but would have ensured these proceedings were open and transparent for observers. In an email, Counsel for the Public Guardian wrote that they were instructed not to send the position statement of their client, and apologised that ‘the judge did not provide an opportunity for an introductory summary’.

It is regrettable that this was not done, and another observer has written about a similar experience with the same judge. However, I think it’s important that Counsel remember that they can offer to provide introductory summaries whether or not the judge signals that they should. Indeed, that happened in this case.


Background to the case

I am grateful to Counsel for the first and second  respondent (R1 and R2, two of P’s adult children) for sending me their (joint) position statement, which has allowed me to report on the details of this case.

P is a gentleman in his eighties who is living with late-stage dementia. He currently resides in a care home that provides specialist dementia care, and he is physically frail but receives commendable care. 

Strictly speaking, this case begins in 2016 when P appointed R1 and R2 as his attorneys for property and financial affairs. Three years later, he appointed them as attorneys for health and welfare. Then, a year later, ‘there was an attempted deed of revocation’ (quote from the position statement) of both LPAs (in effect, an attempt to make the LPAs null and void). 

But that same year, a doctor appointed by the Office of the Public Guardian (OPG) concluded that P ‘lacked capacity to execute the deeds of revocation’, and the OPG rejected them.

However, a month later, a revocation of the LPA for health & welfare was ‘produced’ (again, this is quoted from the position statement), and P signed a new (purported) LPA. This LPA appointed the 3rd and 4th respondents (R3 and R4, another of P’s adult children and P’s partner respectively) as attorneys for health & welfare. Finally, in mid-2021, the OPG applied to the Court of Protection in order to determine the validity of both the revocation and the new LPA. 

I do acknowledge that there’s some ambiguity in the above timeline. The position statement does not mention who attempted the deed of revocation, and what the attempt consisted of. Furthermore, the position statement does not explain who produced the final revocation. There is mention of a full chronology, which I assume clears up these ambiguities but I (of course) did not have access to that.  

The position statement explains that R3 does not challenge the original rejections of the deeds of revocation, and all parties accept the LPA for property & financial affairs first signed in 2016. 

The dispute, therefore, is whether P had capacity to revoke the original LPA for health and welfare, and appoint R3 and R4 as attorneys for health and welfare in a new LPA. It is the position of R1 and R2, as well as the Public Guardian, that P did not have capacity to do this.

Hearing of 14th April 2023 

In addition to the judge (DDJ Chahal) and the two lawyers, Courtney Step-Marsden of Outer Temple Chambers for the applicant, the Public Guardian and Joss Knight, of St John’s Chambers, for the first and second respondents), there were three other people present (on one screen, seated around a table) who I could not identify but who I think included at least one of the respondents. R3 and R4 were not present.

The Judge was clear from the outset that “this was only ever intended to be a directions hearing”. She did not have all of the information because not all of the relevant assessments were in the bundle, and therefore she was “not in a position to make an order”, not least because the parties disagree. 

Counsel for the Public Guardian explained that “there won’t be much further in terms of evidence”, and that the Public Guardian is broadly in step with the view of R1 and R2.

Counsel for R1 and R2 acknowledged that “there’s certainly contest between the parties”; namely, between the Public Guardian, R1, and R2 on the one hand, and R3 on the other. It was mentioned later in the hearing that nobody has been able to ascertain a position from R4, possibly due to ill-health. 

At this point in the hearing, it became clear that R3 had initially signalled her intention to attend but, when submitting her position statement the day before, said that she no longer would be attending. What was also clear was that R3 is diametrically opposed to the Public Guardian, R1, and R2: she wants the Court to appoint a deputy to make decisions. 

Counsel for R1 and R2 explained, “my position is thatthe third respondent wants to make various allegations and comments about the first and second respondents”, wants the Court to make final orders without being present, and “doesn’t appear to question the LPA.” R1 and R2’s position statement states that ‘none of this bears any relevance for the hearing and the proceedings….no concerns have been raised…about R1 and R2’s ability to carry out their duties under the LPAs’. Furthermore, the OPG has previously expressed the belief that it was not in P’s best interests for a deputy to be appointed. In sum, Counsel state that “this is a case where the Court should grasp the nettle and do what it will inevitably do.”

The Judge, however, disagreed. As the missing assessments were from R3, and apparently deal with the question of capacity, she would not make an Order. She decided that whilst there was no need for any further witness statements, she is going to give the opportunity for R4 “to file a witness statement within 14 days of the order”.

Finally, Counsel for R1 and R2 suggested that the Order from this hearing should encourage R3’s attendance at the next hearing. He was concerned that parties will prepare with the expectation that R3 will be present, and that they will be left in a similar situation of R3’s unexpected last-minute non-attendance. The Judge agreed to this, saying “if you indicate when position statements should be filed, and bring them forward a couple of weeks, that should notify us of the third respondent’s position”.

This case will return to Court, virtually, at a date to be set.  

Reflections
There are three things worth remarking upon. 

First, this situation has been going on for quite some time now. I find it quite remarkable that concerns about the validity of somebody’s LPA have been allowed to continue over a couple of years, during the course of which many decisions must have been made about health and welfare matters without any clarity about who should be making them.  It seems to me there has been an unacceptable delay. 

Second, knowing about this case is clearly in the public interest. This case illuminates the tensions within the role of the LPA, and the relevance of mental capacity in the making (and revocation) of LPAs. The substantive content of this case could be quite educational for members of the public who are considering appointing LPAs, as well as those who are acting as LPAs.

Finally, the experience of observing this hearing has demonstrated to me that there is still more work to be done in making the work of the Court of Protection open and transparent. I am grateful to Counsel for R1 and R2 for providing me with their position statement but I find it disappointing that the Public Guardian instructed their Counsel not to do so (especially given that their position is much the same). And of course, an introductory summary would have made the hearing much more accessible: judges and Counsel should aim to ensure that an introductory summary, in line with the advice from the (former) Vice President is provided, for the benefit of observers and to re-centre the discussion around P. It doesn’t need to be long; it just needs to allow public observers to be able to understand what we are hearing. 

Daniel Clark is a PhD student in the Department of Politics & International Relations at the University of Sheffield. His research takes seriously Iris Marion Young’s claim that older people are an oppressed social group, and is funded by WRoCAH. He tweets @DanielClark132

Unplanned disclosure and (still) no agreed ‘exit plan’: Re A (Covert medication: Closed Proceedings) [2022] EWCOP 44 continues

By Celia Kitzinger, 18th April 2023

The case concerns a 23-year-old woman (“A’), deprived of her liberty in a residential placement against her wishes, who is being given medication, covertly, that she consistently says she doesn’t want.  

The court has already made declarations that she lacks capacity to make decisions about residence, care, contact, and medical treatment (as a result of a Mild Learning Disability and Asperger’s Syndrome, plus ‘undue influence’ from her mother).  This was based on the report of an independent expert, back in September 2018.

She’s been refusing treatment for primary ovarian failure (also known as primary ovarian insufficiency).  The recommended treatment is hormone medication designed to ensure, first, that she goes through puberty, and then to reduce the risk of osteoporosis, cardiovascular disease and other health conditions associated with this diagnosis. Due to covert medication, she has now gone through puberty, but doctors recommend ongoing ‘maintenance’ treatment for the next thirty years or more.

Every day for two years she’s been offered the prescribed hormone treatment tablet and every day so far, she has declined to take it. That’s more than 700 treatment refusals. Each day, she is then given the medication covertly via her food or drink. 

The problem the court, and the professionals caring for her, face now is how to manage the situation long-term.  Obviously,  she can’t be kept in a care home and covertly medicated for three decades.  The question weighing on everyone’s mind is whether and how to tell her that she’s been covertly medicated, and how to persuade her to take the maintenance medication voluntarily.  

In an earlier judgment, Mr Justice Poole said that covert medication was “unsustainable in the long run”.  He directed that:
 “… a treatment plan should be devised, for review by the court, for how to exit the covert medication regime with the least possible harm being caused to A. The plan will cover the question of imparting information to A about the past use of covert medication – should that be done and if so, when, where and by whom….” (§48(iv) Re A (Covert medication: Closed Proceedings) [2022] EWCOP 44  15 September 2022)

The judge laid out detailed directions as to the work that needed to be done on this in preparation for a hearing in November 2022, but in the event, very little progress had been made by the time of the November hearing. and the judge expressed his disappointment with how little had been achieved.

So, the hearing of 13 March 2023 was primarily concerned with the same thing – what was the plan for telling A about the ongoing covert medication, and how was she to be persuaded to take it voluntarily. 

Background

When someone lacks capacity to make their own decision about whether or not to take medication, and they are refusing to take it, and attempts to persuade them have failed, carers are faced with a choice: either abandon the attempt, or hide the medication in the person’s food or drink so that they take it without knowing.

Each case is different.  The benefits of medication (or the risks of not taking it) vary depending on what the medication is for and the physical health of the patient.  These benefits need to be weighed up against the harm caused by deceiving the patient, and violating their wishes by secretly administering the medication they’ve refused.  There are other risks of covert medication too: unknown or variable amounts of medication may be ingested; the person receiving it cannot monitor possible side effects; and there’s also the risk of the patient discovering the pill ground up in the yoghurt or dissolved in the apple juice – and losing all trust in the people who are caring for them. 

Covert medication can be lawful if it’s determined to be in the best interests of someone who lacks capacity to make decisions for themselves, and in this case the young woman has been assessed as not being able to understand, retain or weigh the information necessary to make a capacitous decision about medication. (For a lawyer’s view on covert medication, take a look at the blog post by Aswini Weereratne KC.)  In this case, it’s lawful because a judge (HHJ Moir) considered the evidence, decided that A lacked capacity in relation to medication, and ruled that covert medication was in A’s best interests – and also that it was in her best interests that she should remain in residential care and have no contact with her mother, who was considered to be a bad influence on her, and that her mother should not be told about the covert medication. It was feared that the mother would tell her daughter about the covert medication, and that she would then stop accepting food and drink from carers.

The judge, HHJ Moir, made these decisions in a secret closed hearing – a hearing that wasn’t open to the public, and that neither the mother, nor the mother’s legal team, knew anything about at the time.  The case is now before a different (more senior) judge, Poole J, and is being heard in public.

This has been a long-running and complex case.  Observers blogged about hearings we’d watched in May 2020 before covert medication was authorised, and then in April 2022 after covert medication had been authorised but we didn’t know that it had because the court deceived the mother and her legal team into believing that her daughter was not being medicated, and we were deceived too (see “Medical treatment, undue influence and delayed puberty”).  In October 2022, we discovered the true facts and published a correction (“Statement from the Open Justice Court of Protection Project concerning an inaccurate and misleading blog post”). 

This case has raised challenging issues about covert medication.  It’s also highlighted the way in which the Court of Protection can use secret (‘closed’) court hearings to make decisions without family members being present and without them even being told that a hearing is happening – and how this can breach a family member’s rights to a fair trial.   We raised the alarm about ‘closed’ hearings when we discovered what had happened in this case, both via our blog post (Reflections on open justice and transparency in the light of Re A (Covert Medication: Closed Proceedings) [2022] EWCOP 44) and on the Radio 4 Law in Action programme (“Secrecy in the Court of Protection?” 27th October 2022).  The matter was then considered by a sub-committee of the Court of Protection Rules Committee (to which I made a submission: Closed Hearings: Submission to the Rules Committee).  In February 2023, the (then) Vice President published new Guidance on closed hearings.

Meanwhile, hearings for this young woman continue.

The last hearing was in November 2022 and it felt (as I wrote in my blog post, “No ‘exit plan’) “thoroughly dispiriting”.  Despite the efforts of counsel for the Trust (Joseph O’Brien KC) to inject a note of positivity into the proceedings by reminding everyone that the strategy of covert medication and secret hearings had “worked” and been “successful” (in the sense that A has now gone through puberty, which was certainly a key goal), the tone of proceedings felt (to me) rather muted and despondent.  The positive aspect (attainment of puberty) has to be weighed against the deception that has been involved and the public opprobrium the case has occasioned.  

I was very concerned, as was the judge, that no adequate and agreed exit plan had been put before the court, in line with his directions, at the November hearing. The judge pointed out – as he had previously – that if A were to discover in an unplanned way that she’d been treated without her knowledge and after explicitly refusing treatment, this could be harmful to her: the longer covert medication continues, the longer that risk continues.  At the end of the November hearing, it was agreed that there would be a hearing in mid-March at which (the judge said) the court will “review the updated medication plan, its implementation, issues of contact and whether there’s a need for any directions in relation to the residence application”

The hearing of 13th March 2023

This case (COP 13236134) was heard, remotely, at 10.30am on 13th March 2023 before Mr Justice Poole, sitting in Leeds.  

The parties and their representatives were the same as at the previous hearing. The applicant local authority was represented by Jodie James-Stadden.  The first respondent, the protected party in this case (“A”), was represented (via her litigation friend the Official Solicitor) by Sam Karim KC.  The second respondent was A’s mother, represented by Mike O’Brien KC. The third respondent was the hospital trust, represented by Joseph O’Brien KC.

A key part of this hearing was supposed to be a review of the updated plan for moving from the current position in which A is being given involuntary covert medication, to the ideal position in which A voluntarily agrees to take medication.  Some work had been done on this plan during February – but 10 days before the hearing (on 3rd March 2023), the situation suddenly changed.  Staff conducting an ‘educational’ session with A informed her that she had reached puberty. This hadn’t been anticipated in the plan, so it’s back to the drawing board to determine how the plan should now be developed. There is an additional problem now in that A seems to believe that, as she has gone through puberty ‘naturally’ (she has no reason to believe otherwise), she does not have Primary Ovarian Failure (POF).  The Multi-Disciplinary Team (MDT)  “is now required to decipher how to overcome A’s resistance in accepting the diagnosis of POF” – and with it, the need for continued endocrine treatment (Official Solicitor’s Position Statement).

Instead of reviewing an updated plan, the hearing covered a number of issues that I’ll deal with separately: (1) transparency matters; (2) the unplanned disclosure to A that she’s gone through puberty; (3) expert reassessment of A’s capacity and related issues; (4) contact between mother and daughter; (5) permission to appeal out of time against earlier decisions by HHJ Moir.

1. Transparency Matters

I almost didn’t get to observe this hearing because it hadn’t been listed properly.  This is a repeated problem when Tier 3 judges (who usually hear cases in the Royal Courts of Justice in London) sit in other courts across England and Wales.  These hearings are not included in the Royal Courts of Justice cause list (which is where we normally find Tier 3 judges’ hearings) but are supposed instead to be listed in the Court of Protection list in CourtServe – which is the only way for members of the public to find out about court hearings outside of London.  They are often not there.  I’ve blogged about the problem previously (e.g. here) and raised it with the (former) Vice President and with His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunal Service (HMCTS).  I’ve also written previously to Poole J about this very problem when it affected a different hearing before him.

Poole J opened the hearing by stating that it had been “noteworthy, given the history of the case” that he’d not received any observer requests and that he’d learnt it was “because of the way it’s listed”, which he described as “an unsatisfactory situation” that  occurs “regularly” and “needs to be remedied”.  I’m very pleased (finally!) to see a judge take listing problems seriously and hope communication with HMCTS  from Poole J might be more successful than my communications with them in effecting change. I only found out about the hearing when the judge’s clerk emailed me shortly beforehand to let me know it was happening, and I was able to drop everything and attend. (I think the judge also delayed the start of the hearing by 45 minutes to allow me to be there from the beginning.)  I’m very grateful to Mr Justice Poole for supporting open justice in this way – but of course it shouldn’t be necessary – and other members of the public who wanted to observe hearings in this case were excluded because it wasn’t listed correctly.

I also note that there continues to be a draconian set of reporting restrictions relating to this hearing.  In addition to the usual restrictions on identifying the protected party at the centre of the case, and her family members, we are prohibited from identifying the public bodies (the local authority and NHS Trust) and the expert witness (Transparency Order signed by Mr Justice Poole, dated 15th September 2022). 

2. Unplanned disclosure to A that she’s gone through puberty

Counsel for the local authority said that the plan had been that A was not to be told that she’d achieved puberty “and if she raised questions that was to be taken back to the MDT for responses to be formulated”.  Now that – contrary to the plan – she has been told she’s gone through puberty, “there needs to be an urgent MDT to revisit the plan”. Meanwhile, everyone agrees (said counsel) that the maintenance medication should continue to be given covertly while the MDT works out “what narrative she is going to be told”.  

At the moment, there’s a confusing narrative before her, as she’s been told she has POI and that without taking the medications – the medications she’s been offered and refused daily – she would not experience puberty.  Now she’s been told that while she still has POI, she has experienced puberty – and she’s gone through puberty without taking medication, as far as she’s concerned.  That is a difficult and inconsistent position to be in.  The MDT needs to reconsider the plan and come up with a coherent explanation to help P make sense of what is happening to her.” (Counsel for the local authority)

The mother’s Position Statement describes what happened in more detail.  

At a session on 3 March 2023, A suggested to health staff that she had breasts and that she had therefore reached puberty.  A therefore now knows she has reached puberty.  Staff implied it had occurred naturally in order to keep the covert medication secret from her.  They said she continued to need to take the medication for her heart and bones.  It looks like A was left with the impression that she had achieved puberty naturally but late and therefore she seemed to think she did not have Primary Ovarian Insufficiency (‘POI’ or ‘POF’).

The Position Statement goes on to quote from an email from the local authority’s solicitor describing what was reported to him about the conversation with A.  Apparently during the course of a health education session involving a talking mat, A was asked what Primary Ovarian Failure was and placed the response “a ladies breast will grow” (sic) under the “don’t know/depends” category.  She was then informed that “if you have POF breasts won’t grow” and “immediately questioned this as she stated I have breasts”. Asked whether she thoughts she had gone through puberty, A said, “I’ve not given it a thought, but subconsciously thought I had. But I don’t have the problem [i.e. POF]”. When told she does have a diagnosis of POF, “she continues to fail to accept the diagnosis”.  One of the professionals working with her explained that she’d gone through puberty later than other girls and explained that a review of her medical records confirms the diagnosis, to which A said, “You are going to say something completely different to what I’ve said in an extremely long-winded way”. 

Her mother is concerned that A has been told that puberty happened naturally but late, and consequently thinks she has not got POI and does not need medication to deal with it. She’s also worried that A will guess that she’s been covertly medicated. She wants to be involved in explaining to A why she should (voluntarily) take the maintenance medication, and believes that she would be able to persuade her – whereas professionals have failed to over the last four years.  She’s currently forbidden to talk to A about medication issues.  This is because the  MDT members distrust A’s mother, and don’t believe she really wants A to take the medication. The Trust “continues to have some concerns as to whether [the mother’s] wish to support A in taking the maintenance medication reflects a genuine recognition and acceptance on her part that such medication is life sustaining and enhancing for A” (from the Trust Position Statement).  

In court, Counsel for the mother described “an incident on Friday where A confronted her mother about the fact that she’s reached puberty”.  He said:

“[Mother] had been picked up in a bus with two care staff and A joined them.  She turned to her mother and said she’d been told she’d achieved puberty and she was wondering why, then, she was still detained and whether she could come home.  [Her mother] realised that carers had reacted in some alarm, and said ‘what can I say?’. Carers then cut off the discussion and [the mother] changed the conversation to what they were doing next.  So this signals that A is well aware of the implications of having achieved puberty, and her mother is concerned about this.”

He added that the concept of covert medication is not new to A and that – at some time in the past – she had avoided drinks that could have been tampered with in this way and insisted on bottled water.

The judge intervened to say simply (as he has said before) that “covert medication cannot continue for ever.  It is not sustainable in the long term. It is best that it should come to an end in a managed way.”

Counsel for the Trust was also concerned that “A believing that she has gone through puberty without medication may lead her to become entrenched in her position that she does not need maintenance medication”. Despite concerns about the mother’s involvement, he accepted that she did now need to be involved in the collective effort to “get A on side in terms of taking medication voluntarily”. 

The Official Solicitor (appointed to represent A’s best interests) now believes that the mother “must be intrinsically involved, and be at the forefront, of any plan that seeks to promote A accepting the diagnosis of POF and the need for treatment… Her positive involvement is of magnetic importance”. 

So, the matter of the revised plan (with the mother centrally involved) will return at the next hearing.

In the closing judgment, Poole J said that the situation needed to be handled both with urgency and with delicacy, sensitivity and professionalism.  He directed that there should be an MDT meeting and then a round table meeting with the legal representatives from all parties with a focus on communication with A and formulation of involvement of the mother.  “The ideal outcome is that A will accept maintenance medication in a sustained way for the rest of her life. That will be achieved most easily – or most effectively, I should say, not easily! – in full knowledge of the truth.  The worst outcome is that she finds out inadvertently and reacts with hostility.  I leave it for the professionals to work it out and the plan will be reviewed by me in four to six weeks from now.”

(3) Expert reassessment of A’s capacity and related issues

The impetus for reassessment of A’s capacity (in all the relevant domains) came from the Official Solicitor.  It was motivated, in part, by the independent expert’s observation (back in September 2018) that “may gain capacity having regard to her young age, and if a range of support structures are in place to empower A, including increasing her skill-base and knowledge”. The expert also said that “achieving puberty may improve cognitive maturation and help her to gain capacity”.  An independent expert could also be asked to consider related issues e.g. the likely consequences of A being informed that she’s been covertly medicated, why she’s resistant to treatment, and what can be done to change her mind. 

Counsel for the local authority said they were neutral on the subject of an expert being appointed, but were “not convinced that further professionals are going to assist in the mix”.  The local authority has “some concern with overwhelming A with professionals, as she is quite resistant”.  However, if there is to be appointment of an expert, then they are in favour of appointing the same one as last time.

Counsel for the mother said there were fears that A would not cooperate with the previous expert and that “a new set of eyes” were more likely to elicit her cooperation.  The mother would also like the  expert appointed to assess the effects on A of a four-year separation from her family.

The Trust took the position that this was an appropriate time to revisit capacity because “the current evidence is quite old” and “puberty may be relevant to her cognitive functioning”; and that there are compelling reasons for appointing the same expert as previously because “he knows the background; he is aware of the relationship between mother and daughter; he knows where to tread delicately.  There are considerable dangers in inviting another expert without that knowledge and experience”.  This seemed to resonate with the judge who said he “wouldn’t want the involvement of an expert assessing capacity and having to discuss issues of medication with A at this delicate time to interfere with the MDT process of deciding what information should be imparted and how.  “This sounds disrespectful but (laughs), I don’t want an expert crashing in, as it were, on this delicate process”.  With the previous expert, it seems, that is “less likely to happen”.  Counsel also said that the Trust “don’t see the point of asking the expert to look at the impact of four years separation from her family – that’s not relevant to capacity or to the medication plan”. 

In the closing judgment, Poole J said that he had to be satisfied that it was “necessary” before appointing an expert to give further evidence.  “On the issue of capacity, I am persuaded it’s necessary.  She’s achieved puberty and it was foreseen in earlier expert evidence that changes and maturation of the brain with puberty may impact on her capacity. I am not persuaded that the other issues floated need to be revisited but an assessment of capacity, especially in relation to residence, care and treatment, is necessary.  As to the identity of the expert, Mr Mike O’Brien says on behalf of the mother that A distrusts the expert who saw her last time, but he has knowledge of the context and there is a benefit to continuity.  The qualification is that he should not meet A until after the next hearing.  Priority should now be given to providing information for A.  I am a little fearful that involvement of an expert, even [the same one as last time], at the same time as that process is ongoing could disrupt it inadvertently.

4. Contact between mother and daughter

Current contact arrangements are two half-hour supervised telephone calls a week, and supervised weekly face-to-face visit of one hour, with discretion to extend that up to two hours.  Contact has generally gone well, and the mother would like to increase the weekly visit for up to three hours.  She also wants A to be able to attend her grandfather’s funeral.

Counsel for the local authority said they do not recommend any changes to the contact arrangements because “the focus should be on enhancing the health promotional work, and there shouldn’t be additional distractions to A at the present time. She has an awful lot going on at the moment. She’s been informed she’s gone through puberty. Her grandfather passed away a week ago, and there’s the suggestion of additional experts. So, the local authority would prefer to restrict contact to up to two hours and review this in four to six weeks.”

Counsel for the mother said that in fact contact has never been two hours:  “the longest visit has been an hour and a half”.  He drew attention to the Official Solicitor’s view that the mother’s involvement in persuading A to agree to maintenance medication is of “magnetic importance” and said  that longer visits would make it more likely that the mother can fulfil this role.  “[Mother] knows A can be stubborn and difficult, particularly about professional advice.  It may take her a bit of time, but she thinks she can persuade her.” 

In the closing judgment, Poole J reflected on the fact that contact has gone well.  “There’s no evidence that [A’s mother] has given inappropriate information. This is a suitable time for contact to be extended to supervised face-to-face contact once a week for up to three hours. Arrangements should also be made for A to attend her grandfather’s funeral.”

(5) Permission to appeal out of time against earlier decisions by HHJ Moir

Counsel for the mother asked for permission to appeal against the decisions made by HHJ Moir in the closed hearing of 25th September 2020, from which the mother and her legal team were excluded.  He set out detailed reasons why permission should be granted.  The judge did not grant permission and gave a full and separate judgment giving his reasons for not granting permission to file an appeal.  A transcript of Poole J’s decision will be made available to the parties and (the judge has said) to me when it is ready.  I will blog separately about this aspect of the hearing when I have received the transcript and can be sure that I am entirely accurate in reporting the reasons for the judge’s decision.

Concluding remarks

In his closing judgment, Poole J effectively pursued the same line of reasoning as in previous hearings.  He remains concerned that A might realise that she has been covertly medicated and lose all further trust in professionals.  He wants a plan as to how she is to be told about the covert medication and an ‘exit plan’ to enable a move from covert to voluntary medication.  He continues to request this of the MDT,  which has so far failed to provide an adequate (and agreed) plan despite this having been requested since November 2022 – and subsequent events have overtaken the draft ‘exit plan’ they had expected to present to the court.  He’s also increased face-to-face contact between mother and daughter, which is surely necessary given the central role the mother is now envisaged as having in implementing the ‘exit plan’ with her daughter.  Meanwhile, covert medication remains in place, as does A’s deprivation of liberty which the judge considers “necessary, proportionate and in her best interests”.  The question of where A will live “will be considered once there’s more clarity on the use of medications and communications with A”.  

It seems to me that the court is now in the unenviable position of trying to help the MDT extricate itself from the entirely untenable situation it’s in following the directions of HHJ Moir.  I am left wondering how everyone thought this would be brought to a satisfactory conclusion.  What  ‘exit plan’ was envisaged at the point the judge set the wheels in motion for covert medication?  Nobody can have imagined that A could be detained and covertly medicated for the next 30 years – but nobody seems to have planned for any alternative.  

Celia Kitzinger is co-director of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project.  She’s personally observed more than 420 hearings. You can follow her on Twitter @KitzingerCelia

After the kidney transplant: The view from “Team William”

By Ami McLennan, 16th April 2023

Editorial note:  This is a blog post by Ami McLennan whose son, William Verden, was at the centre of Court of Protection proceedings in 2022.  The key issue before the court was whether it was in William’s best interests to have a kidney transplant (if a donor could be found so that this would be possible).  Several observers blogged about the hearings from a range of difference perspectives (e.g. Introducing an upcoming hearing: Is a kidney transplant in his best interests?Is a kidney transplant in his best interests?Listen to him, listen to his mother: The William Verden hearingAdvocacy in the William Verden hearing: Observations from a trainee barrister).  The judge concluded that a transplant would be in William’s best interests.  The judgment is publicly available: Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust v William Verden & Amy McLennan [2022] EWCOP 9.  (Note: There’s an earlier judgment which explains why  – unusually – we can name William and identify him publicly: Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust v Verden & Anor [2022] EWCOP 4).  The transplant took place on 7th August 2022.  In this blog post Ami McLennan reflects on the circumstances that led up to the court case, and brings us up-to-date on what’s happened since William had his kidney transplant.  

In December 2019, my son William Verden was diagnosed with a rare kidney disease which required kidney dialysis to keep him alive. He also has autism and a learning disability. This means he finds it more difficult to cope with going to hospital and receiving medical treatment. 

William began to show signs of anxiety and occasionally aggressive behaviour while he was in the hospital as an inpatient for an infection whilst on peritoneal dialysis.  It was all unknown to William and he had no idea he was so poorly and no idea why he was there.  Due to William’s needs, he requires time to process things and it’s very important he’s given the opportunity to do this. Whilst receiving dialysis, clinicians were frequently unable to complete some of the tests required, such as taking William’s blood pressure every 30 minutes as William would present in an anxious manner, due to needing the time to process what is happening. Many routine medical procedures, when not carried out with proper concern for William’s needs, could cause William to behave in ways that professionals find challenging. I felt that some doctors and nurses became agitated because they were unable to complete tests in what is deemed a ‘normal’ timeline. 

Clinicians felt that it was not in William’s best interests to continue on haemodialysis, which was the next best available treatment, as the peritoneal dialysis was not working properly; the only alternative options proposed were  kidney transplant or palliative care. We were told by his clinicians that William’s behaviours were so aggressive that he would not tolerate dialysis long-term and would not be able to cope with the care needed post-transplant, without a long period of sedation and ventilation in the Intensive Care Unit.  

I was devastated by the news that there appeared to be no active treatment options available for William. I was told that the risks of the period of time in intensive care were likely to outweigh the benefit of William receiving a new kidney.  So that left palliative care.  I felt angry and upset – his life didn’t seem to matter because he was thought of as “broken”. But surely, he deserves the same chance at life as anyone else.

There was a delay of a year before William was put on the transplant list, while doctors continued to recommend the palliative care route, which was very wrong in my opinion. The only way he got on to the transplant list in the end was because we went to court – and I don’t think that should have been necessary. 

I was over the moon when the clinicians agreed, during the court proceedings, that the risks of 14 days of sedation and ventilation, although not without risk, would not outweigh the benefits of having the kidney transplant. 

Then I thought it would be difficult to find a donor but the call came through about five months later that there was a deceased donor. I was in complete shock and dropped the phone. I kept pinching myself. My boy has a chance at last – this was all we’d ever hoped for. My anxiety was running high but my heart was exploding with sheer relief. 

William had his kidney transplant in August 2022. It all happened really quickly once the donor was found, which in my opinion was better for William. When we went into hospital for the transplant he just thought he was having a dialysis session – but he was sedated and taken to theatre.  His time in intensive care was hard both emotionally and mentally for both William and for me. William’s kidney took a long time to work, meaning he required further dialysis to remove fluid. I just kept praying, and I kept reading to him and talking to him. It helped me to help him in a strange way.  William coped very well with both recovery from the transplant itself and the sedation and ventilation. 

When William was extubated, a team was on standby to restrain him as the doctors expressed concern that he would pull lines out and act aggressively. However, William did not touch anything and did not attempt to do so.

After being weaned off sedation, there were only a couple of incidents where William hallucinated and thought that someone was pulling the central line in his neck. As this line was not being used, I requested that it be removed to minimise the risk of him pulling it and making him more anxious. 

When in ITU, William contracted sepsis and E.coli, and had urine infections constantly until December 2022. However, his blood tests from January, February and March 2023 show that he is improving all the time. Recovery is a work in progress, and we still do struggle to encourage William to drink 3 litres of fluids and urinate. The doctors were concerned that William’s stay in ITU could have an impact on his mental health and general wellbeing following the surgery. However, none of the psychological risks have occurred. William does not appear to remember being in ITU or having a transplant. William is back to his old self and is able to enjoy his life again, playing golf, snooker and just being back at home.

When he was poorly after the transplant, the doctors were saying “we said this would happen” and “don’t get your hopes up” – but he pulled through,  like I always knew he would.  If I’d listened to them and not taken the case to court, William would have been sent home in September last year, and had palliative care, and he would be dead now.

Parents know their children best and medical professionals need to listen more to parents, and learn more about children and adults with additional needs –  because in my experience there is a lot of ignorance among health care professionals about people with learning disabilities and autism.

If I were presented with this situation again, I would most definitely do it all again in a heartbeat. William’s situation demonstrated to me that although there are risks to being placed in intensive care, it was absolutely the right decision for William.  

Finally I want to say to parents of other children with autism and learning disabilities that it’s worth going to court when you don’t agree with what doctors are saying is in your child’s best interests.  Judges can be fair and you can get the right outcome.

Ami McLennan is William Verden’s mother. 

Note: With thanks to Ami McLennan for the photograph of her son.

Disadvantaged litigants in person and a long search for a placement

By Celia Kitzinger, 14th April 2023

This very short hearing (just half an hour) interested me for two reasons.  First, it tells yet another story indicative of the horrendous pressures on social care in England, with suitable placements hard to come by.  Second, it raised for me some worries about the way the judge treated the parents, who were unrepresented parties (‘litigants in person’) in this case.

Background

It’s a recurrent theme. A vulnerable person is in unsuitable – even dangerous – accommodation, with care that doesn’t meet their needs.  Everyone agrees the current placement is not in their best interests and they should move somewhere else.  But there’s nothing else available.  And this goes on for months or years. 

The young man at the centre of this case (“P”) is a teenager diagnosed with a severe learning disability.  He also has epilepsy and glaucoma affecting his eyesight.  It’s reported that he can “exhibit challenging behaviours” and that he “requires a high level of support to meet his needs, currently 2:1 care”. 

The local authority, London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham, made an application in June 2021 to determine where he should live after turning 18 and since then there have been many hearings – none I which I’ve observed, until now.

In April 2022, under circumstances that weren’t discussed in court, the local authority moved P to his current supported living placement “without court authorisation or the agreement of [P’s] family or his litigation friend. The local authority’s statement… addresses this move with an apology”.  He’s been there ever since and it’s not worked out well for him.

There’s been ongoing concern about care provision. By the end of 2022, after eight months in the new placement, there was “a marked deterioration” in P’s wellbeing – including two hospital admissions due to epileptic seizures.  The provider had no permanent staff and was relying on agency workers.  Faced with different and unfamiliar staff, P was refusing medication, activities and personal care. A safeguarding investigation found problems with staff knowledge about seizures and medication, the Official Solicitor has “serious concerns about the current placement”, and family members have been raising multiple concerns about the impact of poor quality care on P’s physical health. All parties have been agreed since November 2022 that it’s not in P’s best interests to stay at this placement.  

But there isn’t anywhere else for him to go.  

He’s been in a placement that doesn’t meet his needs for a year now, and clearly something needs to be done. Enquiries with appropriate placements within the borough have drawn a blank.  And the family are concerned about an out-of-borough placement. It would take P away from his familiar local area and make it harder for them to visit him. The parents are (separately) parties to this case as litigants in person.

The position at the beginning of this hearing was that the applicant local authority and the Official Solicitor have agreed that the search should now be broadened to consider possible out-of-borough placements.  But it turns out that the parents have not read the draft order so they’re in no position to agree (or disagree) with it.  I have some concerns about the way this was managed in court: the outcome of the hearing was that the judge ordered that out-of-borough options are now to be considered, without properly eliciting the parents’ views on the matter, despite their party status. 

The hearing

The hearing (COP 13796659) was listed for 2pm on Thursday 13th April 2023 before Deputy District Judge Chahal, sitting remotely (via MS Teams) at First Avenue House in London.  

There were three observers, and (unusually) we were sent the Transparency Order in advance. It’s in the standard terms, i.e. we can report and comment on these proceedings so long as we don’t publish anything that “identifies or is likely to identify” P and his family members, or where any of them live, or their contact details.  

The parents were both in court, sharing the same screen and joined (on a different screen) by their interpreter (for a Central Asian language).  His sister, fluent in English, and articulate in her interventions, was also present.

The applicant party, the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham, was represented by Darren Ward of 5 Pump Court. The young man at the centre of the case (P) was not in court in person. He was represented, via his litigation friend the Official Solicitor, by Gemma Daly of Doughty Street Chambers. The parents were (separate) litigants in person (i.e. each of them was party to the case, but neither had a legal team).  

There was some faffing around before the hearing started to ensure that the parents had video and audio access, and then some issues to resolve with the interpreter, who spoke a different version of the same language as the parents, with variations in pronunciation, grammar and vocabulary.  It was established that this was unlikely to cause problems – and the judge did check on this when the hearing started, a few minutes later than listed.

Although the judge acknowledged the presence of observers by referring to the Transparency Order and reminding us that we were not allowed to record the hearing, she did not ask the applicant for an opening summary, and nor did she provide one herself.  This is not in accordance with the memo from the former Vice President of the Court of Protection, which reads: 

… a small practical suggestion to improve access to the business of the Court when press or other members of the public join a virtual hearing. Whilst the judge and the lawyers will have read the papers and be able to move quickly to engage with the identified issues, those who are present as observers will often find it initially difficult fully to grasp what the case is about. I think it would be helpful, for a variety of reasons, if the applicant’s advocate began the case with a short opening helping to place the identified issues in some context. (as reproduced on the Mental Capacity Law and Policy blog

Sometimes when judges forget (or don’t know about) the need for an opening summary, one of the barristers will step in helpfully to provide one anyway (as Ben McCormack did in a case I blogged recently).  But that didn’t happen here, and so it was hard to follow what was happening especially in the first half of the hearing.  Failure to provide opening summaries undermines the judicial commitment to transparency.

The facts provided in the beginning of this blog post only began to emerge towards the end of the hearing, and many of them are taken from the Position Statement I requested and received from the Official Solicitor. (There was no response to my request for the local authority’s Position Statement.) Especially in the absence of opening summaries, but also as a general practice, it is worth googling the names of the lawyers at the beginning of the hearing, obtaining their emails, and then contacting them right away to ask each one for their Position Statement.  A Position Statement is the document prepared in advance by each (represented) party, laying out the background to the case and the position they take now on what should happen next and the order they want the judge to make.

In this hearing, the draft order had been agreed in advance between the local authority and the Official Solicitor – but not with the parents, who said they hadn’t read it.  I expected the judge to call a short adjournment so that the parents could read it and/or have it explained to them via one of the lawyers, but instead the judge explained very briefly what was in it and said they could read it after the hearing.

It outlines further steps to take to progress the case –  so there are further documents disclosed and further searches for a residential placement, with the case coming back before the court at the earliest available date after 29th May.  And I’m going to ask someone for the Official Solicitor to run through the order with you after the end of this hearing so that you’re aware of its content. The important thing is that there’s now agreement, it seems, that there will be a wider search for a placement, including out of borough, which is a very welcome development, I think, that will assist in taking matters forward.[1]

The judge then said that “unless there’s anything further, I will ask for the order by 10am tomorrow” and seemed ready to end the hearing, without giving the parents the opportunity to express their (possibly divergent) views about the draft order that had been agreed by the other parties.  I’m fairly sure, from what happened next, that the parents did indeed have views about out-of-borough placement options, and this was the place in the hearing where they should have been able to share them. But they were not invited to do so.  I found this somewhat concerning – especially as the parents are litigants in person. It didn’t seem fair.

Fortunately, Gemma Daly (counsel for P via the Official Solicitor) intervened with a “practical point” about the searches that would now (assuming the order were to be approved, as the judge had already indicated it would be) extend out of borough.  She raised a concern about whether and how family could travel to get to any new proposed placement, and recommended consultation with the parents about this.  The judge then asked “Does anyone know if the parents drive?” (I don’t know why she didn’t ask them directly via the interpreter) – and was told the father did.  At which point P’s sister intervened  – in my view, very helpfully since she corrected my misapprehension at this point (which might also have been the judge’s misapprehension) that her father would be able unproblematically to drive her mother to visit P.

Can I just say something in regard to the driving part.  My parents are actually today attending a funeral, which is why they are here together.  But they are separated.  Dad does drive, but he only visits P about once a week.  He is at work during the day.  Mum does not drive, and she is the person who visits a lot.  Sometimes I drive Mum there, but I am at work so I cannot always do that.  At the moment there is a convenient bus route for Mum to visit P.  I am just putting that out there.”

The judge responded by saying that in considering proposed new placements, ease of family visits would be “one of the issues that will be taken into account in determining P’s best interests”, but that it was “not determinative”. She suggested that the social worker (who I think was also in court) should discuss with the mother how the transportation issues would work in relation to putative placements, and said “these are very much practical issues which I hope will be capable of resolution if the parties are able to discuss them fully and frankly”. But as far as I know there is nothing in the order that says anything about the way in which the widening of the search for a placement should take account of the mother’s ability to visit. If there had been, surely the judge would have said so as a way of reassuring the family at this point.

Reflections

From what I heard, and have since read in the Position Statement from the Official Solicitor, I absolutely understand the need for the search to be broadened out-of-borough, since P’s current placement is clearly failing to meet his needs.  But it’s also, presumably, in P’s best interests, for his mother (and other family members) to be able to visit regularly – and it’s his mother who seems to have been picking up some of the problems with his care at the moment, and is likely to be an important person in supporting him with the transition to a new home and new carers.  

There has been some resistance from the family to moving P out of the borough.  Earlier this year, they apparently “refused to visit the out of borough available placement due to its location” – so I’m troubled that they were not given the opportunity to express their views on the “agreed” order during this hearing.  

I’m really uncomfortable that the parents, two parties to this case, were apparently caught by surprise in this hearing: they had not read the draft order[2], were not offered a short adjournment to do so, got only a very cursory summary of it in court, and were not given the opportunity to comment on the key issue in the order concerning widening the search to out-of-borough placement options.  I don’t suppose expressing their views would have made a difference to the judge’s decision to widen the search in this difficult situation, but the parents should have had an opportunity to express their concerns and those concerns should have been properly addressed in the hearing and taken into account in the order.

If one or both parents had benefited from legal representation, I’m certain the judge would have provided their lawyers with a slot to raise concerns about the order agreed by the other parties – and maybe the lawyer would have been able to ensure something went into the order about giving full consideration to the mother’s ability to visit in selecting between possible out-of-borough options (if, in fact, there turn out to be any options).  This seems to me clearly one of those situation where litigants in person were at a disadvantage, and the judge did not provide the kind of support for them that I’ve (repeatedly) witnessed in other Court of Protection hearings. Usually, in my experience,  judges go out of their way to help litigants in person. In this hearing, it felt as though they were side-lined. It also seemed not in accord with the usual display of empathy I see from Court of Protection judges engaging with litigants in person – in this case, with an obviously devoted mother whose commitment to visiting her son seemed to be treated as a potential impediment to effecting his best interests.  Despite my sense that they were not treated as they should have been, neither parent showed any upset or anger at what was happing in court (as far as I could tell).

The barrister representing P (via the Official Solicitor), Gemma Daly, played a wholly positive role in these proceedings in relation to the family litigants in person[3].  She raised early on the point that the parents had not agreed to the order (“I haven’t received a response from them about it”) and she alerted the court to the problem of family transportation to visit P – after the judge had indicated she was ready to approve the order and end the hearing without giving the parents the opportunity to express their views.  She also asked about using the existing video-platform link to discuss the order with the parents once the observers and judge left (the benefit of this, presumably, was that the interpreter and P’s sister would remain and participate) – and that discussion was just beginning as I left the hearing. But of course, by that time the judge had approved the order without hearing from these two parties.

So, this was a troubling hearing both because it exposed the shortcomings of social care and because it raised – at least for me – concerns about procedural fairness for litigants in person.  In my view, this hearing (which lasted for only 30 minutes of its scheduled hour) would have better exemplified what I have come to expect from the Court of Protection if time had been taken during the hearing itself to provide a fuller explanation of the ‘agreed’ draft order to broaden the search out of borough, and if the parents, as litigants in person, had been given the opportunity to address the judge and explain their views about that. As the judiciary’s Equal Treatment Handbook says: “When parties do not get the outcome they would like or expect, it is particularly important that they feel they were fairly treated, fully heard and fully understood.”

Celia Kitzinger is co-director of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project and has personally observed more than 400 hearings.  You can follow her on Twitter @KitzingerCelia


[1] Quotations from the hearing are based on touch-typed contemporaneous notes and are as accurate as I can make them, but are unlikely to be exactly verbatim.

[2] Counsel for the Official Solicitor said the draft order had been sent to the parents, but the parents said they hadn’t read it, without giving any reasons. So I don’t know why they hadn’t read the order. It may have been that it was sent only in English and their English was not good enough to make sense of it without an interpreter, or simply that the legal language was baffling, as it often is even for first-language English speakers.  I’m also guessing that the order was sent only the day before the hearing (the Position Statement is dated 12th April 2023, the day before the hearing, which leads me to think the draft order may also be of that date). Their daughter told the court that her parents were at a funeral on the day of the hearing, so they may simply not have opened their emails or had time to read what was sent.  I wonder, too, if they’d been represented, whether their lawyers might have asked for an adjournment due to the funeral – it must have been a stressful experience to attend both the court hearing and the funeral on the same day.           

[3] There is useful guidance for lawyers on dealing with litigants in person: https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/topics/civil-litigation/litigants-in-person-guidelines-for-lawyers  The Equal Treatment Bench Book (for judges) also has a chapter on litigants in person.

Conflating capacity and best interests? Cross-examining a neuropsychiatrist

By Claire Martin, 25th March 2023

Mr A is the applicant in this case. He is currently deprived of his liberty in a care home setting.  He has made a s.21A application challenging his deprivation of liberty on the grounds that he has capacity to make the relevant decisions about his care, residence and finances, and he wants to return home. Mr A’s case has been before the Court of Protection for around a year, since March 2022.

The position of the Local Authority (which the Transparency Order prevents me from naming)[1] is that Mr A lacks capacity to make the relevant decisions.  The Local Authority is, however, considering a return home as possibly in Mr A’s best interests and will support a trial of his living at home (for a month) once his home has been decluttered and made habitable. They are also exploring a supported living placement.

I’ll begin by laying out the background to this hearing insofar as I understand it.  I’ll then give a sense of the way this hybrid hearing was conducted, illustrated in detail by the expert witness evidence to show the type of questioning that can be faced by witnesses in court.  Finally, I’ll reflect on the hearing, including the potential difficulties that assessors come up against when assessing capacity at one moment in time for capacity to make decisions that, in practice, will need to be made at another point in time. 

Background

Unfortunately for me as an observer the Position Statement says ‘The background to these proceedings is well known to the court. The matter was also last before the court on 6 February 2023. As such, the background to proceedings will not be set out here“. 

There have been four capacity assessment reports from psychiatrists (I don’t think four different psychiatrists though) all of which have concluded that Mr A lacks capacity for the decisions in question, to:

a. Conduct the proceedings;

b. Make decisions about his residence;

c. Make decision about his care; and

d. Manage his finances.

The expert witness at today’s hearing, Dr Thomas Elanjithara, wrote one of those reports (in February 2023), and also reached the view that Mr A lacked capacity for all of those areas.

Mr A ‘strongly asserts his capacity’ (counsel) and my understanding is that a final declaration that he lacks capacity has not yet been made, so this hearing was to enable the cross-examination of the expert witness to enable the court to reach a determination about Mr A’s capacity for the decisions in question.  

The respondent in the case (the Local Authority) does not dispute Dr Elanjithara’s evidence, and has made an application to be appointed Property and Financial Affairs deputy for Mr A (which he is worried about) and at the same time is in the process of exploring options for different types of less restrictive accommodation for Mr A, including a trial in his own home. They are also trying to sort out other things for Mr A, such as helping him with ‘community access’, ‘reablement’ and to do some volunteering. 

What I’ve gleaned from the Position Statement, and the hearing that I observed, is that Mr A is a 70-year-old man who had a haematoma in 2021 and has been living in his current care setting since then. He has a history of alcohol misuse and Dr Elanjithara has diagnosed Mr A with alcohol related brain damage (ARBD) (commonly referred to as alcohol-related dementia) caused by thiamine and nutritional deficiency. He uses the term ‘alcohol related neurocognitive disorder,’ which describes alcohol related brain injury where there are cognitive and executive functioning problems. 

Hannah Bakshani gave a helpful introduction to the case, explaining that Mr A had struggled with alcohol dependency and had been found at home with blood in his bed (I think was in 2021) and, following a stay in hospital, has subsequently lived at his current care setting. I am not sure what sort of a setting this is, but it is quite ‘restrictive’ and that there is a lot of support in place, Mr A himself feels restricted and does not want to live there. As Hannah Bakshani said, Mr A ‘strongly objects’ to being kept in the care setting. I don’t think Mr A is currently drinking – I formed the impression during the hearing that he is closely monitored at all times and he does not go out on his own.

In this hearing, the expert witness, whilst saying he assessed Mr A as lacking capacity for relevant decisions, also says that his tests were not sophisticated enough to be conclusive about  the cognitive impairment (which is asserted as the cause for lack of capacity). In particular, it didn’t sound as if any more detailed cognitive assessments had ever been done – which is why the Litigation Friend is challenging the conclusions.

The Hearing

The hearing I observed for this case (COP 13881941 SA) was on 6th March 2023 before District Judge Read sitting at Middlesbrough County Court. Hannah Bakshani represented Mr A (via his Litigation Friend) and the Local Authority was represented by Stephen Williams.

It was a hybrid hearing – meaning that some people were in the court room and some were attending remotely. This often means that sound quality is not ideal and, despite the court official trying to ensure that the microphones were audible, I was often unable to hear the barristers in the echoey courtroom. The witness (attending remotely) and the judge (as he sat with the microphone right in front of him) were crystal clear, but when the barristers stand to address the judge, they are not close to their microphones. At those times, barristers often refer to their position statements and the loudest sound is then the judge rustling papers to find the relevant paragraphs, because the dominant microphone is the judge’s. A clip-on mic for the barristers would be really helpful for anyone attending or observing remotely, to balance out what is amplified and enable clearer hearing of the proceedings. So, my notes from this hearing have frequent gaps, due to inaudibility. 

The hearing was on CVP (Cloud Video Platform) which is a court service remote video platform – and the main image on my screen was the witness giving evidence. The courtroom itself was a tiny square on my screen and I couldn’t change it (as is easy to do with Microsoft Teams). This could be my lack of technical know-how, and as a consequence I only realised at the end of the hearing (when the witness had left and the courtroom was the main image on my screen) that Mr A was at the hearing, sitting behind Hannah Bakshani. He hadn’t been addressed or spoken himself throughout the hearing. This is very unusual, certainly in my experience of observing many hearings where P is present, remotely or in person. At every other hearing I have observed, the judge has welcomed P and often has made it clear that they will be given the opportunity to speak if they would like to. 

In many CoP cases it is often simply reported that the expert capacity assessment has deemed P to lack capacity for the relevant decisions, without further elaboration. This hearing piqued my curiosity, because the examination of the expert witness meant that this evidence would be scrutinised in detail. In my department at work, we conduct neuropsychological assessments in the context of potential dementia, so the fact that the witness was discussing his cognitive assessments was of additional interest to me. 

Evidence in chief

Hannah Bakshani opened by asking Dr Elanjithara about the tests he had used to assess Mr A’s memory ability and how he reached his conclusions about Mr A’s capacity. What was notable to me was Dr Elanjithara’s assertion that Mr A required further, more detailed, neuropsychological assessment. 

HB: Memory – is this something that is acute or early stage and can improve over time?

Dr E: Correct …. So when we say impairments improve over time, [the] level of accumulated damage that can happen with more alcohol consumed, recovery becomes less and less … cumulative damage increases. Memory improvement can happen but not every time.

HB: You say there are limits with the ACE [Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination]  [unclear] … you recommended more robust neuropsychological testing take place. Can you describe?

Dr E: A full WAIS battery and DKEFS for executive functioning – neuropsychologists tend to start with those and then choose other batteries if they wish. [It is a] matter for specialist neuropsychologists. From what I have seen there is a need for these tests to take place to understand his neurocognitive function better.

Dr Elanjithara went on to explain that a further screening assessment had been conducted (as well as the ACE-III), which he had not administered himself, called the Cambridge Brain Sciences test. This is an online screening assessment that was developed to track recovery and cognitive function. It tests abilities such as short-term memory, reasoning, verbal ability and attention. There was some uncertainty about this test and the validity of the results for Mr A: 

HB: Your tests … at the bottom there’s a further table but I have not been able to find what that table references. Can you explain where those results are taken from?

Dr E: The Cambridge Brain Sciences further cognitive screening. …. [It is a] screening not a diagnostic test – it indicated the need for further comprehensive testing with more validity. Again, one has to put the screening tests – both of which show potential impaired cognitive and executive function – [with the] next step [which] is to ask for more robust testing, through neuropsychological testing. 

HB:  [MrA] … he’s explained to us today that when he completed the assessment [Cambridge Brain Sciences test] I understand you weren’t present?

Dr E:  [The one] online. … Yes I was not present.

HB:  The member of staff he found unhelpful, they ate a packet of crisps while he completed the assessment. Could this have impacted his performance?

Dr E: It could have impacted his understanding of the instructions. I have not relied on the [results] and …. there is need for further robust assessment. [It would be a] different picture if [Mr A] had scored high on these testings. I would have gone back and sought further assessment before completing the report.

This was an interesting exchange to me. Mr A had not scored highly on the online assessment, and Dr Elanjithara was confirming that this might have been because the administration of the test confounded the results. Yet the results had been included as part of the assessment report. The person doing the test with Mr A was eating crisps at the time! I found this quite astonishing. 

Hannah Bakshani continued to explore the meaning of the cognitive assessment results, checking that Mr A ‘would fall into the category of MCI (Mild Cognitive Impairment)?’ Dr Elanjithara said that ‘It is clear that [Mr A] does not have dementia’ and, at the same time, that the assessments indicated an executive functioning difficulty which concerned him in relation to the prospect of independent living: 

Executive function can impact on the ability to learn, if not orchestrating information appropriately and retrieving it appropriately, new learning is not as good. The screening test can only screen out MAJOR pathology and impairment – other things are missed out. This can have a devastating effect if he were to return to independent living without support. [Dr Elanjithara’s emphasis]

Dr Elanjithara went on to explain his reservations about the OT assessment and report that was carried out last year. He said that ‘it’s not impossible’ for Mr A to improve his capacity for the decisions in question, but cautioned that ‘an in-house assessment taking place within a short period of time with a therapist present in the room with him …. takes away the self-initiation part of it. The problem is executive function – self-governance’. 

For me, this echoed the discussion between Alex Ruck Keene KC and two addiction psychiatrists (Julia Lewis and Ken Wilson) in a recent podcast about ARBD and mental capacity. Interestingly, both emphasised the ‘paradox’ of frontal lobe functioning in ARBD: “in a cued environment [there is] a normative way of behaving. In more complex, social decisions, it falls apart.” (Ken Wilson) and asked about OT assessments to see functioning, to complement self-report, Julia Lewis said “OT yes, but a sparkly clean kitchen, all the cues are there. … At home, it’s not the same”. 

Hannah Bakshani asked how this has an impact on Mr A’s ability to manage his own self-care: 

Dr E: In the current setting he is looking after himself fine. … Things are likely to be different … there is a potential underlying deficit, if we expose him suddenly to independent living with limited support, it will overwhelm him quickly, and his default position is likely to go back into alcoholism. So any change has to be gradual supported and stepwise … 

HB: So, you weren’t able to test these because they were masked in the environment?

Dr E: Yes, and that’s the reason I have asked for more neuropsychological testing to put it into context. At the moment, from my assessment, those deficits are present – it is highly likely those deficits are present. 

HB: In which case, were you able to properly assess [Mr A’s] capacity without those tests available?

Dr E: To a great extent in terms of probable ability. [Now we need] fine tuning – we need those tests. From screening and superficial assessment there are lots of soft signs – so more comprehensive tests could then help us fine tune to help [Mr A]. 

I wondered why the further, detailed neuropsychological assessment had not been sought prior to the hearing. Perhaps there wasn’t time? Dr Elanjithara is an expert witness, not Mr A’s treating clinician, and was recommending this to the court though – and it made me think that, if this were necessary (as part of Mr A’s care) to understand his needs, why is Mr A’s care team waiting to be ordered by the court? Professionals carrying out mental capacity assessments need to understand what a person’s needs and limitations are to enable them to present relevant information in the assessment – this is to enable P to demonstrate an ability to understand and weigh up “reasonably foreseeable consequences of— (a) deciding one way or another, or (b) failing to make the decision” (Mental Capacity Act 2005 Section 3(4))

Capacity or Best Interests? 

I felt confused by Dr Elanjithara’s reasoning behind reaching the conclusions he did about Mr A’s capacity, given that he was recommending further assessment. This exchange about Mr A’s capacity to decide where to live highlights the issue: 

Dr E: The next steps are important to be more supported, based on further neuropsychological testing. The current placement is far too restrictive but going home at the present moment could unmask difficulties and cause a spiralling down. There is a step in between the two, as a clinician I would recommend for him to consolidate, then further steps could be taken. Currently he’s looking after himself, but it’s too restrictive.

HB: You have provided his best interests. I’m asking you about his capacity to make that decision. [counsel’s emphasis]

[later]

Dr E: There’s a helpful breakdown in the initial bundle 2018-2021 describing multiple incidents observed by paramedics over time, patterns repeated over and over again despite measures being put in. [Mr A] acknowledged those happened but clearly minimised the impact at the time and in future.

HB: [Mr A has] informed his solicitor during a meeting that when he lived at home he had carers – up, dressed, medicated – he now accepts he needs 4 calls a day. Does that not demonstrate understanding of his care needs in different settings?

Dr E: It represents some understanding. As it stands – those 4 visits are not sufficient to ensure his safety. I explained to him that he needs more robust support and could consider stepping down. Three states: highly exposed, highly supported, and a middle ground. 

HB: Your assessment is an assessment of capacity. What I am asking is: Was P able to understand the residential options, considering the information you’d provided him about care needs?

Dr E:  There’s overlap – [it is] important for me to understand what the care needs are. I would not be able to assess capacity without the knowledge of care needs. I wouldn’t be able to check his understanding. There were no clear pre-existing clinical recommendations that his care team was following. I would have tested his understanding against that. There were no available reports from the care side about his care needs. I would have checked this with him if I had had this.

HB: You were provided with information about his care needs — I can take you to C1 dated 14 December 2022. … Also to the OT assessment at F65: it shows that [Mr A] has independence with walking with aids, is able to use roads safely, is orientated and able to engage in familiar tasks, is able to learn, showers, manages oral care, is aware of medications regime. Although the OT identified some difficulties with meal preparation, they thought he could become independent if using a timer. So, you did have information about care needs.

Judge: Had you seen this assessment?

Dr E: Yes that’s correct

HB: So, it’s not quite right to say you didn’t have the relevant information to assess the residence options against. What [Mr A] has said is that he would like to go home with a package of care. The Local Authority has concluded that those residence options would be able to meet his needs. Why do you say different?

Dr E: I agree those reports were set out from an OT and social side of things. In a complex presentation such as [Mr A’s] it is important to have a more integrative MDT assimilation of the information and at the centre is an understanding of the clinical diagnosis and risks. At the time of my assessment, I did not have oversight of the comprehensive medical assessment of risks and prognosis. In the absence of this, from the available information, I put together and integrated information. An understanding of the progression of [Mr A’s] presentation, what are the future risks … [it] led me to integrate to a clinical understanding. [There are] areas of concerns and rehabilitation, as well as areas of improvement. The ability for new learning gives hope, there is also risk of significant destabilisation. 

HB: Are you not setting the bar too high for [Mr A’s] understanding?  You have taken a significant amount of information – clinical – are you not setting the bar too high for his capacity?

Dr Elanjithara said that he did not think he had set the bar too high when assessing Mr A’s capacity and that there has been a pattern of decline over the past 4-5 years when aspects of daily living overwhelm Mr A and he returns to drinking excessive alcohol. He argued that Mr A cannot weigh up this information in reaching a decision. 

HB: So, the assessment was based on how he previously presented in the community and risks on those occasions?

Dr E: It partly did involve that, but capacity is time specific so … it’s important to reflect on how he is able to use information generally, in the past as well. And to consider what has changed. What are the changes from the past to now? 

HB: What evidence do you have that he can’t adapt to those changes?

Dr E: At this moment – he’s in a supportive environment where those things are masked. The last 4 years or so [there have been] repeated patterns of how those risks – personal and environmental safety, risk of exploitation, health risks – have repeated over a period of time. That’s an important factor. It’s unfair on him to purely report on him in a very supported environment. Unfair to rely on day-to-day observations in his current placement. 

HB: You’re saying that [Mr A] needs to consider information about what could happen, what has happened, and analyse that from a clinical perspective. But what you’re being asked to do is consider whether he can use and weigh information in order to make a capacitous decision. Going back to residence – those 3 options. The Local Authority is suggesting he could live at home with a package of care. You have described that to him. Why is he unable to use and weigh that information to make a capacitous decision?

Dr E: It has to be based on the factors you see and the clinical presentation, risks etc. I was given a partial view of this, a report from the OT and other information. [There’s an] absence of a collective report. I wouldn’t be doing my job if I didn’t integrate the bigger picture. Is that clear? 

At this point, my notes say ‘No, not to me.’ I was getting really lost in the questioning and evidence. I don’t know whether Dr Elanjithara had asked, specifically, about ‘reasonably foreseeable consequences’ of deciding one way or another (S3(4) MCA), based on his established needs. I think he was saying that, when he did the assessment, he did not have a comprehensive picture of established needs to test Mr A’s understanding against, and that he was trying to ensure he did not miss anything important when he was assessing Mr A, especially because of the history and what that might indicate for Mr A in future. This was certainly a position put forward by Julia Lewis and Ken Wilson in the podcast mentioned earlier. They suggested that ‘performative decisions’ (future, complex scenarios) are harder to assess in ARBD than ‘decisional decisions’ (such as what to wear now), and that ‘you need to pick up on old behaviours to predict the future’, and that ‘it is almost negligent not to have baseline information from others in alcohol and mental capacity assessments’. 

There was a similar tussle over whether all of the relevant information was available to assess Mr A’s capacity to manage his finances. And a similar assertion that, in the confines of a structured environment, Mr A was able to demonstrate some financial understanding, but that if in a less supported place, Dr Elanjithara predicted this could break down, mainly due to the risk of alcohol relapse. And in relation to litigation capacity Hannah Bakshani noted that Dr Elanjithara’s report changed over time, from not rebutting capacity to the opposite. It wasn’t quite clear (to me) why that was. 

Cross-Examination

After a lunch break, Stephen Williams, counsel for the Local Authority cross-questioned Dr Elanjithara. I very much felt for Dr Elanjithara. Having recently given evidence myself at a hearing (not the Court of Protection), I empathise with how stressful and exposing an experience it is. 

SW: Throughout your evidence today, Dr Elanjithara, you referred to risks and [Mr A’s] understanding and ability to weigh up those risks. Is it your opinion, doctor, that the crucial issue for [Mr A] in lacking capacity to make relevant decisions, is his inability to weigh up and use the information about those risks?

Dr E: Yes that is a particularly important factor, I felt

SW: If I could refer you to your report at F127 in the bundle. At 6.3.4. – you say that [Mr A] struggles to [quotes Dr Elanjithara’s report – lost what was said here] … risk of rapid breakdown in safety – risk of rapid and severe relapse. ARBD (alcohol-related brain disease) falls etc. So you confirm that using and weighing in particular is an important factor. You answered questions about ability to retain information. Is it your view that the crucial element is the ability to use and weigh?

Dr E: That’s correct

[later]

SW: Would you agree that this inability to identify, initiate seeking help and the concern you had about self-governance, shows a lack of insight into the risks?

Dr E: There is an overlap. Insight is knowledge – what we are talking about is being able to use that knowledge when it is required to be acted upon. That is required for anyone to keep themselves safe.

Overall, I think this longitudinal perspective is what Dr Elanjithara was getting at. Stephen Williams enabled Dr Elanjithara to more succinctly state his position: 

SW: One final question. Does it remain your opinion that [Mr A] lacks capacity to make decisions as to residence, care and support, finances and these proceedings? And if yes why?

Dr E: I do agree with that. It is because of an organic brain impairment and functioning – neurocognitive impairment with the potential for worsening in future. The impairment in the function of the brain affects his ability to weigh up and use information to deal with those tasks mentioned. 

SW: No further questions.

Closing Submissions

Hannah Bakshani submitted that Dr Elanjithara had ‘treated a capacity assessment as a best interests assessment’ and assessed Mr A against those best interest options. She argued that people are ‘routinely assessed in care homes and this is not a barrier to assessing capacity’. She reminded the court that people are allowed to make unwise decisions. Reference was made to PB and Tower Hamlets [2020] EWCOP 34, a case of a man with alcohol-related brain disease heard by Mr Justice Hayden, in which the judge said: 

Within this context, a person cannot be considered to be unable to use and weigh information simply on the basis that he or she has applied his or her own values or outlook to that information in making the decision in question and chosen to attach no weight to that information in the decision-making process.” (§14 (§14 PB and Tower Hamlets [2020] EWCOP 34, Hayden is quoting from Kings College NHS Foundation Trust v C and V [2015] EWCOP 80 at §38, MacDonald J).

The professional instinct to achieve that which is objectively in P’s best interests should never influence the formulation of the criteria on which capacity is assessed.” (§51 (ii) PB and Tower Hamlets [2020] EWCOP 34, Hayden)

Judge Read confirmed that ‘we must never eclipse the fundamental right to make decisions when [they] have the capacity to do so.

So Hannah Bakshani’s submission was that “the litigation friend would invite the court to consider further assessment. My position is that there are significant benefits to a further assessment taking place.” To which the judge replied: “We have already had two neuropsychiatrists! Never mind though there is no limit to that number”.

My notes at this point express my own view that the court needs a neuropsychologist as recommended by Dr Elanjithara. A neuropsychologist is a specialist psychologist (either clinical or educational) who has completed further post-graduate training in the assessment of the functioning of the brain. They use tests that assess in detail abilities such as attention, memory, language, visual problem solving and ‘executive’ function (the ability to organise and plan, as well as the ability to ‘regulate’ our responses, use judgment and the ability to inhibit or stop ourselves from acting inappropriately). Neuropsychologists often work alongside neuropsychiatrists who are medical doctors specialising in the diagnosis and treatment of brain disorders e.g. following traumatic brain injury, or in the context of mental health problems including alcoholism and other addictions.  

On behalf of the Local Authority, Stephen Williams submitted that his client did not accept that Dr Elanjithara ‘set the bar too high’. He referenced the case of TB v KB and LH (Capacity to Conduct Proceedings) [2019] EWCOP 14 concerning executive dysfunction and alcohol consumption, quoting the judge stating that such capacity decisions are a ‘dynamic transactional process …. decisions to be taken over a number of years ….’ Stephen Williams said that ‘we do not think yet another report from yet another psychiatrist is necessary.’ 

Judicial decision

The judge referred back to previous decisions for Mr A, directions for assessments and court reports and then summed up: 

There are a range of possibilities – if the court makes a decision in favour of [Mr A] having capacity, that’s the end of it. If the court holds he holds capacity in regards to some areas and not others, it would end in respect of those areas that he has capacity for and not for the others. If, however, either the court decides that [Mr A] is not capacitous to any extent, or decides he lacks capacity in one of the substantive areas, we have to move on and look at best interests. I don’t think the court can a make substantive decision for best interests without further evidence. This is a particularly finely balanced decision and I am not going to rush.” 

There was discussion about living options being explored, including a return home, but only in the spirit of enabling all options to be considered, pending a decision on capacity and best interests. 

At the end of the hearing, the judge said ‘Good to see you [Mr A] – thanks for bearing with us.’ Hannah Bakshani then said ‘[Mr A] would like to speak to you – perhaps now is not the forum.’ 

Judge: I said at the last one he could have one! Might be an idea to do it when I have handed judgment down. It would be a good idea then – couple or three weeks or so. You’ll remember I said if you’d like to speak to me again that is fine

This final exchange was curious to me. In previous hearings I have observed, when P has been present, able and willing to speak to the judge, they have been able to fully participate in proceedings. I wondered why this was not the case for Mr A. His counsel had not asked throughout the hearing for Mr A to be able to speak, though at the end she was aware that he wanted to. Clearly, from Judge Read’s comment, Mr A has spoken to him before. Perhaps the judge thought that the decisions regarding capacity were still so up in the air there was little point in discussing things further. In any event, Mr A sat quietly, listening throughout the day, from 11am to 3pm, with a lunch break, without being addressed (by the court) or speaking himself (to the court). I have imagined what that would be like myself – especially listening to other people discuss me, my abilities and my future. My image is not of myself sitting silently throughout the whole process! 

Reflections

I felt frustrated for Mr A that a final declaration regarding his capacity to make his own decisions about these things has not yet been made. And that further assessment is now recommended and being considered by the judge. However, the cognitive assessments carried out by Dr Elanjithara are screening tools (as he said) and do not provide a detailed assessment of Mr A’s abilities. Why hasn’t the system around him commissioned those assessments already? Perhaps this is what Dr Elanjithara meant when he said ‘at the time of my assessment, I did not have oversight of the comprehensive medical assessment of risks and prognosis’. 

Hannah Bakshani’s contention was that the expert witness strayed into best interests recommendations rather than focusing on a capacity assessment. Did he? I think he might have at times – in particular here: 

“The current placement is far too restrictive but going home at the present moment could unmask difficulties and cause a spiralling down. There is a step in between the two, as a clinician I would recommend for him to consolidate, then further steps could be taken.”

I empathise with Dr Elanjithara. Clinicians find it so hard to set aside what they think is best for people and, instead, solely focus on whether P understands (retains, weighs and can communicate) the relevant information about a decision – regardless of whatever decision is then made. But doing that is crucial to upholding the spirit and letter of the Mental Capacity Act. 

However, he was grappling with the difficulty of assessing capacity in the context of a calm conversation whilst knowing that Mr A would be acting upon such decisions in a completely different situation (as HHJ Lieven points out, below). Another case, observed and blogged by Jenny Kitzinger has similarities and also involved alcohol-related issues. I am not familiar with case law on addictions but I have had experience with patients (in the absence of dementia, but experiencing mental health problems or with other diagnoses such as Parkinson’s disease) who have been told, time and again, by various organisations (such as Social Services, NHS, banks), that they ‘have capacity’ to decide to drink or gamble. 

Is theoretical capacity the same as actual capacity if you are not making the decision, doing the ‘thing’, then and there? This particular point reminds me of a recent case that I observed (and blogged here with Josie Seydel). A key issue for P in that case was the difference between being able to talk, intellectually, about a future situation and what she asserted she would do, and being able to similarly weigh and use that information when actually in that future situation. As Lieven J. said in that hearing:

This is a classic case of lawyers meeting clinicians, particularly psychologists and psychiatrists. Life just isn’t as simple as lawyers want it to be.  What I’m getting from your evidence is how complicated it is. We can’t dissect P’s mind to get at every instance. Things change depending on different variables. ….   I’m getting a picture of P being quite calm at home, less so in the community. My focus must be on decision-making – when she’s faced with an actual DECISION”.  (Lieven J, as blogged here)

The judgment in that case took a ‘longitudinal view’ of P’s capacity in different situations at different times, and the practicability (for people working with P on the ground) of acting on court orders. HHJ Lieven said, in that judgment: 

It is a principle of statutory construction that the Court must have regard to the “mischief” of the statute. One of the mischiefs of the MCA is to seek to preserve an individual’s autonomy, but in a way that ensures that when they do not have capacity, their best interests are protected.” (Re PG [2023] EWCOP 9, Lieven J)

Perhaps Dr Elanjithara wrestled with this ‘mischief’ when trying to complete his capacity assessments. 

I very much hope that decisions will be made soon for Mr A, to enable him to get on with his life, wherever that may be. 

Claire Martin is a Consultant Clinical Psychologist, Cumbria, Northumberland, Tyne and Wear NHS Foundation Trust, Older People’s Clinical Psychology Department, Gateshead. She is a member of the core group of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project and has published several blog posts for the Project about hearings she’s observed (e.g. here and here). She tweets @DocCMartin


[1] I don’t know why it was thought necessary to refuse permission to identify the local authority in any publication about this case.  On the basis of what I have learnt about this case I could not see any reason why the Article 8/Article 10 balancing exercise should have resulted in a decision that it was necessary to conceal the name of the public body involved.

Emergency placement order in a closed hearing

By Celia Kitzinger, 20th March 2023

At a closed hearing by telephone, out-of-hours on Saturday 25th February 2023, Mr Justice Hayden granted an order that it was in P’s best interests to be removed from the home where she lives with her sister (Q) and taken to an emergency placement.  

Mr Justice Hayden also approved an injunction against P’s sister saying that she must not prevent or obstruct that move.  

The local authority, the Royal Borough of Greenwich, hadn’t told Q that they were making this application.  She didn’t know that the hearing was happening and was not invited to attend.  She is a litigant in person in ongoing Court of Protection proceedings and she was deliberately excluded from the Saturday hearing.

I didn’t observe this hearing. It was arranged at short notice, never appeared in any lists, and I doubt – even if I had known about it – that it was open to members of the public or to journalists.

The hearing I did watch, COP 13490547 on 6th March 2023 before Mrs Justice Arbuthnot, arose out of this earlier hearing and the events that followed.  

What had happened after the urgent closed hearing?

Presumably the first Q knew about any of this was when officials turned up with the court orders on 1st March 2023 and took her sister away.  

Counsel reported that it had all  “proceeded peacefully and without incident or obstruction” and P was “not visibly upset” but “came with the social worker willingly and has settled in well” at the emergency placement – whose location has still not (at the time of the return hearing) been disclosed to Q or to other members of P’s family.

What precipitated the urgent closed hearing?

The woman at the centre of this case (P) is in her sixties. She has Downs Syndrome, a “significant” learning disability, and autism. She was described as “non-verbal and registered blind”.  She was initially living with her parents, and then with her brother until 2018, when he couldn’t cope anymore.  She was then in residential accommodation (with the Royal Borough of Greenwich) for a period, since when she’s been living with her sister – and the circumstances under which P moved from the placement to live with her sister are disputed.

Before the emergency hearing, there was already a case concerning P in the Court of Protection, before District Judge Grosse.  It had started in February 2022 and concerned two matters:

1.  an application from the local authority under s.16 Mental Capacity Act 2005 to determine P’s best interests in respect of residence, care and support (i.e. is it in P’s best interests to live with and be cared for by Q); 

2. an application made by Q and her daughter (P’s niece) to be appointed as P’s joint Deputies for Property and Affairs. 

Two days before the last hearing before the District Judge there was an “incident”.  Q had been arrested on suspicion of assaulting a police officer.  

And although both Q and her daughter had communicated with the court and the other parties ahead of the hearing on 23rd February 2023 (though they failed to attend the hearing) and they did not mention the incident or Q’s arrest.  The local authority learnt about it from the police.  

The police had interrupted Q’s grandson in the course of committing an alleged attempted robbery somewhere near the block of flats where P and Q live.  He ran into their flat, pursued by the police, who were met at the door by Q who was “resistant” to allowing officers inside.  When they did make their way inside, the grandson resisted arrest: he “fought officers, trying to assault them, screaming and shouting”.  

Although Q had nothing to do with the robbery, it’s alleged (and she denies it) that she tried to assist her grandson in resisting arrest and that she “punched an officer in the face multiple times”.  She was also arrested, and has been released on bail but has not been charged: it’s “under investigation”.  

During this episode, according to the police, P was standing just inside the bathroom watching, and she appeared to be distressed: she was “visibly scared and rocking and shaking”.  It’s also alleged that the grandson was keeping an exposed knife in the bedroom he was staying in.

When the local authority received the police report, they became seriously concerned for P’s safety, which is why they applied for the order to remove P, which was granted by Hayden J at the closed hearing on Saturday 25th February 2023.

The hearing of 6th March 2023

The key issue before the court was whether to authorise P’s continued residence in the placement (which is what the local authority and the Official Solicitor ask for), or whether to immediately authorise her return home (which is what Q wants).  

And if the judge authorises P’s deprivation of liberty in the placement, then what is the plan for contact between P and Q (and the rest of the family)?

Applicant local authority

The applicant local authority (represented by Tara O’Leary of Cornerstone Barristers) said that P is “stable and settled” in her current placement.  She’s “struck up a friendly relationship with another resident” and doesn’t appear to be distressed by being away from home.  They don’t think it’s safe or in P’s best interests to return to her flat to live with her sister.  They’re also concerned about visits from Q because, they say, when P was in another placement, Q simply took her away to her home unilaterally.  “Given this history, and the strained relationship between the family and the local authority”, the local authority wanted to draw up a “contact plan” for supervised contact, and proposed to do so in the next 14 days. (The judge said that was a long time and asked them to sort it out within a week.)

Family

Two members of the family are in court: Q is a litigant in person and Q’s daughter is there to support her.  Q has submitted a list of concerns about P being in care.  She says that last time P was in care, she was neglected, assaulted, and abused: P suffered burns (she says)  and possibly sexual abuse at the hands of staff she labels “institutional criminals”.  

Apparently, Q’s submissions (which run to 100 pages or so) do not address the events of 21st February 2023.  What she’s written deals mostly with “historic complaints and allegations” about P’s former care placement and accusations against local authority staff.  The local authority disputes these claims.

When Q addresses the court, she focuses almost exclusively on her concerns about the alleged (“historic”) abuse. The judge establishes which care home this relates to and asks the local authority whether they can provide assurances that P is not currently in that care home or any care home associated with it. Ms O’Leary undertakes to find out about that. 

Q’s daughter (R) does address recent events.  She says it’s “really unfortunate, what happened” and that her son has agreed not to come to the flat except with his parents, not to stay overnight, and not to see P.  

Judge:  But the trouble is that on 21st February 2023, the police arrived to arrest your son. There was some kind of scrum, it’s said he was resisting arrest, and police officers  noted P was shaking and was frightened by what was going on.  That is not a safe placement – not at that moment.  I appreciate that [your son] is being removed from the scene.  And a knife! Whether it was on a kitchen surface or, as the police say, on a dresser in a bedroom.  And then not to mention it to the court, not to write an email saying, “we’ve had some problems with the police”.  In fact you were hiding it. That the police were arresting your son and grandson.

R:  I explained it in a phone call to the social worker on the 21st and again on 24th and said I was happy for someone to come to the property.

Judge:  But what about the court?

R: It didn’t come into our heads, to be honest.

Judge: But, I’m sorry!, there was a hearing on 23rd February in front of a district judge, so why not say to him-

R: We weren’t attending that hearing. We was never coming to the court. We wanted an adjournment to get legal representation.  But they went ahead.

Judge:  This incident is said by the local authority and the Official Solicitor to be the ‘final straw’.  Before this there was you not granting access, non-compliance with court orders, refusing to sign a Working Agreement, you and your mother holding yourselves out as P’s Deputy when this wasn’t the case, requesting medical procedures inappropriately (to find out if P had been sexually abused), saying she had hepatitis, which she doesn’t.  This is so upsetting for her.  That’s not a stable place for her to live.

This was followed by the judge asking for information about which members of the (large) family would want to make arrangements for contact with P, if P were to remain where she is. She doesn’t really get an answer.  Instead, Q and R talk about how much they love P, how difficult it would be for P to have her family visit and then go away and leave her there – and they describe activities they do as a family with P (including shopping and going to church regularly).

In a final plea to the court, R said:

“I feel completely awful over the incident with my son.  P has really had a bad deal in this situation. I would like to reassure the local authority that P is not an orphan. Please will the court consider her coming back home.  We’re happy for the therapist to visit.  We want to work with the local authority and do feel that in future we could work together.  I feel personally that P would benefit by getting back home to her bedroom and her community rather than starting all over again with people she’s not familiar with”.

Official Solicitor (for P)

Ms Alison Meacher,  counsel for P via her litigation friend the Official Solicitor, said:

“We support the application that P should remain where she’s currently living.  It is not a safe environment for her to live with Q, notwithstanding that she loves her very much.  The difficulty we have is that statements about wanting to work with the local authority have been made at previous hearings but that is not what happens after the hearing.  For example, the Working Agreement discussed in September and drafted by the local authority with counsel for Q, provided by Advocate on a pro-bono basis, was then not signed by Q.  It was agreed, but she then did not sign it.  There are other examples – e.g. the information sought by P’s deputy about P’s activities so that decisions can be made about whether to use part of P’s personal allowance to get a mobility car.  It was explained to Q that information was needed so a decision could be made. The information asked for has not been provided.  Then on 20th January there was a prearranged visit from the OS’s representative, and Q had agreed that she could have a small amount of time with P on her own – but she wouldn’t let her spend any time alone with P on the day.  So, agreement is proffered at the hearings, and intentions are set out – which is of course very positive. And we would love to see them then seen through, but they are not seen through.  Things are said in court, but that’s not what materialises afterwards.”

Counsel for the Local Authority again

Ms Tara O’Leary confirms that “the current placement is entirely unconnected to [the previous one]”.  She also confirmed that (as the family have apparently requested) P has only female carers at the moment.  The judge asked for a recital recording the expectation of the court that this would remain the case – at least in relation to “toileting and personal washing type care”.

She then said she wanted to “endorse every word Ms Meacher has saidThe headline is the disconnect between what’s said in court and what happens afterwards”. 

She also raised a missed appointment. It had been agreed that a social worker would visit with an Occupational Therapist to discuss access to the community, but when they arrived at the flat, nobody was home.  “Q and R said they’d gone shopping to IKEA with P and hadn’t managed to get home in time – so it was a complete waste of time and resources.  That was on 25th January, and that visit still hasn’t happened.”

Judgment

The judge found it was in P’s best interests to stay in her current placement while assessments take place, with an expectation of female carers and a contact plan required within seven days.  She asked for a list of family members who ought to have contact and approved a timetable for witness statements, other evidence (including P’s wishes and feelings) and the date of a round table meeting.  She encouraged Q to contact another solicitor who (the OS said) would be willing to take her on.

The next hearing will be before District Judge Grosse on 10th May 2023.

Reflections

It is obviously a very serious matter for a court to make an order against a person without giving them an opportunity to be heard. All the cases I know about – with the significant exception of Re A [2022] EWCOP 44 (which I’ve blogged about several times, including: “Reflections on open justice and transparency in the light of Re A (Covert Medication: Closed Proceedings) [2022] EWCOP 44“) have concerned ’emergencies’. They include, for example, the risk of P being taken out of the country for a forced marriage, or physically abused by a partner, or (as in this case) some other possible high risk to P’s physical and emotional well-being. The court decides it needs to act quickly to remove P and does so without alerting parties who might cause harm to P.

Given the history of this case, as presented by the lawyers – even bearing in mind the different version of that history presented by P’s sister and niece – I could understand why the court felt it imperative to act as they did.

Given that Hayden J was the author of the recent ‘Closed Hearings’ and Closed Materials’ Guidance [2023] EWCOP 6, it is not surprising that he seems to have acted in compliance with it – in particular by fixing a date for a full hearing as soon as possible after the closed proceedings, giving the excluded party an opportunity to attend. This was that hearing.[1].

My concerns about the way closed hearings were managed in Re A [2022] EWCOP 44 are largely inapplicable to this case. In this case, the family was informed about the closed hearing and the order resulting from it very shortly thereafter; the case was back in court for full consideration; and the intractable problem of the parallel open and closed hearings that plagued Re A does not apply to this case.

It seems to me a good example – as in other cases I’ve watched (e.g. “Forced Marriage Protection Order“) of the court balancing the requirements of open justice (with parties on an equal footing) with the imperative of protecting the vulnerable adult at the centre of the case, and acting quickly and effectively in P’s best interests.

Celia Kitzinger is co-director of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project and has personally observed more than 400 hearings since 1st May 2020. She is on LinkedIn and tweets as @KitzingerCelia


[1] Hayden J ordered that a return hearing should be listed in the urgent business list on Monday 27th February 2023.  That hearing was not effective because the local authority had been unable to locate P and Q.  So the judge (Roberts J) had adjourned the return hearing for a week, until this hearing on 6th March 2023.