Capacity to consent to sexual relations: “I want my freedom back”

By Amanda Hill, formerly ‘Anna’ , 3rd September 2023

When I saw this case listed, I didn’t fully appreciate the complex issues it would cover, especially about the difficulties of ensuring that somebody who is used to going out independently can do so safely – and the role that technology might play. 

At the heart of this case is a woman I’ll call Sarah (I find the term P too anonymous and I like to try and visualise the person behind the letter P).  Sarah is a 41-year-old woman diagnosed with Asperger’s syndrome (a form of autism), bipolar affective disorder, atypical anorexia nervosa, obsessive compulsive disorder and severe anxiety.  She’s living in supported living, and she’s been accustomed to having a good degree of autonomy, including being able to go out into the community by herself. 

However, there are now concerns about a man she has met who may have “groomed and sexually exploited” her, and it has been suggested that she may lack capacity to decide on contact with others and engage in sexual relations. This is the third time over the last few years that she has been exploited by a man. An initial assessment by her social work team was that Sarah “was unable to understand, retain and use/weigh relevant information relevant to the decision” to engage in sex. There is now an ongoing criminal case against the man and concerns for her safety. 

After this, and without court authorisation, the local authority increased the 1:1 provision of carers, and prevented her from going out in the community alone. She objects to these restrictions on her freedom. Observing these hearings highlighted to me the practicalities of managing the difficult balancing act between the principle of autonomy at the heart of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the principle that vulnerable people in society must be protected. 

The case (COP 14088706) was listed with the subject matter as ‘Capacity to Consent to Sexual Relations’. I don’t have much knowledge about the law in relation to capacity for sex (I’ve learnt a lot writing this blog post) and it wasn’t because of the topic that I chose to observe this hearing.  Rather, in my role as a core team member of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project, I am focusing on hearings in the South East Regional Hub where the lead judge is HHJ Owens and, as she was the judge in this hearing, I thought I would observe it. The hearing did cover other areas that I do have a particular interest in, such as the role of Litigants in Person and Deprivation of Liberty – and, having previously focused largely on s.21A cases, because this is what my own mother’s case was about, I’ve discovered that I can learn a lot through observing COP cases concerning a variety of different issues. 

I’ve observed two hearings in this case: one on Monday 17th July 2023 and another on Wednesday 9th August 2023. I received the Position Statements (PS) for both hearings from Oliver Lewis after the hearings, which greatly enhanced my understanding and which I have drawn upon when writing this blog. In fact, without them, I don’t think I would have really understood the case at all.[1]

1. Hearing of 17th July 2023

Access was straightforward and I was sent the Transparency Order in advance. The Clerk gave me access to the video-platform at 1.55pm (for a 2.00pm hearing). There were already a number of people attending. I could see Oliver Lewis of Doughty Street Chambers who was Counsel for Sarah via her litigation friend, the Official Solicitor (OS); Sebastian Elgueta of Garden Court Chambers who was Counsel for the Local Authority (LA); and two people who I learned were Sarah’s parents. Various other people joined after me, including the solicitor for the LA, the solicitor for the OS, a trainee solicitor and Sarah’s social worker. Sarah was not present, either at this hearing or the following one, I don’t know why. This means that we didn’t hear her voice directly. The clerk asked everybody in turn (including me) to confirm that they could see and hear him. I turned my camera and microphone on so he could see me, and I replied I could. Then I switched my camera and microphone off. 

Then something happened that quite surprised me. Before the judge joined the platform, Oliver Lewis spoke directly to Sarah’s parents (who I shall call Dr and Mrs G) and because they had not taken part in pre-hearing discussions, asked them if they would like to be joined formally as parties to the case. They asked him to explain what that meant. This is something I know a bit about, as I asked to be joined as a party for my mother’s case, as I wrote about here. I was interested to know how it would be explained.  Oliver Lewis explained that Sarah was a party to the case and had a litigation friend to represent her.  They, her parents, were currently not parties to the case and so were not automatically entitled to receive all the information relating to the case (“the bundle”) or have their opinions heard. If they were joined as parties, they would play an integral role in the proceedings. Dr and Mrs G said that they would like to be joined as parties. Oliver Lewis explained that it would be up to the judge whether they needed to fill out an application form or if the judge could decide that they could be parties without the need to fill in the form. He then went on to explain that the hearing was about appointing an independent expert to determine capacity for “a range of capacity issues”. Mrs G said that the explanation was “very helpful”.

He then explained that the expert could cost between £2,000 and £3,000 and the cost would normally be shared between the parties, so that was a potential disadvantage to becoming a party. But if they didn’t have the means to contribute, they could ask the judge to excuse them from paying. (NB: In that case, the cost would be divided between the LA and Sarah, who is in receipt of Legal Aid). Oliver Lewis apologised to the parents for the “technical” nature of “all this”.

At 2.05pm the judge joined and made some introductory remarks about this being a formal hearing in a courtroom (even though it was online). She said that there was an observer present and reminded everyone about the Transparency Order preventing Sarah from being identified.

She next addressed the issue of Sarah’s parents becoming parties to the case, explaining (as had Oliver Lewis) that they would not be entitled to see all the documents if they were not joined as parties. Dr G said “We would like to ‘join’, if that’s the right word, but we are worried about the cost”. I thought at this point he was referring to the point made before the judge joined about the cost of the expert. However, in her reply, the judge referred to them not needing formal legal representation and that the court could assist Litigants in Person. She said “You are known as a Litigant in Person and we have an obligation to help you”.[2] The parents stated that they did want to be joined as parties. The Judge said it was clear that the parents have a personal interest in Sarah and what happens to her and she could see the benefit of them being involved. She waived the requirement for a formal application and said they would be joined as parties from that point on. As they had not been parties before the hearing, they had not seen “the bundle” of documents –  so she asked Sebastien Elgueta to explain what the hearing was about. He apologised for not having formally submitted a draft order, and he then set out what would be in it. 

As far as I know, there is no easy leaflet or resource for families on becoming an LIP in the Court of Protection, which I think would be really useful. I certainly wanted to feel fully informed before I became a Litigant in Person. 

Some points about the style of the hearing

There were some IT issues during this hearing. At one point, Sebastian Elgueta dropped off the call (later apologising for the “IT meltdown”) and the judge rose for a few minutes and left the video platform. While we were waiting for her to return, Oliver Lewis spoke to Dr and Mrs G: “Are you OK? Is there anything you want to ask?” I thought this was very thoughtful of him. The judge and Sebastian Elgueta re-joined the call a few minutes later. Oliver Lewis gently pointed out to the social worker that she was not on mute. HHJ Owens was also very sympathetic to Sebastian Elgueta about his IT problems. The way that this episode was handled indicates the generally amiable spirit that the case was conducted in, which I think helped discussions in what are very difficult circumstances. 

As a family member myself in COP hearings, I was interested in how the parents were treated. At points, I suspect reference to sections of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 would have been difficult for the parents to follow. At one point Dr G stated that Sarah’s mental health would decline if “getting an assessor (if that’s the right word)…..” took a long time, showing that language very familiar to professionals can be more difficult for lay people in the court to understand. That’s why it’s so important to explain things simply for parties who are lay people, something that can be lost with the time pressure of a hearing. Overall, I thought the parents were treated very well in the hearing, particularly by HHJ Owens and Oliver Lewis.  Interactions were personable and done in a way to put people at ease. Even I was made to feel welcome as an observer. In my experience, this is a common feature of the COP, although obviously it is dependent on the personalities and style of the legal teams and the judge. 

The substance of the hearing: Capacity to engage in sexual relations

Given that this case raised potentially very serious issues, the judge explained that she had had a gatekeeping concern which she took to the Vice President of the COP in early June 2023. There were question marks about Sarah’s capacity to make decisions about contact[3] with the man she was seeing (whom I shall call Mr Grey) and the risk he posed (which was information that would come from the police). The position of the Official Solicitor was that there seemed to be uncertainty as to what exactly the LA were asking the court to approve at this hearing, but the OS was concerned about how much Sarah’s autonomy was restricted in order to protect her. Sarah wants to continue to see the man, even if it is with a support worker. 

Reading the PS of Oliver Lewis on behalf of the OS, I understand that the OS agreed that on the basis of an assessment done by a social worker, there was sufficient evidence to cause the court to have reason to believe that Sarah lacked capacity to engage in sexual relations. However, the OS disputed that there was good enough evidence to override the presumption of Sarah’s capacity in other areas, such as decisions relating to her residence, to consent to her ‘de facto’ deprivation of liberty, or to make decisions about contact with others, including Mr Grey.  

So, although the hearing was listed as “Capacity to engage in sexual relations”, it became clear that it was about capacity to make decisions in various other domains as well. The OS was seeking to ensure that the LA’s view that Sarah lacks capacity for sex wouldn’t lead to an unlawful restriction of her rights in other areas. It seems that the OS was trying to ensure each domain was considered appropriately.  And it was all urgent as imposing new draconian restrictions on someone’s liberty, such as an increase in 1:1 support hours for Sarah (to 105 hours from 48 previously) can’t be justified unless they’re absolutely necessary.

Therefore, the OS submitted on Sarah’s behalf that “there needs to be a comprehensive capacity assessment carried out by an independent expert (if there is no person in the local Trust able to do a report under s.49, and enquiries are being made) to assess capacity to make decisions about (a) residence, (b) care, (c) contact with others, (d) engaging in sexual relations, and (e) contraception”.

On behalf of Sarah, Oliver Lewis said (in his PS): “It is unfortunate that (Sarah’s) freedoms on a daily basis are proposed to be curtailed because of the sudden appearance in her life of (the individual). The Official Solicitor invites the court to scrutinise the necessity and proportionality of the proposed care arrangements.”

It was also stated that the individual is the third man who seems to have posed a risk to Sarah as a vulnerable adult in the last few years. 

I wasn’t entirely sure what ‘Capacity to engage in sexual relations’ covers but it is a fundamental principle of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 that each person is presumed to have capacity unless it is established that they lack capacity ( s.1(2)) and a lack of capacity to make a decision cannot be established simply by reference to some ‘condition’ that a person has (e.g. mental illness) (s.2(3)(b)).  It must be shown that the “impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain” (s.2(1)) causes the person to be unable:

(a) to understand the information relevant to the decision,

(b) to retain that information,

(c) to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision, or

(d) to communicate his decision (whether by talking, using sign language or any other means). (s. 3(1) MCA 2005)

The courts have warned about setting the bar for capacity for sex too high since this could operate as an unfair, unnecessary and discriminatory bar against mentally disabled people. It’s also been stated that the person must understand the salient information but it is not necessary for them to understand all the peripheral detail (LBC v RYJ [2010] EWHC 2665). 

What counts as ‘relevant information’ depends on the decision being made and the circumstances of the case.  In relation to sexual contact, a recent decision by Lord Justice Baker in the Court of Appeal (A Local Authority v JB (Rev 2) [2020] EWCA 735) found that the relevant information includes: the mechanics of sexual intercourse, the fact that both people must have capacity to consent (and must in fact consent), that pregnancy is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of (heterosexual) intercourse, and that there are health risks involved such as sexually transmitted diseases, the risks of which can be reduced by use of precautions such as a condom.”

This is for capacity to consent on a “generalised” basis. The Supreme Court in Re JB also made clear that different consequences would arise if there was a person-specific decision to be made, such as in the case of  Hull City Council v KF [2022] EWCOP 33 (see also this blog post: Capacity to have sexual relations with a specific partner: In the matter of Hull City Council v KF [2022] EWCOP 33; and the very useful Mental Capacity Guidance Note from 39 Essex Chambers.

The following issues were also discussed during the hearing.

  • Appointing an IMCA for Sarah. Oliver Lewis proposed that an independent mental capacity advocate (IMCA) be appointed for Sarah as “even if her parents love her very much”, Sarah might not want to discuss her sexual relations with them. The judge agreed and said it could be “vice versa” too. I found this a very human exchange. I learned afterwards that IMCAs were introduced by the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (ss. 35-41) and their role is to support and represent the person in the decision-making process. 
  • Sarah’s mental health. At various points during the hearing, issues were raised showing concern for Sarah. Her parents said they were worried about the impact on her mental health of more delays in the assessment. Also, it seems that Sarah has to be accompanied at all times by a carer, even going to a café, and her parents were concerned that this was depleting her financial resources as she had to pay for the carer’s travel and coffees. Later in the hearing, after the judge had left to consult her listings team, Sarah’s solicitor returned to this point and suggested that the care should be provided within her existing care package. The parents confirmed that it was actually the additional cost of the coffee and meals for the carers that she was obliged to pay for. There was also a discussion about whether the police would be called in a particular situation, which was proposed by the LA in the draft care plan. Sarah’s parents said that she was terrified of the police as she had been chased by them once and she had found it very traumatic. On one occasion, they said, it had resulted in her being sectioned.  The judge talked about necessity and proportionality of calling the police and it was removed from the care plan. 
  • Urgency vs practicalities. It was clear that getting the care needs assessment (and a care plan proposed) was urgent as this had implications for the DOL. This was partly for Sarah’s mental health but also for her protection. After much discussion, HHJ Owens authorised 21 days for the identification of the expert to determine capacity, so that they could be appointed by the judge, and for a new care plan to be drafted in time for the next hearing on Wednesday 9th August 2003. 

2. Hearing of 9th August 2023

On requesting the link the evening before the hearing, I was surprised to get a quick reply from the Administration Officer, telling me that HHJ Owens had asked her to let me know that there was a doubt over the start time but they would clarify the situation the following morning. Mid-morning the following day, the Administration Officer got back to say the hearing was to be in two parts:  the first part, to start as listed at 2pm and to last 45 minutes, was going to be an “injunction application subject to reporting restrictions” and then the second part of the hearing was to last 95 minutes, being the “main COP proceedings, again subject to reporting restrictions”. I checked whether I could observe both parts and was told I could.

I was shortly sent the link and a new Transparency Order (TO). The difference between this one and the previous one was that not only could I not identify P, the protected party (Sarah) but also not the man who was to be the subject of the injunction (Mr Grey). 

Injunction application

I clicked on the link a few minutes before 2pm and was soon admitted to the hearing. This time I could see the clerk and another person in a physical court room. The clerk again asked me to confirm that I could see and hear him, which I did, before turning my microphone and camera off. Unlike the previous hearing, nobody else joined until 2pm and then nearly everybody else joined at once. I soon gathered that this was because there had been a pre-hearing meeting attended by most of the others. Most people were using the Cloud Video Platform and included: 

Oliver Lewis representing Sarah via her litigation friend, the Official Solicitor (OS)

Avril Rushe, Counsel for the LA (replacing Sebastian Elgueta, who was at the previous hearing).

Dr and Mrs G (Sarah’s parents and Litigants in Person)

There were also two instructing solicitors, Sarah’s Social Worker, and a mini-pupil with Dr Lewis. 

There was also a man who had joined by telephone: Mr Grey. 

Each person in turn was asked to confirm they could see and hear the Clerk. Then, at 14.08, HHJ Owens, the judge, joined the hearing. 

Once again, the judge started by telling everyone that they should behave as if it was a physical hearing, that there was a TO in place and there should be no recording of any sort allowed. She stated that there was an injunctive order affecting this hearing, Mr Grey was not to be identified, there was a police investigation under the Sexual Offences Act going on in the background which was outside her jurisdiction. 

This was a very stern warning given by the judge and my impression was this was so that the police investigation would not be compromised. HHJ Owens asked Mr Grey to confirm that he understood he was the subject of injunctive relief, and of the TO, which prohibits identification of Sarah and himself. She also mentioned that I was a member of the public and an observer, that I had been sent the TO and had observed the previous hearing – but I wasn’t asked to confirm this orally. 

In her introductory summary, Avril Rushe explained that this was an application for an injunction against Mr Grey under s.16 of the Mental Capacity Act and the jurisdiction of the Court of Protection (COP) was the test of whether it is just and convenient for an injunction to be made against Mr Grey because he was a risk to Sarah. There was an ongoing police investigation against Mr Grey for alleged sexual assault against Sarah. He is on bail with a condition that he is not to contact Sarah, which is due to expire at the end of August and that may be extended. However, the bail conditions by the police were less robust than those that could be imposed by the COP, so they are asking for a court injunction against Mr Grey. There had been a wide-ranging injunction proposed originally but they were now proposing a “pared back” injunction as that would be more proportionate.  This was that Mr Grey: 

  1. Must not speak to, call, text, email, or contact via social media (etc.) Sarah or any person involved in her care 
  2. He must not enter any property he believes Sarah would be in. 

An open injunction was asked for (I gather this means with no fixed ending). 

HHJ Owens asked about prohibiting Mr Grey from contacting Sarah via a third party. 

Avril Rushe said that this was not being sought because there was no evidence of Mr Grey attempting to use a third party to contact Sarah. 

The judge then stated that there was no current evidence, but what if that changed? She then asked Avril Rushe if Mr Grey could make oral submissions to the court and Ms Rushe confirmed that he could and that he had not seen the new terms of the proposed injunction. 

The judge then asked all parties involved in the main Order to speak and said that after that she would hear from Mr Grey.

There was then a discussion because Oliver Lewis had not been sent the version of the Order that the judge had in front of her, so the judge offered to read out the new version of the Order that she was being asked to approve: 

The proposed injunctive relief Order warns Mr Grey that he will be in contempt of court, which means he could have his assets seized, be fined or sent to prison (or all three, as she emphasised). Once the court has heard from all the parties and oral submissions from Mr Grey, the court decided that it is in Sarah’s best interests not to have any contact with Mr Grey and that he must not speak to, email, text or contact Sarah or any person involved her care and must not enter any property she is likely to be in, and the injunction would last until further order of the court. 

She then asked if there was anything else on behalf of the OS. Oliver Lewis asked that full names be included rather than abbreviations in the order, to avoid any confusion for Mr Grey. HHJ Owens said that would be no problem and with the TO in place that would avoid issues with identification. 

HHJ Owens then asked Dr and Mrs G if they wanted to say anything about the injunctive application and they replied “No, thank you”. 

The judge then turned her attention to Mr Grey. She went through what he was being prohibited from doing and he replied “I won’t speak to her, I won’t have anything to do with social workers, I won’t be going to her home or place of work so I agree with them”. 

HHJ Owens then stated that “It goes a little wider than that”. She reiterated that he should not speak, telephone, or attempt to contact Sarah in any way whatsoever, including Facebook, even via friends and in indirect form.” She also asked Avril Rushe whether as well as the social workers, should it be specified that Mr Grey be prevented from contacting Sarah’s parents? Avril Rushe confirmed that – and HHJ Owens stated that she would change the injunction accordingly. 

She then returned to Mr Grey. 

And Mr Grey, any premises where you believe she might be. So, if you believe she could be anywhere, you must walk away”. 

Mr Grey said “I understand”.  

The judge then confirmed that the order would be “indeterminate” and he replied “Yes, I agree, as it’s not going to happen”. 

HHJ Owens then said “That’s good, but the Order says that you mustn’t do it” and once again she outlined about contempt of court and what that entails. 

She continued “So, Mr Grey, thank you for agreeing to this. I am satisfied that it is in Sarah’s best interests not to have contact” and then referred to wording that would be slightly different to the draft order. 

She stated that “Mr Grey is prohibited from attending any further public hearing” so as to protect Sarah. 

Mr Grey was then disconnected from the hearing and the Clerk confirmed that he was no longer present. 

At this point, HHJ Owens suggested to Avril Rushe that she would need a sealed copy of the order sooner rather than later so she would rise to re-write it, and ask the COP hub to issue it so that it could be issued to Mr Grey as soon as possible. Avril Rushe confirmed that this would be “greatly appreciated”. HHJ Owens rose at 14.32. 

She came back at 14.53. This time there were no discussions between the other attendees as everyone waited, some with cameras on and some with cameras off. On her return the judge confirmed that she had “perfected” the injunction, emailed the draft approved order to the hub and rang them to ask them to do it quickly and for the TO “to be appended”. She finished with that hearing by thanking everyone for their patience but “I thought it was important to deal with it now”.  

At this point the court moved on to the “substantive hearing” about welfare. 

I had never observed a hearing where an injunction had been placed on somebody, not least when they were present. I was conscious of how the need to keep Sarah safe and as quickly as possible was paramount, to the extent of HHJ Owens ensuring the injunction could be served immediately. The judge was very clear to Mr Grey about what would happen if he ignored the injunction. 

Committal hearings for contempt of court in the COP are rare but the Project has blogged about a few (e.g.  A committal hearing to send P’s relative to prison – and the challenges of an in-person hearingCommittal hearings and open justice in the Court of Protection).

Case management

This second part of the hearing essentially comprised two elements:  the appointment of an independent expert acceptable to all parties and Sarah’s care and support plan. 

Appointing an independent expert

The first element was non contentious. An independent expert (Dr Camden-Smith) had been identified who had agreed to do the assessment and provide a report for the beginning of November 2023. I learned from the PS that the letter of instruction would be written within a week of the court “agreeing the identity of the expert”.  There was some discussion about what would be included in the letter of instruction, including asking the expert to diagnose whether Sarah has a learning disability – which is important because she does not currently have such a diagnosis and is therefore excluded from some health services such as sexual education. 

The OS’s PS shed further light on what exactly the expert was being asked to report on and the following paragraph caught my eye: “In addition to the capacity assessment and review of diagnoses, the Official Solicitor seeks from Dr Camden-Smith an opinion as to steps the carers and the family could take to encourage Sarah to engage with activities for a sustained period, so that she builds her skills and has meaningful activities to look forward to on a weekly basis. This would decrease the risk that she rides around on buses on her own where she has now been groomed by three different men.” This underlines to me how important the role of the independent expert is and how much finding the right person counts as the impact on Sarah’s future, both in terms of freedom and safety, is immense. It also highlights to me the vulnerability of women like Sarah, who strive to live freely but may not appreciate how at risk they are. 

Later on in the hearing, the judge scheduled a further hearing for 19th December 2023 to consider the report from the expert. But this meant that what should happen in the meantime had to be considered. Avril Rushe outlined that the LA was asking the judge to make best interests decisions under s. 48 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, as there was ‘reason to believe’ that Sarah lacks capacity to engage in sexual relations (which would be confirmed or not by the expert’s report). The OS did not contest this and it was indeed ordered by the judge at the end of the hearing. 

A new care and support plan

The second element, Sarah’s care and support plan, proved to be a much more contentious issue. In order to try to protect Sarah when the incident with Mr Grey had occurred, the LA had increased the number of hours of 1:1 support from 48 to 105 per week, without the authorisation of the court. Sarah’s social worker had subsequently produced a new care and support plan outlining a gradual reduction in hours from 105 to 79 and eventually back to 48. But the OS was not happy with the plan and Oliver Lewis seemed somewhat frustrated with the way the case had been managed so far.  He said he and his solicitor were confused about “what is written in the care plan, what is being delivered and what is being proposed”. He wanted the LA to draft a new care and support plan that was much simpler than the current draft which was in the bundle. He went as far as to say that he and his instructing solicitor could not understand what the care and support plan was. “It’s a mixture of thoughts and intentions but does not set out needs and how care is to be put in place to meet those needs, so that the OS can understand and Sarah can understand”. The judge appeared to agree that the plan could have been written better as she said later that “The document as a whole….is not clear”.  And Avril Rushe representing the LA acknowledged that some of the details needed to be ‘fleshed out’

Oliver Lewis outlined that Sarah is a person who greatly values her independence and autonomy and is now distressed that she doesn’t have freedom. She has said “I want my freedom back”. There was concern that unless the situation was resolved quickly, it could have serious consequences for Sarah’s mental health, something both the OS and Sarah’s parents were very concerned about. She had previously been sectioned under the Mental Health Act and everyone wanted to avoid this happening again. But what could be done to protect Sarah whilst giving her as much freedom as possible? 

“Find my Device”: A technological solution? 

The proposed solution surprised and slightly shocked me, even though I can see why it was being considered: the use of technology via a GPS tracker. The idea was that Sarah’s whereabouts could be tracked, allowing her to go out independently but with a type of security blanket. Some of the 1:1 hours allocated could be used to monitor the tracker. This solution was supported by the LA, the OS and Sarah’s parents, even though there was disagreement as to the practicalities of how the tracker would be used. 

The social worker had met with technicians to discuss what was possible. It would show whether Sarah was near to places she had gone to with Mr Grey (his home and a particular pub) where she may be at risk. But it would not show if she was at risk in a new location. There was also a major concern about her using public transport to get to day activities or to spend time. It was agreed that Sarah had been groomed by three men on the bus over the past three years, and the LA wanted Sarah to be “chaperoned” on public transport, but the OS and Sarah’s parents felt that the use of technology would be the least restrictive option and more proportionate. 

Oliver Lewis proposed that the use of an app such as the android “Find my Device” could be the simplest to use. He stated something along the lines of “ …as many parents all over the world know – and I’m not equating her as being a child – but the Find my Device app could be adjusted so she does not switch it off”. Before the hearing, he had discussed with Sarah’s parents how it might work and that it could be used as a bargaining chip, as a price Sarah would have to pay to go out alone. “That might work”. The OS thought 48 hours of care should be returned to as soon as possible, as this is in line with the wishes and feelings of Sarah. With regards to the risk, the carers could use the extra hours to monitor her phone rather than going with her, and see if she goes to places where she is at risk. He said that it shouldn’t need much time for the technology to be sorted out. 

Urgency vs practicalities – again:  

There was then some discussion about how soon a new care and support plan could be completed and when the next hearing to consider it should be listed for. The OS wanted it as soon as possible given Sarah’s deteriorating mental health. But there were practical difficulties, given the social worker’s availability to draft the plan as well as the judge’s annual leave and whether judicial continuity was essential. The eventual decision was that the next hearing would be listed for 4th September 2023 and HHJ Owens would hear it.  (In the event, that hearing was vacated. I’ll keep a look out for when it next returns to court.)

In reaching this decision, the judge considered what was realistically feasible. She stated that there was a “tension between an ideal world and what was practicably achievable”. She directed the LA to provide a revised section of the care and support plan covering the use of technology. She stated that “None of us know what the impact of the injunction will be, regarding Mr Grey and Sarah” and- as had been flagged by Oliver Lewis in his PS – Sarah “reacts well to people in authority telling her what the rules are. The Official Solicitor suggests that it would reduce the risk of [her] seeking out [Mr Grey] if the judge or social worker phrases the best interests decision as a rule, by telling her “You must not try and find [Mr Grey]”. This may have the desired effect and would be a better way of ensuring that [Sarah] does not try to seek a meeting with [Mr Grey[.”

In consideration of the injunction, the LA was asked to reflect on what was proposed regarding technology as a replacement for 1:1 support or a partial replacement. The judge stated “none of us understand what might be practically achievable” as tracking on a phone only indicates location. But 1:1 support on public transport might function as a considerable restriction. Technology may answer that, as if it shows she is spending hours on a bus and at risk from men, then it might enable action to be taken so that she is discouraged from doing that. So, a key sticking point was not resolved during the hearing and it will be very interesting to see what is proposed in the revised care and support plan. 

One final point needed to be confirmed: Oliver Lewis asked HHJ Owens to confirm whether she was authorising the deprivation of liberty. HHJ Owens replied that, as she had alluded to, yes she was, there was a significant interference with Sarah’s right to liberty. Whether that would alter with a new care and support plan, there was still the issue of surveillance by technology, so it probably still would be. She asked whether he was raising the issue due to funding, as if there was no DOL, it alters funding.  

Oliver Lewis replied that there was no funding issue, as this was not a deprivation of liberty in a care home (which would be covered by the DoLS regime in Schedule A1 of the MCA, for which P is granted non means tested legal aid), but a community deprivation of liberty in a supported living placement (for which legal aid is available on a means tested basis) and means-tested legal aid was in place. After some final technical discussions, the hearing concluded. 

Final Reflections

The whole exchange about the proposed use of technology to enable Sarah to have more freedom to go into the community alone really made me think. As Oliver Lewis stated, many parents have become used to using smart phones to track where their children are. I also know families who use it to track where other family members are, even to the extent of knowing when to have dinner ready for. Or single friends using it to ensure that somebody has arrived home safely. Or family members living with dementia using “airtags” so that their families can see if they have started “wandering”. I have also read of smart phones sadly being used to enforce coercive control.  It seems as though tracking has become somewhat normalised in today’s world, for better or for worse. I wonder, how does this fit in with the law, especially with regards to the concept of Deprivation of Liberty? And the concept of “freedom”?

I also discovered something new about DOL. I had thought that it was restricted to hospital and care home settings, which can lead to s.21A appeals, as had happened in my mother’s case. But deprivation of liberty in the community was something I hadn’t heard of. 

I am very interested in finding out what steps will be put in place to help keep Sarah safe whilst giving her as much freedom as possible – and whether the injunction served on Mr Grey achieves its objectives. 

Anna was the pseudonym of a woman whose mother was a P in a Court of Protection s.21A application.  Since March 2025, Amanda Hill is allowed to reveal that she is Anna, because the Transparency Order covering her Mum’s case has been varied (changed). Amanda Hill is a PhD student at the School of Journalism, Media and Culture at Cardiff University. Her research focuses on the Court of Protection, exploring family experiences, media representations and social media activism. She is a core team member of OJCOP. She is also a daughter of a P in a Court of Protection case and has been a Litigant in Person. She is on LinkedIn (here), and also on X as (@AmandaAPHill) and on Bluesky (@AmandaAPHill.bsky.social). 


[1] I am also grateful to Celia Kitzinger for substantial feedback on earlier drafts and assistance in making sense of this case.

[2] The Equal Treatment Benchbook sets out this obligation  https://www.judiciary.uk/about-the-judiciary/diversity/equal-treatment-bench-book/

[3] I have learned that capacity for sex and capacity for contact are separate and are assessed separately.  It’s quite often found that P has capacity for sex, but not capacity for contact and this poses problems

Prolonging life or protracting death? An end-of-life decision by Hayden J

By Zach Moss and Jemma Woodley, 1st September 2023

At a hearing in the Royal Courts of Justice on 22nd-23rd August 2023, Mr Justice Hayden made the decision to withdraw treatment (dialysis and clinically assisted nutrition and hydration) from a man in his fifties who was in a coma following a stroke.  

There is, as yet, no published judgment, but this case (COP 14075103) has already been blogged by Rhiannon Snaith (“Withdrawing treatment from a pastor in a coma: Balancing religious beliefs and medical realities”).  She describes, in detail, the background to the case, and the evidence that was given in court. 

We watched the hearing too, and want to give our overall impressions of the experience. 

We are grateful to the Open Justice Court of Protection Project for alerting us to this hearing and for its tireless work to ensure transparency in the court. 

Reflections from Zach Moss

The first half of the day’s evidence served to build a picture of P’s current health situation. As someone who has observed hearings before concerning withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment I am familiar with some of the medical conditions usually explored. This case however was perhaps the sickest patient I’ve come across. The first half of the day’s evidence outlined just how sick P was. P suffered from stage 5 chronic kidney failure, requiring dialysis three times a week. P was also diagnosed as being in a prolonged disorder of consciousness. The prognosis from most of the clinicians who gave evidence was bleak, with the medical consensus being that P would likely not live beyond a year.

There seemed to be little doubt about P’s medical situation: the grim prognosis was perhaps more certain than any other case I’d observed. In previous cases, the focus has often been on the prolonged disorder of consciousness – the grade and prospects of recovery being explored. Often there are disagreements between the family (who visit often) and the expert (who doesn’t). This case did indeed have some elements of disagreement in terms of observed behaviours and the label of ‘vegetative state’ but I noted that Mr Justice Hayden made the point that there is, in these cases, sometimes very little practical benefit in focusing on the distinction between the vegetative and minimally conscious states. In this case, with P’s other medical conditions, this perhaps seemed even more pointless as he was also suffering from end stage kidney failure – a terminal illness.

Whilst the medical evidence was being discussed, I was struck by one moment, when Mr Justice Hayden asked that the relevant witness statement be brought up on the screen for the benefit of the family. This may seem a minor technical point, but I think serves to highlight the diligence and focus of the Court in placing P (and the family) front and centre. Given what is at stake, being mindful of the family and those close to P, and making sure they can follow and understand what is being discussed in terms of P’s medical situation and prognosis is crucial.

As the medical evidence seemed to be coming to an end in the hearing, it was becoming clear this was, in Mr Justice Hayden’s impression “not about preserving life, but from medical perspective… trying to focus on how to achieve for P the best death”. I took note of Mr Justice Hayden wanting to ensure he had a proper reflection of the medical evidence.

Another moment of note was where one of the witnesses, Professor Derek Wade (a consultant in neurorehabilitation) noted that of the hundreds of patients he’s seen in a prolonged disorder of consciousness, P was maybe in the bottom 2 – 5 patients in terms of the lower end of the spectrum of consciousness. In fact, it was made clear later in the day that P would not have met the criteria for dialysis in this condition. It was only due to the fact that P sustained a brain injury whilst already receiving dialysis that it continued, almost by default perhaps. It maybe highlights the grey area, lack of practical guidance and difficult situations medics face in these extreme situations.

Hayden noted: “…there comes a point where the laudable aspiration to prolong life is overtaken by the equally strong moral imperative not to protract death. Where that point arises is very difficult to identify…

Another moment of note in the hearing, was when footage was played of P in the role of Pentecostal pastor delivering a sermon. I thought it a very powerful moment after listening to hours of evidence about P, to spending just a minute listening to P. The family was understandably and visibly upset at this point. I am not surprised.

During the second half of the day, P’s family members, and a close friend, gave evidence. Mr Justice Hayden wanted the camera focused closely on each witness in turn – a reminder of his desire and need to build as rich and detailed a picture of P through these witnesses as is possible.

With one witness, Mr Justice Hayden posed several moral thought experiments to try and glean P’s theological position on life-and-death issues: abortion, euthanasia and withdrawing treatment. Mr Justice Hayden almost apologetically stated at one point “I’m creating a nightmare scenario because P is in a nightmare scenario“.

By the end of the day’s evidence, it seemed clear to me as an observer of P’s strong faith, that P would likely have wanted treatment to continue and for his life and death to be placed in the hands of God. In particular, the Pentecostal belief in present day miracles seemed particularly relevant. It seemed Mr Justice Hayden was also convinced of this, and seemed to already be clear about what P would have wanted. This was confirmed when the judgment was delivered ex tempore the next day.

In fact, Mr Justice Hayden said he’d had little difficulty in reaching this conclusion. He explained, though,  that whilst P’s wishes and beliefs are important, they are not (under the Mental Capacity Act 2005) to be regarded as determinative. This turning point in the judgment is not one I’ve observed before, so I was struck by how Mr Justice Hayden used the law to explain how in essence ‘context is everything’. 

He had carefully weighed P’s wishes and beliefs in the context of the degree of P’s incapacity and the strength and consistency of medical views. It seemed the plan to bring P back to hospital 3 times a week for dialysis whilst being in a PDOC and dying from end stage renal failure was too much. Dialysis was characterised in this context as being“both burdensome and futile”. I thought it interesting as well that the wellbeing of the treating clinicians was taken into account (because, said the judge, P would have taken it into account). With P’s future treatment likely to cause the treating clinicians distress, Mr Justice Hayden had heard enough to make a judgment that P would “be the last person to want to impose such a burden on anybody else”.

I found this hearing another advert for the Court of Protection – in particular for its ability to function as a forum to explore complex medical and legal issues. As Mr Justice Hayden noted, these are incredibly difficult cases for everyone involved – made slightly more bearable by the professional approach of all those involved in working towards a resolution for P and his family.

Reflections from Jemma Woodley

Over the last two days I watched both medical professionals and brave friends and family take turns to give powerful evidence about P’s medical situation and his wishes and beliefs. 

While the family gave evidence of P’s wishes, I was struck by their description of P’s uncompromising nature when it came to his religious beliefs and practices. It was clear throughout that P’s faith was the driving force behind this hearing. 

Mr Justice Hayden did not hold back on exploring P’s religious beliefs.  He asked both friends and family several hypothetical questions, designed to explore P’s personal views regarding topics such as euthanasia and abortion. At first I questioned the relevance of these hypothetical scenarios, but I came to realise that Hayden was intent on exploring the depths and possible limits to P’s faith, to further understand how far his religion makes up an integral part of his being. 

His friend’s and family’s answers continued to demonstrate the depth of P’s faith. Hayden J was led to be confident that, in face of absolute suffering, his family and friends believed this would not stop P’s commitment to sanctity of life. They believed P would rather hold out for a miracle or for death – whichever is the will of God –  even at the cost of personal suffering, rather than to have medical treatment withdrawn. 

Hayden J was faced with a difficult decision. Where do you draw the line between protecting P’s faith and the family’s belief that he would want to continue treatment at all other costs, against the decision not to protract death and to manage this in a dignified way. I was struck by Hayden’s clear description of the decision before him: 

“There comes a point where the laudable aspiration to prolong life is overtaken by the equally strong moral imperative not to protract death. Where that point arises is very difficult to identity.” – Mr Justice Hayden

In his judgment, Hayden J deemed the Trust’s application to withdraw life sustaining treatment was well-founded. Although the weight he attached to P’s wishes and beliefs was extensive, he told the friends and family present in the hearing that the weight attached to any individual’s wishes must be done within the context of the situation – that context being both the complex medical situation P is in and the consistent evidence given by all medical professionals involved. Hayden noted, in particular,  the concerning burden of continuing dialysis for P.  

I am confident that today we saw the very best of the Court of Protection. I was especially pleased to witness Hayden J’s continuing references to the importance of P’s autonomy throughout the two days of proceedings. 

The decision served as a stark reminder that our views on the line between prolonging life and protracting death are different for us all. Talking, recording and sharing your wishes, on treatment and care at the end of life, has never felt more important to me. 

Zach Moss and Jemma Woodley both work for Compassion in Dying – as Digital Manger and Information Support Officer respectively.  The charity supports people with making plans for end of life and loss of capacity.   They have both previously blogged for the Open Justice Court of Protection Project, e.g. here and here.  The charity tweets @agooddeath

Withdrawing treatment from a pastor in a coma: Balancing religious beliefs and medical realities

By Rhiannon Snaith, 30th August 2023

An evangelical preacher in his fifties (KT) had a stroke in February 2022. He underwent emergency surgery but has sustained significant brain damage and never regained consciousness. He is currently in hospital, in a coma and also has end-stage kidney failure and Type 2 diabetes. 

The Trust was seeking a declaration that KT lacks capacity to make his own decisions about treatment and approval of an Order permitting withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, specifically dialysis and clinically assisted nutrition and hydration (CANH). His life expectancy if these treatments are continued is likely to be 6-9 months, and death could be sudden, and possibly without his family present.  Without the treatments, he will die a managed and predictable death within a couple of weeks. The family position is that it is in KT’s best interests to continue receiving treatment. The Official Solicitor, acting on behalf of KT, reserved her position until the closing statements at the end of the hearing.

KT’s wishes, beliefs and values were important factors that were considered throughout, along with their place in best interests decision-making.  Right at the beginning of the hearing, Mr Justice Hayden said:

“Mr T has practised in a proselytizing way as a pastor in a very robust, muscular, and uncompromising version of Christianity, and his has been uncompromising. The concept of faith being able to move mountains is not figurative for him. It is real. He believes very absolutely in the power of prayer. And that may lead me to the conclusion that, invidious though his situation is, he would have preferred it to the alternative. Much of the evidence points to that. If I do come to that conclusion, how do I address best interests?”[1]

The question of what KT would want for himself in this situation was difficult to determine. KT’s family did not have discussions with KT about what he would want in this situation but strongly believe that if KT had the capacity to choose, he would want treatment to be continued. The Trust argued that there is not sufficient evidence of what he would want. 

This case (COP 14075103) before Mr Justice Hayden was heard in the Royal Courts of Justice over two days (Tuesday 22nd of August 2023 and Wednesday 23rd August 2023). It was listed as ‘hybrid’ which meant that people could attend either in-person in the courtroom or (as I did) remotely using a video link.

The applicant in this hearing was the Trust, represented by Vikram Sachdeva KC

The person at the centre of the case (KT), the first respondent, was represented by Fiona Paterson KC  via the Official Solicitor. 

KT’s wife was the second respondent (as a litigant in person) and his sister (GT), whose views are aligned with the rest of KT’s family, was third respondent, represented by Francesca Gardner

Witnesses called for the Trust were: Dr D a Consultant Nephrologist, Dr W a Consultant in Neurorehabilitation,Dr B a Consultant Neurosurgeon, and independent expert Professor Derick Wade. Witnesses were also called for the family.

DAY ONE

Witness 1 – Dr D, Consultant Nephrologist

I joined the hearing slightly late (due to technical difficulties my end) as Dr D was giving evidence to the court. KT had been diagnosed with end-stage kidney failure in 2015 – meaning that his kidneys were providing less than 15% of their normal level of function. In end-stage kidney failure, the body is no longer able to survive without treatment to remove waste products (kidney dialysis), which he has been receiving since then. Dr D was explaining the burden dialysis has on patients’ quality of life, stating that treatment can often lead to patients experiencing cramps, feeling sick, fatigued or like they may pass out (although others cope reasonably well). It was described as a “burdensome” treatment.

Dr D said that KT is usually sat upright in a hospital bed and that dialysis comes to him three times a week so that he does not have to be moved to another location. 

Mr Sachdeva, counsel for the Trust, questioned Dr D as to why KT was no longer on the kidney transplant waiting list despite having kidney failure. Dr D explained that KT used to be on the list and was scheduled to have a transplant, but it never happened for “various reasons”. She further stated that when KT suffered a brain haemorrhage, he was taken off the list due to the increase in risk. They were not sure he would survive being put under anaesthesia and Dr D stated that there was an “unacceptable increase of risk” due to the medication KT would need to be on to have the transplant. Mr Sachdeva asked: “So, a transplant is not an option?”, to which Dr D replied “exactly”. 

It was explained by Mr Sachdeva that in the written statements submitted to the court the doctors gave the average life expectancy for someone who has kidney failure, diabetes and is on dialysis as 3-5 years. KT has survived 6 years on dialysis so far. At this point, the judge intervened and asked why KT has lived longer than anticipated, Dr D replied that it was “hard to know for sure” but that it sounded as though KT was a “motivated”patient before suffering a brain haemorrhage and knew what to do to stay well. He also managed his own dialysis. 

Should treatment continue for KT, Dr D said that while cardiac arrest could be a cause of death, “infection is also a risk, particularly because he [KT] is bed bound, therefore he is at risk of pneumonia and pressure sores and the things that will ensue from that leading to sepsis”. Dr D explained that KT’s tracheostomy, PEG (Percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy) and cerebral spinal fluid shunt could all be portals for infection. She went on to explain that for patients who require long-term dialysis “their access point for the blood stream is one of the key determinants of their prognosis”. 

Dr D explained that there were two ways to access the bloodstream for haemodialysisThe first, as is the case for KT, is with an AV fistula which is a blood vessel located in the arm, this method offers “a low risk of bloodstream infection”. However, some patients who have diabetes and need dialysis are unable to have a fistula in their arm, so they need a piece of plastic tube in the vein from which there is a “high risk of it becoming infected”. Dr D states that KT’s fistula “continues to work very well”, so there is currently “no increased risk in bloodstream infections”

The judge questioned whether “the most likely circumstances in which he [KT] might die would be cardiac arrest, or sepsis or fluid overload”. 

Dr D explains that “if we [treating team] can’t remove the fluid if the blood pressure keeps dropping, that would be what would lead to the fluid overload”. She further stated that “in KT’s case, sepsis is unlikely to occur from the fistular” but if it stopped working then they would have to put a tube in the vein which would result in a higher risk of sepsis. Dr D went on to clarify that “the risk of hospital acquired pneumonia remains…which could lead to sepsis which could prove fatal”. 

Mr Sachdeva asked why KT’s would not now be a candidate for dialysis were it not that he’d already been receiving it before his stroke. Dr D explained that “it’s really because of the lack of evidence of any benefit in terms of survival and quality of life in this situation”. Although, she said that it was “impossible” to comment on KT’s quality of life because “I don’t know how much he is aware of”. Reading the evidence submitted by (I think) Professor Wade, Mr Sachdeva said “a good death is possible…only through careful planning and avoidance of distress”. Dr D agreed. 

Dr D said that KT’s clinical situation has become worse explaining that in the first few months of KT’s admission they reduced his blood pressure tablets before eventually stopping them, and that KT got to a point where he was “tolerating dialysis”. However, KT then started experiencing drops in blood pressure during dialysis despite there being no change in the process. Dr D stated that his heart muscle had weakened which was a concern. In the statement submitted to the court it was stated that KT’s blood pressure dropped “in 9 out of 36 occasions” during dialysis. His low blood pressure could cause a heart attack, further brain injury and cardiac arrest. 

Dr D explained to the court that if KT’s blood pressure continued to go down then they “would sometimes have to give fluid back into the vein” to bring his blood pressure back up, but in doing so they are “going several steps backward” as KT needs fluid removed. So, having to give fluid back could make the situation worse and may lead to fluid overload. 

It was clarified by Mr Sachdeva that according to the written evidence, fluid removal was reduced as KT’s blood pressure dropped too low with it being 55 over 38. Dr D explained that “many people would not be conscious with a blood pressure of 55 over 38” and that for most people this would lead to unconsciousness and could “lead to heart attack or heart rhythm disturbance”. It was described as life threatening. 

Dr D said: “Sadly, I do believe that his [KT’s] death is inevitable, and there is a risk it could happen in a sudden and uncontrolled way”. She explained that she wanted to avoid causing “unnecessary suffering” for KT and his family but said that she also respects their wishes and beliefs. 

When asked by the Official Solicitor to describe the level of risk to infection in the coming months, Dr D stated that in the Autumn months there was an “increase in cases of seasonal flu and it’s quite likely cases of COVID would also increase”. She said that infection could be brought in from numerous sources including other patients, visitors, and staff members so the risk will increase over the autumn and winter months. However, Dr D stated that the risk of infection from the PEG tube or cerebral spinal fluid shunt is always a risk regardless of the season. She also said that the risk of hospital-acquired pneumonia will remain. However, if KT became ill with influenza or COVID there would be an increased risk of him developing bacterial pneumonia, from which the outlook would be poor. 

Dr D stated that sometimes patients can deteriorate rapidly with sepsis which can be scary. The judge intervened and questioned, “without wishing to distress the family, why is sepsis such a particularly difficult death?”.

Dr D responded that if someone has pneumonia and they’re producing sputum and are short of breath or feel like they can’t breathe it is “one of the most profound ways to suffer I would say”. Dr D said that no one knows how aware KT is, but with the tracheostomy there are increased problems with coughing up sputum which must be sucked out using special catheters. She said this was not a pleasant situation and is “not something any of us would ever want to have to go through”.

The judge responded saying “sometimes, I have heard it be described as being like drowning” – to which Dr D said “yes, I have heard it described that way too”.

When asked by the Official Solicitor about KT’s risk of developing pressures sores, since he is largely confined to his bed, Dr D says that “he [KT] has been very well cared for by doctors and nurses, and he has not yet suffered from a pressure sore, but the risk remains”.

Witness 2 – Dr B, Consultant Neurosurgeon 

Dr B was on call when KT suffered his brain haemorrhage and took him to surgery, which he assisted in. When questioned by Mr Sachdeva as to why KT had suffered brain bleeds, Dr B explained that brain haemorrhages can happen for a number of reasons but for those with cardiovascular disease the risk of having a brain haemorrhage is much higher. 

Dr B had prepared two statements that were submitted to the court in which he had stated that there had been no significant clinical improvement in KT’s neurological state. In his statements he had said that  KT’s “condition has plateaued”. When asked whether his opinion today differs, Dr B responded “no, it remains the same from a neurological perspective”.

Mr Sachdeva sought to clarify that there was no neurosurgical intervention that could help KT nor any ongoing neurosurgical role that could benefit. Dr B stated that this was “correct” and that KT “has been stable from a neurosurgical standpoint for a long time”

It was made clear that Dr B did not believe that continuing life sustaining treatment would be in KT’s best interests. Dr B stated “I agree with evidence [Dr D] has given that we can’t change the overall outcome for P” in that KT’s death is inevitable and the only thing that could be controlled is how he dies. Dr B said, “if we continue with current treatment his [KT’s] death with be unpredictable and could cause suffering to him and his family”.

Witness 3– Dr W Consultant in Neurorehabilitation

In her witness statement (read out in court), Dr W said: “It is the opinion of myself and the clinical team that neurorehabilitation is not appropriate. [KT] has no meaningful interactions which could be formulated into a rehabilitation plan”.

It was Dr W’s opinion and that of her colleagues – and the independent expert Professor Wade – that KT is in a prolonged disorder of consciousness (PDoC). She stated that there was “no evidence of awareness” and that KT had only “limited responsiveness”, most of which was clearly reflexive. 

According to the written evidence provided by Dr W, it was her knowledge and that of the treating team, that KT had not discussed his preferences regarding what he would want in his current situation. It was also stated that were no documents that contained KT’s views. 

Dr W told the court that “there is no prospect of recovery” for KT. She confirmed that the clinical team was “unanimous” in their view that it would “not be in [KT’s] best interests to continue treatment”. 

The court was told that KT presents as being in a coma. Dr W said that “it is a deterioration of his clinical state”that his episodes of eye-opening are less frequent. She also said that KT’s brain stem dysfunction is deteriorating which is evident by his disordered breathing pattern. Dr W confirmed that there were “no further neurosurgical interventions that can help him”.

When questioned by the judge whether she believed that it would not be in KT’s best interests for treatment to continue, Dr W answered “yes, that is correct”.

The judge then asked: “If I concluded that KT wanted what most of us wouldn’t want and would prefer to take his chances with a bad death because he believes that to be God’s gift and nobody else’s, would it be in his best interests to go against those wishes?” 

Dr W responded that it was a “very difficult question to answer, which is why it has taken so long to get to this stage”. She explained that in KT’s situation “unlike other patients I have been involved with who have prolonged disorders of consciousness and a tracheostomy, the burdens of continuing treatment are far higher, and I am referring to him needing dialysis three times a week. If he were not in hospital, he would need an ambulance three times a week…and because of his diabetes he has increased risk of infections”.  She added that the risk of pressure sores mentioned earlier would also be an issue. 

Dr W was then questioned by Francesca Gardner, counsel for the family. Ms Gardner began by emphasising that the family are “very grateful for the care [KT] has received and are complimentary of it”. She stated that it was important to them that Dr W was aware of that. The area of disagreement in this case stemmed from whether KT’s treatment should be withdrawn or continued. Dr W stated that she was aware of these facts. 

Ms Gardner asked whether Dr W was aware that the family believe that KT has some awareness of them. Dr W answered yes. She said that there was a “remote chance” that the family would be able to identify certain behaviours or mannerisms indicating conscious awareness that a clinician would not be able to.

Dr W was then asked whether she had spent much time with KT when his relatives were also present. She responded “no, I have not”, but explained that she had been with KT when his wife (JO) was there. She said that KT was not based on her ward, so she only tended to see him when there was a specific need. 

Ms Gardner questioned whether Dr W had watched the recordings submitted by the family that showed (they believed) that KT was showing signs of awareness. Dr W responded that she had. Ms Gardner referred to a specific entry where a Chaplain (KT receives prayers twice a week) had reported KT opening his eyes and looking at him as he read to him, which was of particular concern to the family. Dr W responded saying that when KT’s eyes are open they tend to move to his left – but this does not indicate a localising response. The configuration of KT’s room, with his dialysis machine on the right of the bed, means that visitors sit on the left-hand side, so it appears that he is looking at them.  She said: “the entry by the chaplain is an interpretation of what he has seen… I cannot say whether it was a meaningful response as I was not present at the time”

Ms Gardner then asked Dr W whether she had treated a patient with a similar prognosis and awareness to KT where she has concluded that it would be in their best interests for treatment to continue. Dr W answered that she had not been involved in a case previously where the patient had severe kidney failure, as KT does, but has had patients whose life expectancy was short and concluded nonetheless that continuing CANH would be in their best interests. 

After being questioned about how she had weighed in KT’s religious beliefs and his family’s views into her decision, Dr W stated that “the views are not purely my own, I express them on behalf of the treating clinical team, and I share their view. We tried hard to explore the views of the family…the dilemma was that [KT] had not expressed explicit views about being in this type of situation, which made it difficult”. She explained, “prior to his brain injury, he may have had discussions but there was no evidence of that… the decision is difficult, which is why we are here today”.  

If treatment were to continue, Dr W stated that KT “would remain in hospital for the rest of his life”. Counsel for the Trust asked whether, if treatment were withdrawn, she would object to a time allowance to enable KT’s family who live abroad to come to the UK. Dr W said, “I wouldn’t, but I’m not his treating consultant – it would be up to the treating team”.

It was at this point that KT’s wife JO (second respondent) and KT’s sister GT (third respondent) were given the opportunity to ask questions. Through the video link, KT’s wife JO (I think) stated that she first would like to express her appreciation towards the ward, saying that the “staff are great”. To Dr W she said, “You talked about [KT] and said he is in a vegetative state which means he can’t respond to things”. She goes on to explain that KT has a tube that causes “irritation” and says that KT tends to try and pull it out. GT asked, “what do you say about that?”

Dr W responded, “If he has involuntary movement, then he can dislodge it that way or they can catch when he is being repositioned or cared for, but I am not aware of him trying to dislodge his tracheostomy or PEG tube”.

In her written evidence, Dr W described that she had observed KT as having an abnormal breathing pattern in which he had periods of rapid breathing, followed by a period where he was not taking a breath followed by more rapid breaths. Dr W indicated that this was a poor prognostic sign and was due to central apnoea which is indicative of additional brain stem dysfunction. Dr W explained that she was with KT for “20 minutes” to establish a pattern in his breathing. When questioned by the Official Solicitor, Fiona Paterson, whether that was a sufficient period of time to establish a pattern, not just an observation, Dr W said that yes, it was. 

Dr W was further questioned by Ms Paterson, as to why KT’s deteriorating brain stem function was a poor prognostic indicator. Dr W said that it was because KT “in this situation can suddenly stop breathing”. KT’s current breathing pattern could result in further injury as the brain is not getting enough oxygen. 

When asked by Ms Paterson if KT’s functionality was deteriorating, Dr W said, “it appears so, yes”. She further stated that KT already has brain stem damage which has resulted in a swallowing impairment. Dr W was then asked whether there was a link between brain stem dysfunction and awareness to which she responded, “patients can have severe brain stem dysfunction and be aware”.

The judge intervened and asked Dr W whether KT would be more vulnerable if he acquired a hospital generated infection, as he already has difficulty swallowing. Dr W said that KT had already been on antibiotics for an assumed respiratory infection and that “he appears to have responded to intravenous antibiotics”. However, she did not know entirely how he has responded as she does not work on the same ward that KT is currently in. 

Witness 4 – Professor Derick Wade, Consultant in Neurological Rehabilitation, independent expert witness 

Following a lunch break, the independent expert witness, Professor Derick Wade, gave evidence. “I have seen a large number of patients with a prolonged disorder of consciousness”, he said, “and he [KT] is among the 2 or 3 at the most extreme lower end of that spectrum”

In his written reports submitted to the court, Professor Wade explained that according to early observations of KT, there was some indication that he showed low levels of awareness that included responses to oral commands. However, Professor Wade thinks that these are improbable. Observations made in more recent months had not included any suggestion of awareness on a significant level. According to Professor Wade, KT’s level of awareness is “minimal” and “transient”

In terms of categorising KT in either a vegetative state or a minimally conscious state, Professor Wade stated that there were “no unique signs that will put someone into one state or the other” and believes that it is not necessary to do so as it would not impact “treatability or prognosis”. So, categorising a patient in these terms would not be helpful. However, when later asked whether KT could be classified as being in a coma, Professor Wade said, “yes, as far as the criteria, he can be classified as being in that group”

The judge then said that while the family agree that there were not behaviours indicating a specific emotional state, they said that he “occasionally showed behaviours which, if he had a greater degree of consciousness, would automatically be suggestive of discomfort or pain”. Referring to one of the passages, the judge said that KT was said to have been “grinding his teeth”. He asked whether that is what Professor Wade had been referring to in his written report, which explained that some behaviours are suggestive of pain or discomfort and that if KT were to experience anything, it would most likely be pain, discomfort, or fatigue. Professor Wade answered “grinding teeth is a behaviour that would be more likely to suggest pain, discomfort or distress”. However, he later stated, “I think it is extremely unlikely that there is any experience [for KT]”

Professor Wade was asked by Mr Sachdeva about the multidisciplinary report that recorded the results of the WHIM test (a test that assesses and monitors the recovery of cognitive function after severe head injury). The test showed that grinding teeth had been observed 6 out of 9 times for KT. Professor Wade said the “only comment I would make of that is that I cannot say that it means he has pain; it may have no meaning and is just something he does, but if it does have meaning then it would be indicative of pain”. He went on to explain that grinding teeth is common for those with brain damage, though he does not know why. It was also noted that there were no records of KT showing behaviours that were suggestive of pleasure or happiness. 

Professor Wade clarified that when he states in his reports that a behaviour is suggestive of pain, “I’m not saying that [KT] is experiencing pain, but that he is showing a behaviour that suggests pain”

In his written report, Professor Wade stated that being immobile is also uncomfortable for patients and reported that most patients with spasticity report discomfort and pain. When questioned by Mr Sachdeva whether he was implying that KT had spasticity, Professor Wade said, “yes, to an extent. I am just making the point that for someone in his [KT’s] clinical state, overall being immobile is uncomfortable”

Professor Wade stated that it was “extremely difficult to know” whether someone who is almost completely unresponsive and has no awareness, as he believes is KT’s case, was experiencing pain. He said, “I do not think he has any experience, but those in prolonged disorders of consciousness will respond to external factors like cold or pain or warmth but that doesn’t necessarily mean he has experience…I do not know what is going on inside [KT]”

In his written report, Professor Wade stated that KT “has deteriorated clinically over the last few months, coinciding with an increase in cerebral atrophy… [KT] will never have autonomy or live outside a hospital environment”. Mr Sachdeva questioned whether this includes nursing homes, to which he responded that yes it did and that he meant any medical or clinical environment.

In terms of the prospect of continuing treatment for KT, Professor Wade believed that it would offer no benefit to him. “I do not think he is consciously experiencing anything, but one has to acknowledge that in the end for someone who is completely unresponsive, we don’t know what he’s experiencing”. Further stating that if KT was experiencing anything it would be an unpleasant experience that he is having, he said “I cannot identify any benefits other than the prolongation of life”

The judge intervened and stated that the points discussed by Professor Wade are extremely complex both morally and ethically but said that “there comes a point where the aspiration to prolong life is overtaken by the equally strong moral imperative not to protract death”.

Professor Wade said that “when it comes down to [KT’s] best interests, I am not satisfied that he would want to continue in this particular state”. He made the point that there was no evidence of what KT had previously discussed with his family. He further stated that KT was “someone who is concerned about other people…I think he would want to take into account the effect of his continued living on the care team, for example, who have to continue suctioning him when he looks like he’s in pain, and he likely would be – as it is an unpleasant process”

Ms Gardner, Counsel for the family, asked Professor Wade about the medical records that he had viewed. She stated that he had considered those records but “took the opinion that you did not need to see [KT] again. The family are concerned that it has been 8 months since you’ve seen [KT]” and that there are recordings of his awareness and of KT being awake. She asked what Professor Wade would say to that. He responded that “if I came up to see him, I may be there for two to three hours, not days…even if there were episodes, it is statistically unlikely that I would arrive when one of those episodes arises”. He said that he had to consider his efforts and the efforts of those involved. 

When asked by Ms Gardner whether the evidence provided by the chaplain made him want to visit KT, Professor Wade said, “I think that in the end what the chaplain wrote does not constitute in my view an observation independent of interpretation”. He stated that KT is “not totally immobile” and that an interpretation could have been made based on the chaplain’s belief or could have been a human interpretation of the movement. “Awareness isn’t something that will restrict itself to certain circumstances”; others would have also seen it. 

Professor Wade explained that KT “has cerebral atrophy, but he is also atrophying” as there are several factors that are causing damage to his brain including low blood pressure and diabetes. He is “deteriorating”. 

Video

It was at this point that the court was shown a short clip of KT preaching. After watching it, the judge addressed the family directly stating, “when I saw the video, it made me think that some people are born with charm… it’s perfectly obvious that [KT] was born with the gift of charm”

Witness 5: KT’s Friend and fellow pastor

This was the first witness produced on behalf of the family. He explained that he has known KT for over 35 years, and when describing their relationship, he said KT “is like a brother to me”. His friend spoke of how they had met when he was going to school near to where KT’s family owned a restaurant. He said they became friends after KT joined the same school where they would both attend a faith group for students. From then, they would try to “preach the gospel” and “reach the people” in their neighbourhoods. When KT moved to the UK, he explained that they would still speak to each other “a few times a week”.

When describing KT, his friend stated that he was “the type who will put his faith over everything else, he will gladly let everything go and just follow God…that was his life”. He described how he knew KT and “his theological views and views on several subjects”. He talked about KT’s belief in the sanctity of life which meant that he was “against abortion and euthanasia”, and “anything that directly or indirectly takes away life or puts it at risk”.

After being given several scenarios by the judge as to what KT would do or believe would be the best thing to do in those situations, his friend clarified that “anything that has to do with exercising human power to end life will not have his support” as it is something “God should decide”.  

It was mentioned earlier in the hearing that there was the belief that KT may not want to continue treatment if he knew that it would have a negative impact on his friends, family, and the clinical team. KT’s friend was asked by Francesca Gardner, counsel for the family, whether they had discussed a scenario like this. 

“It’s been said KT might take into account the impact of his situation on his clinical team and the family. Did you discuss that with him?”

“Specifically in relation to this situation, no. But he cares about people, that care and compassion and sense of empathy and trying to make sure he’s a blessing rather than a burden – these are all inspired by his belief in God. Now, this same God, he believes, expects  him to respect the sanctity of life, so he will not allow his love for people to triumph over his faith in God or his belief that God can bring about a miracle, or take that to mean that he can decide when his life ends.  He will not care about people to the point of offending God. Because his care for people is inspired by his love for God. So, the decision to do something that he does not believe will be pleasing to God will decide the boundaries for him. There is a truth to saying that he would not want to be a burden. That is consistent with his personality and character. But it goes too far to assume that because of his love and consideration for people he would say ‘I don’t care what God thinks – doctors think it’s over – just pull the plug on me’. That is a stretch too far. I don’t see him doing that.”

Counsel for the Trust asked about the history of the relationship between this witness and KT, and the judge intervened to enquire what they liked to do together when they weren’t being pastors  – to which he said that they would often debate on global issues and theological matters, go out to eat together, go shopping or do business research. The judge followed up by asking what was KT’s favourite food and how he adjusted his diet when he first became ill. KT’s friend explained that “he [KT] started eating more vegetables, he did a lot of research to identify what was okay or not to eat and so he adjusted his life to eat more natural food and drink more water”.

Mr Sachdeva picked up the cross-examination again, asking whether he had discussions with KT about what it would be like to be in a coma. He said that they hadn’t, “not in the context of him or me or anyone we know being in a coma,” but that they had discussions about other people. He explained that the subject of euthanasia was debated often in the area where they used to live. He and KT had conversations as there was “a situation where someone was in a coma and there were people of the view that their life should be terminated and [KT] did not share that view”

“What do you mean by ‘euthanasia’”, asked Vikram Sachdeva.

Friend: I know that’s a technical term – but I can tell you what it meant to us at the time.  Human beings were going to make decisions about whether to continue or to end another person’s lif,  because of a desperate situation where a person is never going to recover. So, to make it more bearable, let it end now. We used the word not as experts but as, “hey, this person is alive thanks to the machines, which have been invented by people who received knowledge and wisdom from God. If God wants the person to die, the machine won’t keep the people alive, because some people go on the machines and die anyway.  Let’s stay away from saying ‘we’re going to stop this now'”.

Sachdeva: So, your view is doctors can never stop providing life-sustaining treatments for someone who is still alive?

Friend: If there’s any technology keeping a person alive, that comes from God, and people capable of rendering that care should keep that care going.

Sachdeva: So what you mean is ‘yes’.

Friend: Yes. Doctors should prolong life when they have the ability to do so.

Sachdeva: Should doctors ever withdraw treatment from a patient who is alive.

Friend: Theologically, no.

Sachdeva: From KT’s point of view?

Friend: I would say KT would be saying ‘no’ to that too.  Based on my knowledge of him.

The Official Solicitor then took a turn to cross-question the friend.

In terms of KT’s prognosis, his friend said, “we honour and respect the doctors and hear what they have to say but never take their words as absolutely final” because “there’s another layer of power who is God” who can intervene. He said that KT has already lived longer than he was expected to, therefore there is always a chance for a “miracle”.

His friend was made aware by Ms Paterson that the evidence provided to the court indicated that ,despite the efforts of the treating team, and the fact that KT has lived longer than expected, the medical evidence is that his death is inevitable in the next six to seven months. There was a risk that KT could die “rapidly and unexpectedly” and “alone”.  His friend answered that he believes when people have chosen a path, they have made their own choices. He likened it to being a soldier.

“They join the military and put on a uniform, and travel to another nation to fight in defence of their countries, their fellow citizens. They kiss their wives goodbye on their way to strange countries, never sure they’ll come back.  When a person makes a choice of a lifestyle, to believe in God and the principles of the Bible, that person is also making an indirect choice. …. If you can leave your wife and go abroad, there is no question that you have a higher vision. The day you decide to follow Jesus, you are saying your life is no longer your own.” 

The judge intervened again.

“The picture that Ms Paterson was painting for you showed you that there are different scenarios for KT’s death”.  He said that KT was susceptible to hospital infection and could, essentially, drown in his own bodily fluids. “My every instinct as a judge and as a man is to spare [KT] from that if I can”.

He engaged in some theological discussion: “I think Pentecostalism believes that man is made in the image of God  and how we treat men is how we treat God” t- o which KT’s friend agreed. The judge went on to say:

“Now, I have said in many cases there is something intrinsic to the human condition that carries dignity with it, and we have an obligation to preserve human dignity.  The scenario I’ve just outlined to you does not preserve KT’s dignity as a human being, and it causes him avoidable pain and effectively protracts his death, rather than keeps him alive.  I don’t have KT here to be able to answer this question, but I am persuaded he was a committed Pentecostalist. Tell me what your position would be.”

His friend answered, “I’m not claiming to be a voice for Pentecostalism, but I can tell you my view – and this is a very important part of our theology. We will not promote poverty or anything that we believe will cause people pain, but we are familiar with the fact that we do not have an ideal world. And in this world, we try everything within our power and with the grace from God to create an ideal world, but we recognise the limits to where we can go. Let me give you an illustration”.

“No”, said the judge. “I want you to deal directly with my scenario. You think he would rather go through that dreadful death?”

“Yes”, he replied.  “People who think otherwise will think so out of love too – but he would not choose to end his life. He would rather go through humiliation”.

Witness 6: KT’s wife (JO):

After a short break, KT’s wife was invited to speak to the court. She described KT as “a caring person. He’s a believer, a good friend, a confidente” and said that “he’s been through a lot but never allowed the situation to get the best of him”.  

She said that she visits him “sometimes four times a week” due to work and said, “he is a good person, I would do anything for him”. She felt that KT knows she’s there when she visits. And when she plays recordings of sermons it’s her belief is that he hears them.

When asked about what she would say about whether or not treatment should stop, JO said, “it’s a life event. He didn’t allow his condition to bring him down. He did his research to see how he could improve. He tried his best to get better”. She told the court that they never had a discussion as to what KT would want to happen if he were to become as poorly as he is now. 

Judge: Thinking about situations when you see him struggling to breathe, or someone suctioning his throat in situations that are very distressing to watch.  We don’t have to have that. 

(She shakes her head)

Judge:  You could avoid it.

Wife: He’d want to leave it to God. 

JO described to the judge how KT did not tell her for a while after he was diagnosed with kidney failure because “he didn’t want me to worry”. The judge told her “I think you had a very happy marriage” to which she said, “I tried to make him feel happy because I didn’t want him to feel bad about his situation”.

When the judge said that if it were left to the prospects of a miracle, which would be unlikely, the course of events “will be very sad for both of you”. JO responded, that while she would “definitely want to be there…as a Christian, we take each day as the last day you will live on earth”. She said that “even if we’re not there, we visit him, so he knows he is loved”

Counsel for the Trust then proceeded with the cross-examination. Mr Sachdeva asked JO whether she believed that KT’s condition had deteriorated and whether she accepted the evidence from Dr W and Professor Wade. JO stated that she didn’t accept the evidence provided by Dr W and Professor Wade and disagreed with the belief that KT has deteriorated neurologically. She said that she “wouldn’t say he’s gotten worse” because “he was getting irritated with the pipes in his nose and would try to pull it out…he opens his eyes, he moves his legs and left palm”

JO was concerned that, if treatment were to continue, the plan would be to move KT into a nursing home. She asked, “wouldn’t it be best for him to stay in the hospital?” as he is currently receiving his treatment there and “they know what to do”. However, this was not an option proposed by the Trust.  Mr Sachdeva told her that “if the application is refused, then the Trust will seek to discharge your husband to a nursing home, as he does not need hospital care” but assured her that “he will go to a suitable nursing home” where they are trained to provide the treatment KT needs. 

KT’s sister (GT):

Although there was no further formal evidence, the judge asked KT’s sister if she could tell him about KT. GT, who joined virtually, described her brother as “a lively person and very active, very caring” – someone who “doesn’t take no for an answer…he is a fighter and doesn’t give up”

When talking about the prospect of treatment continuing for KT, the judge said that he “may pay a very high price” and experience a “painful death”. Similar to JO, GT responded saying that KT knows who is around him and knows that they care for him. 

The judge said that if he followed the family’s wishes “it would lead to a very painful death for [KT], do you think that’s what he would want?” JO said yes, she believed that is what he would want. When the judge raised the concern that KT would be “effectively choking on his own secretions”, JO responded saying “death is death, it is God’s will”.

Closing discussions

The judge spoke to her and the rest of the family who had joined virtually and said, “I appreciate how extremely difficult this must be for you”.

The evidence seemed to indicate that KT would have wanted treatment to continue. The judge stated that he found “the evidence compelling as to what [KT] would want”, but now had to confront that if it were the case that KT would want treatment continued (which could still be disputed), what weight would be given to KT’s wishes, values, beliefs, and feelings in determining best interests. Especially as the evidence indicated that continuing treatment could lead to an uncontrolled and painful or distressing death for KT. He asked counsel to address this question:

“If I come to the conclusion that this is what he would have wanted for himself, however painful, and however contrary to most people’s instincts, as a man rooted in Pentecostal faith, how determinative is that of the Court’s decision?”  He pointed out that KT’s human rights were engaged – including his right to exercise autonomy in the later stages of his life.  “Would it be wrong to impel people to treat him in this way? I don’t know. Would it be contrary to their ethics? I don’t know.  Is it workable and capable of preserving his dignity… I think we really are in the territory of what if those are his wishes and feelings, and what that means for best interests”. This was the issue he asked counsel to address in written submissions the following day when the court reconvened at 10.30am. 

DAY TWO

Closing statements

The judge had been sent written closing statements by 10.30am. I requested the closing statements from the Trust and counsel for the family, but only received the Trust’s closing statement. (Celia received all three and used them to help me with this section.)

The closing position of the Trust was that it was not possible to infer from the fact that KT was a Pentecostalist that he would have wished to continue to live in a coma, with the very significant burdens that life holds. There was no direct evidence (said the Trust) about his past wishes and feelings relating to this situation – no witness even claims to have had a conversation with him about this. He has no ascertainable current wishes or feelings.  In any case, a person’s values, wishes, feelings and beliefs are not determinative of a best interests decision. The Trust cited extensive case law to that effect.

The closing position of the Official Solicitor was also that it was not possible to be sure what KT’s wishes would be in this situation, because he “never contemplated the terrible reality of his present circumstances, which were outside his experience and probable knowledge”.  The OS argued that “The court cannot know how, had he known thi,s KT’s views may have been refined… It must be live to Lady Hale’s observation in Aintree at [45] that ‘[even] if it is possible to determine what his views were in the past, they might well have changed in the light of the stresses and strains of his current predicament’.  This is not in any way to undermine or belittle the strength of KT’s beliefs, but is to recognise the reality of human experience, i.e., we adapt and reflect upon our beliefs, in the face of circumstances”.  The OS submitted that the Trust’s application should be granted so that KT’s death would be peaceful, with full symptomatic relief and his family present. To continue treating him, they said, would be to deprive him of “the last vestiges of his dignity and comfort”.

The closing submission from the family was that all the evidence showed that if KT were able to decide he would elect for treatment to continue. He had dedicated his life to God, and for him there are no limits or exceptions to sanctity of human life. He would not support a decision to bring about the end of his life in any circumstances. This is not a case where the court has only one option. There is a formulated option for KT to continue his treatment until such time as he dies naturally or, as the family hopes, there is a miracle.  It has not been suggested at any point that the treatment plan is not an available option for the court to consider, or that any aspect of the plan goes beyond that which the clinicians would be willing to provide. It is the family’s unwavering position that treatment should continue because this is what KT would want for himself.

Delay with a ‘sensitive matter’

I used the link I had received the previous day to access the hearing, making sure I was ready at least 15 minutes before the scheduled start time. However, the hearing did not begin until a little past 11 o’clock. The judge was told by Ms Paterson that a sensitive issue had arisen. She made an application to the judge that this matter should not be made public. The judge was required to decide whether it would be appropriate for members of the public, the family, or the media to be present for this part of the hearing and he decided to ask everyone except the lawyers to leave the platform while he heard what it was that had arisen. Members of the public and the family were asked to leave, and the hearing was converted to a private hearing to deal with the sensitive matter. It was made clear to us prior to leaving that if it was determined that we could rejoin, we would be made aware. 

It was just under two hours later that Celia Kitzinger contacted me to say that we were able to rejoin the call. However, when we tried to rejoin we were denied access. There was some confusion over the coming hours as to what was going on and when we were to be readmitted with the answer being ‘soon’ but with no definitive time set. 

We were eventually readmitted at around 2.40pm at which time the judge informed us “I have to be limited in what I can say. I apologise if it sounds rather delphic. This morning an issue arose that may have had some bearing on the issues in the caseIn the event, and having heard from the counsel, I have concluded that the material is not relevant to the decision I have to make. It’s deeply sensitive, and because it is not relevant it does not need to be in the public domain. I will set out my decision on that in a separate judgment, which will not be placed in the public domain.”

The closing statements from the Trust, the family and the Official Solicitor were then discussed. It was agreed that all parties were happy not to provide an oral submission, but to leave it with the written submission. However, Ms Gardner told the judge that “in the event that it’s in [KT’s] best interests to stop treatment, the family would ask for a period of time to visit [KT]”.

The Official Solicitor applied to withhold the name of the Trust from the public domain. The Judge said that there would have to be “powerful reasons” as to why the Trust should not be named. Ms Paterson acknowledged that the “practice of the court is to name the Trust” but argued that the judgment would have to deal with KT’s age and religious background which may allow the public to determine his ethnicity, amongst other things, and combined with his brain injury it may make KT identifiable to the public if the name of the Trust is known. As a result, it was requested that the “Trust not be named between now and three months after [KT’s] death whenever that may be”

The judge stated, “excluding the names of Trusts bringing applications to withdraw treatment…greatly unsettles the public”. He explained that it can “have a corrosive impact not only on public trust in the healthcare system but also on the confidence in the court”. The judge refused the application stating that he did not believe “the relatively short-term advantages of not naming the Trust outweigh the very strong disadvantages of  undermining the public trust in the process of this court and the healthcare system”.

The judgment was then scheduled to be handed down at 4.15pm. 

The judgment

I rejoined the link and the oral judgment commenced at roughly 4.40pm. The judge found that KT was in a prolonged disorder of consciousness, stating that a “compelling medical consensus established that he [KT] has no awareness or scope of rehabilitation”.

He summarised that KT “is dependent on dialysis three times a week to keep him alive, but it has become increasingly difficult as his blood pressure drops which carries risk of further brain injury, cardiac arrest or heart attack”.

The judge acknowledged that the family holds a “strong Pentecostal Christian faith” that means they have “belief in the power of prayer and miracles” and  “confidence in the power of God to cure the sick, however parlous”. He also acknowledgesdKT’s faith, his role as a pastor and as an active member of the church. “He [KT] was a very highly regarded and popular preacher”.

Speaking of the family, the judge said, “[KT’s] family feel that his faith was such that he would want his life sustained for as long as possible. They do not proactively dispute his prognosis but feel he has a greater level of awareness than the Trust proposes”. They believe that KT is “aware of their presence and they have, on occasion, observed meaningful responses”

If treatment were to continue, the judge acknowledged that KT “cannot remain indefinitely” in hospital and “would need to be put in a nursing home” that would be able to appropriately care for him.  He stated that the Trust’s “multidisciplinary team agree that treatment should be removed and he [KT] should receive palliative care only”. The process leading to KT’s death would be managed by the Trust, and it would enable KT to have his family around him. In the hypothetical end of life plan proposed by the Trust, the likely cause of death would be due to the withdrawal of dialysis after which it is estimated that KT would “likely die within two weeks”.

The judge stated that “whilst there is disagreement…it is also important to emphasise there are high levels of respect and mutual understanding”

The judge spoke of the pastor in KT’s church who had described KT as “a man of stubborn faith” who believed in the supernatural power of God and would be strongly against withdrawing any form of treatment from anyone. “Even when confronted with pain and his own death he [KT] would still respect sanctity of life”

Speaking of KT, the judge said, “[KT’s] popularity as a pastor is, in my view, not only because he was manifesting a charming and engaging personality but also because his faith was so evidently genuine and sincere”. He said:  “the code by which he lives his life is clear…I find that [KT] would have chosen to continue with life sustaining treatment even in the face of a coma and with a terminal diagnosis”

The judge found that – contrary to the closing arguments presented by the Trust and by the Official Solicitor – there was compelling evidence that KT “would not have wanted treatment withdrawn” – and that he would “rather suffer and hold out for a miracle”. 

However, the judge said that “dialysis for [KT] can achieve nothing, it is both burdensome and futile”. The plan to sustain treatment would “cause harm without delivering benefit and it would cause great distress for the treating team to act in a way that would become contrary to their own professional principles”. He stated that he believed KT would be “the last person to want to impose such a burden on anyone else” and said that “it is plain from all I have read that he was both a kind and gentle man”

The judge said, “I have ultimately concluded that the application by the Trust is well founded… I can tell KT that which he would want to know, namely that everything possible had been done. I do however think that the family would want to say their goodbyes directly to KT and that he too would very much have wanted that. Family, plainly, was important to him”. The judge stated that the declaration is not to be put into effect until “twenty-one days from today’s date so they [the family] can arrange flights from diverse parts of the world, but it would be inappropriate to go beyond that period”.

The judge expressed his gratitude to counsel for their assistance, acknowledging that challenging and difficult cases like these can “take its toll on everyone concerned”.

REFLECTIONS

This case, like many others I have attended, greatly emphasised the importance of advance care planning (ACP). ACP is a process through which you can document your personal values, goals, and preferences regarding future medical care, appoint someone to make decisions for you if you can’t, and – if you want to – you can make legally binding treatment refusals. It was frequently mentioned in this case that there was not sufficient evidence to support the claims that KT would want treatment to continue. However, we were not made aware as to why, despite being ill with end stage kidney failure, KT had not (apparently) been supported by his health care team to explicitly discuss his wishes with them and with his family members, and why no advance care plan had been drawn up.

Undeniably, conversations about death and dying can be incredibly difficult and daunting, and there are a number of reasons as to why people – including doctors – avoid having these discussions and making an advance care plans. These reasons could include a lack of awareness, cultural or religious beliefs that conflict with planning, or general discomfort with the topic. However, it’s cases such as this one that highlight the importance of having a plan in place because even though KT’s family and friend were all unanimous in the belief that KT would want treatment to continue, and the judge accepted that this was KT’s position, it was ultimately decided that it was not in KT’s best interests. 

This case highlighted the intricate and complex nature of best interests decision making. The judge in this case acknowledged the compelling evidence that KT would have wanted treatment to continue, which the doctors were willing to continue to offer, yet decided that continuing treatment would not be in KT’s best interests. His decision not only draws attention to the diverse considerations that encompass best interests decision-making, but also suggests that ‘best interests’ extends beyond adherence to the past preferences and beliefs of P. It seemed in this case that the decision was made by considering not just KT’s beliefs and values but the medical evidence and expertise, potential outcomes, and the possible impact on the well-being of KT as he is now. Furthermore, and as expressed in the closing statement of the Official Solicitor, it cannot be truly known whether, in light of his current situation, KT would hold the same views. As a result, it’s clear that while KT’s religious beliefs and values are important to consider, they are not the sole determinant. Rather, the decision is made through the consideration of a range of factors. 

As a PhD student who is currently researching media representations of end-of-life decisions, the mention of a ‘good’ death and its opposite – a  ‘bad’ death  – was something I noticed in this case. with comments like “a good death is possible… only through careful planning and avoidance of distress”. When discussing a potential risk for KT in developing an infection that could essentially drown him in his own bodily fluids, the judge expressed his wish to “spare” him from that death, implying, to me, that it was undesirable. The concept of a ‘good’ death is often present in research pertaining to end-of-life and palliative care, although what constitutes a ‘good’ death is difficult to establish. There are also several studies that refer to the impact media coverage can have on public understanding of a ‘good’ death including the identification of certain circumstances that are deemed ideal – such as being surrounded by loved ones. Meanwhile other studies have considered the media’s ability to influence and shape cultural understandings of what constitutes a ‘good’ death. It made me keenly aware of the impact and influence cases such as this can have in shaping public understanding of a ‘good’ or a ‘bad’ death. However, it can be argued that the definition of a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ death is subjective – as personal or cultural beliefs can impact an individual. in this case I couldn’t help but question whether for KT, a ‘good’ death would be one that was, in his eyes, decided by God, or whether a ‘good’ death would be one that was as painless as possible and one where he was surrounded by his loved ones?  

Brain Farmer, PA journalist, also observed much of the hearing and wrote about it in The IndependentWife of brain-damaged pastor loses life-support treatment fight. It was interesting to read what he had written, especially in comparison to how I approached writing this blog. There’s no question that writing a news report, and writing a blog requires different approaches even when they both include information that stem from the same source. As suggested by the title, the news report has a significant focus on KT’s wife. This can make the case more relatable and emotionally engaging for the reader whilst also highlighting the contrast between the views of KT’s wife (and loved ones), and the views of the medical experts. While this focus emphasises the newsworthiness of the case, the report also delves into the key points of the hearing. Brian Farmer explores KT’s medical condition and treatment, the family’s beliefs and religious considerations, key points of the legal proceedings and the judge’s ruling. The article also highlights the ethical and moral dilemma and challenge of balancing deeply held religious beliefs with medical realities. It’s interesting to see the details that journalists like Brain Farmer pick out and to think about how news reporting of cases such as these could help develop public understanding of the Court of Protection and of end-of-life decision making. News reports such as this make information accessible, and easily digestible in terms of its succinctness. However, blogs can offer more context by providing an extensive account of what unfolded during the hearing moment-by-moment. Together, they can cater to a wide audience, potentially increasing engagement and providing balanced coverage of the case that caters to the various levels of interest and, hopefully, developing a more informed public audience. 

Finally, discussions relating to the transparency order also piqued my interest. The Court of Protection has, in the past, been referred to as a ‘secret’ court in which judgments were difficult to access and hearings were often held in private. It was encouraging to see the judge in this case consider the detrimental impact withholding information (the Trust’s name) could have on the public. It is not contested that the privacy of those involved in these cases should be respected, but it is also important to ensure that the public are able to access information that could develop their understanding of the court’s processes and how end-of-life decisions are made. 

As we have also seen in the dispute present in Independent News and Media Ltd & Ors v A [2009] EWHC 2858 where it was determined that there was ‘good reason’” for the media to be present at the hearing “with the potential for reporting its outcome”. In that case, the judge, Mr Justice Hedley, highlighted three reasons as to why he concluded that there was ‘good reason’ in this case. They are as follows: 

First, all these issues in principle are already within the public domain and the questions which they raise are readily apparent. Secondly, the court is equipped with powers to preserve privacy whilst addressing the issues in the case. Thirdly, the decision of the court will have major implications for the future welfare of ‘A’ and it is in the public interest that there should be understanding of the jurisdiction and powers of the court and how they are exercised. It can be objected that the second and third reasons above could apply to almost any case, and it is important to stress that it is the combination of those three reasons that impels my decision; by the same token it should not be assumed that the first standing alone would necessarily be sufficient. (my emphasis)

The ability to observe and read about cases can greatly aid the public in our understanding of the court process and end-of-life decision-making. Statements such as these point to a shift in attitude of those involved in the court in acknowledging the benefits and importance of transparency and openness. 

Rhiannon Snaith is an ESRC funded PhD student at the School of Journalism, Media and Culture at Cardiff University. Her research focuses on media representations of decisions about life-sustaining treatment, specifically for those without the capacity to make such decisions for themselves. She has previously blogged for the Project here and here.  You can learn more about her work by checking out her academic profile and her Twitter profile


[1] This quotation was supplied by Celia Kitzinger.  All extracts purporting to be direct reported speech from the hearing are drawn from contemporaneous notes made by Celia Kitzinger and (with this sole exception) Rhiannon Snaith, and cross-checked for accuracy.  However, we are not allowed to audio-record hearings and they are unlikely to be 100% verbatim.

A court system creaking under its own weight: Transparency challenges


by Daniel Clark
, 25th August 2023

Earlier this month (on Tuesday 16 August 2023), I was given an insight into the cracks spreading through the structure of the judicial system. 

This blog highlights those cracks, so that more people are aware of the pressure facing judges and, by extension, everybody else in the court system – from regional county courts to the Royal Courts of Justice. 

From Sheffield County Court…

It all started when I asked for the link to observe a hearing before HHJ Marson, sitting remotely in Sheffield. 

I asked for the link to observe this hearing because I had some previous knowledge of this case, having observed a hearing at the end of June this year. 

It caught my eye because Celia Kitzinger had tweeted about it from the Open Justice Court of Protection Project feed when she noticed it was incorrectly listed: it appeared in the Sheffield Daily Cause List rather than the Court of Protection list. It was only by chance that she’d looked at the Sheffield Daily Cause list, and so only by chance that we even knew this hearing was taking place. Celia tells me she also reported this incorrect listing to a Deputy Manager at His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunal Service (HMCTS) who said she would address this with the people responsible.  At the time she posted this, she didn’t know I’d observed a hearing in this case before.

When hearings are listed in Court of Protection list, would-be observers are instructed to contact the regional hub. As the hearing was in the Sheffield Daily Cause List, the instruction was to contact the Sheffield court directly. 

After some consideration, I decided to email the Sheffield court but copy in in the regional hub which, as a result of the last hearing (which had been listed correctly), I knew was the Leeds Hub. I cannot be sure which email resulted in a response because the response for my email (received at 09:45) came from the Sheffield Court of Protection email address. 

I was advised my details had been passed to the Judge and the Clerk and that they would join me to the hearing. The Transparency Order was also (unusually) attached. The hearing was listed to start at 10:30 but I still had not received the link at 10:40. I therefore sent a (polite) email asking whether there was some delay to the hearing getting started. 

At 10:50, having received no response, I rang the Sheffield Court directly, and the person I spoke to advised me to email them again so that my request could be sent to Sheffield’s Court of Protection team. I advised this was who I’d been in contact with so far but the person I spoke to advised me that this was the best option.  

At 11:11, I received a message from the judge (via the administration officer who sent me the Transparency Order) explaining that, ‘Circuit Judges in Sheffield are block listed at 10.30am. Just because they appear in the list at 10:30am does not mean that will be heard at 10.30am, I may not reach this case until this afternoon, I have too many other equally important cases to deal with at the same time.’ 

My first reaction was, if I’m honest, of frustration. I felt that the tone of the email was somewhat irritable, assuming that I should have some sort of knowledge about the way lists in Sheffield are composed. I also thought that it would have surely been possible for somebody I’d emailed or spoken to, to have made me aware that this hearing would not necessarily commence at 10:30am. 

I think it is also worth pointing out that the hearing at the end of June was also listed to start at 10:30am. On that occasion, I received the Transparency Order at 09:52, and the link at 09:58. In my opinion, it wasn’t unreasonable to except that would happen again. 

However, the tone of emails is very hard to judge. I’ve come across as short and irritable in email (I know because I’ve been told) when in reality I simply wanted to ensure information was passed on to somebody in a timely manner, when I didn’t have much time. 

In that light, I think this whole experience really demonstrates the way in which judges are expected to handle an increasingly high volume of hearings – as well as the demands of transparency, as exemplified by requests from would-be observers like me. We know about the volume of hearings: when we share listings on Twitter (aka X), we often have occasion to point out that some judges have multiple hearings listed for the same time, and so that inevitably some will start later than the listed time.

HHJ Marson is, of course, right to say that all cases are of equal importance. But every case has a diverse set of people involved, and every single one of them want to know about their own important case. 

I later found out that this case was vacated with consent orders in place. 

…to the Royal Courts of Justice

There was a hearing before Mr Justice Keehan that was also listed to begin at 10:30am that same day (Tuesday 16 August 2023).  I learnt from another observer that the start of that hearing had been delayed because the judge was involved with another matter. I therefore requested, and received, the link for this hearing, and joined the virtual waiting room. 

It was hard not to miss some similarities. Two cases, on the same day, were listed to start at the same time, only for the judge to be engaged in another matter, and the start of the hearing delayed. 

I knew, though I couldn’t see them, that also in the waiting room there must be lawyers waiting; lawyers who also have many other clients to make contact with, and other hearings to plan for. I thought there may well be professionals – a social worker, as it turned out – who were also anxiously waiting for the hearing to start, their diary already marked out as ‘do not disturb’ and facing the possibility of extending that period of not being available. 

And finally, I thought there may well be anxious family members, maybe even the protected party (P) herself waiting for the hearing to start. Although I could get on with other things, occasionally re-opening the tab to check I hadn’t missed anything, I highly doubted that they could switch between tabs with such comfort. For the hearing about you or your loved one to be delayed must be unbearable. 

Of course, this isn’t the judge’s fault at all.  He was apologetic (both at the start and end of the hearing) for the delay. In fact, it struck me again that this is an almost impossible situation for a judge to find themselves in: having to move with urgency from one hearing to the next, knowing full well how important each case is but inevitably having to keep somebody waiting.

Delay, delay, delay…

Both of these cases were, of course, dealt with by a judge on the day they were meant to be heard. However, it goes without saying that given the sheer volume of outstanding cases, there is delay elsewhere in the system too. 

It is not just public hearings that Court of Protection judges deal with. There are hearings that are private and others that are ‘closed’ (i.e. a party is being excluded, though all such hearings should now be listed).  There are applications for deputyship that must be approved by a judge, and applications for the deprivation of liberty where P is not living in a care home or hospital that must also be approved by a judge. 

The increasing number of people requiring a judge’s attention puts incredible strain on the judicial system: a system that is creaking under its own weight. Judges are expected to juggle an ever-increasing workload, as are the lawyers involved. Professionals feel the shockwaves of delays in the courts, and family members become even more anxious to see their loved one’s situation resolved.

And when we look past the judges and the barristers and the solicitors and the social workers and the nurses and the doctors and the anxious mother or worried uncle, we see P, the person at the centre of the case. When workloads are stretched and schedules would benefit from an extra couple of hours in the day, it is ultimately P who is left in limbo.  

Our focus, as the core team running the Open Justice Court of Protection Project, is of course on open justice and transparency.  We recognise the challenges the court faces in ensuring transparency – as well as everything else! –  in this context. It is to the credit of the Court of Protection that it continues to maintain its commitment to transparency as a fundamental principle, despite (or maybe because of) the pressures the system is under.  Our role is – and continues to be –  to support that judicial commitment to transparency.

Daniel Clark is a member of the core team of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project. He is  a PhD student in the Department of Politics & International Relations at the University of Sheffield. His research considers Iris Marion Young’s claim that older people are an oppressed social group. It is funded by WRoCAH. He tweets @DanielClark132.

Closed Material Proceedings: A ‘forced marriage’ hearing before Theis J

By Celia Kitzinger, 23 August 2023

The hearing (COP 13907545 on 27 July 2023) concerns a young woman in her twenties (M) who has a mild learning disability and can also experience anxiety, depression and impulsivity.  She needs 24-hour support to provide assistance with personal care, nutrition, medication and to allow her to access the community safely. 

In March 2022, M was moved from her parents’ home into supported living accommodation and the local authority (Luton Borough Council) made an application for personal welfare orders regarding her residence, care and support, and marriage.

In their application, the local authority described M as “a vulnerable lady who has entered into a marriage with her cousin” in Pakistan.  They said: “It is believed that her parents forced her to marry her cousin. M was previously living at home with her parents, who kept her locked in the house when they found out she is talking to a male friend”.  Divorce proceedings are now underway, and the parents are invited to file the Nadra Card providing final confirmation of divorce under Sharia law, with the court.

After 7 months in supported living accommodation, M returned home.  But just a few weeks later (in December 2022), she jumped from her first-floor bedroom window and sustained serious injury.  When she was admitted to hospital, her parents disguised how she had sustained the injuries (saying she had slipped and fallen in the snow in the garden), which led to M having an untreated fracture in one leg for nearly two weeks. 

On discharge from hospital, she was moved to a nursing and residential care home for rehabilitation. She’s engaging with physiotherapy and now (nearly 7 months after sustaining the injuries) is able to walk with a zimmer frame and crutches.  Her parents and younger sister visit her there, and she visited the family home recently to celebrate Eid – which went well. There are no restrictions on contact between M and her family 

M is currently subject to a Forced Marriage Protection Order (made by HHJ Hildyard).  This is an injunction preventing her parents, and her brother, from (amongst other things) forcing or attempting to force or otherwise instructing or encouraging any other person to force M to undergo any ceremony (or purported ceremony) of marriage, civil partnership, betrothal or engagement and from removing her from England and Wales.

The main issues before the court concern (1) M’s capacity to make her own decisions in the relevant areas; and (2) what best interests decisions should be made on her behalf in relation to those domains where she lacks capacity. The parties are not in agreement about the adequacy of the assessments before the court (made more than nine months ago) -which find capacity in some areas (including residence, contact, sex, and marriage, ) and not in others (including care and support).  There is a suggestion that her capacity fluctuates due to her anxiety and impulsivity.  There is also some concern about how she is affected by the “coercion and control” exerted upon her by her parents.

I’ve watched this case in court before – on 28 February 2023 (“A ‘closed material’ hearing on forced marriage”). On that occasion, PA reporter Brian Farmer also observed the hearing and wrote about it (“Arranged marriage: Judge protects woman with learning disabilities”).

A key issue to be resolved before the final hearing concerns redacted material in the court bundle – which had caused the judge considerable concern at the February hearing.

The parents, both of whom are parties to this case (as second and third respondents) do not have access to all the information available to the other parties and to the judge.  Some information has been redacted from the documents made available to the parents “because of certain matters M does not want discussed or disclosed to her parents”. I don’t know what that information is because it has also been withheld from observers.

At the last hearing, the judge was also unsure, on the basis of the paperwork before her, what the redactions were and hence what the parents did and did not know.

I’m unclear at the moment from the documents I’ve got what exactly has been seen by the parents.  I understand that certain parts of the information P has given has been redacted because of her concern about certain information being shared with her parents?  [Yes] I don’t know what has been redacted. It hasn’t been highlighted in the document and I think that is unsatisfactory…. I don’t think that was raised at the last hearing. I don’t know how much there has been discussion with the parents outside court so they know what all this means.”

At the end of the last hearing, she said: ” I’m minded to permit these redactions at the moment, but make it clear there is going to need to be some very rigorous thought and scrutiny of that before the next hearing.

So what happened at this hearing?

I watched the hearing from 11.16am when it started until the lunch break began at 1pm. I believe that the hearing continued in the afternoon, but I wasn’t able to observe then. So anything that was said or decided about closed material in the afternoon is not included in this blog post.

‘Closed material’ – the Guidance

The Court of Protection does have the power to withhold material in this way, but the starting point is that, in principle, all parties to proceedings should have sight of all materials upon which the court will reach its conclusions.  This is because:

  1. The principle of open justice, “fundamental to the dispensation of justice in a modern, democratic society,”normally requires that a judge cannot read or hear evidence, or receive argument which is not before all the parties to the proceedings;
  2. Securing the full participation of parties to proceedings, including by way of disclosure, not only enables them to present their case fully but also ensures that the court has the assistance of those parties in arriving at the right decision in relation to P’s capacity and best interests; 
  3. In any case where there is a suggestion that the court may in reaching its decision proceed on the basis of materials adverse to a party, both common law fairness and Article 6 of the ECHR normally requires that that party should be able to answer that material by way both of evidence and argument

This is taken from recent guidance available here (Guidance for the Court of Protection: ‘Closed hearings’ and ‘closed material’). For me, part of the value of observing this hearing was seeing how this Guidance (into which I had some input) played out in practice – and in relation to a very different set of facts from those that prompted my participation in creating the Guidance (see “New Guidance on closed hearings from the Vice President of the Court of Protection“).

The Guidance continues:

23. In any case where the basis for withholding disclosure is identified as being necessary to secure the rights of P, the following staged approach applies to the court’s consideration (and hence to the matters which must be set out in any application for material to be closed):

  1. When deciding whether to direct that a party should not be able to inspect the part in question, the court should first consider whether disclosure of the material would involve a real possibility of significant harm to P;
  2. If it would, the court should next consider whether the overall interests of P would benefit from non-disclosure, weighing on the one hand the interest of P in having the material properly tested, and on the other both the magnitude of the risk that harm will occur and the gravity of the harm if it does occur;
  3. If the court is satisfied that the interests of P point towards non-disclosure, the next and final step is for the court to weigh that consideration, and its strength in the circumstances of the case, against the interest of the other party in having an opportunity to see and respond to the material.  In the latter regard the court should take into account the importance of the material to the issues in the case;
  4. In all cases, the test for non-disclosure is whether it is strictly necessary to meet the risk identified by the court.

The July 2023 hearing

There had been some progress towards the “very rigorous thought and scrutiny” Mrs Justice Theis had asked for before the next hearing.

The position taken on behalf of M via her litigation friend the Official Solicitor (Emma Sutton KC of Serjeants’ Inn) is that the redaction of this information may be necessary to facilitate M’s full participation, and to promote her autonomy and independence.  This, she says, “trumps” the need for her parents to see all the materials.

A psychiatrist has been approached and offers a preliminary opinion that revealing this – currently redacted – information could lead to significant harm for M because of a risk of self-harm “if she feels unable to cope with negative emotions secondary to her family’s reaction”. 

The Official Solicitor is also looking at what steps can be taken by the care home staff to see if they could in some way be the conduit of the currently redacted information between M and her parents. It is (she said) “important to give M the tools to discuss the information currently withheld… We have been in discussion with the care home to see who would be best placed to support M with this”.

Acting for the local authority, Sally Gore of Fenners Barristers said that it was recognised that “to litigate, the parents are going to need this information”.  She also expressed concern that the local authority needs to build a good working relationship with the parents going forward and  “that is undermined by the fact that the parents know there’s information we have that we’re not sharing with them”.

The judge still seemed somewhat frustrated by the redactions and her impression was that “M believes she can keep these matters secret forever”.  She emphasised the need to have “open discussion with the parents, and at the moment, we can’t”. She said:  “The redaction issue needs to be grappled with before the next Case Management Hearing, with a view to the redactions being removed, so there can be meaningful discussion with the parents” – and in particular “the redaction issue needs to be dealt with before any placement options are approved by the court”. Returning home is one placement option; alternatives are either a Shared Lives placement or a supported living placement.

There is to be an in-person case-management hearing on Tuesday 17 October 2023 and a final hearing on 11-14 December 2023 (with a time estimate of 4 days).

It will be interesting to see how the issue of redaction has been handled.

Celia Kitzinger is co-director of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project. She has observed more than 470 hearings since May 2020 and written more than 100 blog posts. She is on LinkedIn (here), and tweets @KitzingerCelia

“I am very concerned … that the current situation is not tenable”: High-risk behaviour and questions about jurisdiction


by Daniel Clark
, 22nd August 2023

The young woman (AB) at the centre of this case (COP 12953545) suffered a Traumatic Brain Injury following a Road Traffic Accident some years ago. 

She is engaging in high-risk behaviour, and the local authority is seeking an order from the Court that it is in her best interests to be conveyed to a specialist unit for assessment. 

First, though, it must be established whether the Court of Protection has jurisdiction over this case. 

This hearing, which took place (remotely) on Wednesday 15 August, 2023 before Mr Justice Keehan, was in the urgent hearings list at the Royal Courts of Justice. The parties and their counsel were:

  • Conrad Hallin, of Serjeants’ Inn Chambers, representing the applicant local authority;
  • AB’s mother (the first respondent) who was representing herself as a litigant in person
  • Anna Datta, of Parklane Plowden, representing AB (the protected party) via her litigation friend, the Official Solicitor – as second respondent;
  • Francesca Gardner, of 39 Essex Chambers, representing the Integrated Care Board (ICB), the third respondent.

Background to the case
Very helpfully, and in accordance with the (former) Vice President’s advice (here), counsel for the applicant local authority offered to provide a background to the case, which was welcomed by the judge. 

He explained that following the accident, AB had spent some time in a neurological rehabilitation unit but, 18 months later, went on leave one weekend and refused to return. She was subsequently discharged.

In June 2021, she moved to rented accommodation with a support package amounting to 22 hours. In November of that year, a judge made a final order authorising her deprivation of liberty. 

In June 2022 she bought the property, and the deprivation of liberty was amended. Later, the local authority applied for a more restrictive package of care, which would entail an adjustment to the deprivation of liberty. 

Counsel for the local authority explained that ‘It was known [AB] was drinking a lot, inviting men to her house to have sexual intercourse, and wasn’t engaging with support staff’.” This escalation of high-risk behaviour prompted a Mental Health Act Assessment, wherein AB was assessed as not eligible for detention. Between May and August of this year, AB has been assessed several times.

AB’s behaviour has continued to escalate, with Counsel noting that “most recently I think it’s important to note that [AB] removed her own contraceptive implant which carries risk, it’s not medically advised that be done, and she’s also assaulted a support worker.” A specialist unit has been identified as a place that AB can move to for, initially, a period of 12-weeks of assessment. 

There was not any dispute that AB lacks the capacity to make this decision nor that it is in her best interests to move to this unit. However, Counsel for the local authority explained that, “there has been, it’s fair to say, some controversy about the status and the interaction between the Mental Health Act and the Mental Capacity Act in this case”.

The issue, in other words, is whether the Court of Protection has jurisdiction. 

The Mental Health Act and the Mental Capacity Act: An uneasy alliance

Counsel for the Local Authority submitted to the judge that the Court does hold jurisdiction, appealing to the judgment of Mr Justice Charles in the case of GJ v The Foundation Trust [2009] EWHC 2972 [Fam]. 

In that case, Charles J concluded that a decision-maker should, when considering whether to deprive somebody of their liberty, first accept the primacy of the Mental Health Act. Going forth, the decision-maker should assume that there is no alternative available under the Mental Capacity Act, and ask whether the person they are assessing could meet the eligibility for detention under the Section 2 or Section 3 of the Mental Health Act.

In this hearing, Counsel for the Local Authority submitted that, “in this case we have a situation where an assessment has taken place and [AB] has been found not to meet the criteria for section. It is very indicative that this patient is not within the scope of the Mental Health Act”. 

Having established (at least in the eyes of the local authority) that the Court has jurisdiction in this matter, the local authority was asking the Court to approve an Order that the move to the unit is in AB’s best interests. 

Given AB is “not in any way engaging” but that “there’s no way of managing that [risk] in the community”, the local authority also wanted approval for a draft transition and conveyance plan, including the possibility of the use of “restraint and chemical sedation”. This would be shared with both a private ambulance service and the unit. 

Following Counsel for the local authority’s submissions, the judge stated, ‘If I can just observe on the jurisdictional point, I’m inclined to agree with you and Mr Justice Charles. It would be absurd to know that a psychiatrist found her not to be detainable and yet the Court was still precluded from exercising its powers under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 to afford some protection to [AB] as this very vulnerable person”. 

The judge also acknowledged he had been to see AB the day before. He stated that, when he met her he learnt that “she feels though she has not been fully engaged in plans for her life ….I am concerned that [AB] has the opportunity to feel at least she has the opportunity to feel like she is planning for her life…She doesn’t accept that she needs help. Certainly she indicated to me yesterday, she doesn’t accept that she needs treatment, although she was urged to keep an open mind about a placement at [Unit]…But I am very concerned, as I think is the Official Solicitor and no doubt the local authority, that the current situation is not tenable.”

Counsel for AB via the Official Solicitor submitted that they were still awaiting instructions on the jurisdiction issue and the draft order. However, she did confirm that the Official Solicitor “has significant concerns about the vulnerability of [AB]”, and it is the Official Solicitor’s view that is in AB’s best interests to go to the unit identified. 

The judge also heard submissions from AB’s mother, who stated that the move “is not something I can see [AB] accepting….that’s like a zero to nothing chance.” However, AB’s mother explained that she wants “to get her back, to get her rehabilitation, to get her back into the community with support – how she was prior to the last 8-to-10 months”. 

I found this quite striking, and I thought at the time (and still do) that I cannot imagine the situation that AB and her mother are in. I have cared for people (in an inpatient setting) whose high-risk behaviour, whilst living in the community, placed them in dangerous situations, and resulted in moments of high anxiety for their families. They would often relay feeling as if their loved one has been ‘lost’, especially when the behaviour was so out of character.  

Counsel for the ICB also had limited submissions, agreeing with the consensus on best interests, and relaying that they will continue to support the parties as needed. However, “given the potential legal argument, I intend to say very little unless I can assist you, apart from this – it is not in my submission as straightforward as my learned friend suggests.”

Counsel made reference to the recent judgment of Mrs Justice Theis, Vice-President of the Court of Protection, in the case of Manchester University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v JS & Others. In this case, Theis J commended the Official Solicitor’s suggested questions that should be asked in cases such as: 

“(1) Is P a ‘mental health patient’? 

(2) Is P an ‘objecting’ mental health patient? 

(3) Could P be detained under s 3 MHA 1983” [s48]

Counsel for the ICB simply made reference to this judgment and so the full position of the ICB on this matter remains to be seen. Whilst I did receive the ICB’s position statement, this was written at an earlier time, and does not acknowledge this issue in any great detail.

Similar to earlier in the hearing, Keehan J did state that “on a provisional basis, I would find it very unattractive that [AB] is not eligible for decisions made in the Court of Protection. Whilst she may not be judged to be detainable under the Mental Health Act, that may not be the same in the future. It leaves the question of what is to be done.” 

Given the fact that there is a sense of urgency in these proceedings, the judge decided to schedule another hearing for next week (week commencing 21 August 2023). At the very least, the “jurisdiction issue” will be dealt with at this hearing, as can what other evidence is needed for the formulation of a best interests decision.  

Transparency matters

Neither Celia Kitzinger nor I received the Transparency Order before this hearing, instead receiving it when the hearing was finished.

The purpose of a Transparency Order is to enable transparent reporting of Court of Protection proceedings.  This is usually achieved by permitting reporting but protecting the identity of the protected party (P), where they live, and the identity of carers and family members. It is usual to be able to name the public bodies involved in a case. After all, they are funded by the taxpayer, and cannot be accountable to the people who live in their area if they do things that go unreported.  

However, this Transparency Order (made by a different judge, Sir Jonathan Cohen, in an earlier hearing) extends further. It states that we cannot publish anything that “identifies or is likely to identify…any of the parties”. This goes far beyond protecting the identity of the protected party and her family. It means that we cannot name the local authority or the ICB. 

As she has done before (albeit much too often) Celia Kitzinger emailed the judge asking for the Transparency Order to be varied. She received an email not too much later, thanking her for her email and advising the judge is seeking the views of the parties. Hopefully, this can be addressed by the time of the next hearing.

Daniel Clark is a member of the core team of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project. He is a PhD student, funded by WRoCAH, in the Department of Politics & International Relations at the University of Sheffield. His research considers Iris Marion Young’s claim that older people are an oppressed social group. He tweets @DanielClark132.

“Not at risk of life and limb”: Room to breathe in a complex case


By Daniel Clark
, 20 August 2023

This case (COP 13043376) concerns Mr K, a gentleman with ulcers on both his legs, which he refuses to allow medical professionals to examine or treat. 

At a previous hearing, which law student George Palmer blogged about earlier (“Assessing and treating leg ulcers of a resistant patient“), Mr J McKendrick KC ruled it was in Mr K’s best interests to be assessed by the vascular team. Rather than be conveyed to hospital, it was ruled it was in Mr K’s best interests to remain at the care home in which he currently resides for this assessment. If necessary, chemical and physical restraint was to be utilised. The judgment for the previous hearing (Barnet Enfield And Haringey Mental Health NHS Trust & Anor v Mr K & Ors [2023] EWCOP 35 (15 August 2023) has already been published.

The hearing on 18 August 2023, a week after the last one, was to determine the way forward in Mr K’s best interests in the light of the assessment – and in light of the further expert evidence that was supposed to be ready for this hearing.

This hearing was listed to be heard before Mr Justice Keehan sitting (remotely) in the Royal Courts of Justice at midday on Friday 18 August 2023. It was a brief hearing – it began slightly late (at 12.12) and finished at 12.25.

The barristers representing the parties were the same as in the previous hearing: Arianna Kelly of 39 Essex Chambers, for the NHS Trusts; Simon Cridland of Serjeants’ Inn Chambers, representing Mr K via his litigation friend, the Official Solicitor; and Chiara Cordone, of 39 Essex Chambers, for the Local Authority.

Transparency matters

Access was challenging. I only got the link to this hearing at 11:55 – that’s five minutes before the hearing was listed to start. This is despite the fact that I sent my original request at 16:58 the day before, and then re-sent my request at 11:03 on the morning of the hearing. I also forwarded my request to a video hearings administrator whose email address I happen to have from correspondence about a different hearing. At 11:40, when I still hadn’t received the link, Celia Kitzinger forwarded my request to the person who had sent it to her. 

Obviously one of those courses of action paid off, though I can’t be sure which one it was – the link came from (what looked like) a generic email address. The delay isn’t actually anybody’s fault: it’s indicative of how busy the Court staff are. Transparency is a noble goal but for it to be fully realised, there must also be the infrastructure to support it. 

I have not been formally served with a Transparency Order for this hearing. Counsel for the NHS Trusts provided a detailed summary of the case so far but, unusually, she made no mention of a Transparency Order. In fact, nobody did. It struck me that, if there were observers new to joining hearings, they would not necessarily know that some information cannot be shared, and they would certainly have no way of knowing what that information was.

As it happens, Celia Kitzinger and I were (I think!) the only observers in this hearing, and from the hearing on 11 August 2023  (which Celia attended) we could reasonably deduce the Transparency Order would be the same. After all, if it had been changed, that would surely be raised in this hearing. Celia sent me the Transparency Order from the previous hearing before publishing this blog post.  

However, it is not crystal clear to either of us, having inspected the Transparency Order, exactly what information it is prohibited to report.  The “subject matter of the Injunction” (§6) says, as usual, that we can’t publish any information that identifies or is likely to identify (a) that Mr K is the subject of the proceedings, or (b) that any member of his family is the subject of these proceedings (in fact, no member of his family was a subject of the proceedings and it’s not known to the court that he has any family). At (c) it also forbids us reporting that Mr K is a party to the proceedings (that seems redundant, given (a)). And then (d) is a list of 7 other persons/organisations who can’t be identified: health and social care professionals involved in Mr K’s care, the care home he lives at, his GP and GP practice, the transport provider, and any witnesses (other than an independent expert witness).  The list of 7 prohibited pieces of information at (d) also prevents identification of “Hospital A” and “NHS Trust A responsible for Hospital A” but we don’t know which hospital or hospital Trust the injunction means to refer to here, since there are several hospitals and hospital trusts involved.  So we won’t name any hospital or any hospital Trusts (although some are named in the published judgment) until we receive clarification on this point. (There is “A Hospital” referred to in the judgment which “shall remain anonymous” (§87-89) – so presumably that’s the same as “Hospital A”.)

The hearing itself

Counsel for the NHS Trusts explained that Mr K was assessed by clinicians at the care home on 16 August 2023, a few days after the last hearing at which the judge authorised this. 

Although Mr K did not resist the administration of IM (Intra-Muscular) medication, the “care team [previously identified as an outside agency who can provide physical restraint] did hold his hands”. Mr K tried to cover his legs when he thought pictures were being taken of his legs but otherwise allowed them to be examined and re-dressed. 

The examination found palpable pulses to both feet and there was no cause for concern with the left leg. However, “his right leg is more swollen and is more painful and is described as having a malodour”. There was some discharge that could easily be wiped away. The vascular surgeon noted “the skin around the ulcer is not normal” which is potentially concerning given that cancer can develop with wounds such as this. 

The normal course of treatment would be admission to hospital for surgical debridement and biopsies. However, the consultant anaesthetist is of the view that general anaesthetic could be dangerous due to Mr K’s long-standing heart problems – it would “impose a realistic risk of death”.  Furthermore, given that Mr K “is not at risk of life or limb”, the consultants are convening a Multi-Disciplinary Team (MDT) meeting (scheduled for the afternoon after the hearing finished) to discuss the most appropriate way forward with a wide range of colleagues. 

In essence, this assessment of Mr K not being at immediate risk has allowed all parties a small space to breathe, which must surely have been welcomed in a case such as this. There has also been a delay in receiving the expert evidence (due by 4pm the day before) and there is a view that this evidence would be of benefit to the team making best interests decisions – another reason why some breathing space is welcome.

The apparent urgency of the situation has not, however, meant that decisions have been rushed. Alex Ruck Keene notes, in his analysis of the published judgment, that Mr McKendrick KC engaged in ‘careful examination’ and was concerned to test ‘each step on the restriction ladder’. With the intensity dialled down a little, the parties have even more time to test that ladder. 

The NHS Trusts were therefore not making an application (at this time) for Mr K’s conveyance to hospital or for compulsory treatment. Nor was it the view of the Official Solicitor or the Local Authority that conveyance to hospital would (at this stage) be in Mr K’s best interests. 

Instead, all parties were asking for the submission of further evidence, setting out the options available to Mr K and the risks associated with each option. This would include, should it be considered in future that it would be in Mr K’s best interests to go to hospital: a conveyance plan, a care plan for while he is in hospital, a palliative care plan should he deteriorate in hospital (“which is a risk”), and a plan for ongoing care in the community.

Counsel for the Local Authority indicated she had attempted to contact the care home manager for an update on Mr K’s presentation immediately after, and the days following, the assessment. She had been unable to reach him but offered to share the evidence with the other parties once she has done so. 

There was also a possibility raised that the care home manager has expressed concerns that the home could possibly not be able to continue to care for Mr K. This will also be pursued in the interim.

Brief reflections

Above all else, I was struck by the collaborative work that is being undertaken in order to ensure the best possible outcome for Mr K. I had the impression, as I often do, that all the parties were prioritising both Mr K’s best interests and his own wishes and feelings. 

I was relieved to hear that it hadn’t been necessary to physically restraint Mr K. As I have written for this blog before, physical restraint can be physically and emotionally demanding for both the person who is restrained  and for the staff. Any time it is planned for but avoided is a success.

Although I understand that some people may read that the staff “held his hands” as a euphemism for restraint, I imagine it is not. There were many times when, in my role as a carer supporting people who had been detained under the Mental Health Act 1983, I was involved in the planning of potential restraint for a person who had been outright refusing an intervention (often personal care) that was in her or his best interests. When safe and appropriate to do so, reassuring hand holding is a positive first step to take the ‘heat’ out of a situation. Sometimes, this comfort allowed a moment to be facilitated where the intervention could be carried out without the need for more restrictive holds. Where somebody did become suddenly resistive or aggressive, it would be easy to quickly and safely convert hand holding into a physical restraint. 

If you begin with out-and-out physical restraint, that means you don’t  give the person in question another opportunity to work with you.  Starting with restraint symbolises that you have gone into a room having already decided the outcome. In cases where behaviours that challenge can prevent interventions, it is important to maximise the choice available to somebody. 

This case will return to Court on Thursday or Friday of the week commencing 28 August 2023. Look out for it on our “Featured Hearings” list for how to observe it yourself.

Daniel Clark is a member of the core team of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project.  He is a PhD student in the Department of Politics & International Relations at the University of Sheffield. His research takes seriously Iris Marion Young’s claim that older people are an oppressed social group, and is funded by WRoCAH. He tweets @DanielClark132

Assessing and treating leg ulcers of a resistant patient: A law student’s first COP hearing

By George Palmer, 17 August 2023

Editorial note: The judgment has been published here: Barnet Enfield And Haringey Mental Health NHS Trust & Anor v Mr K & Ors [2023] EWCOP 35 (15 August 2023)

The person at the centre of the hearing I watched (Mr K) has chronic ulcers on both his legs. Medical professionals want to examine them and assess what treatment is needed.  Mr K is refusing to permit this. He has a long history of mental health challenges, going back at least to 2007, and he was diagnosed with severe ischaemic cardiomyopathy (heart failure) in 2014.  Previous medical opinion is that because of Mr K’s heart problems, it would be too risky to use physical restraint, or chemical restraint, to compel him to submit to examination or treatment against his wishes. 

I am a third-year law student at the University of York and I’m intending to go into Clinical Negligence as a barrister. I have always intended to go into the legal profession: its competitive nature and challenging environment are two of the many aspects that drive me towards the profession with the aim of pushing myself to achieve my best. I have always found healthcare law, which takes something so subjective and personal, such as a patient’s mental or physical health, and attempts to turn it into an objective matter and problem for barristers to debate over, and judges to determine, incredibly fascinating. And I feel that being a barrister, rather than a solicitor, gives me the best chance to make an impact on the decision-making process revolving around these patients and individuals. Although I’ve witnessed a variety of in-person and remote court hearings before, such as criminal trials in my local Magistrates Court, this was my first COP hearing and I found it highly intriguing.

I was keen to gain some real-world experience with health-related court cases, so contacted the Open Justice Court of Protection Project hoping to gain access to a medical treatment case. 

Transparency 

With the support of Celia Kitzinger, who was observing the same hearing, I sent an email to the Royal Courts of Justice staff, requesting access to observe the 3:00 pm hearing (COP 13043376) before Mr J McKendrick KC sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice on Friday 11 August 2023, remotely via MS Teams. 

I didn’t get a reply from the RCJ email address, but I forwarded my email to Celia who forwarded it on to a Video Hearing Administrator, who responded promptly by sending me the link. 

I’m not sure I would have gained access without the support of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project – either in terms of knowing how to go about finding a hearing to observe, or getting the link. The Open Justice Court of Protection Project allows aspiring barristers like myself the opportunity to observe and report on issues that I would never have had the opportunity to see without their help. Their dedication to the access of justice for all individuals, and their commitment to ensuring justice is open for all to observe, is something I am hugely impressed by.

There was an introductory summary at the beginning of the hearing which was hugely helpful to someone like myself, where this was my first encounter with the case, despite there having been multiple hearings in the past few weeks. It is now clear to me why the former Vice President of the Court of Protection, Mr Justice Hayden, placed such an emphasis on the importance of these introductory summaries, as they clearly do ‘help to place the identified issues in some context’, which he hoped they would. 

I have not been sent a Transparency Order for this hearing. One of the lawyers explained that there was a ‘standard’ Transparency Order (TO) in place – but as this was my first Court of Protection hearing I had no idea what this meant until Celia sent me a link to the ‘standard’ template. Although the judge mentioned that the standard TO allows for public bodies to be named, but not clinicians, upon further research and looking at this TO myself, I found that the anonymity surrounding COP cases and other healthcare law matters differed hugely from my experience of criminal trials. 

The person at the heart of COP hearings is someone who is deemed to have some “impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain” (§2(1) Mental Capacity Act 2005) and it’s usual for their identity to be protected.  My research led me to the highly interesting criminal case of R (on the application of C) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016], where the court considered whether to grant anonymity to a mentally ill man convicted of murder. This case highlighted the importance that courts place on ensuring the reintegration of the mentally ill back into society, placing a large emphasis on the possibility that a lack of anonymity may result in the jeopardising of a person’s treatment, even where they have committed a crime. Therefore, from the unjust potential undoing of any treatment of a patient at the heart of healthcare cases, it is clear to see why so many are anonymised where most criminal cases are not, and the need for such anonymity within the Court of Protection. 

The barristers

The applicants, represented by Arianna Kelly of 39 Essex Chambers, were Barnet Enfield and Haringey Mental Health Trust and North Middlesex University Hospital NHS Trust.

The first respondent, represented (via his litigation friend the Official Solicitor) by Simon Cridland of Serjeants’ Inn Chambers, was the person at the centre of the case, Mr K. 

The second respondent, represented by Chiara Cordone of 39 Essex Chambers, was the London Borough of Enfield. I found via Google that Ms Cordone is a member of Freebar, a network dedicated to the inclusion and support of LGBTQ+ people within the legal community, which I find both an incredible and much-needed project within our current society.

The third respondent (also represented by Arianna Kelly) was the Hospital Trust. 

What was the hearing about – and what did the judge decide?

This was an application from two Trusts to find a way of assessing –  and subsequently treating – the long-standing ulcers  on Mr K’s legs. There was medical evidence that both legs might need to be amputated to save his life, in a worst case scenario.

Proceedings concerning Mr K go back a long time. 

In 2016 he was detained under section 2 of the Mental Health Act 1983, and prescribed antipsychotic medicine.

At some stage he was admitted into hospital and it would appear lived in hospital from around 2017 until he was discharged to B Home in March 2023, after Court of Protection proceedings, and with a standard authorisation in place depriving him of his liberty. 

However, once in the care home, “he spent almost all of his time in his room alone, declined any intervention from professionals and is not attending to his personal hygiene”.  

In July 2023 it was noted: “There are significant concerns regarding Mr K’s physical health, in particular the state of his leg ulcers which are reported to be in a concerning malodorous state” (§20 judgment)

On the 10th of July the applicants’ solicitor issued an application for an order to convey Mr K to hospital and for his ulcers to be treated.  The judge quotes from the grounds for the application.

Mr K is subject to a standard authorisation in a care home following five years spent in a mental health facility in which he was not detained but which he refused to leave. He suffers from persistent delusions and paranoia and refuses to engage with professionals. He has a long-standing heart condition which makes any treatment against his will extremely difficult to carry out. Previous orders of the Vice President Theis J have authorised his successful conveyance from hospital to a care home with provision for physical and chemical restraint – neither of which was in fact required. Mr K has longstanding leg ulcers which he has previously treated himself. He refuses to allow staff or other medical professionals to assist him or assess them. Staff at his care home are now concerned, however, that the wounds are foul smelling and may be demonstrative of significant infection: one staff member reports vomiting at the smell and seeing “bone” when dressings were removed. In light of the seriousness of the issues, reallocation to a Tier 3 Judge is considered necessary and appropriate.”

The key issue before the Tier 3 judge, Mr. J McKendrick KC,  is about the best way to assess Mr K’s potential health issues. 

Determining capacity

If Mr K has capacity to make his own decisions about his medical treatment, then his decision to refuse to allow professionals to inspect his leg ulcers is final. The court cannot order assessment or treatment of a person with capacity to refuse it.  

A person can only be deemed to lack capacity if they are unable to understand, retain, weigh or communicate information relevant to the decision that needs to be made, and if that lack of capacity is caused by an impairment in the functioning of their mind or brain. 

Both jointly instructed expert in old-age psychiatry and Mr K’s treating psychiatrist have given evidence that Mr K lacks capacity to make decisions about his treatment due to a delusional disorder or a severe (paranoid) personality disorder 

In determining P’s capacity, Mr. J McKendrick stated:

I am satisfied applying the statutory principles set out in section 3 of the 2005 Act that there is reason to believe that Mr K is unable to make decisions about the treatment options. I accept the written evidence of Dr M following his recent assessment that Mr K is unable to weigh the relevant information in respect of the treatment for his ulcers. This is largely because of his paranoid preoccupations and obsessions. Mr K is reported to be screaming at night in pain, yet will not permit a tissue viability nurse to assess his malodorous wounds. All the evidence points to there being reasons to believe he cannot make a decision for the purposes of section 3.” (§68 judgment)

He concluded, therefore, that “The court accordingly has jurisdiction to consider where Mr K’s best interests lie.” (§70)

Determining best interests

When a person is deemed to lack capacity to make a decision, the court must make it in their best interests.  A ‘best interests’ decision is not the same as the decision the person wants to make for themselves.  Here it is clear that Mr K does not want his legs to be assessed by professionals, but the judge made a decision that they should be assessed.

Doing nothing and allowing Mr K to go on in pain was, the judge said, “inhumane”. But taking Mr K  to hospital under sedation was too much of a risk for his physical health.  Therefore, the only option left to the court was to assess his leg ulcers in the residential home where he currently lives.

On 11th August 2023  (between court hearings) an overnight team of clinicians put together a care plan for his assessment. The judge notes that “They are much under pressure anyway, but particularly so as a result of the junior doctors’ strike. The clinical team trying to treat Mr K are operating in the most demanding of circumstances and have the court’s admiration and gratitude”. (§75, Judgment)

The plan contains detailed information how Mr K will be assessed by the vascular team, supported by others.  It is proposed to use very short-term chemical and physical restraint (if necessary) to ensure Mr K can be properly assessed, without causing the risks to his cardiac system or physical health that would arise out of longer-term restraint in an ambulance or in a long-term setting. This might include covert chemical restraint.

The judge said, “I am proceeding on the basis that Mr K doesn’t welcome this plan, and his wishes and feelings are against it, but we cannot permit further delay and it is overwhelmingly in his best interests”.

It is always uncomfortable to be in a situation where people are treated against their stated wishes – and even against their physical resistance.

One interesting feature of the hearing is that Mr K has what the judge described as “a strange view of authority”. Apparently, he is much impressed by the authority of the court, towards whom he displays “a degree of deference and respect, if I may put it that way”.  The judge suggested that “it may be that Mr K seeing the court order, and maybe a short letter from the judge saying, ‘I ask you to cooperate’ would be useful.  It might help to focus on his understanding why all of this is necessary and how worried we all are about him”.

Reflections

Considering I only observed the penultimate of many hearing, reading the judgment for context was incredibly helpful for gaining insight into the case. However, actually watching the hearing, live, in real time, and being able to listen to the barristers talk about the issues concerned gave the final outcome in the judgment lots more meaning and understanding than I am accustomed to when studying law and reading judgments for research purposes. 

Watching the advocacy skills of these established barristers and observing how a judge interacts with barristers, especially compared to my experience only with mooting which can be quite scary and harsh compared to this reality, was very insightful, and has given me more confidence that I will be able to go on and advocate in front of a judge with the same amount of skill and confidence as those within this case. Of course, one of the key differences in this case is that the Court of Protection is an inquisitorial – rather than adversarial – court, and the way that the barristers and everyone else were working together in the best interests for Mr K was very apparent.

This experience has been incredibly useful in giving me insight into the court – not only as to how barristers and judges interact and advocate in the Court of Protection, but also in  displaying the practical implications associated with a lack of capacity under the Mental Capacity Act 2005.  To see how deeply decisions about mental capacity can impact a patient’s life and the decisions that are made on their behalf was just eye-opening. 

The final hearing on Friday 18th August 2023 is to determine the way forward in Mr K’s best interests in the light of the assessment that this hearing authorised – and the further expert evidence that will be prepared for that hearing.

I would highly encourage law students to observe this hearing tomorrow  – and other hearings in the Court of Protection.  It is a great opportunity to see how the provisions and materials we learn about in our studies really affect people in a court of law.

George Palmer is a third-year University of York Law student and aspiring Clinical Negligence barrister. He hopes to commence Pupillage in 2025 and one day become a leading barrister in his chosen field.

Is he deprived of his liberty? (Plus a request to vary the reporting restrictions – again)

By Celia Kitzinger, 15 August 2023

This is an unusual  s.21A challenge to the authorisation of Mr P’s deprivation of liberty.

The only issue for determination is whether or not Mr P is actually “deprived of his liberty”.

If he is, one of the key safeguards of DoLS is that he will continue to be entitled to non-means tested legal aid. If not, he will lose that safeguard, including his legal representation, as he doesn’t qualify for means-tested public funding.

Background

The case (COP 14094320) was heard remotely by District Judge Bell, sitting in Leeds Combined Court on 7 July 2023.  Lawyers were in court to represent Mr P (Neil Allen), Leeds City Council (Sara Townend), and – newly joined to the case – the Integrated Care Board (Ben Troke).

About a year ago Mr P suffered a severe cardiac arrest – completely “out of the blue”.  He is in his forties. His wife gave him cardio-pulmonary resuscitation and an ambulance was called. He had six shocks and return of spontaneous circulation was achieved after a downtime of 29 minutes. He was admitted to hospital and diagnosed with a resulting brain injury. 

Since Mr P’s discharge from hospital, the Integrated Care Board (ICB) has commissioned a place for him in a care home for neurorehabilitation. 

Two standard authorisations for his deprivation of liberty have been granted, most recently on 1 June 2023. Leeds County Council is the named supervisory body  for the purposes of these two standard authorisations.

Mr P is now spending weekends with his mother, but living at the care home 9am – 4pm for four days a week. This is a shared care arrangement, with a view to him transitioning to live with his mother once rehabilitation is complete.  (His wife has started divorce proceedings.) 

The question raised by the Local Authority as a supervisory body was whether Mr P is still deprived of his liberty, and if so whether that should be authorised by them, or whether the court should authorise the arrangements in their entirety.  

What does “deprivation of liberty” mean?

When considering if a person’s care arrangements amount to a deprivation of liberty, the case of Storck v Germany (2005) 43 EHRR 96  established that there are three broad components to consider: 

(a) the objective component of confinement in a particular restricted place for a not negligible length of time; 

(b) the subjective component of lack of valid consent; and 

(c) the attribution of responsibility to the state. 

In P v Cheshire West and Cheshire Council [2014] UKSC19, the question of what amounts to a deprivation of liberty was considered further.  Lady Hale described an “acid test”, setting out that a person is said to be deprived of their liberty if they are subject to “continuous supervision and control” and are “not free to leave” (§54). Lady Hale also held that “we should err on the side of caution in deciding what constitutes a deprivation of liberty” because of the vulnerability of the people involved.

Is Mr P deprived of his liberty?

On behalf of Mr P,  Neil Allen (via his litigation friend, Accredited Legal Representative, Alison Kaye) takes the position that Mr P’s care arrangements constitute a deprivation of liberty because:

  • The unit doors are locked
  • Mr P has constant staff support in place and cannot leave the unit apart from arranged overnight periods during the week and “weekend leave” with his mother, as he is vulnerable to possible harm and exploitation of others
  • Others have decided that he is permitted to spend overnights and weekends at his mother’s home
  • He is required to return to the care home for four days per week between 9am and 4pm
  • If he did not return for a long time, the police would be involved to bring him back to the care home
  • The care home continues to be fully funded so that, if necessary, Mr P can be required to return to spend overnights and weekends there
  • Staff support and prompt Mr P with activities of daily living and assist him with managing his behaviours and activities.
  • Staff manage and administer medications in his best interests
  • Staff monitor his condition throughout daily activities and record this
  • He is not free to leave to live where he wants and has, on occasion, been returned by the police.
  • He is not able to manage his own finances.

I think (but don’t know for sure) that Leeds County Council (LCC) must previously have considered that Mr P was not deprived of his liberty.  I think this because the judge made reference to their “current position” (implying a different earlier position) and Neil Allen (for Mr P) said in response that he was “breathing a sigh of relief” – which also suggests that LCC has shifted their position towards his own.  The position statement from LCC doesn’t make reference to any change in their position but simply states that  – erring on the side of caution –  it may be considered that the care arrangements for Mr P do amount to a deprivation of his liberty.  The evidence cited for this position is that Mr P is prevented from leaving the placement between 9am and 4pm, and when he is not present in the placement he is under the supervision of his family at all times. He is deemed to lack capacity to consent to these arrangements (due to his brain injury) and the care arrangements are the responsibility of the state, given that the care plan is commissioned and reviewed by the ICB. 

Parking the “deprivation of liberty” issue

Both parties were content, now, to “park” the question of whether Mr P is properly described as “deprived of his liberty” (and if he is, how that should be authorised) for a next hearing.  Counsel for P said “this may fall away as an issue if and when he is discharged from the care home in September”. 

The judge said she was not in a position to decide today whether or not Mr P was deprived of his liberty, and discussion shifted to other matters.

There are questions about where Mr P is “ordinarily resident”, a need to assess his eligible needs under the Care Act, and arrangements are required for Mr P to meet the judge – face-to-face, as he would prefer.  

The date of the next hearing was set for 2.00pm on 11 October 2023 for two hours. The hope is that, by then, Mr P will be living full-time with his mother and this “might be a final hearing if everything goes according to plan”.

And finally….. Varying the Transparency Order

This was yet another case in which the Transparency Order had been drawn up specifically to prohibit reporting of the name of the Local Authority (Leeds County Council)  in this case (but not the name of the ICB).  

As soon as I received the Transparency Order I checked §6 and found this:

(6) The material and information (the Information) covered by this Injunction is:

      (i) any material or information that identifies or is likely to identify that:

           (a) P is the subject of these proceedings (and therefore a P as identified in the Court of 

                 Protection Rules 2017) or that

            (b) any person is a member of the family of the subject of these proceedings (namely 

                  P), or that 

             (c )  A Local Authority is a party to these proceedings, or that

             (d)  any material or information that identifies or is likely to identify where any 

                    person listed above lives, or is being cared for, or their contact details.

This paragraph is a poorly edited version of the standard template (§ (6)(i)(d) above makes no sense and should have been (6) (ii)). But the key problem is (6)(i)(c) which prevents reporting the name of the Local Authority (or apparently even the fact that there is a Local Authority as a party to these proceedings, though this cannot have been the intention!).

This was an unusual case insofar as I’d been sent the Transparency Order in advance of the hearing (at 9.57am, along with the video-link from the court administrative officer).  The hearing was listed to start at 11.00am, though in the event it didn’t begin until 11.47am: the judge said she’d been “double-listed, and then I was not able to join the link”).  

At 10.35am, I sent this email to the CoP-Leeds email address from which I’d received the Transparency Order and the video-link.

Celia Kitzinger is co-director of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project. She has observed more than 460 hearings since May 2020 and written more than 100 blog posts. She is on LinkedIn (here), and tweets @KitzingerCelia

Varying reporting restrictions to name Kent County Council in “shocking” delay case

By Celia Kitzinger, 11 August 2023

Kent County Council was criticised in court for misunderstanding the law and creating lengthy delays for a care home patient who wants to move to a different care home closer to his family[1]

Mrs Justice Theis, Vice President of the Court of Protection, said in the course of a hearing on 5 July 2023 that the delay had been “shocking” and that she felt “despair” about the way the case had been handled.

Mr N, who has schizoaffective disorder, has been in the care home for nearly three years, since being discharged from hospital. He issued an application (via his litigation friend the Official Solicitor) challenging his deprivation of liberty in November 2022.

Article 5(4) of the Human Rights Act states that: “Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful”.

But nothing has been happening “speedily” in this case.

The judge said: “It’s shocking, frankly. Here we are 8 months later, effectively having the first hearing”.

What did Kent County Council do to contribute to delay?

Until shortly before the hearing, Kent County Council (KCC) said  – wrongly – that the Court of Protection couldn’t make any decisions about Mr N because the court had no jurisdiction.  

The KCC said that because Mr N is a ‘restricted’ patient (under s.37 and s.41 Mental Health Act), the application should have been made instead to a Mental Health Tribunal. 

The lawyer for Mr N (Bridget Dolan) said: “KCC’s position on jurisdiction is quite simply untenable, with no basis in law”. She also said that KCC had “misunderstood” some of the facts of the case and that, as a result, the application had gone “horribly awry”. 

Kent County Council seems to have recognised, at the eleventh hour, that they had got this wrong.  Shortly before the hearing they accepted that the Court of Protection does have jurisdiction and can make a decision about where it is in Mr N’s best interests to live.  

Bridget Dolan (for Mr N) explained that “At the pre-hearing Round Table Meeting, we put to KCC that we considered [their application] misplaced. It has now been withdrawn.  KCC accepts that the court does have jurisdiction… The issue of the jurisdiction of the court has now fallen away completely.  

When Ms Dolan explained this to the judge in court, that was the closest I’ve ever got to seeing a judge roll her eyes, displaying apparent exasperation.

The judge identified other causes of delay in this case. A  hearing listed for March 2023 never happened – the judge later said “there are lessons to be learnt about vacating hearings in such a vague and incoherent way”. There was a delay in transferring the case up to a Tier 3 judge because there was no fixed date for a hearing (only “first open date after …”).  And because Mr N says that he has capacity to make his own decisions about residence, an expert witness was needed in addition to the s.49 report – an expert had been identified, but the capacity assessment had not been progressed, since it might not have been needed if KCC was right about the jurisdictional issue – and the expert was now unavailable for a month).  Overall, “the effect of KCC’s application to dismiss proceedings was everything was put on hold” (Official Solicitor). 

According to the Official Solicitor (acting for Mr N), progress was “delayed for many months by KCC’s application for dismissal”. Her position is that the delay is “a breach of Mr N’s procedural right under Article 5(4) to a speedy determination of the lawfulness of his continued detention. That delay may well now sound in damages once KCC’s application is dismissed[2]

The judge will hear this case again in October 2023, after an expert report on Mr N’s capacity has been obtained. Mrs Justice Theis has decided to reserve it to herself “so that I can understand how this delay has come about.  It is not a good reflection on the system that a challenge was made in November 2022 and here we are in July 2023 without a determination and with a three-month delay”.

Naming Kent County Council

It’s in the public interest to know that a public body has acted in this way.  People who pay their council tax to fund Kent County Council have a right to know when it is subject to criticism in a public courtroom.  Generally, there is no prohibition on naming public bodies when we report on Court of Protection hearings.

But in this case, it turned out that publishing information about the identity of the County Council was prohibited under the terms of the Transparency Order.

I didn’t know this when I was watching the hearing, and I wasn’t sent the Transparency Order until after the hearing had finished.

What is a Transparency Order?

The Transparency Order is an Injunction (a court order) telling us what we are not allowed to tell anyone about a case in the Court of Protection.

If we disobey, we may – as it says in bold on the face of the order – be found guilty of contempt of court and may be sent to prison, fined, or have our assets seized.  

There is a standard template for Transparency Orders in the Court of Protection and §6 covers the “subject matter of the injunction” i.e. the things that cannot be publicly reported.  The main restriction relates to the identity of P (the person at the centre of the case) and their family.  Paragraph 6 of the template forbids us from revealing:

The form of the standard order in this case reads as follows:

The standard template also says (at §10) that anyone affected by the order (which includes observers) can ask for the order to be varied or discharged.

Asking to vary a Transparency Order (in court)

The most straightforward and time-efficient way for observers to raise concerns about the reporting restrictions imposed upon us in Court of Protection hearings is when we are in court during the hearing.  

I’ve done this dozens of times and it’s usually been resolved within two or three minutes.  

It generally runs off something like this:

Judge: Have you seen and understood the Transparency Order?

Celia:  Yes, but I’d like to ask for it to be varied. It’s not clear to me why the (Local Authority/Trust/ICB/Health Board) is included in paragraph (6) in the list of information that we’re not allowed to make public. This is a public body, paid for with our taxes, and should be publicly accountable for its actions.  In terms of the Article 8 (privacy) and Article 10 (right to freedom of information) balance, is there an argument that revealing the name of the public body makes it likely that P could be identified? 

Judge:  (after short faff while everyone locates the Transparency Order and the relevant paragraph) Can I have counsels’ views on this.

Counsel for P, public body and other counsel:  (all looking at Transparency Order as if they’ve never seen it before) There’s no reason to protect the identity of the public body. Publication of the identity of the public body will not realistically lead to identification of P.

Judge: In that case I will vary the Transparency Order.

That didn’t happen in this case because I didn’t have the Transparency Order until after the hearing was finished, so I didn’t know that there was a reporting restriction covering Kent County Council. 

I had asked counsel for the Transparency Order (and their Position Statements) via email while we were all on the video-platform waiting for the hearing to begin.  It was due to start at 10.30am but was delayed (until 11.14am) due to “technical difficulties” with an earlier hearing.  Before the hearing started,  I emailed my requests to the barristers I could see on screen – at 10.51am (Bridget Dolan), 11.02 (Steven Broach) and 11.05 (Michael Paget). 

Virtually the first thing the judge said on joining the platform was that there was a Transparency Order in place which “prevents anybody from naming or identifying the person who is the subject of the proceedings, directly or indirectly”.  She did not mention any prohibition on naming Kent County Council, nor did she direct that the Transparency Order should be sent to observers.  Instead, she said, “if anybody who has joined the hearing would like to see the Transparency Order, they can ask the court for it”.  The hearing ended at 12.25pm and the Transparency Order was sent to me more than three hours later (at 3.43pm).  

So, it was only much later that day, after the hearing was finished, that I realised I was prohibited from naming Kent County Council.

Asking to vary the Transparency Order after the hearing is finished

The delay in sending me the Transparency Order meant a much more cumbersome and time-consuming process both for me and for the lawyers and judges when I decided it was necessary to ask for the Transparency Order to be varied. 

Here’s what happened next.

Wednesday 5th July 2023 (the day of the hearing)

I sent an email to Mrs Justice Theis (via her clerk) at 8.17pm.

Thursday, 6 July 2023

8.16am: Mrs Justice Theis (via her clerk) asked for representations from counsel. The judge’s clerk copied me into an email asking the Official Solicitor and Kent County Council to provide written responses to my request for the Transparency Order to be varied  by 11am that day.

10.09am: The Official Solicitor said she supports the principle of transparency in respect of these proceedings and perceives no realistic risk of jigsaw identification of Mr N should the local authority be identified in this case. The OS therefore raised no objection to my application to identify Kent County Council as the relevant local authority. 

11.57am: Kent County Council has not responded and the matter is passed to a different judge. We were sent an email from Mr Justice Poole’s clerk explaining that Mrs Justice Theis was no longer available to deal with this matter so Poole J would deal with it instead.

Friday 7 July 2023

10.20am: The solicitor acting for Kent County Council says she is urgently seeking instruction and says she’ll provide a response by the end of the day. (She doesn’t.) 

Monday 10 July 2023

2.14pm I email the judge’s clerk to request a decision from Poole J

2.26pm: The solicitor acting for KCC emails to say that KCC do not raise any objections to being identified as the relevant local authority.

2.44pm: I email Poole J’s clerk: “Further to the email […] saying that KCC do not raise any objections to being identified as the relevant local authority, I assume that Poole J will now make an order to vary the TO to permit this?”

Tuesday 11 July 2023

11.10am An email from Poole J’s clerk informs me that an order is now being drawn up to permit the naming of Kent County Council as respondent to the proceedings.

12.33pm: I receives an order which says:

 “UPON receiving an application by Professor Celia Kitzinger of the Open Justice Project  [sic] to be permitted to name Kent County Council as Respondent to the proceedings

AND UPON the Court determining that there should be no restriction on reporting the name of Kent County Council as Respondent to the proceedings

By consent of the parties

IT IS ORDERED THAT

1. The Transparency Order dated 4 November 2022 shall be varies (sic) as follows:

     (i) Paragraph 6(c ) shall be deleted.

     (ii) There shall be added as paragraph 9(1)(f), “naming Kent County Council as Respondent”

So, the deleted paragraph is the paragraph that says I’m not allowed to identify Kent County Council as a party to the proceedings.  And the new paragraph that has been added is under a heading that reads: “What the Injunction does not prevent people from doing and does not apply to”.  So it means that the injunction now does NOT prevent me from naming Kent County Council.

Reflections and outcome

This was all quite a palaver – especially compared to the straightforward way in which this issue can be dealt with in court if the Transparency Order is made available to observers in a timely manner.

If I’d had the Transparency Order during the hearing on the morning of 5th July, I’d have been able to request the variation at that point, and would have been able to write a blog post or tweet or any other kind of public report naming Kent County Council in connection with this case on the same day.  Instead, I had to wait nearly a week –  until the afternoon of Tuesday 11 July 2023.

Because I wasn’t able to ask for a variation in the order until after the hearing was finished, my request involved a fair number of busy people in a lot of extra work, as well as causing a delay in the implementation of open justice.

It is testimony to the commitment of lawyers and judges in the Court of Protection that at no point did anyone say – or even hint –  that I was being a nuisance or that my request was unwelcome.  

And at a subsequent hearing before Mrs Justice Theis a few weeks later (COP 14081834, 1 August 2023), I was pleased to hear her say: “If anybody needs a copy of the Transparency Order, they should contact the court immediately, or if there are any queries once they have seen it”.   Of course, most people don’t know how to “contact the court” (emails to the RCJ court staff or to video-hearing administrators rarely work for obtaining Transparency Orders).  I emailed one of the barristers, Leonie Hirst, and received the Transparency Order at 11.07am, i.e. around half an hour into the hearing.  At 11.12am, I emailed counsel and the judge’s clerk:

Please could it be brought to the attention of the judge that I would like to propose a variation to the TO which currently protects the identity of the Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals Foundation Trust, which is a public body. It’s unusual for us to be required to conceal the  identity of public bodies – paid for by our taxes and publicly accountable for their actions.  I note the TO does not explicitly cover Newcastle City Council.  Is there any real likelihood that identifying the Trust will lead to identification of P? If not (and on my understanding of the case it seems unlikely) then I would like to request this variation please.”

The judge dealt with my request at 11.44am, during a pause in the substantive proceedings during which one of the witnesses, P’s lead support worker,  had been asked to log off to read an attendance note which (it seems) should have been sent to him and had not.  The judge asked counsel whether there were any “compelling reasons” for preventing me from naming the Trust (or the City Council) and was told there were none. She then immediately asked for a revised version of the Transparency Order to be sent to her to reflect that.  That felt much more proportionate!  

The question remains, of course, as to how it is that these Transparency Orders are being drafted, and signed off by judges, in such a way as to ban the naming of public bodies – when in my experience there is rarely any good reason for this, and requests for variations are regularly granted unproblematically.

By including the names of public bodies as the subject matter of an injunction against us, the Court of Protection limits transparency – often, it seems, for no good reason.  It’s frustrating for me to receive blog posts from people who’ve observed hearings I haven’t attended and to see, when I ask for their Transparency Orders, that they prevent publication of the names of public bodies in quite “routine” cases.  In many (most) cases, I strongly suspect that if I’d been in that hearing and asked for that Transparency Order to be varied, it would have been. But, of course, it’s not fair to expect people (often students) observing their first COP hearings, to know that this is something to raise with the judge – or indeed to expect them to know how to go about doing that. Few observers (even journalists!) have the confidence and skills to raise questions about Transparency Orders.

I would like to see the lawyers who draft Transparency Orders and the judges who sign them take responsibility for checking that they’re compliant with the court’s Article 8 and Article 10 obligations, i.e. that they represent a considered balance between respect for P’s privacy and the right of the public to freedom of information.  

It’s very rarely the case that knowing the name of a public body will lead to identification of P, or P’s family.  

There’s an important general principle that we should be able to hold public bodies to account – especially in cases like the one reported here.

The presence of public observers in the courtroom is not enough, in and of itself, to deliver on the judicial commitment to transparency if we’re banned from reporting the names of public bodies for no discernible reason.  

Postscript

For an update on this case, and the judge’s decision in the substantive matter of Mr N’s deprivation of liberty, see the blog post about the October hearing of this case (“Another case of s.21A delay (with a happy ending)“which I also observed. Regarding the Transparency Order, in their Position Statement for the October hearing, the Official Solicitor records as follows (at §5):

“The order of Poole J made on 11 July 2023 varied the transparency order of 4 November 2022 to remove the prohibition on naming KCC as respondent (following an application by Professor Celia Kitzinger) [D80-81]. Regrettably, on review of the file by Mr N’s solicitors, it has come to light that this was an error on the template of the order filed with the initial application, and anonymisation of KCC should not therefore have been included in the order. This was not picked up by the parties until this was pointed out to the court. Mr N’s solicitors will ensure this is not repeated in any further cases.”

Celia Kitzinger is co-director of the Open Justice Court of Protection Project. She has observed more than 460 hearings since May 2020 and written more than 100 blog posts. She is on LinkedIn (here), and tweets @KitzingerCelia


[1] For another blog post about this same hearing, dealing with the substantive matter of the application, see A s.21A challenge for a ‘restricted’ patient: A “shocking” delay.

[2] Taken from the Official Solicitor’s Position Statement (4th July 2023).  The case law cited on this point is R (KB and Others) v Mental Health Review Tribunal and Secretary of State [2004] QB 936.